Science and Pseudoscience

Imre Lakatos

Overview

Imre Lakatos gave a radio address in 1973 on the question of science versus pseudoscience. The selected article was the basis for that address. In the address he responds to the demarcation proposals of both Sir Karl Popper (see Science: Conjectures and Refutations) and Thomas Kuhn (see Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?).

The first half of his address discusses earlier attempts, including those by Popper and Kuhn, to distinguish between science and pseudoscience. Lakatos explores the relationship between theory and fact (or between law and fact) and he explores (and rejects) various attempts to use that relationship as a guide to proper science. He considers probabilism as a way to make the distinction between science and pseudoscience, and unsurprisingly, he rejects this as well. Popper and Kuhn fare no better. Lakatos finds faults with each of their proposed solutions to the demarcation problem.

Having done away with these earlier attempts, Lakatos moves on to provide his own solution to the demarcation problem. He first describes to us what he means by a research program. A research program consists of a core set of ideas, the "hard core" of the program, as well as a large collection of auxiliary hypotheses and a set of problem-solving tools. (Lakatos calls this set of tools a machinery or a heuristic for solving problems.)

Now, having described the basic idea of a research program, Lakatos goes on to distinguish between progressive research programs and degenerating ones. He makes use of a variety of historical examples to illustrate the difference, with novel, unexpected predictions being a highlight of progressive programs and the lack of such predictions being a serious deficiency of degenerating programs. It is the progressive research programs that Lakatos will identify with science.

You will have to decide for yourself how successful Lakatos's attempt to solve the demarcation problem really is, but before ending it is worth taking note of his final paragraph. Lakatos attempts to make a strong case for the importance of this question of distinguishing between science and pseudoscience. To him, the problem is not merely an academic one but one of vital importance to society. Do you agree?

Key Terms

heuristic –a process or method relating to the solving of a particular set of problems

hypothesis – a suggested explanation for some observed phenomenon; a tentative proposal for the solution to a problem

probabilism – an approach to central questions of knowledge that makes use of probability rather than certainty, and in particular that our degrees of belief in propositions ought to satisfy the axioms of probability

refutation – the act of showing something to be false, wrong, or erroneous

In addition to the terms above, an understanding of the basic terms from Popper's article would be helpful.

Reading Questions

The following questions are meant to guide and assist you in reading Popper’s article. They will draw your attention to key passages and challenge you to think about what Popper is really trying to say. Although no page numbers are given, the questions come roughly in the order that you will find their answers in the text.

Why, according to Lakatos, is the demarcation problem so important? It is worth noting that he starts and ends with justification for the value of this particular question.
Why is the “degree of commitment to belief” an inadequate way to distinguish science from pseudoscience?
What does Lakatos mean when he says that the cognitive value of a theory has nothing to do with the psychological influence it has on people's minds?
What was the commonly held view (including by Isaac Newton!) of the relationship between theories and facts?
Why does Lakatos believe that this view persists even today? (Hint: The answer involves theology.)
How did the downfall of Newtonian theory (at the hands of relativity and quantum mechanics) affect this commonly held view?
How did the so-called “inductive logicians” attempt to separate science from pseudoscience? How did Popper respond to this attempt? Does Lakatos seem to think Popper's response was adequate?
What does Lakatos think Newtonian scientists and Marxist historians have in common? How is this relevant to the demarcation problem?
Why does Lakatos think Popper has failed to distinguish successfully between science and pseudoscience?
Why does Lakatos think Kuhn has failed to distinguish successfully between science and pseudoscience?
What does Lakatos mean by “a methodology of scientific research programmes”? What exactly is a research program?
What is the distinction between the hard core of a research program and the “protective belt” of auxiliary hypotheses?
What is a heuristic? How does it fit into research programs?
There is an important footnote on page 24 that discusses the use of “refutation” by Lakatos. How is his use of the word different from a more rigorous use of the word?
What characteristic is common to all of the research programs that Lakatos admires? What examples does he give?
What is the difference between a progressive research program and a degenerating research program?
Marxism also made serious predictions, just as in the cases of Halley's Comet and Einstein's theories of relativity. What was the important difference? (Don't overthink this. What turned out to be different about the predictions made by Marxists?)
What is the relationship between research programs and scientific revolutions, according to Lakatos?
Lakatos returns to the issue at the beginning of the article about the importance of the problem of demarcation. Why does he feel that this is an extremely important issue?

Challenge Questions

Do you think that Lakatos's description of Popper's demarcation criterion is accurate? Would Popper approve of the way Lakatos has worded it?
Do you think that Lakatos's description of Kuhn's demarcation criterion is accurate? Would Kuhn approve of the way Lakatos has represented his ideas?
On page 24, Lakatos refers vaguely to the invention "of a hitherto unknown planet" and various calculations. To which episode in the history of astronomy do you think Lakatos may be referring?
Can you identify any important similarities between Lakatos's approach and that of either Popper or Kuhn? How about important differences?
Can you think of any endeavors that you believe are scientific but that Lakatos's solution would reject?
Can you think of any endeavors that you believe are not scientific but that Lakatos's solution would accept?
Which of the three philosophers (Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos) do you think has done the best job of separating science from pseudoscience? Why?