Oxana Poberejnaia, the University of Manchester,UK, Russian Schoolchildren and the Mass
Oxana Poberejnaia, the University of Manchester,UK, ‘Russian Schoolchildren and the Mass Media: “Screen Generation”’
Abstract
The paper discusses the influence that the Governmental policies in civic education and mass media have on schoolchildren’s political identities. It is based on three-month fieldwork in three Russian cities in 2003 and analyzing secondary sources. The paper argues that to ensure the public’s loyalty Putin’s team relies on the political practices and notions that have been prevalent in the country through the Tsarist and Soviet regime. The Kremlin controls all TV channels. The latter do not convey any clear ideology, but make sure no other political force makes an appearance. On the other hand, the TV reports on some democratic institutions that are still present in Russia. One of these democratic institutions that the Government chose to keep in order to preserve the façade of democracy is civic education. The state programmes for civic and patriotic education uneasily combine democratic and state patriotic rhetoric. The paper introduces a concept of ‘covert agenda’, that is silent understanding of the Government’s intentions and policies by the public. In contemporary Russia there are also social factors unfavourable for forming schoolchildren’s democratic political identity. This results in schoolchildren following the agenda suggested by the Government and having no need or ability to construct independent political identities. The paper presents the results of interviews with the schoolchildren identifying their political adherence in contemporary Russia.
In my paper I will discuss the influence that the Governmental policies in media and civic education have on schoolchildren’s political identities. I will concentrate on state compulsory education, i.e. lessons of Social Studies in state-run high schools. I am arguing that under the conditions of socio-economic crisis and the Government’s controlling television, the children adopt political attitudes that are beneficial for the elites. In this paper, I will first outline the Government’s policy of covert agenda, put forth via the mass media and discuss civic education’s ideological basis in state programmes. Then I will present the general image of the schoolchildren of the Post-Yeltsin age as perceived by their teachers and themselves. I will conclude by introducing the schoolchildren’s political views as reported in their interviews.
My paper is based on three-month fieldwork in three Russian cities in 2003 that I conducted for my PhD thesis ‘Civic education and the problem of “imitative modernization” in contemporary Russia’, and on the analysis of the secondary sources. The primary sources included transcripts of 78 semi-structured interviews and of participant observations I undertook at 26 schools and 11 other educational facilities across three cities in Russia.
I interviewed ten groups of people:
1. Experts in education and civic education (10 people);
2. Officials in education (2);
3. Teachers in state compulsory education (19);
4. Vice Principals responsible for moral education in state compulsory education (10);[1]
5. Children in state compulsory education (61);[2]
6. Teachers and managers in state voluntary education (13);
7. Vice Principals responsible for moral education in state voluntary education (10);
8. Children in state voluntary education (10);
9. Teachers and managers in independent education (5);
10. Children in independent education (11).
The intercourse with children took the shape of either individual interviews (3 in state compulsory sector, 5 in state voluntary, and 4 in independent sector) or group interviews (12 in state compulsory sector, 1 in state voluntary, and 2 in independent sector). All questions on my interview questionnaires were not asked in all interviews. Due to shortage of time, I often only asked the most crucial questions for the research of civic education in Russia. This explains small numbers of responses to some questions discussed below.
I applied structured observation in three sectors:
- First, I observed the lessons of History and Social Studies and related disciplines, such as Law and Literature in the context of state compulsory education. (55 lessons)
- Second, I watched the events and classes occurring under the auspices of state voluntary education, such as: 1. Events organized by the Vice Principals responsible for moral education in state schools, 2. Events and classes that are run by the ‘supplementary education’ institutions. (9)
- Third, I studied the events carried out by the independent civic education organizations, sponsored by bodies such as corporations or international non-governmental organizations. (4)
- Fourth, I observed other relevant events, such as conferences of teachers and events at Institutes for Teachers’ Development. (6)
I also looked at legal and educative texts in the realm of civic education. For secondary sources, I used academic articles on the problems of Russian history, democratization and civic education. To analyze these data, I used qualitative content analysis.
Vladimir Putin after ascending to Presidency brought the new elite group to power. They are referred to in the literature as siloviki.[3]They managed to identify themselves with the ‘federal power’, or Kremlin.[4]The party that is associated with this group is ‘Edinaia Rossiia’ (United Russia).Vladimir Gelman argues that ‘the new ruling group around Putin overwhelmingly dominated Russia’s political scene’.[5]The privileged position does not mean, however, that the silovikiare the most influential group in Russian politics or economics. There are still financial tycoons who strive to exert influence on politics and there are still popular governors active in this realm. In the field of civic education, however, those who control the state apparatus, i.e. in this case the siloviki, are the most relevant elite group to study. They are the ones who determine the ideology and content of state civic education programmes.
In order to ensure public’s support the current Russian ruling elites are using methods different from those applied by their Soviet predecessors. The Soviet leadership was working on industrialization of the country while applying direct propaganda and coercion to secure their power. Putin’s team on the other hand, seek for the benefits that globalization can offer. One of the contextual factors of Putin’s regime is the new twentieth/twenty-first century age of globalization and the information/knowledge society. This new era is known for the influence of the mass media and PR on a scale hitherto unseen.[6]
Consequently the current ruling elites did not have to put as much effort into elaborating an integrated ideology as the Communist Party formerly did. Instead, they went for a more or less coherent set of the most popular and powerful ideas from Russian ideologies of the past. They rely on the habitual political practices and notions that have been prevalent in the country through the Tsarist and Soviet regime.
Judging from data obtained during fieldwork and secondary sources, this set of ideas manifested itself as a three-part world-view, consisting of:
(1) The cult of President Putin;[7]
(2) Patriotism understood as self-sacrifice; and
(3) The notion that there is no alternative to the present regime.
This perspective of course does not coincide with what is propagated officially through legal documents and official speeches. It belongs to the ‘covert agenda’ that will be discussed below and so it is mainly known to all political actors (including civic education school teachers).
‘Covert agenda’ is in my view the implicit understanding by the public of the Government’s policies regardless of what the Government proclaims. It is a silent unsatisfied loyalty to the Government, based on a belief that nothing can be changed on any level by legal democratic procedures.The public see discrepancies between the content of public officials’ speeches and the actual everyday political practices and adjust their behaviour accordingly. ‘Covert agenda’ works as self-censorship. In schools, for example, civic education teachers would not speak of topics unwanted by the ruling elites, e.g., Chechen War.
The ‘covert agenda’ is not a conspiracy theory, because the elites do not have to imbue this sort of attitude intentionally. Arguably it arises from Russian history and culture, particularly from their authoritarian aspects. Edward Keenan states that ‘Russian political culture deprives non-participants of crucial information about the rules of the system itself, the deep structures of that culture must be extracted from the historical record’.[8]
People in Russia quite naturally still live and think in terms of the Soviet regime.[9] The period of ‘romantic’ democracy was too brief and confusing for it to achieve any profound, deep transformation of society. As soon as the Government sends a message, which resonates with the spirit of Soviet times, the public – including teachers – follow the pattern they had developed previously, in line with a mechanism I refer to as the ‘covert agenda’.
One example of that would be the situation where NGO’s feel constant threat from the Government and therefore have to censor their activities and statements. Balzer notes that there is a contradiction between the Government adopting laws that restrict the range of NGO activity and provide mechanisms to interfere in such activity, and yet at the same time the Government refraining from taking actions against individual organizations. Balzer states: ‘It may be that the threat is enough or that most groups are being particularly careful’.[10]
It is acknowledged in the literature that there exists paradox of the state’s apparent power combined with a lack of efficacy. A nation-state can be ineffective, but the state is still ‘the dominant actor in media, politics, and some profitable sectors of the economy’.[11]Balzer proposes a concept of ‘managed pluralism’ to explain the current situation in Russia. According to him, ‘the mass media are not directly censored, but mechanisms are in place to guarantee that the media “understands its responsibilities”.[12]
The Kremlin now controls all TV channels. The latter do not convey any clear ideology, but make sure no other political force makes an appearance. In this way, they create an atmosphere similar to that of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the TV mentions democratic notions and reports on some democratic institutions that are still present in Russia. Putin himself publicly asserted the significance of an independent media and of multiple political parties for Russian democracy.[13]Another democratic institution that the Government chose to keep in order to preserve the façade of democracy is civic education.
A number of federal programmes in the field of education, and two Ruling Directives of the Ministry of Education on civic education were adopted during 2000-2003.The language used to formulate the ideology for citizenship education in the early 2000s combines state and Soviet values with the rhetoric of democratization.[14]The Federal Programme for the Development of Education, an Appendix to the Federal Law of 10 April 2000, No 51-F3, constitutes the organizational basis for state educational policy.As a tribute to the new democratic times, the Programme proclaims that the state encourages schoolchildren to develop school self-government, e.g. young adultsorganizing mock elections and mock Youth Parliaments participating in running the school.[15]
The Government of the Russian Federation approved the federal specialized programme ‘The Youth of Russia: 2001-2005’ in January 2000.[16]Among the goals of this Programme, the first is teaching citizenship and patriotism, and the second is preparing young men for serving in the army. The results expected are, above all, improvement of the demographic situation in the country, meaning more stable families and more children being born, and better civic and patriotic education of the youth. Demography, together with youth’s unwillingness to join the army, are two real problems for the current regime. The Programme aims at creating conditions for employing gifted and competent young people in Governmental agencies.[17]
The ‘Concept of the Patriotic Education of the Citizens of Russian Federation’[18] was published by the Ministry of Education in 2003. It was designed under the auspices of the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No 122 ‘The State Programme Patriotic Education of the Citizens of the Russian Federation in 2001-2005’, passed on 16 February 2002. The document declares that patriotism is meant to give a new incentive for enhancing the spiritual health of the people and for shaping a united civil society.[19] The ‘Concept’ defines patriotism as ‘love for one’s country, longing to serve the interests of one’s country, to the point of self-sacrifice, and to defend one’s country’. (Emphasis added) Inseparably integral to patriotic education, the ‘Concept’ also proclaims, is a military-patriotic education, whose goal is to shape citizens’ desire to serve in the Army.[20]
On 15 January 2003 the Ministry of Education issued a Ruling Directive ‘Civic Education of Schoolchildren of the Russian Federation’.[21] (There is still no official state programme on civic education in Russia.) It provides the Ministry’s definition of civic education:
It is an integrated complex of political, legal and moral education and character training. It is realized through school courses, along with extra-curricular activities, by creating a democratic ethos and rule of law in school life, and by shaping schoolchildren’s civic competence.[22]
The Ruling Directive acknowledges human rights and freedoms as the highest values in Russia. It proclaims the principal goals of civic education as the self-realization of pupils and their socialization in society. Civic education must raise a citizen who:
- Lives in a democratic state and civil society;
- Has the necessary knowledge and skills;
- Has a set of democratic values (tolerance, social responsibility, patriotism);
- Is ready to participate in the socio-political life of his/her school and local community.[23]
Civic education, the Ruling Directive states, is aimed at forming schoolchildren’s citizenship competency, i.e. a set of skills for a person to exercise his/her civic rights and duties in a democratic society in a responsible and efficient way. The emphasis is placed on forming a negative attitude to xenophobia and chauvinism.[24] In this goal formulation however one can trace a conflict between democratization and socialization: pupils are prepared for living in a democratic society, although Russia has not consolidated its democracyyet.
The first opportunity for engaging schoolchildren in social life is through democratic procedures at schools. These might include cooperation with the outside community and modelling the institutions of democracy. Another method is the carrying out of social projects. The Ruling Directive mentions a national competition of school teams, called ‘I am a citizen of Russia’.[25] According to the Directive, over 600 comprehensive schools participate in this programme annually. In its Appendices, the Directive lists 11 civic education centres and organizations and eight schools where democratic procedures are used in day-to-day running the school.[26]
On 25 April 2003 the Ministry of Education issued a Ruling Directive ‘Developing Youth Parliaments in the regions of Russia.’ It reports that some Youth Parliaments are created by the legislature, and some are set up by the executive bodies. Still others are social programmes run by one or several youth social organizations.[27]
All the programmes proclaim that civic education must contribute to the revival of Russia as a great power. All emphasize the value of patriotism, the goal of re-establishing the unity of schooling and moral education.Every time legal documents mention democratic notions, they nevertheless interpret them in a special way, i.e. one that is conducive to the undemocratic policies of the present Government. For example, societal initiative is only considered when under Governmental control.
The mass media are not overlooked either. For example, one of the objectives of the Concept for Patriotic Education is ‘creating conditions for enhancing the patriotic educational role of television and other mass media, active resistance to anti-patriotism, to perverting and falsifying the Homeland’s history’.[28]It is interesting to note that in the Programme for Patriotic Education of the Tomskregion developed by a regional branch of ‘United Russia’ party one of the partners of the regional Department of Education is a neo-pagan organization that propagates racist views and presents the pre-Christian Slavs as an Arian nation with colonies around the world. The Tomsk Regional Programme for patriotic education provides financial support for the two newspapers Russkoe Razdolie (Russian Freedom) and Znamia Mira (The Banner of Peace),[29] the former of which is published by a neo-pagan cult; the latter is put out by the Madame Blavatskaia and Rerich cult.[30]These are meant to be used as a resource for teaching.
‘Covert agenda’ can be regarded as one of the methods by which the state achieves teachers’ and pupils’ loyalty. The current ruling elites do not apply direct control or propaganda. I asked teachers if they knew the intentions of the Ministry in the field of civic education.
Table 1: Teachers’ Awareness of the Official Mission Statement of the Ministry of Education in the Field of Civic Education