Nuclear Proliferation in Asia

Nuclear Proliferation in Asia:

India, Pakistan, China and the Threat to Global Security

Judy Wang

December 3, 2004

Engr 297a: Professor Bruce Lusignan

A Setback for Nonproliferation: Introduction

The United States pioneered the development of the nuclear bomb and ushered in a new age of sophisticated and deadly weaponry. China soon followed and along with the United States, France, Britain, and Russia, it became part of the five countries in the world recognized to possess nuclear weapons. The most recent countries to join the nuclear club, though the international regime tried to halt membership with the Non Proliferation Treaty, are Pakistan and India. In 1998, both countries publicly tested their own nuclear weapons, causing a whirlwind of problems for the world today. My paper will outline the modern day arsenals of nuclear weapons in China, India, and Pakistan and describe their strategic doctrine for the use of these weapons today. I will also analyze the various international security fears stemming from the existence of these weapons. Dr. Khan’s nuclear black market, the vulnerability of weapons, tensions in South Asia, and the terrorist threat all create problems that extend beyond just a regional concern; they are, indeed, global issues. Though these difficulties seem insurmountable, I will recommend policies that can be taken to prevent these dangers and discuss what is currently being done.

The Chinese Nuclear Arsenal and Strategic Doctrine:

“If China does not have atomic and hydrogen bombs and has not launched satellites since the 1960s, it is not worthy of being called a big and influential country and will not have its present international prestige.” –Deng Xiaoping1.

In the 1980s, China began to modernize its nuclear weapons, and it has continued to this day. Though specific information on China’s arsenals and plans to advance its technology are unknown, there is reliable evidence on both. China relies mainly on its ballistic missiles to carry nuclear warheads, of which there are five main types: the DF-3, DF-4, DF-5, DF-21, and DF-31. Currently, the DF-3 is being retired as China moves to longer range missiles2. To replace the outdated DF-3 missiles, China built the DF-21, some of which are conventionally armed. The most modern of these missiles are the DF-31s, which can travel 8,000 kilometers and are aimed primarily at Russia and American bases in Asia. Future modernization plans include revamping the DF-31 to extend its range to approximately 12,000 kilometers, so that it can be targeted at the United States3. This new DF-31 missile is sometimes known as the DF-41, though its proper name is the DF-31A4. Though deployment of this missile is unknown, it is projected to occur between 2006 and 20105. While exact numbers of ballistic missiles are unknown, it is believed China has 20 liquid-fueled intermediate range DF-4s, 48 medium range solid-fuel DF-21s, and 20 silo-based intercontinental DF-5s, which can reach the United States6.

China’s sea-based and air-based weapons capabilities are not as advanced as their missiles. China’s sea-based strategic nuclear force consists of one Xia-class submarine, named the Xia, which carries 12 warheads with a range of approximately 1,700 kilometers. China also has around 100 Hong-6 medium range bombers to carry nuclear warheads7.

U.S. intelligence agencies estimate that China has 20 nuclear warheads, but this number is expected to rise. By 2015, the U.S. predicts China will have 75-100 warheads, mostly targeted at the United States8. Though the accuracy of these numbers is obscure, it is known that China has the capability to produce far more than its current stockpile holds. Based on their strategic doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons, China has chosen not to manufacture more warheads than it feels necessary.

Immediately after conducting its first nuclear explosion in 1964, China announced its intention to abide by a “no-first use” policy9. This coincides with Chinese thinking that nuclear weapons are largely a political symbol used to deter adversaries rather than attack them. A “no-first use” policy is China’s guarantee that it will never be the first to start a nuclear war and engage in mutually assured destruction. To further illustrate China’s no-first use policy, it is believed that China keeps its nuclear weapons under tight command and control with the missiles unfueled and the warheads stored separately10. China has also never participated in an arms race as the United States and Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Instead, China relies on a “limited deterrence” 11. To the Chinese, limited deterrence is the intermediary between “minimum deterrence” and “maximum deterrence”. It is the ability to survive a first strike and respond proportionally12. China’s intention is to dissuade other countries from intervening in local wars or directly attacking China. With this type of doctrine, China is able to establish the legitimacy of its nuclear weapons program while exercising restraint in their use.

India’s Nuclear Force and Deterrent Capabilities

Exact information of the size, complexity, and readiness of India’s nuclear arsenal is unknown, but the Center for Defense Information suggests that India currently has 60 nuclear warheads with enough plutonium to manufacture 30-50 more13. India relies on two main missiles the Prithvi and the Agni. The Prithvi missiles are short range, with the ability to travel less than 500 kilometers. The Agni missiles, tested in January 2002, have a range of 700 kilometers. Currently, India is developing longer range Agni missiles that can travel a distance of up to 5,000 kilometers14.

Other possible missiles for sea-based strength include a short-range Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile and a Submarine Launched Cruise Missile15. India also has a sufficient arsenal for air-based nuclear warheads. Among the plans that could readily carry nuclear weapons are India’s 147 MiG-27s and 88 Jaguars. Additionally, India has 150 MiG-21 fighters, 64 MiG-29s, and 36 Mirage 2000s available to upgrade for the task of carrying nuclear warheads16.

India’s nuclear doctrine focuses on four main ideas: no first use, deterrence, civilian command and control, and eventual global disarmament17. The no first use policy signifies India’s commitment to never initiate a nuclear war. Like China’s doctrine, India relies on its retaliatory strike capability to serve as a deterrent. India believes that as long as it has a survivable force of nuclear weapons, a country will be deterred from attacking for fear of a reprisal, which fulfills its credible minimum deterrence policy18. India’s National Security Advisory Board released an official Indian doctrine outlining the requirements for their deterrence in 1999. In it, the Indian government states that their weapons need to be credible, effective, and survivable, meaning that India is able to threaten and carry out a devastating attack if attacked first19. This is the minimum deterrence policy that India pursues. Another aspect of India’s nuclear doctrine is to ensure civilian leaders keep a firm grip on the nuclear arsenal20. Indian authorities assert that only the highest of political leaders will have access and control of India’s nuclear arsenal21. This minimizes the risk of an unauthorized launch or accidental war because of both India’s no first use policy and its civilian command of the weapons. Though India does have nuclear weapons, it is still interested in world disarmament. If other countries were to also pledge to rid themselves of their nuclear weapons, India would reciprocate or so the doctrine claims22. The Indian doctrine as described on paper shows considerable restraint in the use of nuclear weapons.

Pakistan: Nuclear Weapons and the Balance of Power

Intelligence experts estimate that Pakistan possesses anywhere from 30-50 nuclear weapons. Their delivery methods consist of missiles and fighter planes, all of which originated from foreign technology. The Ghauri I and II are the Pakistani version of the North Korean Nodong. These missiles have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers. Pakistan also possesses the Shaheen I, derived from Chinese technology, and is developing the Shaheen II. These missiles have a range of approximately 2,500 kilometers. Pakistan’s fighter planes capable of carrying nuclear warheads are Chinese A5 fighter planes, French Mirage fighters, and 32 American-made F16s23.

Pakistani Foreign Minister Mian Khursid Mahmud Kasuri says that their nuclear doctrine is aimed only to deter India; the rest of the world should not view Pakistani nuclear weapons as a threat24. The Pakistani nuclear weapons program is viewed to be an intrinsic part of Pakistan’s deterrence. Pakistan believes that their nuclear power is crucial to preventing India from engaging in a limited war or a large-scale military operation25. Pakistan has not agreed upon a no first use policy because it fears that without the option of using nuclear weapons first, India could escalate any conflict into conventional warfare. India has a far superior conventional army, which would put Pakistan at a severe disadvantage in any conflict if it could not credibly threaten the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan feels the only way to deter an Indian attack is to leave open the option of using nuclear weapons during any type of conflict.

An International Nightmare Realized: A.Q. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan is a national hero in Pakistan. He is known as the father of Pakistan’s bomb, and indeed, Pakistan owes a lot of its success to him. Despite his confessions of violating Pakistan’s export control regulations by selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea26, his status and prestige earned him a pardon from Musharraf instead of criminal charges.

Though Pakistan passed laws prohibiting the export of nuclear materials, these laws had loopholes and no authority to monitor compliance27. Khan operated mostly through intermediaries and sold the technology through a black market. Pakistan strongly denies ties with Khan’s illicit trade, claiming that they did not know about it, but this still remains controversial today. It is hard to believe that Khan could have acted without a higher authority, but officials in the Pakistani government say that Khan was able sell technology without the government’s knowledge because he had virtually no authority overseeing his actions28. There is evidence that the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) not only knew of A.Q. Khan’s transfer of technology, but assisted in smuggling the material out of Pakistan29. Whether the Pakistani government simply failed to enforce its own laws, ignored Khan’s proliferation, or complied with it remains to be seen.

A.Q. Khan is believed to have helped several countries in their quest for nuclear weapons, but none more so than Iran. As early as 1987, under General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq, Pakistan and Iran established a relationship for nuclear exchange30. Khan set up and maintained secret bank accounts for the money he received from Iran in exchange for nuclear secrets and material. He used a middle man, Noman Shah, who was also his son-in-law until 1994, to broker deals with Iran31. Khan allegedly sold outmoded centrifuges to Iran and the technical specifications and possibly components for modern models until 199532. The lax reinforcement of Pakistani laws and the lack of authority over A.Q. Khan allowed him to smuggle material to other countries relatively easily. The case of covert aid to Libya illustrates the disturbing ease at which countries wishing to acquire nuclear weapons could do so. Libya is estimated to have purchased equipment worth $100 million that was intended to be used as a centrifuge plant 33. Khan also provided Libya with at least 20 assembled centrifuges (outdated models) and 1.87 tons of enriched uranium34, which is enough to fuel a plant. Even worse, it is believed that Khan sold Libya the design for a workable nuclear weapon35.

Since the A.Q. Khan scandal, Pakistan has made efforts to reform its nuclear export regulations. In late September 2004, the Pakistani government passed a bill known as the Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act. Any violation would result in a maximum of fourteen years in prison, revocation of property and personal belongings, and a fine of 5 million rupees. This law also extends to accomplices, who would receive the same punishment36. The consequences of A.Q. Khan’s transgressions threaten the world today. Pakistan is an example of how other countries or individuals seeking financial gain could invalidate the international regime against nuclear nonproliferation.

Securing Our Future: Threat Reduction

Avoiding Nuclear Terror:

For the international community, the Khan scandal was a worst fear realized. The thought of terrorists ever possessing these weapons is of main concern today. While deterrence may work to prevent wars between states, the new emerging threat to the world today is terrorism. Asia today is responsible for three quarters of terrorism worldwide, and most of this comes from South Asia37. The growing power and extremism of Islamic militants only serves to further destabilize South Asia and poses a serious risk for the world, especially given the nuclear status of both India and Pakistan38. Exploiting the vulnerability of weapons and political instability in Pakistan would be one of the easiest ways for terrorists to get their hands on these weapons. As the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei, asserts, “The danger is so imminent... not only with regard to countries acquiring nuclear weapons but also terrorists getting their hands on some of these nuclear materials, uranium or plutonium”39. Pakistan is viewed as the most likely source of proliferation, either knowingly or inadvertently.

The new relationship between Pakistan and the United States as well as Pakistan’s hardened stance against Islamic extremists and terrorists make it unlikely that Pakistan would knowingly provide terrorists with weapons. The main risk, as the A.Q. Khan scandal demonstrated, is proliferation by Pakistani officials without government authorization. The U.S. has also voiced its concerns over retired scientists in the Pakistani nuclear agency that may have gone abroad to work for North Korea and share their nuclear know-how40. Still, no one is ruling out the possibility of Pakistan selling nuclear material or information for financial gain. With a foreign debt of around $40 billion dollars, the temptation to sell technology or knowledge might be too much for the Pakistani government41.

As the Congressional Research Service notes, the main fear stemming from the Pakistani nuclear arsenal is “that some members of the armed forces might covertly give a weapon to terrorists or that, if President Musharraf were overthrown, an Islamic fundamentalist government or a state of chaos in Pakistan might enable terrorists to obtain a weapon” 42. In recent years, however, the U.S. and Pakistan have worked together to change Pakistan’s image in the international eye. As an ally in the war on terror, Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to cracking down on Islamic extremism to the delight of the international community and most importantly, to the appreciation of India and the United States. Since 9/11, Musharraf has recanted on Islamabad’s earlier claims that it provided “moral support” for the insurgency in Kashmir. The Pakistani government now makes it clear that it opposes such attacks; Musharraf demonstrated this with his ban of radical Islamic organizations43

.Critics of Musharraf claim that he is not doing enough. They point out that these organizations continue to exist under new names and that Musharraf can still do more to improve on his current policies to suppress radicalism44. These accusations, however, ignore the real progress Pakistan is making. Musharraf’s actions against fundamentalist groups are more decisive steps than any other Pakistani leader has ever attempted45. President Musharraf has continued to aggressively hunt terror suspects despite several assassination attempts on his life and officials in his government, purported to be the work of Al-Qaeda in response to Musharraf’s intolerance of militants46. Since 9/11, Pakistan has significantly aided the war on terror not only in Afghanistan, but also by arresting more than 500 terrorism suspects and maintaining an army of 100,000 specifically for anti-terror efforts47. This has significantly improved Pakistan’s relations with the international community because it is proving that it can be a country held responsible for its people and actions. The effects of Pakistan’s new stance against terror on its relationship with India will be discussed in a later portion of this paper.

The Chance of Accidental War and the Vulnerability of Weapons

While there has been no nuclear war between India and Pakistan since both obtained nuclear weapons, this does not mean that there is no chance of a future one. Though neither Pakistan nor India has used nuclear weapons, there is still a chance of accidental war due to the vulnerability of their arsenals. The political instability and economic failure in Pakistan further exacerbates this international concerns Pakistan outwardly assures the international community of the security of their nuclear weapons, but people within the Pakistani government often doubt the command and control of their own weapons. A former Pakistani foreign minister, Agha Shahi, has described the high risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch as neither Pakistan nor India have effective early warning systems to detect missiles that have been fired48.