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Original: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

COMMITTEE ON

THE CIVIL DIMENSION OF SECURITY

Transition in Afghanistan: implications for Central Asia

SPECIAL REport

Ulla SCHMIDT (Germany)

Special Rapporteur

11 October 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.INTRODUCTION

II. UPDATE ON THE POLITICAL TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN

A.GENERAL REMARKS

B.2014 ELECTIONS AND THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

C.AFGHANISTAN’S REFORM AGENDA

III.STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DRIVERS

A.GENERAL REMARKS

B.UNDERSTANDING CENTRAL ASIA

C. DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE

D.INTRA-REGIONAL STRAINS

E.THE RISK OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

F.DRUG TRAFFICKING

G.MULTINATIONAL COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

IV.CONCLUDING REMARKS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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I.INTRODUCTION

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  1. The political and security transition in Afghanistan took place at the end of 2014, but the question of whether or not it has been successful has not yet been answered. Thanks to the statesmanship of President Ashraf Ghani and his electoral rival, now Chief Executive
    Abdullah Abdullah, Afghanistan has completed its first democratic transfer of power to new leadership – an extraordinary achievement given the circumstances as well as the historical and regional contexts. The people of Afghanistan associate their renewed hopes and aspirations with the new leadership, which is expected to resolutely address the country's ample socio-economic ills. With a 350,000-strong national security force, the country is now completely in charge of its security situation and is doing its best to keep the insurgency at bay.
  1. However, the nascent National Unity government has accomplished less than expected in terms of reforms, and the cohabitation of President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah – whose functions have yet to be constitutionalised – is not without problems. The parliamentary and district elections were postponed due to the fact that the fundamental electoral system overhaul has yet to be implemented. Afghanistan's economic prospects for this year are not optimistic as revenue collection continues to decline. With regard to the security situation, the “fighting season” is seriously testing the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to counter the insurgency without direct assistance from NATO combat forces.
  1. Becausethe global political agenda is shifting towards new hotspots, such as eastern Ukraine and the Middle East, Afghanistan has almost disappeared from the front pages of newspapers. The adjacent region of five Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) receives even less media attention. The aim of this report is to get the attention of the policy-making community and make them aware that the relative stability in Afghanistan and the Central Asia Five should not be taken for granted. This region constitutes the eastern end of the so-called Arc of Instability that spans from the western shores of Africa through the Sahel, North Africa, Somalia, and the Middle East, to the Arabian Peninsula in the east.
  1. While the correlation between security in Afghanistan and stability in the Central Asian republics is not straightforward, failure of the transition in Afghanistan could be the tipping point in the accumulationof internal strains and cleavages in Central Asia. Sustained international commitment in the region is necessary to prevent it from turning into yet another global hotspot.

II.Update on the political transition in Afghanistan

A.General remarks

  1. When assessing Afghanistan’s democratic progress, one should bear in mind the fact that its statehood is based on different underlying premises than that of most of nation-states in the
    Euro-Atlantic area. From a Western perspective, Afghanistan lacks homogeneity in almost every aspect: it is divided ethnically (Pashtuns constitute a plurality but not a majority), religiously (thevast majority is Sunni Muslim, but there is also a sizeable Shia minority) and linguistically(Pashto and Dari are the two official languages, but a sizeable minority speaks Turkic languages). Moreover, Afghanistan’s largest ethnic communities are part of much larger ethnic groups that extend far beyond Afghanistan’s borders: there are more than twice as many Pashtuns living in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, the Tajik population in Afghanistan is comparable in size to that of Tajikistan, and Afghanistan’s Uzbeks are just a small fraction of the populous Uzbek ethnic group living in the heart of Central Asia. Moreover, many of these ethnic groups are divided into tribes and further into smaller entities. In sum, Afghan society is characterised by a complicated web of identities – in addition to the emerging modern national discourse. This heterogeneity partly explains the virtual absence of political parties on the national level. Yet somehow this heterogeneity has not resulted in blatant separatism; there is little evidence of ethnic clashes.
  1. Other important factors to consider include the historical legacy of the Soviet invasion, the civil war and the Taliban era, which left Afghanistan’s central government severely weakened and its human resources considerably depleted. Furthermore, governance in Afghanistan is characterised by thecohabitation between the constitutional structures and traditional structures. The traditional structures being theshuras, tribal assemblies of elders, and jirgas, informal
    quasi-courts. The all-Afghanistan gathering of elders and other respected figures calledLoya Jirga has been involved in some of the country's most important political decisionssince the beginning of the 20th century. The role of tribal warlords and local strongmen – who do not necessarily hold official positions – is an important aspect of Afghanistan’s political scene.
  1. Against this backdrop, the consolidation of democratic governance in Afghanistan might seem like a gargantuan task. The challenges are indeed formidable and the modern state-building process is likely to take decades. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the progress made so far; while all elections in Afghanistan were far from perfect, the country is already in some aspects more democratic than many of its neighbours. With every election, Afghanistan’s political system is becoming increasingly more mature. The parliament is nowmore independent and competent, Afghan institutions havetaken over a growing number of functions from international stakeholders and the number of voters, including women voters, continues to increase. In particular, the electoral transfer of the presidential office in 2014 elevated the Afghan democracy to a new level.

B.2014 Elections and the National Unity government

  1. It is important to recognisethat there was a real risk of Afghanistan sinking into internal political turmoil in the wake of the 2014 presidential elections. Mr Abdullah had a comfortable lead against Mr Ghani after the first round of elections (45% vs. 31%) and his supporters felt that the presidency was within reach. Moreover, these supporters believed that their candidate had already been robbed of victory in the 2009 elections. Therefore, when the Independent Election Commission (IEC) issued a winner’s certificate stating that the former World Bank official Ghani won 55.27% of the total votes (3.93 million out of 7.12 million votes), Abdullah contested these results.
  1. To their credit, Abdullah and Ghani were able to reach a power-sharing agreement on
    21 September 2014, brokered by US Secretary of State John Kerry and other international leaders, thus preventing a potential political catastrophe. The agreement specifies that both leaders will have "parity" in appointing senior officials; the President will preside over the Cabinet of Ministers when strategic decisions are taken, but day-to-day activities of the Cabinet will be supervised by the Chief Executive. On 11 December 2014, President Ghani signed a decree aimed at better defining the competences of the Chief Executive. The decree underlines that the Chief Executive is “accountable” to the President and identifies 20 specific tasks delegated to the Chief Executive. The position of Chief Executive is considered temporary and it is expected that a Loya Jirga will be held to decide whether or not this position of quasi-Prime Minister should be made permanent. Since the 21 September agreement is not part of Afghanistan’s Constitution, its application rests essentially on the good will of both leaders.
  1. Ghani and Abdullah are indeed widely regarded as pragmatic and sensible politicians: they are both modernisers and their political visions largely coincide. The representatives of the international coalition already noticed definite improvement in the attitudes of the new leadership towards international partners, especially in comparison with the erratic and anti-Western leadership of former President Karzai. As soon as President Ghani was inaugurated, on
    29 September 2014, he signed the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States on behalf of Afghanistan as well as the Status of Forces Agreement withNATO.
  1. However, domestically, the Ghani-Abdullah cohabitation has already encountered problems. The process of forming the National Unity government has been progressing very slowly:President Ghani was unable to fulfil his campaign promiseof forming the government within 45 days. The delays reportedly were due to pressures from various tribal leaders and regional strongmen seeking rewards for their support during the presidential election campaign. The list of ministerial candidates that Ghani and Abdullah were finally able to come up with in January 2015 was characterised by observers as innovative: it included a number of relatively young professionals, representing a new generation of Afghans, and replaced the old guard of tribal heavyweights and political veterans who had dominated previous governments.
  1. The parliament and the media have vigorously embarked upon scrutinising the nominees, criticising the competence of several of the candidatesand revealing potentially damaging facts about them such as the possession of dual citizenship, attempts to fake their real age or their names appearing on Interpol's wanted list. Criticism from some legislators can also be explained by their ties with the disaffected old guard of Karzai, now largely eliminated from power. The list of candidates has been criticised by some ethnic groups or tribes for allegedly being imbalancedsome non-Pashtun leaders, for instance, complained that the ministries or agencies in charge of security, defence and law enforcement are to be headed exclusively by Pashtuns.
  1. After prolonged deliberations, the process of forming the government was almost completed by late April 2015. Of 24 confirmed ministers, four are women. Among notable ministers is the new Foreign Minister Salahuddin Rabbani, son of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who replaced his father as the head of the Afghan High Peace Council following his father's assassination in 2011.A notable exception is the absence of a Minister of Defence. The parliament rejected two out of three candidates submitted by the parliament, while the third withdrew his candidacy himself after videos of him making ethnically charged comments appeared in the social media sphere. Other vacancies include the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. For the appointment of the latter, on 8 July 2015, Afghan lawmakers rejected AnisaRasouli, the nation's first-ever female nominee for the Supreme Court (UNSecretaryGeneral, 2015).

C.Afghanistan’s reform agenda

  1. The near completion of the government finally allows the new leadership to embark upon the implementation of their ambitious electoral promises. Living up to his reputation as a reformer, President Ghani early on presented a 19-page reform programme entitled “Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reform and Renewed Partnership” at the London Conference on Afghanistan on 4 December 2014. This ambitious plan reaffirmed Afghanistan’s resolve to, among other things, create a stable political and security environment in the country, stabilise the country's economy and finances, augment administrative capacities, impose the rule of law, fight corruption and protect human rights, including the rights of women.
  1. Some analysts noted, however, that the programme is largely declaratory and lacks clarity on specific delivery mechanisms. In response, the Cabinet approved the Ministry of Finance's proposed plan to implementof the “Realizing Self Reliance” programme on 3 April 2015. The plan consists of 52 measures, 26 of which were identified as priorities for action within the next
    six months. The Ministry of Finance engaged with line ministries to advance the plan. All ministers were also tasked by the President to prepare, during their first 100 days in office, detailed reform plans in their respective areas.
  1. Security remains the top concern for the new government. According to UN officials, there was a 45% increase in recorded armed clashes the week following the Taliban's announcement of the start of the spring offensive on 22 April 2015. Civilian casualties from ground engagements rose by 16% in the first four months of 2015 compared to the same period in 2014. Actions by Pakistani authorities in the northern areas against militant groups following an attack against a school in Peshawar in December 2014 resulted in the relocation of some of the militant groups to Afghanistan. The most notable security incident in recent months was a suicide car bomber attack on the Afghan Parliament on 22 June 2015. Even the security situation in previously calm parts of northern Afghanistan has worsened markedly, particularly in Kunduz. Fighting has continuedin 2015.According to early assessments, Afghan security forces so far have been able to perform their functions and withstand pressure from the insurgency, despite high casualty and attrition rates. However, worrisome reports have been issued by Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior stating that there are over 7,000 foreign fighters in the country, most of who are associated with Pakistan’s Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(UN Secretary General, 2015). Although some insurgent groups have pledged allegiance to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), the actual operational presence of this group in Afghanistan has not been confirmed.
  1. NATO supports Afghanistan with non-combat training, advice and assistance through the Resolute Support mission, which currently consists of about 12,000 personnel from both NATO and NATO-partner nations. During a visit to the United States in March 2015, Ghani and Abdullah reached an agreement with President Obama, whereinthe United States committed to maintain its posture of 9,800 troops until the end of 2015. The security situation is discussed more thoroughly in the 2015 report by the NATO PA's Defence and Security Committee [169 DSC 15 E].
  1. In terms of a political solution to the conflict, the Ghani-Abdullah government is visibly more pragmatic vis-à-vis Pakistan than the preceding government. President Ghani took proactive steps to reach out to Pakistani leaders with the intention of warming relations. This change in tone is occurring at an opportune time as Islamabad is revisiting its own policies towards the Taliban following the Peshawar school massacre in December 2014.A historic breakthrough was achieved on 7 July 2015 when the government of Afghanistan met for the first time with representatives from the Taliban in the direct talks held in Muree, Pakistan. The Afghan leadership seeks to clearly differentiate between the Taliban and other local insurgents and foreign fighters. While direct talks with the Taliban are a welcome step towards peace and reconciliation, it is imperative to ensure that Afghan women are part of this process from the beginning to the end.
  1. As far as political stability is concerned, Afghanistan faces the important test of holding parliamentary and, possibly, district council elections. According to the law, parliamentary elections should have been held in May 2015with the current mandate of the lower house of the National Assembly expiring on 22 June 2015. On 1 April 2015, the Second Vice-President,
    Mohammad Sarwar Danish, announced that the Parliamentary elections would be delayed until 2016, citing the need to allow time for the implementation of electoral reforms. The reform was one of the key promises of the new government, but so far no progress has been made. On 21 March 2015, President Ghani issued a presidential decree establishing a 15-member Special Commission on Electoral Reform. A member of the lower house of the National Assembly was selected to lead the Commission. The process for fully institutionalising the Commission remained unclear due to ongoing disputesbetween the offices of the President and the Chief Executive about the chairmanship and confirmation of its operational modalities. Reportedly, Abdullah has demanded a drastic overhaul of the electoral structures and the replacement of most electoral officials in order to avoid the problems of past elections. However, President Ghani's approach seems to be more cautious. From an international community perspective, international
    election-support institutions are strongly urging Kabul to decisively pursue meaningful electoral reforms.
  1. District council elections are another important issue. These elections are stipulated by the Constitution, but they have not yet been held due to various problems, including issues regarding voter registration, a lack of census, as well as difficulty determining district boundaries that are acceptable to all respective tribes. The absence of these councils leaves a serious administrative gap. These elections are also important because they are constitutionally responsible for nominating one third of the members of the parliament’s upper chamber, the Meshrano Jirga.
  1. The new administration is expected to be more serious about fighting corruption than the previous administration. Afghanistan is ranked 172 out of 175 countries by Transparency International on its 2014 Corruption Index. Ghani promised to end corruption in his first speech after signing the power-sharing agreement. As President, he instructed the Supreme Court and the Attorney General’s Office to reinvigorate the investigation of the Kabul Bank scandal – the largest corruption scandal in the country’s history – and to prosecute the culprits. Once the deadline announced by the President to those who owed money to the Kabul Bank expired, the country’s authorities issued travel bans for 150 debtors, froze their assets and began preparations for the auction of their properties.