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The Ontological Argument:

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THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

  • Attributed to St Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury in the 11th century.
  • Attempts to prove that God is a necessary being with every positive attribute: infinitely powerful, wise and good.
  • There is still much interest in it in modern times.

THE ESSENCE OF THE ARGUMENT

  • Anselm defines God as a being greater than which nothing can be thought.
  • By 'greater' he meant 'more perfect'.
  • However, if the object of this idea only existed in our mind, we could frame an idea of something superior to it.
  • This being would be a being with all the perfections of the idea we had framed, but with the improvement of actually existing in reality.
  • It therefore follows according to this argument that God must exist in reality: the concept of a most perfect being that we have must include real existence.
  • Any conceptualisation of a being greater than which nothing can be thought must include real existence as one of its qualities: existence belongs to the nature of the most perfect being.

GAUNILON'S OBJECTION

  • Gaunilon was a monk at Marmoutiers in France, and a contemporary of Anselm's.
  • He was the first important critic of the ontological argument.
  • In his introduction of the ontological argument, Anselm referred to the psalmist's 'fool' who says in his heart, 'There is no God.'
  • Anselm believed that even a fool would have the idea of the greatest possible conceivable being.
  • Gaunilon therefore entitled his objection On Behalf of the Fool.
  • He claims that Anselm's reasoning would lead to absurdities if applied in other areas.
  • Gaunilon develops a parallel ontological argument for the existence of the most perfect island.
  • The argument can be made that, unless it also exists in reality, the island cannot be the most perfect conceivable.
  • We could therefore use the ontological argument to prove the real existence of the perfect island.

ANSELM'S REPLY TO GAUNILON

  • Anselm said that the ontological argument could only be applied to God.
  • The important concept for the argument to work is necessary existence.
  • Anselm stated that we could easily imagine an island not existing because it is just a material object and forms part of the contingent world.
  • Contrasted with this, God as an infinitely perfect being would not be limited by space or time.
  • He therefore could not be conceived of as coming into existence at a particular point in time, or ceasing to exist at a particular point in time.
  • According to Anselm, this renders his non-existence impossible.
  • As He is perfect, God would not only have to exist, but also have to exist necessarily.

NORMAN MALCOLM AND NECESSARY EXISTENCE

  • Norman Malcolm thought that existence is not a predicate.
  • However, he thought that necessary existence is a predicate.
  • An object that exists necessarily depends for its existence on nothing outside itself. Malcolm argues that if we say God exists necessarily, we vastly add to his powers.

DESCARTES' REFORMULATION

  • The French philosopher Descartes (1596-1650) reformulated the ontological argument.
  • He treats existence as a predicate: Descartes believed that saying about something that it 'exists' describes a characteristic.
  • He thought that existence must be a necessary characteristic of a perfect being: a defining property of God. It is an essential attribute, without which God would not be perfect.
  • So Descartes thought that the idea of existence belongs analytically to the concept of God.

KANT'S OBJECTION

  • Kant thought that saying about something that it 'exists' does not add anything in thought to the concept.
  • All that is added by saying that a concept 'exists' is that it is instantiated: that there is something in the world that corresponds to it.
  • Kant accepted that real existence belonged analytically to the concept of God, the most perfect being.
  • However, he asserted that it did not necessarily follow from this that God existed.
  • The most we could say is that, if there is a supremely perfect being, then that being must really exist in order to be supremely perfect.

IS EXISTENCE A PREDICATE?

  • Kant expressed this objection formally by saying 'existence is not a true predicate'.
  • In saying about something that it exists, are we actually adding anything at all to the concept of the thing?
  • Or are we instead saying that there is at least one instance in reality of the thing in question?
  • Consider the following argument:

1) Elephants exist.

2) Dumbo is an elephant.

3) Therefore Dumbo exists.

  • However, when we say 'elephants exist', do we not mean that some elephants exist?
  • This would allow us to say that Dumbo does not happen to exist.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN BEING AND EXISTENCE

  • Are we forced to make this distinction?
  • We would then have to say that there are things that do not exist.

IS 'EXISTENCE' A PROPERTY, (A PREDICATE)?

  • If God is the greatest being, and existence is a property, then God must exist - otherwise He would not be the greatest being.
  • He would be less good, omnipotent and omniscient if He did not exist, than the perfect being we can imagine.

PLANTINGA AND POSSIBLE WORLDS

  • Plantinga presents a version of the ontological argument by using the concept of possible worlds.
  • 'Maximal excellence' = omniscience, omnipotence and moral perfection.
  • It is possible that a maximally excellent being exists.
  • There is therefore a possible world in which a maximally excellent being exists.
  • 'Unsurpassable greatness' = 'Maximal excellence in every possible world'.
  • An 'unsurpassably great' being exists either in every possible world or in none.
  • Therefore if any world contains an unsurpassably great being, then every world contains him.
  • However, there is a possible world in which an unsurpassably great being exists.
  • Therefore an unsurpassably great being exists necessarily in all possible worlds.

OBJECTIONS TO PLANTINGA

  • This argument assumes that what is necessary or impossible does not vary from world to world.
  • A crucial premise is that maximal greatness, and therefore unsurpassable greatness, are instantiated in a possible world.
  • Leibniz maintained that the ontological argument does not prove God's existence: it just proves that God's existence is either necessary or impossible.

THE DEVIL AND THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

  • Perhaps Plantinga's methodology could be adapted to prove the non-existence, or the existence, of the Devil.
  • The Devil could be defined as a being of 'minimal greatness'.
  • The Devil would possess the ultimate of all negative attributes.
  • If 'non-existence' is regarded as a negative attribute, then this could be attributed to him as well.
  • We would then have to regard 'non-existence' as a predicate, which seems conceptually difficult.
  • We might counter that evil is in fact increased, and not decreased, by the actual existence of the evil being.
  • Perhaps the ontological argument can therefore be used to prove the necessary existence of the Devil, an unsurpassably evil being, rather than his non-existence.