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STATUS AND ROLES OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AT THE SUMMITS OF POLISH GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION
(BETWEEN PROFESSIONALISM, DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND POLITICAL CRONISM)
Witold Mikulowski PHD
W.M. Consulting INT.
Warsaw – Poland
1. Introduction
1.1 Senior public officials’ status and efficiency in the context of evolution of public administration paradigm
During last twenty years or so, we are observing in all modern democratic states a common trend of certain politicization of senior positions at the summits of public administration systems. This phenomenon is generally considered as one of characteristics of the passage from traditional Weberian model of politically neutral, formalistic and anonymous bureaucracy to more open, transparent and participative model of democratic governance and efficiency oriented, managerial administration. The changing paradigms of the public administration could not maintain untouched senior public officials status and identity. But, they are not necessarily modifying, profoundly and immediately their legal status, behaviour and attitudes. Generally, these paradigms are continuing to coexist in changing proportions, generating real or apparent contradictions. The most important are the following:
1. Professionalism, political neutrality, objectiveness and fairness of senior public officials are challenged by the imperatives of effectiveness and active engagement in the implementation of the policy decided by the governing political authorities;
2. Obligation of reserve, secrecy, anonymity and loyalty to their services and superiors are challenged, from one side by the principle of transparency, accountability and the duty to inform and assist public administration customers and clients (citizens and other members of civic society) and, from other side, the necessity to communicate, cooperate, exchange the information and opinions and coordinate the activities with other administrative structures and different partners in the civic society in search of positive synergy in policies implementation;
3. Principles of rule of law, legal legitimacy of any public activity and legal formality and respect of administrative procedures, are challenged by the necessity of creativity, flexibility and rapid adaptation to permanently changing conditions and constraints of economic and social environment in view to ensure effective and efficient policy implementation;
4. Public service ethos, public servants proud and psychological contract creating a specific public service culture, developed on the base of continuity and stability of public employment and merit based, lifelong carrier development, are challenged by more flexible recruitment and employment, necessary to ensure efficient and dynamic competency and knowledge-based human resource management.
All contemporary democratic public administration systems are permanently confronted with these contradictions and are searching more or less successfully the best way to overcome them effectively. These contradictions are much more complicated and difficult to overcome in transitional post-communist countries, which during communist era could not develop the legalistic model of classic Weberian bureaucracy and are confronted now with the necessity to build more modern administrative system based on the values of democratic governance and efficient managerial approach.
1.2 Political versus professional appointments at the summits of governmental administration in post-communist countries
Creation and development of democratic, professional and efficient civil service became very soon and still remain the key issues of administrative reform in post-communist countries. It appeared in practice as very difficult task. After more than one-and-half decade of transition, most of these countries are still searching a model of the civil service responding to the commonly recognized democratic values and modern professional standards, well fitting to their historical traditions, political culture and institutional specificity. On of the most difficult problems to solve are the limits between the senior positions to reserve for political appointees and those to reserve for professional, politically neutral civil servants.
In fact, after long communist practice of fully politicised public administration, the politicization of senior positions in governmental administration is a phenomenon immanent to the transitional process in all central and east European countries. This problem is particularly important at the summits of governmental administration. Do the Prime Minister and the members of the government need political cabinets? How big they should be? What are the selection criteria of their members? Are they, can or should be recruited among professional civil servants? What are their role, functions and relationships with professional civil servants occupying managerial and expert positions in permanent administrative structures? The solutions are varying from one post-communist country to another and they are fluctuating in each country following evolution of its political situation and changing governing coalitions. However, it seems that there is a common trend, in which we can distinguish three phases of evolution.
The first phase covers the development of a new legal framework creating the civil service inspired by one or, more often, a mixture of several civil service models of advanced democracies. The solutions adopted during this phase were privileging a carrier civil service status with limited number of highest positions in governmental superstructures (Prime Minister Office, Ministries, Offices of Central Administration or Agencies) reserved for political appointments. Henceforth, in conformity with general principles of any democratic state, civil servants were supposed to be politically neutral. Their external recruitment, integration into newly created civil service corps, internal promotion and appointment for senior managerial positions, were supposed to take into account only their formal qualifications, professional skills and experience.
The second phase covers the process of progressive implementation of this new legal framework. The new civil service legislations have included transitional measures ensuring continuity of public services and progressive implementation of the new system. Nevertheless, the implementation encountered a lot of difficulties and strong resistance of all succeeding governing coalitions, especially concerning the rules of appointment for politically sensitive superior managerial positions. The principles of new legislation were politically correct but an open, transparent and competitive recruitment was limiting the liberty of action of governing authorities in realisation of their short term partisan goals. Leftists, post-communist government could not easily integrate into the new civil service corps older generation of more trustful officials serving formerly under the communist regime but having difficulties to meet new qualification criteria. More rightist anticommunist governments could not easily eliminate or block the promotion of officials recruited or integrated by their predecessors and to replace them by more trustful, often better educated but less experienced young candidates. The coalition governments have had difficulties to ensure the influence and power sharing in the ministries allocated to different coalition partners. Paradoxically, with growing number of professional civil servants, successive governing coalitions were more often bypassing the new rules or delaying their application, appointing on senior public positions their political cronies. Practically all successive governments were progressively enlarging the number of arbitrary, political appointments at senior positions, limiting simultaneously the number and lowering the level of positions filled though open, transparent, merit based and competitive recruitments and promotions.
Currently, we are living the third phase of this development. The governing coalitions try to rationalise, justify and legalise their former legally and morally doubtful practices. They are softening the restrictions of recently adopted civil service legislation and openly enlarging the range of senior positions reserved for political, more or less arbitrary appointments. To justify these modifications they argue that the effective implementation of governmental policies requires trustworthy and loyal officials at senior executive positions, sharing the same political convictions. They refer also to recent trend in public administration theories and practice of certain well developed, mainly Anglo-Saxon countries, where the range of external appointments on contractual bases for senior executive positions is progressively enlarged. They forget that this new trend is justified there by the search for highly qualified, more independent and accountable professionals with private sector experience, rather than by their political filiations’ and personal trust.
1.3 Subject and scope of our investigations
The study aims to describe and analyse the phenomenon, signalled above, and its consequences for the efficient fulfilment of governing and administrative functions, in the case of Polish governmental superstructures.
We are focusing our investigation on senior staff and line positions in the Prime Minister Office (PM Chancellery in Poland), ministries and central agencies placed directly under the PM or other government member’s authority. We discuss more particularly the relationship between the mode of appointment for these positions in different superstructure’s organisational units and the professionalism and efficiency of their holders in execution of their tasks and functions.
The study begins with the analyses of these positions roles and functions. We are trying to clarify the rationality of their political status and professional profile of their holders. Are these positions, by their nature, mainly political or rather technical and politically neutral? How holders of these positions should be selected and appointed? What are respective advantages and inconveniences of political engagement and precarious situation of their holders in comparison with their political neutrality and tenure?
The core part of the study is consecrated to the Polish case. It begins with short presentation of the evolution of political and/or professional status of senior line and staff positions at the summits of governmental administration in relation with turbulent historical development of Polish civil service. It is followed by general presentation of development of Polish governmental superstructures, their organization and political or professional status of senior positions holders. The formal, legally based status of these positions is compared with some data concerning the profiles of their holders and their turn-over. We are trying to identify the main factors causing described situation and its consequences for efficient execution of their roles and functions.
In the conclusions we are trying to find out, how much the presented dysfunctions are contingent to the heritage of recent and/or older past of political and organisational culture, or rather to present internal and external factors like political, social and economic environment, and short banc of competent human resource available?
At the end we are formulating some hypotheses concerning prospects and conditions of necessary improvement of the professionalism and efficiency of superior positions holders in Polish governmental superstructures.
2. Political status and professional profiles of public officials at the summits of public administration in theory and practice of modern, democratic governance systems
2.1 Typical roles, functions and key superior positions in central government superstructures
We consider as governmental superstructures political authorities and organisations directly supporting their activities. It includes the head of the government (prime minister), government as collegial body (council of ministers) each of its members (ministries) and their direct political collaborators (vice-ministers, secretaries and under-secretaries of State). It includes also the heads of central governmental agencies and their offices.
Each of these political authorities is playing triple role: political, policymaking and administrative – managerial[1]. As one of the main actors of the political power game they are supporting the governing party (or coalition) and more particularly its political program. They are playing also a leading role in policymaking, which means the translation of political program orientations and priorities on concrete policies aiming the realisation of program goals and objectives. Finally, as the supreme administrative authorities, they are responsible for the implementation of governmental policies and good functioning of governmental machinery in conformity with the constitutional order. All these roles are complementary, interrelated and interdependent, and their frontiers are often confused and difficult to draw (Claisse&Meininger; 1994:141). However, each role and function has its specificity and its efficient execution requires well adapted organisational arrangements and adequate in number and competent human resources.
The typical governmental superstructure is generally composed of:
1) Political and administrative highest authority (Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister, in certain countries, also Head of Central Agency)
2) Subordinated political authorities - members of political management (vice-minister, secretary and undersecretary of state)
3) Political cabinets (head of political cabinet, advisors and assistants)
4) PR, press and communication unit (spokesmen, PR and communication specialists)
5) General administration and logistic support units (director or secretary general, HRM, Finance, IT, transport, maintenance, etc…)
6) Substantive line departments (directors, deputy directors, technical advisors, experts specialists)
7) Control and/or auditing units (auditors and controllers)
8) Strategic research and planning units (team of experts)
9) Legal and legistic support units (lawyers)
10) Special advisory, consultative and/or coordinating bodies (highly competent personalities and representatives of internal and external environment).
Each element of governmental superstructure needs staff of senior officials whose political status and competences should fit to its specific role and function.
2.2 Status and professional profile of senior officials executing different functions of central government superstructure
a) Political functions:
The most important political functions are situated at the level of the Prime Minister Office. They are particularly important and complicated in the case of coalition governments and cohabitation with the President coming from politically opposite camp. These functions are generally assumed by the members of PMO political management and political cabinets. The PMO political management is headed by a minister who can be Cabinet member and is usually composed of one or more secretaries and under-secretaries of State including PM spokesman and head of PM Political Cabinet.
The members of PMO political management are responsible for different sectors of government administration, represent the Government in the Parliament, act on behalf of PM and supervise the activities of different PMO substantive departments. They are political appointees and generally leave their position with the PM. Each of them is responsible for the functions assigned by the PM and are cooperating closely with his/her political cabinet.
The Head of PMO is managing the PMO substantive and administrative support departments. He or she performs also the co-ordinating functions of the substantive departments in different ministries.
The PM Political Cabinet is generally headed by a Cabinet Chief or Director who is also coordinating all other political cabinets. The main functions of PM Political Cabinet include:
- providing the PM and other members of PMO management with all necessary and useful information