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The Influence of Interest Groups on Federal Education Policy
Anne Whitesell
Fowler Paper Competition
Table of Contents
Abstract
Literature Review
Interest Groups in Education
Conceptual Framework
Methodology
Strategies to Influence Education Policy
Analysis
Submitting Letters to Multiple Hearings
The Influence of PACs, Lobbying, and Revenues
Education Policy Issues
Multivariate Regression Analysis
Conclusions
Appendix 1.
Appendix 2.
Bibliography
Abstract
Much research has been devoted to studying the influence of interest groups in shaping public policy; I chose to focus my research on groups interested in federal education policy. The data comes from the letters of support submitted by interest groups to the nomination hearings for Secretary of Education appointees Rod Paige, Margaret Spellings, and Arne Duncan. I collected data on the characteristics of the groups, their strategies, and the issues mentioned within the letters. The relationships between variables were analyzed using a series of chi-square tests and binominal regressions. My results show that financial resources and the nature of the group’s members affect the group’s strategies. The results also show that the specific issues mentioned are influenced by the background of the nominee, the incoming administration’s priorities, and the current political climate. Further research on the topic might include looking into how interest groups shape education policy in other venues (lawmaking, regulations, etc.).
Literature Review
Any study of American education policy will uncover an extensive network of competing interests looking to make their mark in governmental policy. These groups cover a vast constituency, ranging from educators(primarily teachers, principals, and administrators) to student and parent advocacy groups, to groups representing various religious, ethnic, and other minorities (Bailey 1975, 7). These groups have existed since the creation of public schools, and special interests have existed since the country’s founding. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 10, the role of a republican government is to control the effects of factions, or those groups which are “united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest.” Therefore, before delving into the influence of outside groups in education, it is important to have a basic understanding of the creation of interest groups as a whole and their influence in the governmental process.
In his 1951 book The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion, David Truman postulated that advanced societies are bound to see an increase in the quantity, and significance, of interest groups. As people develop specific skills and labor becomes specialized, those with similar interests will band together; in times of disturbance, such as periods of economic crisis or political change, these individuals will meet with increased frequency (Truman 1951, 97). Eventually, these meetings lead to the formation of interest groups, defined as “any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes” (Truman 1951, 33). Truman also suggested that the formation of new groups occurs in waves, for as one group emerges to present their claims, another will emerge in opposition (59). These groups will then bring their concerns, whether they are interested in maintaining the status quo or are promoting policy change, to government institutions (Baumgartner, et al. 2009; Truman 1951).
Agreeing with Truman’s general principle concerning the creation of interest groups, Mancur Olson stated in The Logic of Collective Action that interest groups generally exist to advancethe common interests of its members (1965, 5). Olson disagreed, however, with Truman’s emphasis on the importance of group size in promoting common interests. According to traditional group theory, the amount of power accorded to a group was proportional to its membership size, so the larger groups, generally those with broader interests, would usually succeed over the smaller interest groups (Olson 1965, 121). Olson refuted this theory, pointing out that it assumes there is a general consensus within large groups as to which action will best achieve the group’s goals (1965, 60). This is almost never the case, however, and so small groups that can reach consensus and organize their actions more quickly have an advantage (Olson 1965, 58). Olson cited politics as evidence against the traditional theory, where politicians are very much aware of the power of small, “special interest” groups to change public policy (1965, 127).
If the primary objective of an interest group is to change current policy to align with the group’s claims, the intermediary goal is to attain access to the government (Truman 1951, 264). This proves to be a difficult task, however, as the time and resources of government officials are scarce (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 22). To begin, advocates must elevate their grievances to the public agenda. Items on the public agenda generally meet three criteria: first, the group identifies the problem or gives it a name by which it will be known to the public. Secondly, the group identifies the culprit causing the problem, whether it is another group or a government institution. Finally, the group issues specific demands on the government to resolve the issue (Cobb and Ross 1997, 5-6). For public action to be taken on an issue, it must move from the public to the formal agenda, a shift that signifies the issue is actively under consideration (Cobb and Ross 1997, 7). In order to be added to the formal agenda, an advocate promoting change from the status quo must provide objective evidence that an issue exists, as well as convince the public that a complete overhaul of current policy is necessary. This is especially pertinent when considering policy changes that have varying impacts on different constituencies (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 21). Within the education sector, education issues with strong ties to other policy areas often see a shift to the formal agenda. During the Cold War, for instance, increased attention to math and science programs came from the threat posed by the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union.
For some issues, securing a place on the formal agenda will be easier, such as those issues that are well-covered by the media. The issues that attract media coverage and the attention of the public are known as salient issues; frequently, when the salience of an issue grows, so does its importance for the political parties (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 99). In other instances, there is a crisis or focal event that draws attention to an issue. Even so, the likelihood of policy change will remain low unless the issue was already being discussed prior to the focal event (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 122). In the absence of a focal event or the media coverage that comes with a partisan issue, Truman (1951) places the responsibility on interest groups to increase awareness of the issue and its possible consequences. This process is necessary to rally public support based on rational and stable principles; rationality and stability make for a public that is more willing to act. In addition, an interest group has a greater chance of gaining access to government if it is well-established and has a history of success in the political process (Cobb and Ross 1997; Truman 1951).
Interest groups have an assortment of access points from which to choose when looking to receive governmental attention. First, the group must select which branch of government will be the venue for the proposed policy change, and whether it will be most effective to lobby local, state, or federal officials. When appealing to Congress members or the presidential administration, the group may become involved in the nomination and election process, or wait until the official has been elected. During the campaign season, interest groups may opt to donate to campaigns or encourage their members to vote in the primary and general elections. They may also supply their members with the voting records and backgrounds of the candidates, thus highlighting which candidate is most supportive of the group’s goals (Truman 1951, 289-290). Rarely do interest groups come out with open endorsements of candidates. An interest group faces potential hostility in the new administration if they campaigned against them during the election season, and groups with members from different political affiliations risk division within their organization if they issue an endorsement (Truman 1951, 290). While interest groups may not officially come out in favor of one candidate, common links between certain groups and political parties are well known. Labor unions, for example, typically favor Democratic candidates, while business organizations generally work with Republicans (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 92)
Opponents of change may threaten to withdrawal support should the candidate advocate a change in the status quo. This strategy is less effective when used by groups with a small membership or geographically dispersed constituency, because they are unlikely to have much influence on other groups, and the membership is not large enough to carry significant weight (Truman 1951, 304). This would seem to run counter to Olson’s group theory, mentioned previously. There is a caveat to Olson’s theory, though; while small groups succeed when the issues are narrow and concern a small population, they tend to be less powerful “when questions which divide the entire nation are involved” because they are faced with opposition from much larger organized groups (1965, 147). The sheer size of large business organizations or labor unions, with their millions of members (and voters), outweighs the quicker mobilization of small interest groups. Withdrawal of support, therefore, is used most often by the most powerful interest groups (Cobb and Ross 1997, 39). Those groups that do officially endorse a candidate seek to gain more than those who choose to remain neutral, with the greatest gain seen by those who endorse the winning candidate and help create the candidate’s policy platform (Truman 1951, 285). According to Truman (1951), an interest group chooses to influence a candidate’s platform in hopes that it will guarantee access to the future administration.
Turning toward the executive branch was a common route for the policy advocates studied by Baumgartner et al. (2009, 14). If an interest group seeks to become influential in the administration, it may begin making its case during the transition. One way to become involved in the transition is through political appointments. Truman observed that the public official without conflicting motivations is an “illusion” and some of the most important connections officials have are those in “professional and skill groups” (450-452). Consequently, interest groups that have a hand in creating the administration have the opportunity to discuss the issues to be addressed by the administration. Thus, when analyzing public policies, Truman suggested questioning the interest groups associated with the administration and their internal organization (439-441). Becoming involved in implementation is not only important for the advancement of a group’s own objectives, but also gives them the opportunity to determine which issues will not be addressed. Bachrach and Barantz called this process of limiting the scope of policy options “non-decision-making” (as cited in Cobb and Ross 1997, 16).
The transition is a period in which interest groups from all sides are faced with uncertainty. Those opposed to change increase their efforts to maintain the status quo, while policy initiators see a presidential transition as an opportunity for change. Uncertainty increases when control of the White House switches parties, for as Truman (1951) noted, the new administration may repeal old policies, adjust former methods, or head in a completely new direction. This window of opportunity is short-lived because issues capture public attention for only a short time before being replaced by new concerns. Reauthorizations and nondiscretionary items occupy a large amount of public officials’ time, forcing new ideas that require extra time and resources into “issue limbo” (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 220; Cobb and Ross 1997, 11). In addition, politicians are typically risk averse, so interest groups with ideologies that conflict with the views of the administration face even more difficulties. Politicians will also be wary of engaging in issues that increase partisan conflict (Cobb and Ross 1997, 17).
Policy advocates are at a disadvantage because of their limited opportunity to bring their issue to the formal agenda, and so for many interest groups, maintaining the status quo is their most important objective, as found by Baumgartner et al. (2009) in their study of 98 policy debates. While advocates for change fight for increased visibility of their issue and attention from public officials, opponents benefit from staying out of the spotlight and initially may refuse to recognize that an issue even exists (Cobb and Ross 1997, 26-27). When the opponent can no longer deny the existence of an issue, both sides may choose to share research with public officials. Baumgartner et al. (2009) noted that advocates are more successful when they can provide an official with expert policy information because it gives an advocate the opportunity to emphasize one dimension of the debate (124). It is also a valuable tool because it subsidizes the official’s limited time and effort. Conversely, a supporter of the status quo can use distribution of information to highlight potential negative consequences of policy change and may even suggest that a policy initiator’s position is built on weak evidence (Cobb and Ross 1997, 30).
In their study, Baumgartner et al. (2009) found that opponents of change were less likely than proponents to report lobbying activity. Opponents are on the defensive and only need to act when a group proposing change is a substantial threat to the status quo. Cobb and Ross (1997) theorized that opposition groups will attempt to keep the status quo intact using as few resources as possible. As mentioned above, opponents may stave off change by ignoring the issue completely, and in many cases, time is on their side; eventually attention dies down and public officials move on to other issues (Cobb and Ross 1997, 26). On those issues that require some action, opponents attempt to discredit policy advocates through the use of stereotypes and attacks on their issue. In addition, opponents may resort to symbolic placation strategies such as the creation of committees or commissions. Designed to acknowledge the problem without seriously considering the initiator’s solution, a committee is typically made up of a bipartisan expert panel with limited time and resources to study the problem (Cobb and Ross 1997, 34-35). In contrast, Truman stated that advisory committees give change advocates another opportunity to influence decision-making. Such committees provide public officials with technical information by consulting with those who are likely to be affected by the new government action (Truman 1951, 458). Regardless, supporters of the status quo have a distinct advantage because they have already gained access to the system. As Baumgartner et al. (2009) reported, after two years, over two-thirds of the policy issues studied had not experienced any change.
Along with the assumption that groups with more experience in policymaking (usually those defending the status quo) will have greater success, there is a widely held belief that groups with greater financial resources will get their way more often. In reality though, policy debates are often composed of sides with relatively equal resources, for as one side collects resources, their opposition is likely to do the same (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 229). The correlation between resources and policy success was positive, but not statistically significant, in the Baumgartner et al. study. Furthermore, this advantage was stronger for supporters of the status quo, while advocates of change saw the advantage decrease over time (2009, 234). The support of the president appears to be more important than the amount of resources. The probability of success for defenders of the status quo was far greater when the administration was also defending the status quo (233). For proponents of change, change was more likely to occur when the administration was in support of change, though even this probability was lower than the likelihood that the status quo would remain in place (235). Ultimately, the numerous factors that play into policy advocating make it extremely difficult for advocates and public officials to predict the final outcome of a policy debate (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 260).
Interest Groups in Education
Narrowing the focus to interest groups concerned with education policy, many of the same trends found among interest groups in general exist. Policy advocating, regardless of the issue, typically requires a long-term commitment (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 219). The majority of education interest groups seek solutions to far-reaching problems, although occasionally groups form around a single issue, such as sex education, school and bus safety, or drug abuse (Adam 1975, 170). In general, a consensus already exists on these issues, so once the policy is changed, the group disbands (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 219). Even for those who advocate over long periods of time, the ultimate goal may not be to change an established government program (Baumgartner, et al. 2009, 116). Within an education interest group, a few critical issues exist, but others may be on the agenda simply because a minority feels strongly about it, or an ally is advocating on the same issue. This combination of crucial and less important issues is due to the fact that only a small proportion of education interest groups have any substantial influence (Bailey 1975, 48). Few groups, for example, have the resources to become heavily involved in campaigns, or the membership to rally behind a candidate (Bailey 1975, 79).