Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber
Commander, Advance Force Operations
What is your view of the command structures for Task Force 11 and for Operation Anaconda?
Are you comfortable with the battle plan?
Army Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber was the Delta Force officer who led thelong-range reconnaissance teams that played a large role in Operation Anaconda. Blaber’s “Advanced Force Operations” unit was part of the larger “Task Force 11,” an agglomeration of elite covert or “black” special operators whose prime mission was to kill or capture senior alQaeda and Taliban leaders. A fiercely independent commander and thinker, Blaber’s leadership ensured that his teams collected important intelligence and called in devastating air strikes on the al Qaeda and Taliban forces who were the targets for Anaconda. At the same time, his forceful personality exacerbated political and personality divisions within Task Force 11, and the task force senior commanders shut him out of crucial decisions that profoundly affected the course of the battle.
Background
Pete Blaber grew up in Illinois, and was an accomplished marathon runner and triathlete in college. He was commissioned through Officer Candidate School, served as an Army Ranger, joined theArmy’s elite Delta Force in 1991, and saw combat in Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, and Iraq. Blaber rose to serve as Delta’s operations officer, and commanded Delta’s B Squadron. Before Operation Anaconda, he had deployed to Afghanistan once before in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom.
Blaber relied on certain principles to guide his decision-making. “Listen to the guy on the ground. Imagine the unimaginable. When in doubt, develop the situation.” His combat leadership was marked by creativity and daring, and he stressed the ancient axiom of “audacity, audacity, and audacity.” Blaber also considered the human element to be decisive in combat.
The previous summer, while commanding the B Squadron, Blabertook 30 Delta operators on a hiking excursion in the wilderness of Montana. He wanted to figure out “the art of the possible” if Delta ever had to traverse similar terrainelsewhere. The 100-mile trek was extremely challenging, but valuable to Blaber and his team. His warriors realized they could get over one or two snow-covered 9,000-foot mountains a day, and that packed snow actually made some difficult terrain easier. These lessons would prove their worth during Operation Anaconda.
Blaber often felt constricted by the rigidity of military hierarchy and modes of thought, and believed success hinged on being nimble and adaptable. In contrast to many others who had prominent roles in Anaconda, Blaber had an aversion to using helicopters in his operations. Far from sowing fear in the hearts of the enemy, he felt they ruined the element of surprise, and stymied creative planning. He was a proponent of the “power of combinations,” using the synergy of teams from various Special Forces units, conventional forces, and the CIA in Afghanistan.
Inside Task Force 11
Operation Enduring Freedom, the campaign to destroy al Qaeda and topple the Taliban in Afghanistan, began on October 7, 2001. In the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom, it was American special operations forces and intelligence operatives, in tandem with Afghan allies and with the support of U.S. air power, that provided the main effort against al Qaeda and their Taliban sponsors. Along with Army “Green Beret” Special Forces responsible for training and equipping Afghan militias,elite special forces, which conduct “kill-or-capture” missions, were a crucial part of the campaign. These so-called “black” special operations forces, grouped under Task Force 11, enjoyed a separate, parallel chain of command. And because of the perceived “high-value” of their targets and their mission, they often took priority over others.
The teams of Blaber’s Advanced Force Operations were part of Task Force 11, though their reconnaissance missions relied upon stealthy scouting rather than direct action. The main body of Task Force 11 was comprised ofNavy SEALs, Army Rangers, Air Force communications and medical experts and special operations helicopters. Advanced Force Operations was an ad-hoc grouping, and Blaber could not have been happier with the mission-first focus. Regional commander Gen.Tommy Franks had told Blaber simply: “Get some men out into the frontier to figure out what’s going on. Find the enemy, then kill or capture ‘em.” For Advanced Force Operations, however, the killing would, in all but exceptional cases, be indirect: AFO would call upon U.S. air power to eliminate enemy positions.
Blaberhad about 45 men in Afghanistan, divided among six teams. Most came from Delta Force, the elite Army unit, but Blaber also was able to select the best operators from Navy and Air Force Special Forces. The members of Advance Force Operationsthought like their commander, and the teams needed little oversight as they developed intelligencein concert with the CIA, other Special Forces units, and Afghan allies. Blaber pushed his intelligence analysts and communications experts out of Bagram air base, north of Kabul, and into local CIA“safehouses,” where they could develop a clear intelligence picture close to the action. He also metregularly with his CIA and Special Forcescounterparts, even moving his command shopinto the CIA’s Kabul headquarters, and agreed to create pilot teams in which the CIA would produce and process intelligence, the Special Forcesteams would equip and train the Afghans, and the AFO would conduct operations to find and destroy the enemy. Well before Operation Anaconda was unleashed, Blaber was putting his beliefs about how to operate into practice, and getting other agencies to work in a similar way. This approach to making the total effect greater than the sum of the parts would repay dividends in Operation Anaconda – but when it broke down, catastrophe resulted.
Before deploying to Afghanistan, Blaber had combed the literature from the Soviet war of the 1980s, including the records of the CIA operatives who served with the mujahideen in the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War. Among the valuable finds was a report on Ali Mohamed, an Egyptian-born Special Forces officer turned al Qaeda operative who was detained in 1998 for his role in the American embassy bombings in Tanzania. Ali Mohamedrevealed to his American interrogatorsthat shopkeepers, taxi drivers, shepherds, and money-changers would be the best sources of information on alQaeda. Mohamed also told the Americans that the towns around the remote Shah-i-kot valley, located in the mountainous and remote Paktia province along the border with Pakistan, would be the place to search for Osama bin Laden. Blaber also instructed his men to read deeply about the history of Afghanistan and, sensing that it made for a likely battleground,Shah-i-kot valley in particular. Through their study, the AFO soldiers learned that the mujahideen always tried to hold the high ground, and hide their artillery in creek beds. (For the regional location of the Shah-i-kot, see attached map of Afghanistan)
Though he was successful at instilling his methods within his teams, Blaber had much less success with the rest of the elite special operations Task Force11. This task force worked directly for theater commander Gen. Franks, but also answered, indirectly but importantly, to Joint Special Operations Command, normally based at Pope Air Force Base. Over the years, JSOC had developed into a kind of separate service – and through the years since September 11 and the declaration of the “global war on terrorism,” its independence and influence have continued to grow.
Through Task Force 11, JSOC Commander Major General Dell Dailey – himself a dominant personality – would exercise a powerful influence on Operation Anaconda from his North Carolina headquarters. The emphasis on “high-value targets” like Osama bin Laden and his senior lieutenants remained a priority, and Task Force 11 commander Brigadier General Gregory Trebon had established a system whereby his troops would remain atBagramuntil intelligence on a high-value targetarrived, then fly to the site of theraid.Instead, Blaber wanted forces close to enemy hideouts, where they could gather timely intelligence and reach their targets more quickly; he believed his teams could provide important support to conventional operations as well as in the hunt for al Qaeda leaders.(For a diagram of command arrangements, see attached, “Chain of Command”)
For the first week in Afghanistan, Blaber met daily with the CIA Kabul station chief, known as “Rich,” and the U.S. Special Forces commander, Colonel John Mulholland. Mulholland’s “Task Force Dagger” directed the Green Beret detachments that worked closely with Afghan militias, that had been at the center of Operation Enduring Freedom. Even with the planned commitment of conventional forces in the campaign in the Shah-i-kot, the need to emphasize anti-Taliban elements among the Afghans remained important for a host of reasons.
Blaberbelieved there was a large al Qaeda force in the Shah-i-kot, and likely a senior leader with them, especially with the valley so close to Pakistan. The AFO Commanderrequested more troops for aggressive reconnaissancemissions in theShah-i-kot, but JSOC commander Dailey was skeptical. Dailey did not like Blaber personally, disagreed with his assertion that a large enemy force was gathered in the Shah-i-kot, and felt Blaber was exceeding his authority by pushing for bold reconnaissance missions in the valley. Others in Task Force 11 headquarters agreed, mockingBlaberas “Peter the Great,” or “Colonel Kurtz,”in reference to the crazed “Captain Kurtz” character from Heart of Darkness.
Planning Anaconda
The planning for an operation in the Shah-i-kot was done initially by Mulholland’s Task Force Dagger. Mulholland and his staff began with the now tried-and-true mix of U.S. unconventional and Afghan forces, backed up by U.S. air power. A local anti-Taliban leader, Zia Lodin, who had helped organize a small band of militia within the region, would be the main effort in the attack.
Yet, the previous battle at Tora Bora – itself still a controversial operation that became the subject even of a Senate investigation – where the combination of U.S. air power, special operations forces and local Afghan militias notoriously cornered but did not kill Osama bin Laden and other high-profile al Qaeda leaders – strongly suggested to Mulholland that something more would be needed in the Shah-i-kot if the enemy were not to live to fight another day. Mulholland, appreciating that his Green Berets and their Afghan allies were not up to the task,agreed with Major General Franklin “Buster” Hagenbeck, commander of U.S conventional land forces in the area, that American light infantry would be needed to supply the steel for another “hammer-and-anvil” style attack. Blaber, too, welcomed the arrival of conventional forces, but he still encouraged Mulholland to retain overall command, arguing that the Task Force Dagger leader had the most experience in Afghanistan and his troops had been working hand-in-hand with the Afghans set to make the main effort in the fight to come. But Mulholland understood that the task of planning, coordinating and commanding such a large, complex operation also exceeded the capabilities of his staff.
In particular, Blaber was concerned about the use of helicopters – which would necessarily be the means of transport for any substantial U.S. infantry force – in the valley. At a 10 February 2002 planning session, only a few weeks before the operation itself,Blaberwarned strongly against a helicopter-borne air assault. Unlike some of the enthusiasts among the conventional forces, which included both a large element from the 101st Airborne Division but also included others, like Hagenbeck, who had served in that unit – Blabercautioned thatthe enemy in the valley would expect, and be prepared for, an air assault, and would cover all the likely landing zones with heavy weapons. Blaber’s study of the history of the Shah-i-kot, where Soviet forces had repeatedly attempted helicopter assaults but had never succeeded, informed this view. But, lacking sufficient vehicles for a ground operation and armed with intelligence assessments that the enemy would be few and lightly armed, the air assault continued. Blaber’s prediction of the enemy’s was prescient. Al Qaeda fighters in the Shah-i-kot manned the same cemented anti-aircraft positions that mujahedeen had in the fight against the Red Army. Even the American landing zones for the helicopters would be identical to those used by the Soviets. (For an overview of the campaign plan, see attached, “Anaconda Plan”)
Nonetheless, and to the consternation of his Task Force 11 superiors, Blaber was convinced of the need to attack the al Qaeda force gathering in the Shah-i-kot. He also had concluded that, air assault or not, his spotters could play a crucial role and that such a large al Qaeda force would have to be led by some high-ranking figure, even if it was not that likely to be Osama bin Laden himself. Finally, Blaber convinced his superiors in Task Force 11, dubious as ever of Blaber’s judgment, of the merits of playing a role in the coming campaign. Blaber would oversee AFO missions from the safe house in Gardez, only 18 miles north of the valley, while his deputy commander, “Jimmy,” remained in Bagram to share intelligence with Hagenbeck. This move, too, reflected Blaber’s commitment to making even his highly independent unit part of a larger whole; he had no obligation to dispatch Jimmy to Hagenbeck’s side—Task Force 11, and AFO with it, did not answer to Hagenbeck— but Blaber understood acutely the helpful role AFO could play, both in providing intelligence from his scouts and other special operations channels and, in the battle itself, by calling in air strikes. (For a view of the Shah-i-kot and Gardez, see attached, “The Shah-i-kot and Surroundings”)
Sneaking into the Shah-i-kot
On February 14, Blaber gathered his menand briefed them on their first Anacondamission: reconnoiter the approaches to and interior of the Shah-i-kot valley. These would be the first American on-the-ground eyes on the target.
Blaber envisioned a two-phase initial reconnaissance mission. The first would be done by vehicle, driving the roads south of Gardez to determine the feasibility of moving into the valley on foot. Then Blaber planned to send two teams into observation posts around the valley, one from the north and one from the south, before returning to prepare for Anaconda itself.
Blaber had two of his six small teams at his disposal,dubbed “India” and “Juliet.” Juliet’s mission was to establish an observation post on the northern end of the valley, while India reconnoiteredthe south. The teams set out on February 17 in two Toyota pickups, only to turn back after encountering impassable terrain. But just as the northern routes toward Shah-i-kottoo rough for the American to drive through, so they would not be viable avenues of escape for enemy fighters. Blabersent the teams out again two days later, and they returned with reports that 700 al Qaeda fighters – more than triple the number in formal intelligence assessments – had recently passed through to the Shah-i-kot. The Juliet team was sent back a third time on February 20 to observe the valley itself. The next day, and despite severe snow and high winds, Blaber decided to send the India team to scout the southern approaches to the valley. The team rode in trucks to a spot well west of the valley, and hiked the rest of the way. Even for men trained in the mountains of the American west, the team reached limits of its endurance on the Afghan mountaintops in the extreme weather. Still, the India men found that the southern approaches were viable as reconnaissance posts over the valley, and that the enemy was using trails from the southern Shah-i-kot into Pakistan. These missions also convinced Blaber that he needed more men, and he was able to convince the newly arrived SEALs of Task Force 11 – the SEALs had just deployed to relieve the main Delta Force units that had been doing the kill-and-capture work up to that point – to give him a one five-man team called “Mako 31.” Blaber knew that the SEALs would be chomping at the bit to get into the action.(For a view of the Shah-i-kot, with its terrain and villages as well as the observation posts, see attached “The Shah-i-kot Valley, with observation posts”)
Blaber also began sharing his intelligence directly with Hagenbeck, with whom he quickly developed a close relationship. And unlike Trebon and Dailey, Hagenbeck quickly trusted what Blaber had to say. The two also recognized that, though they were under formally separate command chains, that they would be sharing a battlefield in Anaconda. Even though, for example, they differed over the use of helicopters, having a common understanding of the plan was critical. Thisback-door relationship infuriated JSOC commander Dailey, and he contemplated bringing Blaber home. Dailey was adamant that Blaber’s units, like the rest of Task Force 11, focus on the high-value “Big Three;” bin Laden, his number-two Ayman al Zawahiri, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar, not spend its time supporting Anaconda.