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Union Learning Representatives and the New Bargaining Agenda:

The Role of Unions in Workplace Training Initiatives

For MHRM 6700

By

MHRM Student

Introduction

In an unstable economic environment where some unions find themselves less able to bargain the significant wage increases and job security provisions that they were once able to secure, the international labour movement appears to have recognized the need for unions pursue more innovative, long-term solutions to the mounting problems they are facing in an increasingly knowledge-based economy (Stuart, 1996; Heyes & Stuart, 1998; Dundon & Eva, 1998). As employers continue to pursue business initiatives that maximize competitiveness and flexibility in volatile markets, the need for high-skilled workers has brought the issue of employee training to the forefront (Dundon & Eva, 1998). Throughout Western Europe and the United Kingdom in particular, the result has been a strong push from the labour movement for unions to begin negotiating agreements with employers whereby they can exercise some influence or control over workplace training. In the United Kingdom, legislation passed by the New Labour government in 2002 brought about a statutory requirement for employers to recognize the role of unions in employee training initiatives, through the formalization of the role of “union learning representatives”. Seven years following the introduction of this unique solution, researchers continue to question whether or not unions in the United Kingdom are able to involve themselves in employee training initiatives in any meaningful way. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the British model and to evaluate whether union representatives taking an active role in workplace learning initiatives adequately addresses the issues that unions hope to resolve.

Industrial Relations Theory and Training

An abundance of research has uncovered that British firms, in comparison to their German, French and Japanese competitors, tend to invest significantly less in employee training (Finegold & Soskice, cited by Dundon & Eva, 1998; Claydon & Green 1994). Having recognized the importance of training to remaining globally competitive, the British labour movement has become largely supportive of unions bargaining for increased investments in employee training (Stuart, 1996). In 1990, the British Trades Union Congress (TUC) published its strategic manifesto, Collective Bargaining Strategy for the 1990s, in which it called on unions to adopt a “new bargaining agenda”, a new, modernized approach to collective bargaining. This new strategic direction emphasized the need for unions to move away from “the traditional, often adversarial approach” to labour relations, and rather to embrace a more “constructive… developmental” approach to bargaining with employers on issues of mutual concern to both workers and employers (Trades Union Congress, cited by Claydon & Green, 1994, p. 41). Among the new, emerging issues on this “new bargaining agenda” was pursuing a more “integrative”, positive-sum approach to promoting training in workplaces (Heyes & Stuart, 2007, p. 459). Through joint union-management partnerships devoted to facilitating these training arrangements, employers would presumably benefit from increased worker productivity, brought about as a direct result of improved training outcomes (Claydon & Green 1994). At the same time, employees would benefit from learning new skills that improve their employability, making them better able to adapt to changing market conditions (Claydon & Green, 1994).

Industrial relations theorists have both supported and challenged the notion that union involvement can have a positive impact on training. In decentralized labour markets like Canada, the United States and (to a lesser extent) the United Kingdom, increased training tends to lead to increased wages (Green & Lemieux, 2006), and some theorists argue that because of this wage premium, employers are less able or willing to make investments in employee training (Claydon & Green, 1994; Hoque & Bacon, 2008). According to Becker’s human capital theory (cited by Hoque & Bacon, 2008), paying employees premium wages and making high investments in training is economically inefficient for the employer. Furthermore, Mincer (cited by Hoque & Bacon, 2008) argued that in unionized environments, employees may be less willing to undertake training to secure pay increases or promotional opportunities, because these benefits are typically tied to seniority. These arguments outline the reasons many theorists object to the notion that training is more successful in unionized settings than non-unionized ones.

Critics of this perspective, however, assert that there are many ways in which unionization creates an optimal setting in which to train employees. Firstly, as a counter to the notion that high training investments and wage premiums paid to unionized employees is economically inefficient, it has been argued that both of these factors lead to increased productivity, which enables the employer to earn a significant return on these investments (Booth & Chatterji, 1998). Also, given lower voluntary turnover rates in unionized workplaces, employers tend to have a longer time to achieve a return on training investments (Claydon & Green, 1994; Booth & Chatterji, 1998; Green & Lemieux, 2006). In unionized environments, well-trained workers are also compensated fairly for their skills and are not exploited or mistreated by employers (Claydon & Green, 1994). It has also been argued that the value of training in terms of its ability to increase employee morale, particularly in a unionized setting, is also deserving of consideration. Some have argued that in unionized workplaces, employees are provided with a “voice”, which enables them to lobby employers through the union to gain better access to training, or to improve the quality of training programs (Hoque & Bacon, 2008). It could be argued that through unionization, the recipients of training are better able to express their concerns to management through their representatives. Employers who engage unions in assessing an organization’s training needs, developing and delivering training programs, and providing employees with access to greater learning opportunities have the potential to reap the benefits of an engaged workforce. According to Leisink (cited by Stuart 1996), unions who pursue a more progressive bargaining agenda by focusing on training, lifelong learning, employee recognition and participation programs, will gain the support of the union membership, who, as a result of these improved working conditions, will become more productive. Therefore, as a result of these initiatives, both parties will benefit.

Some theorists, however, have rebuked the assumption that unions and employers can develop mutually beneficial training agreements without resorting to the zero-sum approach to bargaining that tends to characterize traditional bargaining (such as negotiations over wages increases and job security provisions, for example). Firstly, one argument forwarded by Stuart (1996), is that this “joint interest” approach to training (Claydon & Green, 1994, p. 38) understates the significance of the industrial relations context in which unions and management tend to function, noting that the success of any organizational change (such as a new training initiative) “will be shaped by the historical interplay of patterns of control and resistance, conflict and accommodation” (Stuart, 1996, p. 256). These sentiments are echoed by Munro and Rainbird (cited by Wallis et al, 2005), who state that “the workplace is a problematic site for learning… Rather than representing a neutral intervention, training must be viewed in the broader context of the employment relationship” (p. 287).

While in principle, the notion of unions and management collaborating with one-another for mutual gain ought to appeal to both parties, in reality, most relationships between employers and unions are characterized by conflict and resistance to change (Stuart, 1996). In most organizations, unions are typically not involved in training policy outside of the realm of normal bargaining, and thus instituting or formalizing a new role for unions would require employers to consent to changing how they adninister and implement training. In environments where training plays a crucial strategic role in a firm's ability to advance its business interests, management is likely to be hesitant to involve unions in matters that are typically considered to be at the discretion of management. To have management abdicate total control over training and create a participatpory role for unions in the decision-making process presents significant economic and political risks for the employer, who may fear that such changes could strengthen the influence of unions at the expense of management prerogative (Stuart, 1996). Employers may also be concerned that this would result in a “slippery slope” effect, and lead unions to demand that they be consulted or involved in other matters that were previously exclusively under the control of management (Claydon & Green, 1994, p. 42). At the same time, union supporters might argue that the nature of the union-employer relationships is evolving, and that a new approach to industrial relations whereby unions have a more participatory role is long overdue (Wallis et al, 2005). Given these issues, the success of such collaborative efforts would depend highly on the nature of the union-management relationship. For these reasons, some industrial relations theorists, including Stuart (1996), are skeptical about the success of joint union-management training partnerships.

Furthermore, as in any relationship based on opposing interests, while both unions and employers may agree that in principle, training is important to both firms and employees, there is likely to be enormous disagreement over the over-arching goals of joint management-union training programs (Leisink, cited by Stuart, 1996; Wallis et al, 2005). Unions’ approaches to training tend to be rooted in the ideals espoused by the broader labour movement. Unions tend to focus primarily on the more distributive aspects of training, such as securing equitable access to training for all union members, in order to prevent management from using training as a tool to propagate elitism in the workplace (Heyes, 2007). In some cases, unions may prioritize the provision of training programs to marginalized groups, including unskilled or immigrant workers (Hoque & Bacon, 2008). From the employer’s standpoint, where there is no economic incentive to undertake such measures, there is likely to be opposition to these approaches. For employers, training is a tool that ought to be used to maximize efficiency and overall organizational effectiveness, through the development of skills that lead to positive on-the-job performance outcomes.

A separate issue that needs to be resolved is what kind of training managers and employers agree should be provided. Typically, firms tend to prefer firm- or job-specific training, which can be applied immediately to one’s current position within the organization (Dundon & Eva, 1998). Unions, on the other hand, are more likely to promote generalized training, more based on the principles of “lifelong learning” and targeted to improve general employability (Wallis et al, 2005). Once again, the interests of unions and employers may be at odds, as employers are less likely to sponsor training that is of greater value to other organizations than one’s own.

One last issue that is of particular importance to this discussion is the question of what specific role unions should have in influencing training programs, policies and provisions. In theory, training, like any other issue, can be addressed through collective bargaining (Stuart, 1996). In settings where training issues generally do not make their way to the bargaining table, training has been addressed through formal or informal negotiated agreements with employers that often limit bargaining agent involvement (Stuart, 1996; Claydon & Green 1994). In recent decades in Western Europe and Britain, state intervention has played a crucial role in allowing unions to participate in discussions about employee training. Of particular interest is the British model, which will be discussed in the following section.

Union Learning Representatives in the United Kingdom

Since the 1980’s, the European labour movement in particular has been increasingly vocal about the need for governments to intervene and regulate workplace training (Perrett & Lucio, 2008). Throughout Europe and the U.K., the labour movement began to lobby governments for increased government regulation of Vocational and Educational Training (VET), and campaigned in favour of the establishment of government- standardized training requirements and nationally recognized vocational qualifications (Stuart, 1996; Dundon & Eva, 1998). In the early 1990’s, the European labour movement recognized that the promotion of training issues as an integral component of the “new unionism” movement (Forrester, 2001).

At the same time, in Britain, the labour movement's role in training policy initiatives at a national level was reduced dramatically, as a result of several changes to national labour relations policy introduced by the Thatcher Conservative government (Wallis et al, 2005; Stuart, 1996; Hoque & Bacon, 2008). In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the tripartite training institutions that existed to address training issues at a national level, such as the Manpower Services Commission and the Industrial Training Boards, were shut down, and replaced by employer-dominated bodies (called the Training and Enterprise Councils), in which unions had a very limited, nominal role (Stuart, 1996; Heyes & Stuart, 1998; Dundon & Eva, 1998). With the country suffering from the economic and political effects of a major recession and the near-collapse of certain industries including the manufacturing sector, union density and influence began its steady decline (Stuart, 1996; Claydon & Green, 1994). Unable to influence training policy at a national level, unions began to lobby for changes at a local level (Wallis et al, 2005). In the early 1990’s, the TUC’s “Bargaining for Skills” campaign called upon unions to attempt to set up joint union-management committees in local workplaces to discuss training issues (Claydon & Green 1994). While the ultimate goal was to formalize these committees in legislation the way that joint union-management health and safety committees were made a statutory requirement, without government support for such an initiative, these had to be established on a purely voluntary basis (Claydon & Green, 1994). The TUC continued to lobby the government for changes to the country’s regulation of VET, calling upon the government to establish nationally recognized training standards (Dundon & Eva, 1998; Forrester, 2001).

With the election of the pro-union New Labour government in 1997, the government began to introduce drastic changes to the country’s labour relations framework (Forrester, 2001). The importance of educating Britain’s workforce to remain globally competitive was reflected in a number of government initiaves, such as the establishment of the Union Learning Fund in 1998, which provided unions with access to funds to support union-driven skill development programs (Wallis et al, 2005). Large UK unions launched campaigns in support of training and development, including UNISON (the largest union in the UK), who launched a training initiative called Return to Learn (Wallis et al, 2005).

Towards the end of the 1990’s, the TUC began to promote the concept of union learning representatives in workplaces (Wallis et al, 2005). In the absence of any formal mechanism through which unions could directly control training provisions, the role allowed unions to engage their membership and increase interest in workplace learning among workers. The TUC undertook the task of training workplace representatives, whose responsibilities included “promoting the benefits of learning, giving “front line” advice and guidance, assessing learning needs, helping colleagues to attend courses, accessing funding for courses,” and other related duties (Cowen et al, cited by Forrester, 2001.)

In 2002, the passing of the amended Employment Act formalized the creation of union learning representatives in unionized workplaces across the United Kingdom (Wallis et al, 2005). Under section 43 of the Act, ULRs were provided with a statutory right to recognition and paid time off to perform duties related to “analyzing training needs, providing information and advice on training, arranging training, promoting the value of training, and consulting the employer over these activities” (Hoque & Bacon 2008, p. 703). The legislation was significant because it affirmed the notion that training is of considrable significance to sustaining the competitiveness of firms, and that the issue was so crucial that it necessitated state intervention (Wallis et al, 2005). It implies that in order for organizations to remain competitive internationally, there is a need to invest in the development of workers. Furthermore, the Act is an indication of the government’s recognition that unions have a legitimate, vital role to play in involving training (Wallis et al, 2005).

At the same time, the legislation has many weaknesses. Firstly, unlike the act to which it is most often compared, the Health and Safety at Work Act (introduced in 1972), the provisions in the Employment Act that address the rights of ULRs are not supported by any “broader regulatory and policy frameworks” (Wallis et al, 2005, p. 286). Health and safety legislation is backed by government regulations and enforcement mechanisms, administered by government bodies, which monitor compliance with the legislation and prescribe specific remedies for violations (Wallis et al, 2005). However, the legislation requiring employers to acknowledge the role of union learning representatives is limited to requiring employer recognition of the role. There is no statutory obligation placed upon employers to negotiate or consult with these representatives, or even to meet with them. Rather, they simply need to be provided with paid time off to perform the duties outlined under Section 43 of the Act. Whether or not the employer works with the ULR is the decision of management.

The second weakness of the Act is that fails to extend statutory rights to unions with respect to collective bargaining over training (Hoque & Bacon, 2008; Wallis et al, 2005). Collective bargaining is the most effective procedural mechanism available to unions in bringing about change at the local level, and yet prior to the passing of the Act, few unions were ever able to successfully bargain formalized training agreements with employers (Claydon & Green, 1994; Wallis et al, 2005). Given the government’s support for the labour movement’s learning agenda, it seemed strange that in the midst of passing the most significant changes to labour relations policy in recent years, that the government would stop short of giving unions the procedural mechanism needed to execute changes to workplace training policies. While unions do have more rights they did without the Act, the question that remains is whether or not these new statutory rights adequately address the concerns that brought about these changes in the first place.