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The Minnie Pit Halmerend
Researched by John Lumsdon
The sinking of the Minnie Pit commenced three hundred yards from the North Staffordshire Railway Company Station at Halmerend in April 1883, to a depth of about 1,200 feet. Although the first sod was actually cut in 1871 in sinking the shaft there was trouble with quicksand and water. This persisted for a depth of 38 feet. The final diameter was 16 feet 3 inches and the shaft was less than originally intended, owing to the lining that had to be fitted to combat the sand and water. The headgear over the shaft was of strong pitch pine timber and its main legs were 50 feet long.
An explosion occurred in February 1898 without loss of life, although numbers of pit ponies were killed. Then on a Sunday in 1915 when only twenty-seven men were at work, tragedy struck with an explosion killing nine men with others severely injured. A third of the work-force died that day. If it had it been a weekday, it would have been a major disaster.
Minnie Pit
Safety measures in today’s mines are more stringently applied than may have been the case in days gone by, when the coal barons of the day were more interested in production and profit than in safe working conditions of their workforce. Even so, in today’s relatively good conditions, working many hundreds of yards under ground can hardly be described as an ideal environment in which to earn a living.
What then of the working conditions in the Minnie pit in the days prior to the third explosion in 1918?
Ventilation.
A modern colliery will probably have coalfaces up to 200 or 300 yards in length with an intake airway at one end and a return airway at the other end, so that an uninterrupted flow of air is carried through the entire workings. In such conditions it would be more difficult for noxious gases to accumulate. In contrast the Minnie pit had many steeply inclined and honeycombed workings. The air entering these districts became warm as it progressed through the working places the temperature increased as heat was picked up from the coal, the bodies of men, pit ponies, lamps and shot firing. By the time the air reached the outer limits of the district, the temperature would have risen substantially. This warm air, being lighter, would concentrate, along with any methane gas present in the higher parts and roof cavities of the workings.
Because of a weakened airflow in these areas, highly dangerous pockets of inflammable gas would tend to accumulate. A modern colliery would also have a system of piping off this methane gas for commercial use, but in the old days they were happy enough to be able to disperse the dangerous accumulations by directing airflow over the higher parts of the workings. This task was made so much more difficult by the fact that many of the working areas were off shoots from the main dips. The air circulation became more and more sluggish as it found its way into these isolated pockets. In some cases metal pipes were bolted together in an attempt to introduce a better airflow into the more inaccessible places, but it must be realised that noxious gases could not be removed from the areas where men were working, in a totally satisfactory manner. Another method of combating these dangerous conditions was the use of brattice cloth; this is a thick Hessian type of material. If a test for gas proved positive, the brattice cloth would be erected in such a manner that it would re-direct the gas/air mixture into places where dilution would occur, thus making a potentially dangerous mixture, relatively harmless.
Gobs
A gob is the void left after the coal has been extracted, and because of the old pillars of coal and props previously supporting that area a certain amount of caving in of the roof has taken place. These old areas invariably had a certain amount of coal left in them, and gave rise to spontaneous combustion, resulting in what’s called a gob stink, a sulphurous gas. A gob fire could follow, and the only way to combat this situation would be to completely seal off the area, as these gob fires were impossible to extinguish by conventional methods. Of course, a gob fire is one of the means of igniting the methane gas and causing an explosion.
Explosions are traditionally regarded as the most serious of hazards faced by the miners in the course of their daily work. Traditionally firedamp is blamed for colliery explosions, but in fact, with rare exceptions, violent explosions have been caused by the combustion of coal dust. So it is worthwhile to look at some of the historical facts on coal dust explosions.
Coal Dust
At the beginning of the 19th century, the danger of coal dust was slowly being realised. There were references to the explosibility of coal dust in several reports, including that of the celebrated North of England mining engineer, John Buddle, on the Wallsend Colliery Explosion in 1803 and that of the Rev. John Hodgson, describing the Felling Colliery Explosion in 1812.
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More emphatic and detailed is the description by Lyall and Faraday (great scientists of their day, on the Hasswell Colliery Explosion in 1844, they stated: - “In considering the extent of the fire from the explosion, it is not to be supposed that firedamp is the only fuel.
The coal dust, swept by the rush of flame and wind from the roof, floor and sides of the workings, would instantly take fire and burn if there was enough oxygen in the air present to support its combustion.
In his report on the Ince Colliery Explosion in 1854 HMI of Mines Dickinson stated: - “That as the workings were very dry, it would be aggravated by the coal dust raised by the blast”.
Another interesting reference was made by two colliery managers at the inquest following the Winnstay Explosion in 1873 when they said in their evidence that the coal dust would be ignited by “firing the shot”.
There were many other examples of the potential danger of coal dust not only in Britain but also in France and other European countries. In 1906, one of the most extensive explosions happened at Courrieres, Northern France, where 1,099 men lost their lives. This was a formidable coal dust explosion.
Investigators from this country believed that nearly all the big explosions were due chiefly, and in some cases entirely, to coal dust, and that, “the only certain method of preventing such loss of life would seem to be, to render the mines incapable of being the scene of widespread dust explosions, by watering or otherwise preventing the accumulation of dry coal dust in the roads and workings”.
About the same time, experiments were carried out in the North of England and the Midlands. The results of the Midlands experiments were reported in a paper, read before the Chesterfield and Derbyshire Institute of Mining in 1878 and concluded: - “Explosions of coal dust and air were obtained in the absence of firedamp”.
After the Seaham Pit Explosion in September 1880, in which 164 died, the problem assumed great public importance, and the British Government sanctioned official experiments.
At this enquiry too it appears that the first mention of stone dust was made. Atkinson, a mines inspector, stated that: “the intake travelling road was not damaged by the explosion, but the parallel haulage road was completely wrecked”. The difference he attributed to the presence of stone dust in the travelling road. So that reduced the potential hazard.
Thus he for-shadowed one of the future methods of combating the inflamabillity of coal dust in mines. It was not until the Coal Mines Act of 1887 that amongst the precautions required, was that of watering the dust in the vicinity of shots for a radius of 20 yards.
Royal Commission
Following further disasters, the Home Secretary invited suggestions for the prevention of colliery explosions. As a result, one of H.M. Inspectors of Mines, Mr. Henry Hall, was commissioned to carry out experiments. In 1891 a commission report, recommended that the mine dust be watered and that certain rules be adopted affecting the use of explosives in mines.
It was in 1901 that the first official mention of the possible general application of incombustible dust is made, and that was at an inquiry of the Talke-o-th-Hill explosion H.M.I. of Mines, Mr Atkinson stated: It is far easier to prevent an explosion occurring, than to stop it after it has travelled some distance.
The Minnie Pit Disaster
In the Minnie pit at Halmerend, on January 12th 1918 the conditions prevailing at the time were, begging disaster. A spark was all that was needed, and this was provided, resulting in the deaths of 155 men and boys.
On that fateful Saturday, Mr. Smith, the colliery manager, was in his office at the surface of No 3 pit. He was informed that haulage lads were at No1 pit bottom and wanted to come out of the pit. There had been a sudden gust of wind against the air current, and pieces of small coal and dirt had been projected out bye (towards the shaft) and they thought something was wrong. At the same time his attention was drawn to the soot and smoke issuing from the fan chimney at the up cast shaft. He went round to the fan house, where he found the fan running all right, but the fan attendant informed him that a few minutes previously, it had slowed down.
He then went into the hauling engine house, where the engineman said; that the haulage rope was fast (stuck) and the engine could not be moved. Mr. Smith then got in communication with Frank Halfpenny at the top of the Banbury dip, who told him that the men and boys were lying around in the dark owing to their lamps having been extinguished. Mr. Smith told Halfpenny not to allow anybody to go through the separation doors into the return airway, as it would be contaminated with poisonous gases, and he instructed the winding engineman not to allow anyone down the No. 3 up cast shaft. He also rang up the Central Rescue Station at Stoke-on-Trent and asked for apparatus and teams to be sent to the Minnie pit immediately.
The agent manager and under manager went to the Minnie pit immediately, and after a brief consultation, it was decided, that the agent and under manager should descend the pit, whilst the manager should remain on the surface to take in hand the general organisation of the rescue operations.
On descending the pit, they found a party of men from the West district and preceded them up the haulage road in the direction of the area affected by the explosion. A lad was found dead about 20 yards out bye of the Rearers junction.
Three more bodies were close by, seven men and boys were found alive, though suffering from the affects of afterdamp. The party divided at the top of the Banbury dip, one going to the Rearers district and the other down the Banbury dip. No one was found alive below the top of the Banbury dip haulage road, but the men and boys in the Rearers district were alive and safe.
In the meantime Mr. Smith, the manager, who had called for the rescue brigades, made arrangements for the reception and treatment of any injured men. The rescue apparatus from Stoke Central Rescue Station soon arrived, also rescue brigades fully equipped and with instructions to travel as far as they could in the direction of the workings. By noon, all the injured men had been brought out of the pit and the rescuers continued with their work. The Minnie pit brigade reported a large fall of ground at the entrance to the Bullhurst crut had obstructed them going any further, but ventilating air was travelling through to the Bullhurst. They then made their way to the top of Lockett’s dip, where their progress again obstructed by another large roof fall. They came back and went into the return airway, where smoke was seen coming out of the Bullhurst seam. After receiving this report, a conference was held between Mr. Saint, H.M. Senior Inspector of Mines, Mr.Henshaw, the managing director of Talke-o-th-Hill colliery, and other mining engineers and management.
A gob fire was feared in the Bullhurst seam and it was decided to seal the seam off temporarily. To do this, the Silverdale rescue brigade, wearing self contained breathing apparatus (to enable the wearers to breath and work independently of the surrounding atmosphere), descended the Minnie pit at 4.30 pm with Mr. Bull, Sub-Inspector of Mines, Mr. Davies, and the manager. They found that the separating doors between Lockett’s intake and return roadways were blown out, but 50 yards further inbye another set of doors were intact. They took air samples at various places and this team returned to the surface at 7.30 pm. and was replaced by the Burley colliery brigade. A bird, taken to the place where air samples had been obtained, died at once. As the team advanced they found the dead bodies of a man, boy and horse. Rescue brigades continued to attempt to enter the Bambury workings in advance of the air until 4 pm. On Sunday, when it was decided to carry forward the air with them, and at 8 pm. Holland’s place was reached. Here three more bodies were found.