Case Name/ Issue

ARS Cases Chart – Spring 2009, Rascoff. –Jason Hardy

Cases

C01. INS v. Chadha...... 2

C02. Clinton v. City of New York...... 3

C03. State v. Warshow...... 4

C03½. United Steelworkers v. Weber...... 5

C03¾. Rector, Holy Trinity Church v. United States...... 6

C04. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp...... 6

C05. U.S. v. Locke...... 7

C06. Green v. Bock Laundry...... 7

C07. Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Dept. of Education...... 8

C08. United States v. Marshall...... 8

C09. Brogan v. U.S...... 9

C10. Li v. Yellow Cab of Calif., Calif...... 9

C10½. FISA/NSA wiretapping case...... 10

C11. Muscarello v. United States...... 11

C12. Leo Sheep Co. v. U.S...... 12

C13. Blanchard v. Bergeron...... 12

C14. In re Sinclair...... 13

C15. Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv. [I]...... 13

C16. Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv. [II]...... 14

C17. Bob Jones Univ. v. U.S...... 14

C18. Cartledge v. Miller...... 14

C19. Lorillard v. Pons...... 15

C20. Morton v Mancari...... 15

C21. Flood v. Kuhn...... 15

C22. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S...... 16

C23. “Benzene Case”...... 16

C24. American Trucking Ass’ns., Inc. v. EPA...... 17

C25. Myers v. United States...... 17

C26. Humphrey’s Executor v. U.S...... 17

C27. Morrison v. Olson...... 18

C28. Commodity Futures Trading Commission [CFTC] v. Schor...... 19

C29. Benslimane v. Gonzales...... 19

C30. Londoner v. Denver...... 20

C31. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization...... 20

C32. Goldberg v. Kelly...... 20

C33. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld...... 21

C34. Board of Regents of State College v. Roth...... 21

C35. Perry v. Sindermann...... 21

C36. Mathews v. Eldridge...... 22

C37. Nt’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Albright...... 22

Cases – 1

Textualism or Formalist / Purposivism / Functionalist / Institutional Competency
- Truepenny and Tatting in Speluncean Explorers
- Burger in Chadha
- Stevens in Clinton
- Barney in Warshow
- Rehnquist in Weber
- Hand in Fishgold
- Marshall in Locke
- Easterbrook in Marshall
- Scalia in Bock Laundry*, Brogan, etc.
- Breyer in Muscarello. / - Foster in Speluncean Explorers (counter by Tatting)
- Billing in Warshow?
- Brennan in Weber.
- Rehnquist (I) in Weber
- Brewer in Holy Trinity*
- Hand in Fishgold
- Stevens in Locke
- Posner (pragmatic) in Marshall*
- Stevens in Bock Laundry*, Brogan
- Ginsburg in Brogan (but limited by the text, in contrast to Stevens in Zuni)
- Stevens in Zuni (intention can trump text, per Holy Trinity)
- Sullivan (DSI) in Li.
- Burger in Bob Jones. / - White in Chadha
- Scalia in Clinton
- Blackmun (P)* in Weber
- Blackmun (P) in Bock Laundry
- Breyer (Eclectic) in Zuni.
- Breyer (Eclectic) in Muscarello.
- Taft (3) in Myers.
- Rehnquist (3) in Morrison v. Olson.
- But see Brennan in Schor (Framers chose limits on efficiency)
* Golden Rule / Issues: less democratic accountability for courts, lack of constitutional authority to legislate, how to judge when a law needs to be changed
- Keen in Spel. Explrs. (counter by Handy)
- Hill in Warshow.
- Ginsberg in Brogan.
- Clark in Li.
- Rehnquist in Bob Jones.
- Blackmun in Flood v. Kuhn
- Marshall et al. in Benzene case
- Counter: Calebresi (DSI - §IIC3).
Case Name/ Issue / (Majority approach) / (Concurring or Dissenting approach) / (Concurring or Dissenting approach)
C01. INS v. Chadha, U.S. (1983), 1150: INS suspended a deportation order. The House overrode the suspension via §244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorized one chamber of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate a decision by the executive to allow a deportable alien to remain in the U.S. Chadha’s lawyer argued that §244(c)(2) is unconstitutional because it does not adhere to the procedures outline in Art. I §7. / [Burger]: (Formalist) – “legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully and fully considered by the Nation’s elected officials.” By bypassing the presentment requirement, the legislative veto gives Congress a “second bite of the apple” and too much power. / Concur in result [Powell]: Separation of Powers - The judiciary should be the check on legislative power. The problem is not so much one of presentment but that the Legislature is displacing the role of the Judiciary and performing a quasi-judiciary function by applying a general law to a specific fact-pattern. (Powell might be o.k. with a change to a law in regard to an unintended application by an administrative agency.) / Dissent [White] (Functionalist):Congress should retain some power to oversee the administration of agencies that it creates with broad delegation of authority.
Public choice analysis: An ig could focus its resources on an agency decision and then a Congressional committee if the agency decision is unfavorable to the ig. Thus, the ig could have influenced a decision thrice (in the passage of the law, in its application by the agency, and in the act of oversight).
C02. Clinton v. City of New York, U.S.(1998), 373: Under the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, the President could sign a bill into law and then cancel out certain provisions. To do so, he is required to consider the legislative hxy and purposes. He also must determine that the cancellation will “(i) reduce the Federal budget deficit, (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not harm the national interest.” And he must notify Congress within a specified time of the cancellation. Clinton exercised the line item veto on a law that gave tax breaks to NYC and farmers, among other groups. Congress members had previously brought suit against the Line Item Veto Act (Rains v. Byrd), but the case was dismissed for lack of standing. / [Stevens] (Formalist):The line-item veto as granted in the Act violated the Constitutional separation of powers because it bypassed the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Art I § 7 by giving the President the power to unilaterally amend or repeal the text of statutes that had been duly passed by Congress; only a Constitutional amendment could make such a structural change. / Dissent [Scalia] (Functionalist):Despite its name, the bill didn’t authorize a line-item veto; it only allowed for the President to “cancel” a spending item, which is functionally equivalent to the Executive’s ability to spend money with discretion which “Congress has permitted the President to do since the formation of the Union.” / Dissent [Breyer]:The Act represented no violation of the text of the Constitution or separation of powers principle. Congress could have parceled out individual bills (a procedure called “enrollment separation”) rather than packaging all the provisions together in a large omnibus bill, and the President could have vetoed individual bills with no problem.
Public choice analysis: Would all the provisions have passed if they were passed separately? Furthermore, isn’t Congress implicitly acknowledging that is it beholden to special interests by granting the President the power to undue compromises that Congress strikes to appease interest groups?
C03. State v. Warshow, (595): Warshow and other Ds engaged in a sit-in designed to prevent nuclear power plant workers from bring the plant back online. Charged with trespass, Ds asserted an affirmative defense of necessity, claiming that the nuclear plant posed a severe threat to public safety, and that blocking the entrance to the plant was necessary to avoid a nuclear accident. The court refused to allow the defense, and Ds were convicted. Affirmed.
[ Public Choice analysis: Well-funded and well-organized nuclear business interests lobbied for the passage of the current law, so were all the policy issues fairly weighed? Possible interest groups opposed to the nuclear business groups would consist of average people who are less-involved in the political process with less money, less organization, and less motivation due to less tangible benefits – thus, concentrated benefits for the business groups and distributed costs for public opposition.] / [Barney, C.J.] (Formalist): The letter of the law for a necessity self-defense was not applicable in this case – “low-level radiation and nuclear waste are not the types of imminent danger classified as an emergency sufficient to justify criminal activity.” The Ds had time to take other actions. / Concur [Hill]: Deference to legislature on policy decisions – The legislature had weighed the competing policy considerations and found that operating a nuclear power plant was relatively safe, thus precluding a necessity defense to self-help protection against harm from the plant. “The balancing of competing values cannot, of course, be committed to the private judgment of the actor, but must, in most cases, be determined at trial with due regard being given for the crime charged and the higher value sought to be achieved… If we were to allow Ds to present the necessity defense in this case we would, in effect, be allowing a jury to redetermine questions of policy already decided by the legislative branches of the federal and state governments [since they had already passed laws to allow for the operation and regulation of nuclear power plants]. This is not how our system of government was meant to operate… Ds still have the right to try to induce those forums that have made the policy choices at issue today to reconsider their decisions. But until that time I feel constrained to follow the law as it is, not as some would like it to be.” / Dissent [Billing]:Evidence should have gone to the jury - “where, as here, the Ds offer to prove an emergency which the regulatory scheme failed to avert, the inference of preclusion is unwarranted.” In response to [Hill], he disputes that the statutes indicate that the legislature had weighed all the policy considerations and found that “the benefits of nuclear energy outweigh its dangers,” as Hill wrote. (Counter argument to Billing’s argument: If juries are allowed to decide policy issues, where will the line be drawn?)
“Moreover, statutory enactments in derogation of the common law are [to be] strictly [(narrowly)] construed.” So, here, legislation endorsing nuclear power should not be read to indicate a broad legislative intent to undermine the common law necessity defense. (Hill’s counter to Billing’s view: The legislature’s stated policy, enacted through statutes, overrides the more general common law doctrine of necessity in this case.)
C03½.United Steelworkers v. Weber, US (1979), 99:
The United Steelworkers of America and Kaiser Aluminum had “voluntarily” implemented an affirmative action-based training program to increase the number of the company's black skilled craft workers. Half of the eligible positions in the training program were reserved for blacks. Weber, who was white, was passed over for the program despite his qualifications. He claimed that he was the victim of reverse discrimination. Lower courts supported Weber's claim that employment preferences based upon race violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s prohibition against racial discrimination in employment. Rev’d. / [Brennan] (Purposivism): An affirmative action plan voluntarily adopted by private parties to eliminate traditional patterns of racial discrimination does not violate the spirit or intent of Title VII. (Textualist) argument as well: Although an employer cannot be compelled by the government or the courts to adopt a remedial program like Kaiser’s, a voluntarily-adopted program, as at issue here, is not barred by §703(j). / Concur [Blackmun] (Pragmatic/ Golden Rule): Voluntary quota programs like Kaiser’s are permissible to remedy “arguable violations” of the CRA. Congress did not consider this sort of situation when it passed the CRA. Kaiser’s situation is that, if it takes no action, it faces possible future liability for discrimination under the CRA. But by taking voluntary action to remedy racial imbalance in the workforce, it risks a lawsuit from white employees like Weber.
Public choice issues: If Congress didn’t like the decision, couldn’t it change the law? Congress may be reluctant to avoid legislating on controversial labor and employment issues because Labor and Business lobbies are powerful interest groups. In this case, both groups benefited from the decision, so there would be little motivation to push for a change. / Dissent [Rehnquist and Burger] (Textualist): The text of the statute clearly prohibits the type of discrimination that Weber faced.
(Intentionalist): Furthermore, the legislative history indicates an intent to eliminate all racial discrimination, “recognizing that no discrimination based on race is benign, that no action disadvantaging a person because of his color is affirmative.” Thus, programs that give preference to workers of color would be barred under the Act, just as discrimination against workers of color was barred.
(Purposivist): The purpose of the CRA was to contribute toward a “color blind” society.
In response to the majority’s contention that Kaiser adopted the plan voluntarily, they did so under pressure of potential intervention by the Fed. Gov’t.
C03¾. Rector, Holy Trinity Church v. United States, U.S. (1892), 695: Holy Trinity Church contracted with E. Walpole Warren, an Englishman, to move to NY to serve as its pastor and rector. A statute forbade a company from assisting or encouraging an alien to immigrate for the purposes of performing “labor or service of any kind in the United States.” Express exceptions did not include preaching.
- Holding: Although Holy Trinity’s contract fell within the literal interpretation of the statute, the intent of the statute’s drafters was “to stay the influx of … cheap unskilled labor” (not preachers). / [Brewer] (Purposivist/Intentionalist – Golden Rule): “It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.” “This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute…” Although a (Textualist) analysis indicates rectors are not one of the vocations excepted from the statute, the title of the statute refers to the prohibition of aliens under contract to “perform labor,” and preaching is not commonly understood to be considered “labor.” / [Brewer] (cont.):
(Intentionalist)
- Historical framework/general intent - Re: Heydon’s case #2, the evil (mischief) this statute was enacted to remedy was outlined by Justice Brown in United States v. Craig: Businesses contracted with aliens to provide passage to the U.S. and low wages in exchange for labor. “The effect of this was to break down the labor market…” leading to an appeal to Congress to enact the Act.
- Legislative History/ specific intent – An extract from a committee report indicated that the term “manual labor” was suggested as an adequate replacement for the overly-broad term “labor.” However, the committee recommended passage of the law without changing the term in light of a deadline and “believing that the bill in its present [final] form will be construed as including only those whose labor or service is manual…” [Note that extrinsic legislative material was generally not allowed to alter “plain” statutory meaning.] / [Brewer] (cont.):
Constitutional and historical argument – The 1st Am holds that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The U.S. (“a Christian nation”) was founded by and continues to be ruled by religious people, who undoubtedly did not intend to interfere with religious work. Constitutional and historical argument – The 1st Am holds that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” The U.S. was founded by and continues to be ruled by religious people, who undoubtedly did not intend to interfere with religious work.
C04. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 2d., 707: A federal statute provided that a person who had left private employment for U.S. military service must be restored to their previous position upon return from service “and shall not be discharged from such position without cause within one year after such restoration.” Fishgold charged that his employer violated this law after it laid him off within a year of his return to work after serving in the army. J for D. / [Hand](Formalist/Textualist): The dictionary definition of “discharge” denotes a permanent termination of employment, rather than the temporary termination denoted by “layoff.” / [also Hand majority]
(Purposivist – Imaginative Reconstruction): When Congress passed the Act in 1940, service was limited to one year and the U.S. was still at peace. “Against that background it is not likely that a proposal would then have been accepted which gave industrial priority ... to unmarried men – for the most part under thirty – over men in the thirties, forties or fifties, who had wives and children dependent upon them.”
C05. U.S. v. Locke, U.S. (1985), 728: Fed Land Policy & Mgt Act (FLPMA) required mining claimholders to file documents with Bureau of Land Mgt. (BLM)“prior to 12/31.” Locke, whose family had been mining for decades prior to the FLPMA’s passage in 1982, filed on 12/31 and was denied. P sued BLM. District found for P, overturned the denial, and held the statute unconstitutional, which sent the case directly to the Sup Ct. R’d. / [Marshall] (Formalist/Textualist): “[W]ith respect to filing deadlines a literal reading of Congress’ words is generally the only proper reading…” “[T]he fact that Congress might have acted with greater clarity or foresight does not give courts carte blanche to redraft statutes in an effort to achieve that which Congress is perceived to have failed to do.” Since the text is clear, no need to look to legislative hxy or intent. / Dissent [Stevens, joined by Brennan] (Intentionalist): FLPMA had obvious drafting errors and Congress likely made a mistake re: the deadline. The BLM apparently misunderstood the deadline as well, so P’s mistake was reasonable because the language was not plain. “Congress would have chosen to adopt a construction of the statute that filing take place by the end of the calendar year if its attention had been focused on this precise issue.”
C06. Green v. Bock Laundry, US (1989) 766: Green, a former burglar, lost his arm using one of D’s machines and sued under products liability claim. D sought to impeach P’s credibility using past crimes evidence. FRE 609(a)(1) states that past crimes evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect “to the defendant.” Since Green was Plaintiff in this case, evidence of his past crimes could not be excluded for prejudicial effect, according to a literal reading of the statute. Appls Ct. affirmed allowance of impeaching evidence, and Sup Ct. affirmed.
Holding: FRE 609(a)(1) should be interpreted to mean that only the accused in a criminal case should be protected from unfair prejudice by the balance set out in the rule. / [Stevens] (Intentionalist – Golden Rule):
(a) A literal reading of the statute would lead to an odd result that “would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adversary’s testimony that it grants to a civil defendant. ... [Thus,] Rule 609(a)(1) ‘can’t mean what it says...’” because civil litigants have the same due process rights under the 5th Am.
(b) The legislative hxy indicates that Congress intended that only the defendant in a criminal case should be protected from unfair prejudice by the balancing requirement set out in Rule 609(a)(1).