CDS

143 CDS 13 E rev. 1

Original: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

COMMITTEE ON

THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY

THE WESTERN BALKANS:

Securing a Stable future

SPECIAL Report

Witold WASZCZYKOWSKI(Poland)

Special Rapporteur

12 October 2013

1

143 CDS 13 E rev.1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.Introduction

II.Bosnia and Herzegovina: Overcoming Deep-Seated Divisions

A.Background

B.Domestic political landscape

C.role of international community and

Euro-Atlantic integration

1.Office of the High Representative

2.EU integration

3.Relations with NATO

III.Kosovo: NEW HOPES

A.Reaching workable modus vivendi

B.Multi-ethnicity in Kosovo

1.Political representation of minorities

2.Physical safety of people and cultural and religious sites

3.Minority languages, education and religion

C.role of international community

IV.The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia:

Challenges of Integration

A. Euro-Atlantic Integration and relations with neighbours

B.Domestic challenges

C. Building a multi-ethnic society

V.conclusions

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………………………………

1

143 CDS 13 E rev.1

I.Introduction

  1. The stabilisation of the Western Balkans and their gradual integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions remains an important prerequisite for European and transatlantic security. The region has undergone remarkable transformation during the last two decades, making enormous efforts to become an area of stability and prosperity. The probability of another outbreak of armed conflicts has been considerably reduced. Substantial progress has been made bringing war criminals to justice. The Balkans have also transformed the Euro-Atlantic institutions, serving as catalyst for NATO to enter the business of crisis management, and for the EU to launch its European Security and Defence Policy.
  2. At the same time, the task of a full normalisation of the region has yet to be completed. The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina is still fragile and beset by internal squabbles that prevent the country from moving forward. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[1] is on the doorstep of NATO membership having been granted Membership Action Plan (MAP) 14 years ago, but is unable to cross it due to the unresolved name dispute with Greece. However, a wind of optimism and reform is re-emerging in the region following the landmark April 2013 agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. The political will and maturity of the choices local leaders made was rewarded with a decision to open negotiations on Serbia’s EU membership and a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Kosovo and the EU. The actual implementation of the agreement has yet to be ensured fully, however.
  3. While other parts of the Western Balkan region also face a range of domestic as well as foreign policy challenges, the Rapporteur chose to focus on these three countries/entities because the international community’s presence there is in particular demand. The Rapporteur will argue that the international community has to revisit its strategy and employ comprehensive, efficient and tailor made policies for each country in the region. The vague promise of EU and NATO membership may have stopped the regress, but it does not always provide a sufficient incentive for some countries to seek genuine reconciliation and to implement meaningful reforms. New approaches ought to be explored, taking into account, of course, the fragility of the region. The Rapporteur will emphasise that while the international community’s contribution is vital, the primary responsibility lies with local politicians who must demonstrate their political maturity and ability to overcome entrenched positions.
  4. The report will build upon the findings of the Assembly’s previous reports, seminars and visits, including the excellent 2010 report The Western Balkans, 15 Years After Dayton: Achievements and Prospects by Marc Angel (Luxembourg), the visits of this Committee members to BosniaandHerzegovina in October, 2011, to Belgrade and Pristina in October 2012, to Skopje in April 2013, the visit of the Sub-Committee on NATO Partnership to Belgrade and Pristina in May2013, and the Rose-Roth seminar in Sveti Stefan, Montenegro in October 2012.

II.Bosnia and Herzegovina: Overcoming Deep-Seated Divisions

A.Background

5. The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement may have imposed an awkward and flawed state architecture[2] on the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is nevertheless credited for ending the war and maintaining peace for nearly two decades now. The security situation has been satisfactory, and basic day-to-day needs of the people are being met. Bosniaand Herzegovina (BiH)has acquired single currency and built single armed forces (multi-ethnic on the larger unit level).

6. However, the Bosnian state appears to be illequipped to tackle the more ambitious goals. The inability of Bosnian elites to overcome domestic political stalemate, to advance the country’s European integration agenda, to address failing economy, human and drug trafficking, organised crime and corruption is a cause of growing frustration among the people of Bosnia and Herzegovinaas well as international community.

7. Attempting to revise Dayton has long been resisted both internally, particularly by the Republika Srpska (RS), reluctant to reinforce central institutions in Sarajevo, as well as externally, due to the fear of the part of international community to undermine fragile peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, a series of recent crises indicate that without certain Constitutional modifications the erosion of stability in Bosnia and Herzegovinacould accelerate dangerously. In addition, the socalled Sejdic-Finci[3] ruling leaves Bosnian authorities no choice but to revisit the country’s Constitutional arrangement. Unfortunately, the current political landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovinagives little hope that a breakthrough can be achieved. It is assumed that Bosniak politicians seek greater centralisation of the country; Serbs want greater sovereignty for or even secession of Republika Srpska, while Croats seek additional political protections, sometimes going as far as demanding a creation of a separate territorial entity. In reality, however, there are little attempts to change the status quo because the proportional division of power among ethnic groups ensures lucrative positions for politicians.

B.Domestic political landscape

8. The political party system in Bosnia and Herzegovinais divided along the ethnic lines and the national decisionmaking process is based on the interplay between the three main ethnic groups rather than political ideologies. The combination of the extremely complex and decentralised political system and the tendency of Bosnian politicians to cling to rigid ethnic positions make frequent political crises in this country almost inevitable. Bosnian politicians are hostages to the promises they made aiming to mobilise and retain their ethnic electorate.

9. On the central government level, by the virtue of direct elections, the tripartite presidency should theoretically enjoy a high degree of legitimacy. However, due to the absence of a separate Croat entity, the Croat of the current presidency, Mr Komsic, had been elected largely by Bosniak votes, causing dissatisfaction within the Bosnian Croat community.[4] This factor, coupled with internal frictions within the presidency, explain why this institution tends to refrain from difficult decision making (ICG, 2012).

  1. In terms of the Council of Ministers, there is an unwritten agreement that the position of chairman should rotate between the constituent peoples. However, since these ethnic communities do not always speak with one voice, the process of government formation is far from smooth. Following the 2010 elections, it took 15 months of complicated negotiations to finally reach a compromise. Vjekoslav Bevanda, a Croat, was appointed as Bosnia and Herzegovina's new Prime minister. He promised to turn 2012 into a “European year”, making progress on the EU’s 2012 “Roadmap” for Bosnia and Herzegovina and getting the economy back on track.
  2. Unfortunately, the new government failed to fulfil this promise. Much of its energy was directed to reshuffling of the ruling coalition. In October 2012, the EU Progress Reportfound that virtually none of the main conditions identified in the “Roadmap” had been met. According to the IMF, economic activity slowed down in 2012 (Jukic, 2012), and the World Bank expects Bosniaand Herzegovina’s economic growth in 2013 to be the lowest in the region – merely 0.5% growth (World Bank).
  3. The legislative branch suffers from efficiency issues as well. Within the two-chamber parliament, several mechanisms – such as the ‘entity voting’ instrument – are in place to protect the interests of all three constituent peoples. In practice this means that qualified voting applies to virtually every parliamentary decision, which makes the legislative process slow and difficult. The inefficiency of this process recently surfaced as the failure to agree on ID legislation, essential for birth certificates and passports, prevented a sick baby from being issued the necessary documents and receive life-saving treatment out of the country. This caused wide spread rallies in Sarajevo, with thousands of people demanding the political elites to assume responsibility and set aside short-term ethnic or party interests.
  1. Serious tensions exist not only between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and RS, but also within the Federation itself. Following a breakup of a coalition of several Bosniak and Croat parties and the formation of a new one at the end of 2012, the government was supposed to be rearranged accordingly. However, the president of the entity, himself a member of a Croat party that was removed from the coalition, refused to replace the ministers in question, leading to a protractedpolitical crisis. The Federation was further disturbed by the arrest of the president on corruption charges, who after spending a month in legally questionable detention returned to his presidential duties.
  2. It is quite clear that there is urgent need of a new Constitutional reform dialogue, in light of the elections in 2014.Council of Europe secretary-general Thorbjorn Jagland and the EU Enlargement commissioner Stefan Füle warned Bosnia and Herzegovina that failure to implement the Sejdic-Finci ruling would seriously undermine the legitimacy of the country’s parliament and presidency to be elected in 2014. Yet, due to the highly polarised political atmosphere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the chances of politicians reaching an agreement are not high. The Constitution reform process should be inclusive and transparent and involve all the stakeholders, including academia and civil society. This path towards reconciliation could be more promising than negotiations among politicians. In this context and with the facilitation of the US embassy in Bosniaand Herzegovina, in late June 2013, the Federation’s parliament adopted a conclusion on the reform of the entity's Constitution, based on recommendations of a special group of experts.This group, which involve legal experts and civil society representatives,presented almost 200 recommendations, including scrapping the entity’s presidency and ensuring the rights of those who do not declare themselves members of the ‘constituent peoples’. These efforts are to be commended and supported, as they are based on a ‘bottom up’ approach to the constitutional reform (Jukic, 2012).

C.role of international community and the Euro-Atlantic integration

1.Office of the High Representative

  1. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), a UN appointed body, created by the Dayton accords, and present in Bosnia and Herzegovinasince 1995 is overseeing the civilian peace implementation efforts. This supervision role has been strengthened in 1997 by the so-called “Bonn powers” which have mandated the OHR to dismiss local leaders as well as to impose legislation in order to bring unity and reform to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In respect for the country’s sovereignty, these special powers are very rarely used.
  2. There is no clear consensus in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the precise role that the OHR should play in fostering reconciliation and reform. Some see it as essential in a system where compromise remains elusive and want the international community to play a more proactive role as the OHR has done over the last decade. Others argue that it only provides an excuse for the political class to evade responsibility. Officials in Republika Srpskaare in particular in favour of stripping OHR of its special powers (European Forum). OHR will eventually have to transfer its functions to Bosnian institutions, but the recent political crises in Bosnia and Herzegovina and failure to agree on a Constitutional reform show that, for the time being, relinquishing these powers would be premature and may destabilise the situation in this country.

2.EU integration

  1. As the OHR is keeping low profile, the EU has significantly reinforced its presence and effectively emerged as the leading international organisation operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As noted, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU jointly devised a roadmap on EU integration which included the priority reform areas and specific obligations to be fulfilled. In order to get closer to the EU membership, the country needs first and foremost to address three key issues: 1) making changes in the Constitution to comply with the Sejdic-Finci ruling; 2) adopting legislation on state aid; and 3) adopting the PopulationCensus law at state level[5].
  2. Regrettably, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made limited progress towards meeting the political criteria for the EU membership. The deadlines outlined in the EU’s “Roadmap” for Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been met. Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to adopt a law on state aid at the central government level and a law on holding a census in 2013. However, it failed to fulfil a pressing task: the consensual adoption of amendments to the Constitution which will ensure compliance with the Sejdic-Finci case. This failure has practically frozen the EU integration process. In July 2013, the Council of the EuropeanUnion expressed disappointment over the lack of progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina and noted that “as other countries of the region make progress, Bosnia and Herzegovina is lagging behind”.It is not unrealistic to expect, however, that the landmark Belgrade–Pristina agreement and the Croatian membership in the EU, will provide a new stimulus for reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
  3. In the context of the EU’s role, it is also worth remembering that in 2004 EUFOR (OperationEUFOR - ALTHEA) took over the mission to ensure safe and secure environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina from NATO’s SFOR. The size of EUFOR has been shrinking constantly from its original size of just under 7,000 troops. After the reconfiguration of EUFOR-ALTHEA in October 2011,the Force is reduced to approximately 600 people, mainly focusing on capacity building and training of the Bosnian army. However, in case of an emergency, an outof-country Intermediate Reserve Force can be called upon on short notice to intervene in support of Bosnian authorities in order to restore peace and order.

3.Relations with NATO

  1. NATO initial presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina was focused on the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton accords. The NATO–Bosnia and Herzegovinarelationship has acquired a different dimension since 2006, when Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Partnership for Peace program. The Alliance supports Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path towards NATO membership through a number of instruments, including Planning and Review Process, Individual Partnership Action Plan and Intensified Dialogue.
  2. In 2010 Bosnia and Herzegovina was conditionally granted the Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, this step was conditional on the registration of defense installations as the property of the central, rather than entity, government. The first Annual National Programme under MAP will take place only once this condition is met. This issue is highly politicised and is a part of a broader dispute between theRepublika Srpska and Sarajevo over the division of immovable property. The implementation of an agreement on this issue is effectively blocked, causing disappointment within NATO. The problem of immovable property is seen by NATO not only as a practical issue for the armed forces, but also as a test for the country’s politicians – failure to agree on this relatively minor problem raises questions on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ability to make decisions on more important issues of Euro-Atlantic security.
  3. On the other hand, the Alliance highly values the progress in the destruction of surplus stocks of arms and the decision to increase the Bosnian contribution to the International SecurityAssistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).[6] The defence sector reform represents the most significant achievement of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina. The reform created a unified military structure, and the multi-ethic model of the armed forces (at least among larger military units) has been a force for integration in the country. The reform stands in sharp contrast to the lack of progress in other areas.
  4. NATO membership enjoys relatively high support among the Bosnian people, but it varies greatly among its ethnic communities. The overwhelming majority of Bosniaks and Croats support membership. However, in Republika Srpska public opinion has yet to be won over on this point. The leadership of Republika Srpska champions the idea of holding a referendum in this Serbdominated entity on NATO membership.
  5. The international community must remain strongly engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly as mounting political, economic and social tensions could have appalling humanitarian and security consequences for the country and for the region as a whole. Yet, no amount of international support can substitute for the political will of Bosnian politicians. If politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina are serious about their stated goal of joining the Euro-Atlantic community, they must be prepared to revisit their entrenched positions.

III.Kosovo: NEW HOPES

  1. As Pristina celebrates the fifth anniversary of the independence declaration, the international community seems to have come to terms with the status quo, at least for the time being. “Normalisation” of relations between Belgrade and Pristina rather than achieving an ultimate agreement on Kosovo’s status has been the focus of diplomatic efforts of the last few years.