PANORAMA:

A FIGHT TO THE DEATH

The Hutton Inquiry.

Tx: Wednesday 21 January 2004 20.30

NOTE: TRANSCRIPT SUPPLIED FOR GUIDANCE ONLY. PLEASE CHECK ACCURACY AGAINST TRANSMISSION

“David, sorry I’m late. “
Soon after the Iraq war ended, a BBC reporter met a government scientist at this London hotel.
They discussed the Iraq dossier No.10 had published which was based on secret intelligence and said that Saddam Hussein was a current and serious threat to British interests.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
KELLY: “….It was transformed in the week before publication.
GILLIGAN: To make it sexier?
KELLY: Yes. To maker it sexier.”
What passed between these two men led to the most damaging charge the Blair government has ever had to confront: that No.10 had taken us to war by deception.
GILLIGAN (RECONSTRUCTION) “…the government probably knew that that forty-five minute figure was wrong even before it decided to put it in.”
In the row between the BBC and No.10 that followed, Dr Kelly was caught in a vicious war of words. He was later found dead.
His death led to a public inquiry.
In tonight’s Panorama, we’ve reconstructed key events based on the evidence to the inquiry chaired by the law lord Lord Hutton.
BLAIR (RECONSTRUCTION) “I mean look this was an absolutely fundamental charge……had the allegation been true, it would have merited my resignation.”
Just as fundamental to the BBC Chairman was the Corporation’s right to report what a credible source had told them, free of pressure from No.10
DAVIES (RECONSTRUCTION)“…..I do not at any stage in my life ignore the facts. The most important thing, undoubtedly, is to tell the truth to the public.”
The Hutton inquiry has investigated not just how Dr Kelly was treated – but also how the Iraq dossier was put together. The verdict will be delivered next week.
The inquiry has prized opened up parts of the establishment which might otherwise have remained closed forever.
At stake is whether both the government and the BBC can be trusted to tell the truth.
TITLE:
A FIGHT TO THE DEATH
ACTUALITY “The answer as to why we’re here is because we’ve been ordered to be here..”
The Prime Minister deployed 45,000 British troops to the Gulf because he said Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.
The evidence had been set out in Mr Blair’s Iraq dossier.
Never could he have imagined that lawyers and the world’s media would be scrutinising the dossier so minutely so soon after victory.
Least of all could Mr Blair have imagined that he himself would need to defend his reputation before one of highest judges in land.
ACTUALITY “Sir can you just turn around here. Sir”
At the judicial inquiry chaired by Lord Hutton Mr Blair said the purpose of the Iraq dossier was to inform the public of the threat from Saddam.
It was categorically NOT a propaganda device for rallying the country to war.
BLAIR (RECONSTRUCTION) “..it is important to recognise that the September dossier was not making the case for war, it was making the case for the issue to be dealt with; and our preferred alternative was indeed to deal with it through the United Nations route…”
The Prime Minister said it was critical the threat assessment came with the full authority of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the most senior government officials which has provided such assessments for ministers for sixty years.
BLAIR (RECONSTRUCTION) “The whole purpose of having the JIC own this document was in order to provide the absolute clarity and certainty….. it was essential that anything that we said in the course of my statement or in the dossier we could hand on heart say: this is the assessment of the Joint Intelligence Committee.”
Why, therefore, if the dossier was to be free of political spin, was the Prime Minister’s Director of Communications and Strategy Alastair Campbell involved?
(RECONSTRUCTION)
CAMPBELL: Yep, come in.
SCARLETT: Hi Alastair.
CAMPBELL: Hi John, take a seat.”
John Scarlett, a former MI 6 man, was the official put in charge of compiling the dossier.
He’s chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
CAMPBELL:”The new dossier must be, and be seen to be, the work of you and your team. It’s credibility depends fundamentally upon that.
SCARLETT: I need to take ownership of the document.
CAMPBELL:It goes without saying that nothing should be published that you are not 100% happy with. I’ll look at it from a presentational point of view and make some recommendations.”
Spin doctors like clear simple messages; rarely is intelligence so clear cut.
One of Scarlett’s predecessors as chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, or “JIC”, is Sir Rodric Braithwaite.
He was also ambassador in Moscow when Scarlett was there.
Braithwaite believes Scarlett crossed a red line by allowing Campbell a say in the process.
BRAITHWAITE (SYNC) “..The JIC is there to try and produce a dispassionate assessment on some problem usually involving a threat to this country. It's not there to be helpful, it's there to try and make an honest judgement which is very difficult. I’m not suggesting it’s easy to come to a conclusion in the JIC and very often the conclusions of the JIC are boring – on the one hand this, on the other had that…”
Exceptionally, some of Campbell’s team of press officers were security cleared to sit alongside intelligence officers while drafts of the dossier were discussed.
Their criticisms of an early draft came thick and fast.
Danny Pruce – a press officer at No.10 – e mailed Campbell:
VOICE OVER
“….much of the evidence is largely circumstantial so we need to convince our readers that the cumulation of these facts demonstrate an intent on Saddam’s part..”
Phil Bassett, a senior special adviser to the Prime Minister sent two e mails on the first draft of the dossier:
VOICE OVER
“… very long way to go…it’s….intelligence-lite… we’ve got find a way to get over this by having better intelligence material…”
That evening John Scarlett met Alastair Campbell and several other members of the Prime Minister’s inner circle.
(ARCHIVE SIMPSON IN RECONSTRUCTION)
“…it’s quite extraordinary…”
Scarlett says they did discuss these concerns raised by Campbell’s staff.
Campbell says he has no recollection of this.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
[KNOCK ON DOOR]
Hi gents...
What is certain is that earlier that day Scarlett’s team had sent out an urgent message to the intelligence services.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
CAMPBELL: Phil and Danny on the way?
MAN: Yes, they’ll be here shortly.”
No.10 had wanted more facts in the dossier like how many chemical and biological weapons Saddam was supposed to have - and what type.
The intelligence services didn’t have anything like this sort of detail.
So the latest plea from Scarlett’s team to the intelligence services contained a note of desperation:
VOICE OVER
“…..No. 10, through the Chairman, want the document to be as strong as possible within the bounds of available intelligence. This is therefore a last (!) call for any items of intelligence that agencies think can and should be included…..”
BRAITHWAITE (SYNC)
“…That is not what the JIC is for…..
BRAITHWAITE (SYNC)
“ ..it’s not their job is not to fiddle with documents in order to make them more presentable with the public. If they start doing that, they get involved instead of in analysis which is their job, in presentation, and presentation means not falsifying the facts but presenting them in an order which is designed to produce a particular impression on the audience. It's ceasing to be objective, it's becoming an advocate.”
At the Hutton inquiry Alastair Campbell was asked if No.10 wanted to strengthen the dossier because the early drafts were not going to convince the public Saddam was a serious and current threat to Britain.
All sides were represented by barristers. The BBC’s quoted back to Campbell some of the emails sent by his own staff.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
CALDECOTT :… an e-mail to you from Mr Bassett, your senior special adviser, it is the top of the page: ‘Re draft dossier. Very long way to go, I think. Think we’re in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now.’ What trouble did you understand him to be meaning there, Mr Campbell?
CAMPBELL I think he is saying that he was not terribly impressed with the draft; but I was impressed by the draft and actually thought it did form the basis of a very strong document.
CALDECOTT He meant political trouble, did he not?
CAMPBELL I don’t believe so.”
No.10’s plea for more intelligence was followed the next day by a visit from the head of MI6 to the Prime Minister.
Sir Richard Dearlove told him they had some new and ultra sensitive intelligence on Iraq.
The public has not been told what exactly this intelligence was.
Even some members of the Joint Intelligence Committee were not told before signing off the dossier.
But armed with this new intelligence, the Prime Minister wrote this foreword to the dossier. It was categoric:
VOICE OVER
"..What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam Hussein has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons…”
Some intelligence analysts did not believe the Prime Minister was right to be so certain - amongst them this man Dr Brian Jones.
He was probably the country’s foremost intelligence analyst working on weapons of mass destruction.
Dr Jones worked for the MoD’s intelligence service, which is separate from MI6.
It’s known as the Defence Intelligence Staff, or DIS.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
DINGEMANS Was there a perception, right or wrong, amongst DIS personnel that spin merchants were involved in the dossier?
JONES Well, ‘spin merchants’ is rather emotive. I think there was an impression, right or wrong, and I do not know, I did not allow that to concern me as this process – I think there was an impression that there was an influence from outside the intelligence community.
DINGEMANS: And were people in the intelligence community happy with that?
JONES:No.”
Dr Jones said could only speak for his branch of DIS. But they did have a key role in checking the dossier’s accuracy for the Joint Intelligence Committee.
And he had a particular worry about its most headline-grabbing claim: that Saddam could deploy weapons of mass destruction in 45 minutes – even at British bases in Cyprus.
This intelligence had arrived at MI6 headquarters in London. It was hearsay and from just one source
At first the Joint Intelligence Committee had assessed it cautiously, saying only that it:
VOICE OVER
“indicates that chemical and biological munitions could be…ready for firing within 45 minutes.”
By the time the dossier was published the language had hardened, leaving no room for doubt:
VOICE OVER
“….some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes….”
Alastair Campbell drew attention to nine passages in a draft of the dossier which he suggested could be strengthened, or implied were weak.
He sent these to John Scarlet, the official in charge of the dossier.
Replying to Campbell, Scarlett said:
VOICE OVER
“..We have been able to amend the text in most cases as you proposed…”
One man who knew of the disquiet over some of the dossier’s claims was Dr David Kelly.
He was one of the world’s top experts on Iraqi biological weapons.
In the week before the dossier was published, Dr Kelly twice visited Defence Intelligence Staff to review the latest draft.
One scientist there later complained to Dr Kelly about “the spin merchants of this administration.”
“Let’s hope the dossier turns into tomorrow’s chip wrappers,” he said.
Afterwards, Dr Jones placed his concerns on record, as did his chemical weapons expert who wrote:
VOICE OVER
“..the intelligence available to me….has NOT established beyond doubt that Saddam has continued to produce chemical [and biological] weapons…”
Dr Jones told the Hutton Inquiry that when he put his concerns on the record he was speaking for his colleagues.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
JONES: “Some of my staff said they were unhappy… my expert analyst on chemical weapons expressed particular concern… they were really about a tendency in certain areas, from his point of view, to shall we say, over-egg certain assessments in relation particularly to the production of CW agents and weapons since 1998.…”
JOHN WARE PTC
“The letters from Dr Jones and his chemical weapons expert landed on the desks of the Director of Defence Intelligence and his deputy, both also serving members of the Joint Intelligence Committee which finally approved the dossier.
Yet neither the Director nor his deputy even discussed the letters with their authors.
The Prime Minister had specially recalled parliament for a set piece debate on the dossier in the House of Commons. He’d set a deadline for a major publicity launch.”
Just before the publicity launch, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff Jonathan Powell e mailed Alastair Campbell:
VOICE OVER
“Alastair: What will be the headline in the Evening Standard on the day of publication. What do we want it to be?”
Campbell said the coverage went very well, right round the world:
VOICE OVER
“45 Minutes From Attack” (Evening Standard)
“45 minutes from a chemical war” (The Star)
"Saddam can strike in 45 minutes" (Express)
“HE’S GOT ‘EM… LETS GET HIM” (The SUN)
“Brits 45 minutes from doom…(The SUN)
VOICE OVER (The Sun)
“British servicemen and tourists in Cyprus could be annihilated by germ warfare missiles launched by Iraq, it was revealed yesterday.”
On the day the dossier was launched Mr Blair assured Parliament the picture the intelligence services had painted was detailed and authoritative.
BLAIR (ARCHIVE)“… It concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which could be activated within 45 minutes…”
DAVID KELLY (SYNC)
“Ok let me just take a sip before we start..”
A month later, Dr Kelly gave an interview to Panorama which was never broadcast
DAVID KELLY (SYNC)
“You happy with the voice, I’m looking presentable, OK…
In public Dr Kelly qualified any reservations he had about the Iraq dossier’s 45 minute claim by making it clear he thought that Saddam’s weapons were a threat.
INTERVIEWER (SYNC) Are they an immediate threat?
DAVID KELLY (SYNC) Yes, they are. Even if they’re not actually filled and deployed today, the capability exists to get them filled and deployed within a matter of days and weeks, and so yes, they’re a real threat.”
The war was short.
Several thousand Iraqi civilians and soldiers were killed – as well as 170 American and British troops.
ARCHIVE
MAN “Three, two, one splash…”
A tyrant was toppled though, weapons of mass destruction have yet to been found.
Three weeks after President Bush declared the war over, Dr Kelly met a BBC reporter at this London hotel.
Neither could ever have imagined that Dr Kelly would later apparently kill himself following a titanic battle over what was – or was not - said here.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
GILLIGAN: “David, sorry I’m late…..”
Andrew Gilligan was Defence Correspondent of the Today programme.
Dr Kelly was authorised to brief journalists on technical aspects of Iraqi weapons.
According to Gilligan’s version of the conversation, he went beyond that. His private position on the dossier was different from his public one.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
GILLIGAN: D’ you mind if I take a few notes? So, back to the dossier. What happened to it? When we last met you were saying it wasn’t very exciting.
KELLY: Yes, that’s right. Until the last week it was just as I told you. It was transformed in the week before publication.
GILLIGAN: To make it sexier?
KELLY: Yes. To maker it sexier.
GILLIGAN: What do you mean? Can you give me some examples?”
What Dr Kelly said next, according to Gilligan, was a sensational allegation which led to the biggest row between the BBC and No.10 in recent history.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
KELLY: “The classic was the 45 minutes. The statement that WMD could be ready in 45 minutes was single source and most things in the dossier were double source.
GILLIGAN: How did this transformation happen?
KELLY: Campbell.
GILLIGAN: What, you know that Campbell made it up? They made it up?
KELLY: No it was real information but it was unreliable and it was in the dossier against our wishes.”
Upon these words, Gilligan based a report which amounted to an allegation of dishonesty:
..that at No.10’s behest, the government had ordered intelligence to put into the dossier – even though it probably knew the intelligence was wrong.
(RECONSTRUCTION)
VOICE “Hello Andrew – we’ll be with you in a minute
GILLIGAN OK. “
Andrew Gilligan broadcast his story a week later live from home. He was interviewed by John Humphrys and he was not reading from a script.
(RECONSTRUCTION PICTURES, ARCHIVE VOICE)
“It is now seven minutes past six. The Government is facing more questions this morning about its claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq… “
Gilligan had assured Dr Kelly he’d never publicly give him away as his source.