Judicial Systems Are Complex Institutional Structures Whose Primary Function Is to Effectively

National Judicial Reform Strategy

Summary

[To be completed for final draft]

Contents

I.Background

1. Introduction
2. Guiding Principles
3. The Need for Reform

II.Organization

1. Structure
2. Implementation

III.Judicial Reform Framework

1. Overview
2. An Independent Judicial System
3. Self-Governing Structure
4. Independent Budget Authority
5. Rule and Policy-making Authority
6. A Transparent Judicial System
7. Open Judicial Selection, Promotion Discipline Process
8. Appropriate Access to Court Proceedings
9. Improved Public Outreach & Participation
10. An Accountable Judicial System
11. Clear Judicial Productivity & Performance Standards
12. Effective Court Administration & Management
13. Effective Use of Judicial and Prosecutorial Resources
14. An Efficient Judicial System
15. Improved Access to Justice
16. Standardized Training & Education
17. Modern Court Network

IV.Reform of Judiciary-Related Institutions

1. Ministry of Justice
2. Prosecutors
3. Penal System

V.Performance Standards

A. Rationale

B. Performance Indicators

A.Introduction

The Government of the Republic of Serbiahas committed itself to a reform program to achieve a more effective, responsive, and modern judiciary. The reform program promotes the rights of all citizens, including equal treatment under the law, access to justice and due process.

TheNational Judicial ReformStrategysets forth the challenges facing Serbia’s judiciary within the framework of four guiding principles and corresponding goals. A separateImplementation Plan outlines the specific steps needed to achieve those goals.

B.Guiding Principles

Aneffective justice system is based on fundamental principles that provide the framework for the design, development and organization of all judicial institutions. A judicial system that is fully responsive to the rights and interests of all citizens will seek to further these core principles at every stage of development.

The four guiding principles are independence, transparency, accountability, and efficiency. This Strategywill apply these guiding principles to achieve:

A judicial system that is independent;

A judicial system that is transparent;

A judicial system that is accountable; and

A judicial system that is efficient.

C.The Need for Reform

There is compelling justification for implementing strategic reform at every level of the Republic’s judicial system in support of these four guiding principles.

The need for reform has been repeatedly expressed by individual citizens in complaints concerning excessive delays, procedural uncertainty and corruption.In the previous four years various assessments and analysis have detailed a number of operational and organizational weaknesses:

• A governance structure which causes the judiciary to depend on the Ministry of Justice, impeding the judiciary’s organizational and managerial independence;
• A lack of integrated planning, budgeting and performance measurement capacities, reducing the judiciary’s ability to effectively monitor and improve system performance;
• A complicated framework of regulations and policy bodies, contributing to organizational confusion and redundancy, and reducing the accountability of judicial bodies;
• Outmoded staffing levels and hiring practices that are not clearly connected with system workloads, hampering effective justice administration and case processing;
• Unclear performance, selection and disciplinary standards for judges, resulting in inconsistent judicial effectiveness and reducing public trust in the judicial profession;
• Onerous administrative burdens on senior judges, reducing judicial efficiency and lowering morale in the judiciary’s ranks;
• Insufficient training for judges and court staff, hindering the development of a modern and professional staff specializing in judiciary management and administration;
• A lack of practical and judiciary-focusededucation in the law faculties, contributing to a lack of preparation for the future leaders in the legal community and the judiciary;
• An overly complex and extended system of courts and supporting offices, resulting in higher than necessary operating costs and less efficient citizen services;
• Poorly equipped and maintained facilities, restricting access to justice and straining the judiciary’s resources;
• An overcrowded and outdated penal system, which does not effectively encourage rehabilitation or satisfy international standards of humane treatment; and
• Underutilization of information technology and automated systems, resulting in the continued use of inefficient and labor-intensive administrative practices.

These weaknesses, several of which are noted by the reform priorities communicated by the European Commission and the Council of Europe, must be addressed if the Republic’s judiciary is to more responsively, efficiently and fairly serve the interests of all of its citizens.

A.Structure

The Judicial Reform Strategyfocuses on Serbia’scourt system, including the courts of general and special jurisdiction, and the supporting legal framework. It also addresses, to a limited extent,the Ministry of Justice,the prosecutorial and penal systems, and the law faculties given their influence on the judicial system.

The Strategy’s Judicial Reform Framework, presented in Section III, outlines the primary goals and outcomes necessary for the achievement of a modern and efficient justice system. The primary reform goals for judiciary related organizations, including the Ministry of Justice, the prosecutors, and the penal system, are included in Section IV.

Section V details the performance standards that will measure the progress of the Republic’s judicial reform efforts. A separate Implementation Plan details the specific timeframes, sequencing, implementing bodies, and estimated costs associated with each goal defined within the Strategy.

B.Implementation

The Ministry of Justice, High Judicial Council and the Supreme Court, together with the Judiciary Committee of the National Assembly, are responsible for supervising reforms presented in the Strategy. Implementation coordination will be delegated to a Strategy Coordination Commission, which will consist of nine representatives from the judiciary and legal community. The Commission membership, which will include one representative from both the Judges’ Association and the Prosecutors’ Association,will be jointly selected by the Minister of Justice and the Supreme Court President and approved by the Judiciary Committee of the National Assembly. The Commission’s members will be appointed for renewable two-year terms.

Every three months the Strategy Coordination Commission will inform the Minister of Justice and the Supreme Court President in writing of progress on implementation and pending issues. Every six months the Strategy Coordination Commission is required to inform the Prime Minister and the Parliament, in writing, of related progress and pending issues. Every year the Strategy Coordination Commission will submit a report to the Parliament summarizing progress on the Strategy's implementation.

A.Overview

The Republic’s Judicial Reform Framework can be divided into 12 fundamental reform goals, three of which fall under each core principle. Collectively and individually, these reform goals and their associated initiatives address the main challengesfacing the judiciary today.

The Judicial Reform Framework is summarized in the below table, and detailed in the following sections. Each goal is presented with a summary description of the current situation, the vision for a new judiciary, and the primary steps supporting the reform goals.

The reforms are grouped according to short- (2006-2007), medium-(2008-2010) and long-term (2011-2013) implementation timeframes.

Judicial Reform Framework

B.An Independent Judicial System

1.Self-Governing Structure

Current Situation:The management of Serbia’s judicial system is currently led by the Minister of Justice, with the Supreme Court president; various court presidents; the High Judicial Council; the High Personnel Council; and the Supervisory Council performing overlapping roles. The judicial system thus lacks a unified and independent executive management framework, creating an administrativedependence on the Ministry of Justice that extends throughout the court and prosecutorial systems.

Vision for the New Judiciary:In order to respect the principle of an independent judiciary, governance responsibility for the court system will shift from the Ministry of Justice to the judicial system. A phased transfer of governance responsibility will begin January 1, 2008, and be completed by 2011. Further, by transferringsuch authority, the Ministry of Justice will focus its limited resources more effectively on its core functions. A reorganized High Judicial Council, operating with qualified majority voting requirements on important issues, will be designated as the management and oversight body for the judiciary.The High Judicial Council members will be organized intotwo commissions, one focused on the judiciary, and one focused on the prosecutors. Other regular or ad-hoc commissions supporting the Council’s work can be established as appropriate. The High Judicial Council will be supported by an Administrative Office for the judiciary. The director of the Administrative Office will report to the High Judicial Council.

Future Structure of the Judiciary

2.Independent Budget Authority

Current Situation:While courts have a degree of influence in the budget formulation process today, the Ministry of Finance,and the Ministry of Justice, control the budget definition, allocation, and execution authority for the Republic’s court system. The budget authority is therefore removed from those who are most informed and aware of competing requirements and operational priorities, limiting independence and effective budgetary distribution.

Vision for the New Judiciary:Achieving an independent judiciary requiresauthorizing the judicial system to exercise independent budget authority. The High Judicial Council will be authorized to approveand apportion the budget for the judicial system, in conjunction with the Republic’s Treasury and the Ministry of Finance, with final budgetary approval made by the Parliament. Authority for budget development, approval and accounting will be gradually transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the High Judicial Council to ensure a smooth transition of budgeting authority.

3.Independent PolicyRule-Making Authority

Current Situation:Judicial and prosecutorial system policy-making authority rests largely with the Ministry of Justice, restricting the courts’ ability to address and respond to operational weaknesses, and diminishing the direct accountability of judicial institutions. Court procedural rule-making responsibility also currently resides with the Ministry of Justice. The exercise of thisauthority permits the Executive power to exercise significant control over the judiciary’s administrative processes and structure.Within the judiciary itself, a number of disparate policy-bodies, including the High Personnel Council, the Supervisory Council, and the Commission for Judicial Reform, supervise specific policy areas.

Vision for the New Judiciary: The judicial system will exercise independent policy- and rule-making authority throughan empowered High Judicial Council. With the authority for rule-making transferred from the Ministry of Justice, the High Judicial Councilwillsupervise management and administrative policies and procedures, permitting the judiciary’s leadership torespond more quickly to the needs of the court systemand improve theeffectivenessof case management and court performance. The High Judicial Council, supported by the new Administrative Office for the judiciary, will unify judiciary policy-making by assuming the responsibilities of the Personnel and Supervisory Councils.

C.A Transparent Judicial System

1.Open Judicial Selection, Promotion & Discipline Processes

Current Situation: Before 2001, the appointmentof judgesand prosecutors was often based on political allegiances and personal relationships, and judges and prosecutors who resisted political pressure and intimidation were often disciplined or removed from office. The High Judicial and High Personnel Councils mitigate suchproblems, but interference and manipulation are still possible given that the selection, promotion, discipline, and dismissal processes are closed and not sufficiently subject to public scrutiny.

Vision for the New Judiciary:The process of vetting judicial and prosecutorial candidatesby the High Judicial Council and the Parliament will be transparent, in accordance with clear written standards, and allow public review.After the adoption of the new Constitution, judges and prosecutors will be appointed for an initial five year period, after which they will be reappointed based on fair performance. Disciplinary and dismissal actions against judges enforced by the High Judicial Council will be more transparent and in accordance with objective criteria, encouraging greater public confidence in the judiciary.In the long-term, judicial appointees will be nominated by an 11-member Judicial Nominating Commission.Parliament would then appoint candidates recommended by the Commission.

2. Appropriate Access to Court Proceedings

Current Situation: Access to case records is restricted to litigants, counsel, and others on a need-to-know basis. Restricted access protects litigant privacy but constrains public and media access to government processes. Given the history of the former regime, which manipulated judges and prosecutors for political results against a backdrop of secrecy, public access is an important social value. Although the media and public now have limited access to court proceedings, lack of access to recordsand court information hinders public understanding and objective media reporting.

Vision for the New Judiciary:The public will be granted access to case information and court decisions while preserving litigant privacy to promotetransparency and foster improved public perceptions of courts, judges, and the adjudicative process. Automated systems in courts available to citizens will, in particular, improve public access to case information. Speculation and inaccurate reporting by the media will be reduced, improving public understanding and confidence in the judiciary.

3. Enhanced Public Outreach & Participation

Current Situation: Formal citizen complaints against the judiciary are substantial and rising. There exists, both within the general public and the ranks of the judiciary itself, a measure of apprehension concerning the judicial profession. Additionally, there is a public perception that the Ministry of Justice and the courts are operationally connected. Further, manycitizens do not fully understand the role and function of courts, judges, and prosecutors in a democratic society.The consequence is reluctance to utilize the courts to asserts their rights and seek redress under civil or criminal law – and doubt and distrust of the Republic’s judicial bodies.

Vision for the New Judiciary: Recognizing that the strength and vitality of the judicial system depends on citizens who understand and support its role, the judicial system willproactively educate the public and the media to understand its role and functions, reversing the poor image that many have of judges and the court system.The establishment of public relations offices in the Supreme Court and major urban courts will ensure more pro-active communications with the public and the media. The Supreme Court, and in time all lower courts, will utilize an automated system to carefully track and respond to citizen complaints.