Taking the War to Them 1

Taking the War to Them 1

Taking the War to Them:

Confronting ISIS on the Ground

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Taking the War to Them: Confronting ISIS on the Ground

The summer of 2016 saw a dramatic uptick in the frequency and violence of terrorism worldwide. From Orlando, Florida to Nice, France and in dozens of localities in between, lives were stolen or forever changed by the breathtaking brutality of hate. Amid the growing fear are also growing questions about how we are to end this scourge, to wipe it from the face of the Earth before it can do so to us. Combined with the rising fears of terrorist attacks both in the homeland and abroad, however, is a dangerous unwillingness to embroil US troops even more deeply in Middle Eastern hostilities. Yet, it is precisely this squeamishness which is allowing the infection of terrorist groups, particularly ISIS, to fester and to spread. Because ISIS has been permitted to establish and maintain its headquarters, the so-called “Caliphate”, in the Syrian heartland, it has thrived as an agent of global terror, not only by training “soldiers” on the ground but through one of the most successful media campaigns ever wage, prompting adherents to kill in their name, without ever having to recruit or dispatch the murderer directly. We can only overcome this plague if we root out the source of the contagion. By depriving ISIS of a base of operations, we deny them the means to plan, launch, and oversee their deadly campaigns and we profoundly diminish, if not entirely end, their vile public relations regime. This can only be accomplished, though, if the US and its allies overcomes its reluctance for more, not less, Middle Eastern warfare, for an aggressive air and land campaign in ISIS-controlled areas of Iraq and Syria.

One of most important reasons why ISIS has prospered since its emergence following the fall of Iraq is because it has been permitted to establish a relatively stable base of operations by taking advantage of the power vacuum and instability of a collapsing Iraq and civil war-torn Syria. ISIS was enabled to seize the abandoned oil fields of the area, giving it enormous wealth to fund its nefarious intentions. This steady, abundant stream of income, combined with US and Allied military draw-downs in the region and non-intervention from indigenous forces, gave ISIS the time and the means to develop one of the most violent terror networks in modern history. From the important base in Raqqa, Syria, in particular, ISIS has developed a sophisticated media presence luring thousands of recruits to its training grounds in Iraq and Syria. Talbot (2015) writes, “ISIS stands apart in the way it’s mastered online propaganda and recruitment” (p. 72). Through the use of social media, ISIS draws thousands to its headquarters while inspiring countless others who never make it to the “Caliphate” nevertheless to hate, hurt, or kill in its name.

An aggressive and relentless military response from the US and its allies is the only recourse here because the most dangerous enemy is one who is well-coordinated and has a loyal audience. The base of operations in the “Caliphate” provides central location where ISIS can orchestrate their assault. It is here that leaders may congregate; it is here that soldiers come to train and to be further indoctrinated. Deprive the vipers of theirnest and the snakes will scatter. The confusion that follows will disrupt their ability to centralize power and coordinate operations. It will also silence—or at least muffle—ISIS’s voice worldwide, providing fewer and less successful attacks to boast about in the media and thereby putting an end to the narrative of inevitable victory(Brooking & Singer, 2016). Further, a lack of a home base also means a lack of reliable access to the telecommunications systems needed to maintain its constant, powerful, and disgusting PR campaigns.

This will, by no means, be an easy or quick military exercise, however. Like the snakes they are, ISIS relies for its safety on nesting among the civilian population, assuming that the rest of the world is not as cavalier about taking innocent lives as it is. Women, children, and the sick and aged will die in these attacks, but as appalling as this is, the reality is that these lives lost will save countless others. It is also likely that an aggressive campaign like this will inspire civilians to overcome their own fear of ISIS and begin more earnestly to resist them, if only to refuse to be used as human shields. It is also likely that such a war will draw in other hostile actors in the region, prolonging the war and exacerbating the danger our troops face. The loss of US and Allied lives may be great, and it is precisely this war-weariness, the fatigue of flag-draped coffins, which caused the disastrously premature military drawdown in the region in the first place. But if we do not act now, if we do not intervene decisively, determinedly, and with devastating force, there will be no end to the indiscriminate killings, unless and until ISIS achieves what seems to be its final, apocalyptic vision, such as the procuring of a nuclear bomb.

The summer of 2016 has proven that ISIS is far from contained. On the contrary, the threat it poses seems to grow stronger and more terrifying by the day. The only remedy, the only hope to restore some measure of security in this troubled time, is to deny ISIS its base of operations in Iraq and Syria. The US and its Allies must wage an immediate and aggressive air and ground campaign to deprive the vipers of their nest, destroying the ground on which they plan, on which they train, and from which they disseminate their vile propaganda. Hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians and troops alike will die, when even one is one too many, but each life lost, when victory comes, will be countless more saved.

References

Brooking, E. & Singer, P.W. (March/April 2016). The war of social media: ISIS goes viral and the world fights back. Popular Science, 60-65.

Talbot, D. (2015). Fighting ISIS online: The Islamic State is an internet phenomenon as much as a military one. Counteracting it will require better tactics on the battlefield of social media. MIT Technology Review, 118(6), 72-78.