ESPM 169: Compliance, Implementation and Effectiveness
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ESPM 169: Compliance, Implementation and Effectiveness
October 24, 2002
Over the next few lectures we'll look at effectiveness of the CBD at several levels: international, national and local.
Today: general factors important in the compliance, implementation and effectiveness; international level issues; unintended effects
1. International Regimes and some of the recent literature and observations
- international and national factors enhancing compliance
- how we measure and define these
- unintended effects
- measures to improve these
2. All this international activity: is it worth it? Is it too little, too late? Too slow?
- need for new frameworks; less top-down.
- at the same time, I’m not sure that complete decentralization is the right way either.
( Shiva cf. Agarwal et al)
In this section we’re talking about outcomes: good, bad, indifferent?
- later stage of the policy cycle: implementation and effectiveness
- how do we define and identify a regime outcome?
- focus of a lot of recent study of regimes
Particular Issue: environmental regimes are Regulatory Agreements – signatory states have to get private actors to change behavior
- cf. some other sorts of agreements that just involve adjustments of state behavior – e.g. lifting tariffs or changing weapons policies
1. Different Levels of Effectiveness: separate but linked problems
a. after signature: ratification by legislature and implementation into national law
- i.e. a law or an amendment to existing law is passed – such as the Clean Air Act or a Wildlife Preservation Act which contains the terms of the agreement, goals to be achieved, and penalties meted out if no compliance
- then up to private actors to comply, government agencies to advise and enforce
b. compliance: the extent to which states actually stick by the terms of the agreement
- need for monitoring
c. effectiveness:
i. that the agreement does what’s intended
ii. that private actors’ behavior is changed
iii. that the agreement makes a positive difference in the environmental problem
iv. that it’s efficient and equitable
note these are the “ideal” criteria, very hard to reach
2. Measurement Issues
a. Data on environmental changes not in yet – takes years to affect the ozone hole, for instance
BUT: models can predict differences
b. Problems of exogenous effects
- e.g. FSU and ECE and ozone
c. Regime implementation is a long-term commitment and compliance can go up and down
d. So few regimes are actually implemented yet
has tended to lead to a focus on compliance
- but this is problematic – as it leaves open the issue of stringency of regimes, for instance, or regimes that re-affirm status quo
What are the determinants of effectiveness?
- decision cf. structural variables - malleable cf. fixed
1. Endogenous: character of institutional arrangements
- regime design matters - Ron M. - intentional oil pollution at sea
- organizational effectiveness literature
- decision rules, enforcement, funds, revenue sources, flexibility
2. Exogenous: physical, biological, social conditions
- ecosystems
- power, interests, knowledge (new ideas? Change in balance of power?)
also: domestic political will and capacity
3. Linkage Variables: fit between governance system and the environment within which it functions
- e.g. why ozone regime not such a good fit for CC
- coordination problems (polar bears), cf. cooperative or conflictual
4. Barriers to Effectiveness
as some authors have put it, we enter international environmental negotiations – all of us, in fact – with a mixture of hope and skepticism
non-compliance with international law is relatively rare: however it’s also rare that states are being asked to do so much and give up sovereignty
a. Collective Action Problems
b. Monitoring and Enforcement
c. State Capacity
- i.e. the ability a government has to change the behavior of its citizens
- note centrality of states here
- capacity has many dimensions: willingness and ability to change
- resources: financial
- resources: personnel and expertise
- regulatory strength (sort of related)
Example: Britain and HWT ban cf. an LDC and illegal waste dumping
d. The extent to which environmental issues are embedded in broader socio-economic issues – cuts across many sectors of society and economy
e. Finally, are we doing too little, too late??
Despite these barriers, some studies point towards growing trends to comply with and/or implement international environmental agreements
many authors also talk about the strengthened role of non-state actors and experts in enhancing compliance and building an international community concerned with environmental issues
- Litfin piece: she argues that the transnational community being built up now might in tern form the foundation for stronger regimes in the future (global civil society argument)
public awareness and education (the very fact that I’m teaching this course)
inventive mechanisms, market mechanisms, technology transfer. national reporting and the role of the internet
- so much more information is now available
5. Weiss and Jacobson: Factors Affecting Compliance
whether countries adhere to agreements provisions and to the implementing measures they have implemented
Book: 8 countries and the EU: J, US, Russia, Brazil, India, China, Cameroon and Hungary
5 agreements (WHC; CITES; ITT; London Convention on dumping into ocean and Montreal)
- all in effect a long enough time to see results
Findings: membership become global and comprehensive; greater attention over time to strengthening supervisory measures; INGOs involved gained members, resources, sophistication
National findings: all states had environmental agencies by 1992; national research institutes and advisory committees to deal with implementation and compliance
generally positive trend in compliance (except CITES: decline for some countries; Montreal not operative for some)
Diagram:
4 sets of factors affecting implementation, compliance and effectiveness
Note: feedback loops
1. Characteristics of Activity targeted by the agreement
2. Characteristics of Accord
3. International Environment: political agenda and awareness; leader states; international financial institutions and markets
4. Factors Involving the Country
note malleable variables cf. causal variables (and parameters)
- things we can change!
6. The CBD Ten Years On
- how well is it doing?
- Framework Convention - not a set of detailed obligations
- still: report card mixed
more species endangered; details around technology transfer still to be worked out; progress very slow
However:
a. many signatories have created national BD strategy and action plans - more than 100; has provided an important framework for development of national policies, especially for countries who don't have them
- education and awareness
b. international coordination improved among UNEP and CBD secretariat etc.
c. GEF has functioned pretty well; was strengthened and refinanced
increased involvement of NGOs and other stakeholder groups
d. regime strengthening - Biosafety Protocol likely to go through
e. Access and benefit sharing agreements being developed - bioprospecting
challenges: WTO, climate change, invasive species
7. Unintended Effects
- NYT magazine article
- Peluso and Clapp
a. Hitt: "Ecoman" (NYT magazine, August 4 2002)
- "privatization" of environmental enforcement
- "mercenaries" training park employees in Cambodia to protect wildlife - fully armed - group called "WildAid"
- "two experienced eco-spies, a former counter-insurgency spook in training and a wealthy heiress"
- why has such a group (not unique) developed?
- why is this worrying?
b. Clapp: illegal imports of CFCs into industrialized countries (US, Taiwan, Canada, Australia) – second only to illegal drug trade in ports such as Miami – perhaps 20% of CFCs in current global use bought on black market
- LDCs can supply; firms in DCs who don’t want to switch to more expensive equipment are the demand
- differentiated phase-out dates; inability to meet phase-out dates
- CFCs perfect for smuggling
- being addressed in Montreal framework, but very hard – not set up to deal with this issue
- similar problems with wastes and wildlife: goes underground, lucrative niche markets
- question: is this just temporary? Something we can live with for the moment? Or should we change phaseout dates?
c. Peluso: oppressive states use international commitments as an excuse to use violent means of repression against “troublesome groups” – e.g. “poachers” in Kenya, forest dwellers in Indonesia
- more generally, states use agreements to re-define resources and ownership to their own advantage; can facilitate a state’s control over civil society
- state can use financial aid from environmental organizations for this purpose
- very real problem: that international agreements can be used by states to legitimize their actions
- highlights that IEAs usually silent on the means used, and the equity of those means, to implement the terms of the agreement.
- also highlights the need for regime creators and supporters to think very carefully about how to implement “think global, act local” in these cases
8. Suggestions for Improvements (maybe a later lecture)
- international mechanisms
- national, subnational, non-governmental
International and Transnational Mechanisms:
- monitoring and sanctioning – improving international environmental law
- e.g. a “green” court
- transparency and data requirements
- capacity building – states and civil society
- funds, environmental aid, etc.
- technology transfer
Weiss and Jacobson handout on strategies: based on willingness and ability to comply
- sunshine: transparency; lots of opportunity to show off
- can also be used as “shaming” mechanism
- sanctions: for able but unwilling countries
- incentives
mix to be available