2

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 4-480 / 03-0957

Filed September 29, 2004

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

CLAYTON PAUL LAME,

Appellant.

2

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert, Judge.

Clayton Lame appeals from the district court’s determination that the evidence was insufficient to provide the jury with a requested jury instruction regarding his justification defense. AFFIRMED.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Tricia Johnston, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and James Ward, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Zimmer, JJ.


VOGEL, J.

Clayton P. Lame appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the district court on a jury verdict finding him guilty of willful injury causing serious injury, Iowa Code section 708.4(1) (2001), a class “C” felony. Lame contends that the district court erred in denying his request for Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 400.12 to further support his justification defense. Finding no error in the district court’s denial, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Lame’s conviction for willful injury arose from his assault upon Phillip Hummel with a baseball bat in the early morning hours of September 14, 2002. Hummel is a friend of Lame’s adversary, Curtis Dudoit.

Based on the evidence presented, the jury could have found the following facts pertinent to this appeal:

For several months at the end of 2001 and early 2002, Lame lived with Dudoit and his mother, Ellen Wood, as well as with her other children. Lame and Dudoit had been close friends for more than five years, however, the friendship ended when Wood asked Lame to move out of the house.

On the evening of September 13, 2002, Dudoit, along with Lame’s victim Hummel, and several other individuals smoked marijuana and drank alcohol at Dudoit’s residence. About 12:30 a.m. Hummel, accompanied by Dudoit, a former girlfriend of Hummel’s, Angie Currie, and another friend, Jeremy Moon, drove to a Quik Trip store. Lame was also present at the Quik Trip. Dudoit and Lame started yelling at each other, and eventually engaged in fisticuffs. Hummel did not participate in this fight. In fact, according to some witnesses, Hummel did not even know Lame, and may have tried to break up the fight to avoid any entanglement with the police. Dudoit, by all accounts, was the victor of the bout between him and Lame.

After leaving the Quik Trip, Hummel drove the group to Dudoit’s nearby home. Dudoit immediately woke up his brother, Correy Clouse, and told him about his fight with Lame. Approximately fifteen minutes later, Dudoit and Clouse saw Lame, and Lame’s friend Michael Litton, walking nearby. Dudoit and Clouse then chased Lame and Litton to Litton’s grandmother’s house. Litton claims that Dudoit and Clouse were accompanied by at least two other individuals, one of which was Hummel. However, Litton’s testimony is contrary to the testimony of numerous witnesses all of whom stated that Hummel remained behind on the porch with his ex-girlfriend, and only later arrived at Litton’s grandmother’s house.

Lame and Litton’s version of the events taking place at Litton’s grandmothers house is quite different than the version provided by Hummel and his companions. Regardless, one thing is certain, the events concluded with Lame striking Hummel in the head with a baseball bat.[1] No evidence exists demonstrating that Lame suffered any bodily injury as a result of an altercation with Hummel, or that Hummel threatened Lame prior to the altercation. The Polk County attorney filed a trial information charging Lame with, among other things, willful injury causing serious injury. Lame filed a notice of a justification defense and the matter was set for trial. During the course of trial, Lame requested that the court include model instructions 400.12 and 400.13 in the jury instructions to support his justification defense. The court denied this request, finding insufficient evidence to allow submission of these instructions. The jury found Lame guilty of willful injury causing serious injury. Judgment and sentence were pronounced and Lame appeals.

II. Scope of Review

A district court's refusal to submit a jury instruction is reviewed for correction of errors of law. See State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 193 (Iowa 1998). If substantial evidence exists demonstrating that a justification defense applies, the trial court must instruct on the defense. See State v. Rains, 574 N.W.2d 904, 915 (Iowa 1998). Substantial evidence triggering the trial court’s duty to submit a justification defense instruction to the jury may come from any source. Id. Although the burden to disprove the justification defense rests with the State, the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the record contains substantial evidence to support an instruction on this issue. See Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d at 194 (citing State v. Lawler, 571 N.W.2d 486, 489 (Iowa 1997)).

“Error in giving or refusing jury instructions does not merit reversal unless it results in prejudice to the defendant.” State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996); accord State v. Hartsfield, 681 N.W.2d 626, 633 (Iowa 2004) (“Instructional error is not reversible error unless there is prejudice.”). “Prejudice exists when the rights of the defendant ‘have been injuriously affected’ or the defendant ‘has suffered a miscarriage of justice.’” Hartsfield, 681 N.W.2d at 633 (citing State v. Williams, 574 N.W.2d 293, 298 (Iowa 1998); State v. Hackney, 397 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Iowa 1986)). When, as in Lame’s appeal, a single jury instruction is challenged “it will not be judged in isolation, but rather in context with other instructions relating to the criminal charge.” State v. Stallings, 541 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Iowa 1995).

III. Issue

The sole issue presented for our review is whether the district court properly denied Lame’s request for the inclusion of Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 400.12 in the jury instructions.

A.  Applicability of Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 400.12

The district court refused to include Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 400.12 entitled “Previous Threats Against Defendant” in the jury instructions.[2] It was error to fail to provide this instruction if substantial evidence exists demonstrating that this instruction was applicable. See State v. Rains, 574 N.W.2d 904, 915 (Iowa 1998). Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 400.12 provides:

If you find that before the incident, (name of victim) made a threat(s) against the defendant, and because of this the defendant had reasonable cause for believing [he] was in imminent danger of [death or injury]…you may consider the evidence of the threat in determining whether the defendant acted reasonably when [he] [did the act in] question.

I Iowa Crim. Jury Instructions 400.12 (2004) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order for the district court’s refusal to provide this instruction to be error, Lame must demonstrate that substantial evidence indicates that prior to Lame striking Hummel with a baseball bat, Hummel had threatened Lame in such as way as to give Lame reasonable cause for believing he was in imminent danger of death or injury by Hummel.

Under both the State’s and Lame’s rendition of the events, Lame and Hummel did not know one another prior to the evening in question, and Hummel did not engage in the fight at the Quik Trip or make any threats at this time. In fact, no evidence was presented indicating that Hummel threatened or caused Lame any injury at any time prior to the incident resulting in Hummel’s injury. The only evidence offered that could bear on whether Hummel threatened Lame was the uncorroborated testimony of Litton, that Hummel chased Lame and Litton to Litton’s grandmother’s house. The State’s witnesses contradicted this version of the events. Therefore, we agree with the district court that Lame failed to provide substantial evidence that prior to striking Hummel, Lame had ever been threatened in such a way by Hummel as to give him reasonable cause to believe he was in imminent danger of death or injury. Consequently, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 400.12 was not applicable, and the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury accordingly.

B. Prejudice

Even if it was error to refuse to include the requested instruction, Lame must have been prejudiced in order for this to rise to the level of reversible error. See Hartsfield, 681 N.W.2d at 633. When examining whether a failure to provide a single jury instruction is prejudicial, a single jury instruction “will not be judged in isolation but rather in context with other instructions relating to the criminal charge.” State v. Stallings, 541 N.W.2d 855, 857 (Iowa 1995); See also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146, 47, 94 S. Ct. 396, 400, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368, 373 (1973) (examining whether inclusion of a “presumption of truthfulness” instruction infected the entire trial so that the resulting conviction violated due process, and in doing so considered whether other instructions helped obviate the potential prejudice).

The district court instructed on Lame’s justification defense, the use of reasonable force, and the State’s burden to prove the force used by Lame was unreasonable and not justified under the circumstances[3]. Therefore, and contrary to Lame’s contention on appeal, the trial court’s refusal to include Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 400.12 was not a refusal to instruct on his justification defense, but only a refusal to instruct on that part of his defense not supported by substantial evidence. Consequently, because the jury was charged regarding the justification defense, Lame was not prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to include Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 400.12 in the jury instructions.

Moreover, even if the jury accepted the defense’s version of the facts, the record reveals that there were alternate courses of action available to Lame as neither he nor Litton had even attempted to avoid the confrontation. Additional evidence indicates that Lame’s use of a baseball bat was unreasonable as his adversaries were armed only with their fists. Lame offered no evidence contradicting this, or indicating that his adversaries planned on using weapons of any kind. The jury could have concluded that Lame had an alternate course of action rather than striking Hummel with a baseball bat, and the amount of force used by Lame was not justified. Consequently, Lame’s rights were not “injuriously affected” nor did he suffer “a miscarriage of justice” by not having the jury charged with the requested justification defense instruction.

III. Conclusion

Lame failed to meet his initial burden by demonstrating that substantial evidence supported inclusion of Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 400.12 in the jury instructions. Thus, we find no error of law in the district court’s refusal to submit this instruction to the jury. Moreover, the district court did provide adequate instructions to the jury regarding Lame’s justification defense, and the State offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Lame’s act was not justified. Therefore, we find no prejudice in the district court’s exclusion of the requested instruction. Consequently, even if it were error to omit the instruction, it was not reversible error.

AFFIRMED.

[1] Hummel and his comrades all testified that he was struck in the head from behind while he was urinating in a nearby yard, Lame and Litton argue that Hummel was struck in the head during the course of a group attack on Lame after he kept coming at Lame even after Dudoit and Clouse, having seen the bat, had backed off.

[2] Lame now argues that he sought an instruction referring to prior threats made by both Hummel and Dudoit. However a review of the trial transcript reveals that the only request regarding this particular instruction made by Lame’s trial counsel was in the following form: “There are two requested instructions that have not been included. They are on the stock Iowa criminal jury instructions 400.12 and 400.13. We would request both of those be included.” The stock instructions provide only for reference to prior threats by the victim.

[3] Jury Instruction 24 provided that “[a] person may use reasonable force to prevent injury…[r]easonable force is the amount of force a reasonable person would find necessary under the circumstances to prevent death or injury” and finally that “[a] person may use deadly force…if it is reasonable to believe such force is necessary to avoid injury or risk to one’s life or safety.” Jury Instruction 25 instructed that “[a] person is justified in using reasonable force if he reasonably believes the force is necessary to defend himself from imminent use of unlawful force” and that the State has the burden of proving defendant was not justified by proving one of five elements. Furthermore, Jury Instruction 26 stated that concerning elements 3 and 4, “the defendant was not required to act with perfect judgment…[i]f in the defendant’s mind the danger was actual, real, imminent, or unavoidable, even though it did not exist, that is sufficient if a reasonable person would have seen it in the same light.” Jury Instruction 27 informed the jury that “[i]t is not necessary that there was actual danger, but the defendant must have acted in an honest and sincere belief that the danger actually existed.” Finally, Jury Instruction 29 provided that Lame was not required to leave property he legally occupied in order to avoid confrontation, and that “he was not required to take or use the alternative course of action” if the course involved a “risk to his life or safety.”