Rogue Warrior or Eurosceptic Irritant? Mr. Klaus’ Adventures in Euroland
Hospodarske noviny, Prague, Czech Republic
Professor Dr Amelia Hadfield[1] and Silviu Piros
The following opinion piece reviews a few of the noteworthy highlights of the political career of Czech President Vaclav Klaus. In stark opposition to his predecessor, Vaclav Havel, Klaus is a well-known detractor of the European Union (EU). Critics suggest that his attitudes have undermined the ability of the Czech Republic to progress viably along the post-accession road. His supporters however suggest that Klaus’ ongoing criticism of both EU institutions and instruments represents a healthy defiance to the increasingly top-down weight of the Union.
Vaclav Klaus is currently serving his second (and constitutionally final) term in office as President of the Czech Republic. He was first elected in 2003, re-elected in 2008, and will leave office in January 2013; a key decade, in which the country has undergonesignificant changes. A brief retrospective is timely in order to assess the impact of Klaus’ views on the Czech Republic, the country’s place within the EU, its emerging foreign policy agenda and broad public opinion responses to such changes.
With the fall of the Eastern Block at the end of the ‘80s, the Czech Republic began its long march toward democratic reconstruction. A national identity built on the values of liberty and democracy, and a solid pro-EU reputation helped to define the country’s post-Communist path to freedom, market economy and ultimately, European integration. However, the “two Vaclavs” – as architects of Czech post-Cold War reconstruction - could not be more different. The long-running political antagonism between the two politicians, each attempting to steer the country according to his own political credo, has resulted in a variety of fault lines which now define some the uncomfortable realities of the contemporary Czech Republic.
Vaclav Havel, a key figure of the 1990s, “l'incarnation de la réunification de l'Europe”[2], was a strong advocate of a free and united Europe, and in his role as the first Czech President, led the country smoothly through to NATO and EU membership. Vaclav Klaus on the other hand, has consistently positioned himself firmly against further EU integration, rebuffing the perceived top-down diktats of EU institutions, and rejecting many of the recent measures designed to resuscitate the EU’s financial fortunes. The question is whether the forthright anti-EU attitudes of Mr Klaus has undermined the reputation of the Czech Republic in the eyes of its fellow EU Member States.
Vaclav Klaus’s mandates arecharacterized by a consistent leitmotifof Euroscepticism. Some would argue, that Polish pragmatism aside, rampant Euroscepticism is relatively rare in Eastern Europe. When Klaus came to power in 2003, the Czech Republic had completed accession negotiations with the EU, and was waiting to be formally welcomed into the European family. Paradoxically, Klaus – as honorary Chairman of the Civic Democratic Party - was supported by a generally EU-optimistic electorate[3] in a country visibly enthusiastic about EU membership (with approval ratings of 77%[4]), and U.S.foreign policy.
From the outset, both Klaus’personal views on the EU, and his mandate to enact changes within the Czech Republic upon those lines, were both striking and problematic. Among the political elite of the ruling Civic Democratic Party, Klaus could have found a ready home amongst the minoritarian voices who also argued against key EU initiatives, including the ill-fated European Constitution. Klaus however was unsuccessful in harnessing and expanding this small oppositional group. The death of the treaty across the EU subsequently dulled the main argument of this group, while Klaus himself appeared to gravitate away from the central concerns of his own party, retreating instead into the position of President.
With little luck in being able to transform his party into one supporting his own Eurosceptic attitudes, Klaus instead attempted to appealto public opinion, with increasingly outspoken attitudes on a wide range of EU structures and initiatives. These statements on key political aspects of the EU subsequently earned Klaus a degree of notoriety on the international scene, ultimately affording him the moniker of “the Margaret Thatcher of Central Europe”.
Actions followed words in 2004 when Klaus flatly rejected the prospective European Constitution Treaty; promisingto use his powers to slow down the ratifying process (by referring the question of the ratification process to the Constitutional Court, and to a public referendum). By 2008, Klaus’ s position was well-known, both in and beyond the EU, built increasingly on a reputation that saw him repeatedly callfor the EU to be “scrapped” and replaced by a Free Trade Agreement, supporting the Irish NO vote on the Lisbon Treaty, and even developing strong ties with the highly Eurosceptic UK Independence Party and itsleader, Nigel Farage. The apex of Klaus’s Euroscepticism was reached in 2008, first with his initial refusal to sign the Lisbon Treaty, and second through his subsequent siege against the Treaty and its various objectives. Against the current of the near-Herculean efforts across the EU to bring the Treaty to pass, Klaus’ reputation – and to some extent, by association – that of the Czech Republic – turned from vocal Eurosceptic to an apparently unrelenting critic of all things EU. In the end, the treaty was signed by all 27 Member States, but at the expense of an opt-out from the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the Czech Republic.
In foreign policy terms, Klaus appears equally contrarian. Unlike his predecessor, Klaus advocates strong ties with Russia. He shocked majoritarian European views in August 2008 by supporting Russian actions in the Georgia intervention, and subsequently disagreeing with Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. Klaus further declared that “the political system and freedom [enjoyed] in Russia is now the highest and the best in the history of Russia in the last two millennia”, rattling cages on both sides of the Atlantic. His sole mainstream concession appears to be his strong support of US foreign policy. Despite closing ranks with those EU leaders who criticized the 2003 US military intervention in Iraq, Klaus remains a strong trans-Atlanticist[5], favouring friendly relations with the US, where he visits frequently. America however, may not regard Klaus as entirely reliable, with his 2003 opposition, and his continuing cagey support regardingUS missile defense plans in Europe, which remains an unpopular and divisive issue for Czechs.[6]Current perspectives however suggest that the Obama administration still considers the Czech Republic a staunch ally[7].
What then is the net result of Klaus’ impact upon the Czech Republic, and more broadly within the EU? For those who favour EU integration, Klaus is at best an irritation and at worst a genuine obstacle, one who has steadily reduced the credibility of the Czech Republic as a reliable partner in working toward the goals of political and economic integration. For those with qualms about the future direction of the overall Union, Klaus is an ally, but an unpredictable one, and worse, an ineffective one. Klaus is effectively an Eastern European voice crying in the Eurosceptic wilderness. Attempting to curry favour with both Moscow and Washington appears dangerously Macchiavelian to the majority of his peers, who regard both his pragmatism and his Euroscepticism as unsophisticated, reactive, and ultimately unhelpful, particularly in the present time of crisis.
In broad terms, Klaus’ criticism of the European Union and the Eurozone has made little genuine impact on EU policy makers. The Czech Republic is still obliged to join the Euro, and its Charter opt-out produced node facto change. The political elite, and the broader Czech Republic remain broadly pro-EU, supportive of political and economic forms of integration, and at odds with Klaus’ apparently minoritarian support for Russian views, as evidenced by the split between the ruling parties, who officially recognized Kosovo a few months after its unilateral declaration of independence, in contract to Klaus’ own implacable opposition.
This suggests that Klaus’ own flavor of Euroscepticism has never truly taken hold, either abroad, or at home. His attempts to construct the image of a Eurosceptic Czech Republic have failed to take root both in the Brussels sphere (the Czech Republic is rarely if ever associated with the “classic” Eurosceptics like UK or Denmark), or domestically (Eurobarometer results indicate that the Czech public still favors its membership of the EU and general trust in the EU institutions, even exceeding trust in national institutions[8]). As some observers have suggested Vaclav Klau may operate merelyon the basis of the attention gained from being a colourful Eurosceptic, rather than exemplifying the skill and subtlety needed to affect genuine limitations upon aspects of the EU, and indeed to garner the necessary political and public support for such attitudes to prevail. Accordingly, his Eurosceptic actionshave had a limited impact upon the country’s reputation, and have not fundamentally weakened its ties with its European colleagues, or the international community.
References
Eurobarometer 71 – Public opinion in the European Union
Eurobarometer 69 – Public opinion in the European Union
P. Lyons - ‘It’s the Economy, Stupid’ Popular Support for EU Accession in the Czech Republic - Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Sociological Review, 2007, Vol. 43, No. 3: 523–560
Věra Řiháčková - Czech Republic: “Europeanization” of a hesitant Atlanticist? , EUROPEUM Working Paper, April 2005
Martin Mikule - Is the Czech right becoming more Euro-sceptic?
What Lisbon reminds us about President Klaus – Prague Embassy
[1] Dr Hadfield is a Professor of European Foreign Policyat the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, as well as Jean Monnet Chair in European Foreign Affairs and Senior Research Fellow of the Institute for European Studies. Mr Silviu Piros is a 2012 graduate of the VUB/IES MSc in European Integration and Development.
[2]
[3]Martin Mikule - Is the Czech right becoming more Euro-sceptic?
[4]Eurobarometer 71 – Public opinion in the European Union
[5]Věra Řiháčková - Czech Republic: “Europeanization” of a hesitant Atlanticist? , EUROPEUM Working Paper, April 2005
[6]P. Lyons - ‘It’s the Economy, Stupid’ Popular Support for EU Accession in the Czech Republic - Institute of Sociology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague, Czech Sociological Review, 2007, Vol. 43, No. 3: 523–560
[7]What Lisbon reminds us about President Klaus – Prague Embassy
[8]Eurobarometer 69 – Public opinion in the European Union