The Necessary Evils of Theodicy
Matthew Matheny
Mentor: Dr. Paul Bube
Religion and Philosophy Dept.
Lyon College
Why do bad things happen to good people? This essential question has vexed theologians throughout history. Theodicies are attempts to answer this question. Theodicies can be categorized based on which of three faith statements they redefine: that God is all-good, that God is all-powerful, and that evil exists. Some have a less than omnipotent God. Some redefine the goodness of God. Since there are many theodicies, some process should be used to find one which seems to answer the essential question the best. In this paper, a framework of analysis is established using the criteria that Dr. David Blumenthal has used in some of his work. These criteria are: empowerment within an intellectual-moral system, preservation of a sense of reality, and intellectual coherence. Two theodicies will be highlighted and analyzed using this framework. One theodicy, by John Hick, redefines the role of evil and humanity. The other, by Phillip Roth, redefines the goodness of God as a reaction to the reality of the Holocaust. Each theodicy is introduced and then analyzed using Blumenthal’s criteria. After analysis, the one which seemed to fit the criteria the best is presented. The one which takes the least away from believers is considered to be the best. The paper ends with a discussion about the utility of the study of theodicies.
Why do bad things happen to good people? This question is one which has haunted Jewish and Christian theologians at least since the time of the Book of Job was written. This question is a particularly thorny one for Christians who take as articles of faith the following: 1) that God is all powerful, 2) that God is wholly benevolent, and that despite of these facts, 3) evil exists.
Many attempts have been made over the years by theologians and atheists alike to resolve the logical conundrum posed by these statements. Non-atheists, employ many strategies to reconcile propositions 1 and 2 with the empirically evident, scripturally based idea of the existence of evil. Others choose to talk about a God with limited power, or one without total benevolence. The idea that free will is to blame for all evil is employed by some as well.
In this paper, three theodicies will be examined based on which of the three statements of faith they seem to be redefining. Each of these theodicies will be analyzed using certain consistent criteria which are derived from the writings of David Blumenthal.
After analysis, the theodicies will be highlighted regarding which seem to best satisfy the selected criteria. An attempt will then be made to argue in support of a certain theodicy, as far as its relative criteria-related merits are concerned.
Finally, some consideration will be given to the criterion or criteria which the theodicy may not fully satisfy, and a discussion will follow concerning the utility of this distinction and of the study of theodicy in general.
David Blumenthal, in the introduction to his essay, “Theodicy: Dissonance in Theory and Praxis”, states that in order for a theodicy to be a “good” one, “it…should meet three criteria as fully as possible…it should leave one with one’s sense of reality intact…it should leave one empowered within the intellectual-moral system in which one lives…and…it should be as intellectually coherent as possible” (“Introduction”).
These criteria have been selected because they put such a personal emphasis on the quest for theodicy.
The first two of his three criteria are subjective. That which leaves one theologian’s sense of reality intact does not necessarily leave another’s intact, especially if one of them makes reference in a theodicy to attributes of supernatural beings the other does not accept. One may, however, assume that certain aspects of reality can be agreed upon by a majority of people, excepting psychotics. A theodicy should empower most if not all people thinking within an intellectual-moral system to be called empowering. Therefore, it seems that a degree of objectivity can be drawn from each of the two most subjective of the three criteria.
Concerning the third criteria, that a theodicy be intellectually coherent, Blumenthal expands this in saying that “…it does not leave one unduly torn by contradiction…” (“Introduction”) If a theologian is speaking about contradictions, appeals to the rules of formal logic cannot be far from his or her mind. Stephen Davis strongly uses these rules in the structure of his essay, “Free Will and Evil”. In this essay, Davis begins with the three statements of faith mentioned earlier and then systematically responds to some of the major objections made to claims of consistency among these three claims. The system Davis uses at one point in the essay is a syllogistic method of defense based on the work of Alvin Plantinga, namely a “…procedure for proving that two propositions are logically consistent” (76). To do this, Davis states another assumption to support the two he is examining. In doing so, Davis is tries to account for all unstated assumptions. Davis then argues for the consistency demonstrated by this conjunction. Clearly, a theodicy with non sequiturs for premises will not do, and Davis believes he has described one. Marilyn and Robert Adams perform similar logical acrobatics in their book, The Problem of Evil. Therefore, one might borrow from these theologians when applying of Blumenthal’s criterion of intellectual coherence when examining the logic of a theodicy. One should look specifically for unstated assumptions or those which do not follow.
Now that a framework of theodical analysis has been established, so should a method for separating theodicies into categories. In studying theodicies, one notices that every theodicy seems to redefine one of the three faith statements mentioned by Davis. Explicitly, a theodicy seems to either redefine evil, the goodness of God, or the power of God.
An example of a theodicy which redefines evil is the “soul-making” theodicy of John Hick. (Note: This is found in Hick’s Evil and the God of Love, however this selection is from the reprint in The Problem of Evil.) Hick claims that “…in the light of modern anthropological knowledge some form of two-stage conception of the creation of man has become an almost unavoidable Christian tenet” (Adams, 168).
Hick describes the first stage of human development as “…includ[ing] the development of man as a rational and responsible person capable of personal relationship with the personal Infinite who has created him” (Adams, 168). The second stage leads to his or her “…spiritualization as a child of God” and:
“…cannot be performed by omnipotent power as such. For personal life is essentially free and self-directing. It cannot be perfected by divine fiat, but only through the uncompelled responses and willing co-operation of human individuals in their actions and reactions in the world in which God has placed them. [People] may eventually become the perfected persons whom the New Testament calls ‘children of God’, but they cannot be created ready-made as this” (ibid.).
Hick makes the judgment that “…one who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptations, and thus by rightly making responsible choices in concrete situations, is good in a rich and more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state of either innocence or virtue” (168-9). This, in turn, “…justifies even the long travail of the soul-making process” (169). Hick, in addressing a potential reply that facing possible temptations results in pain gives as an example the fact that “[a] child brought up on the principle that the only or the supreme value is pleasure would not be likely to become an ethically mature adult…” (171). If we are the children of God and “…there is any true analogy between God’s purpose for his human creatures, and the purpose of…parents for their children, we have to recognize that the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain cannot be the supreme and overriding end for which the world exists” (ibid.) And what then is this “supreme and overriding end”? “Soul-making” is the reply Hick gives.
He goes on to cite several examples of the good attributes that one can develop in this world and how they would not be possible in a world without certain evils to face. Hick says that such a world can be found in reply to Hume’s question, “Might not the Deity exterminate all ill…and produce all good…?”(Adams, 178). A world can be conceived of in which “if a thief were to steal a million pounds from a bank…another million pounds would appear from nowhere to replenish the robbed safe...If one man tried to murder another, his bullet would melt innocuously into thin air…” (178-9). Hick has a problem with this world. Specifically:
“there would be nothing wrong with stealing, because no one could ever lose anything by it; there would be no such crime as murder, because no one could ever be killed…if to act wrongly means…to harm someone, there would no longer be any such thing as morally wrong action. And for the same reason there would no longer be any such thing as morally right action.” (179).
This is the focus of Hick’s argument. People are not fully spiritually developed, something God wishes them to be. If people have free will, then people can make choices. Good decisions they make contribute to their spiritual development, so they must be able to make good choices. By definition, they must be able to make bad choices as well.
It can be stated right away that this theodicy satisfies one of Blumenthal’s criteria, that of leaving one’s sense of reality intact. Society rewards those who choose to do good. Those who do evil are punished. Popular culture and media have stories about a person who finds a wallet full of money and takes it to a police station without taking any of the money beforehand. These people are said to be good, and underlying this is an idea that those who do otherwise are somehow lesser beings. That the world is a place where people make choices which affect the development of their souls is one which is not a ridiculous departure from reality. Since the life of a person in this world can be expressed as a series of choices, the main premise of this theodicy is very truly rooted in the idea of cause and effect, and therefore satisfies Blumenthal’s criterion.
This theodicy is also empowering, if only in a vacuous sense. A person is said to have ultimate free will over one’s own actions, and good choices lead to spiritual development as an effect of those choices. Thus, this theodicy puts penultimate power over one’s actions in the hands of a person rather than in the hands of God. The only areas which are immutable by a human are the rules under which this system operates and the nature of the reaction to good choices. If one chooses to rob a store, and performs this action, then this action will have been performed no matter how penitent the person may be later. Hick’s theodicy, by not limiting a person with free agency any more than they are already, serves to not disempower them in any obvious fashion, and thus they are vacuously empowered.
When Hick’s theodicy is examined using Blumenthal’s criterion of intellectual coherence, however, one may see a flaw in Hick’s reasoning. To paraphrase that which was stated earlier, Hick says that if one cannot perform a bad action, then one cannot perform a good action (Adams, 179). However, this is not necessarily true. To say that without evil one cannot have good is not a cogent argument. It might be sufficient, but it is not necessary. It is not hard to imagine a world under the same set of circumstances as ours in which, though possible, there are never good acts, only evil ones.
Furthermore, a world in which a person cannot be harmed by another seems to be just that: a world in which a person cannot harm another. Hick is right in saying that evil and good are meaningless concepts in such a world. The error is in using a meaningless concept with another, namely that the possibility of evil allows for the development of the soul. It is not necessary that a world in which no harm can come to a person has inhabitants worse off than we are. After all, in such a world one could never ask why bad things happen to good people. For this reason, Hick seems guilty of begging the central question behind his theodicy, and therefore cannot be said to satisfy the third of Blumenthal’s criteria.
It would now be useful to look at theodicies which redefine the goodness of God. “A Theodicy of Protest”, by John Roth, makes use of that strategy. In an illustration of this strategy, Roth refers to the work of Elie Wiesel in his play, The Trial of God, and then says, “To deny God outright could go too far. But to affirm God’s total goodness, to apologize for God, to excuse or exonerate God…these steps go too far as well” (Davis, 6). Roth then goes on to demonstrate this point by examining one by one certain aspects or roles God plays. Concerning Hegel’s idea that “…history ‘is the slaughter-bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the virtue of individuals have been sacrificed’”, Roth says, “…such a wasteful God cannot be totally benevolent. History itself is God’s indictment” (Adams, 7). As far as God’s possible responsibility for the world being as it is, Roth says “God’s responsibility is located in the fact that God is the One who ultimately sets the boundaries in which we live and move and have our being...Do not take lightly what God’s responsibility entails. It means: in the beginning…Auschwitz” (8). These are just two of the aspects Roth examines, but they are the two most important of his premises. Roth also goes on to say, “…the human prospect is not hopeless, nor is it without reasons for joy and thanksgiving. Life can be less unacceptable. We know that to be true because from time to time people perform works of love” (13). Clearly, God can share some responsibility for this reality as well. So God is not completely malevolent, even if he is not completely benevolent. One can look to the example of Job for a way to handle God in this theodicy.