Nation Building As Security Policy

Nation Building as Security Policy

Unit 7: Afghanistan

Paine’s book gives a very long view of nation building, state building, and economic development. In short, the outcomes of the many studies depended on how locals played the hands they were dealt—their choices. One of my own conclusions is that as a basis of American foreign policy, as opposed to national security policy, we should approach this issue with a great deal of humility and a very long view.

But now let’s turn to security policy rather than the more general foreign policy. Some would propose that pursuing nation building, state building, and economic development stems from a moral obligation to lift people out of poverty and oppression as an end in itself. Others would go further by suggesting that we pursue nation building, state building, and economic development as a means to an end, the end being improved U.S. national security. Different individuals and factions give priority to one or the other. Their political confluence may support these efforts, and the security focus may predict and limit where we apply resources to nation building and hope for improvements in the short term, for example, Afghanistan and Iraq.

You may feel that we’ve drifted off course. However, we often make “analogies at war.” Some use analogies to persuade, some use them to temper expectations and guide action. The first use is generally simplistic and dishonest. The latter requires a greater depth of understanding, and that’s what we’re trying to build by studying Paine. Vietnam has been used for both purposes but is given short shrift in our readings.

We’ve read Paine now and we’re shifting to Fukuyama’s book. The Fukuyama book takes a somewhat narrower view of nation building than Paine’s. It focuses more narrowly on the American experiences, more narrowly on Afghanistan and Iraq, and more narrowly on military-led interventions. Hence, it may seem more on point for our class. But don’t forget the broader issues of the Paine book. A few decades from now, Afghanistan and Iraq will be judged in the longer context of the Paine book.

I am not an expert on Afghanistan, but I did observe important meetings the first couple of years following 9/11 with the experts in attendance. All spoke from the assumption that borders and populations would remain as is. One said that Afghanistan cannot be governed. Another said that it cannot be governed from Kabul. And a third claimed that it could not be governed for more than 3 to 5 years. No other experts offered a more optimistic view. Addressing this issue—establishing territorial sovereignty—was at the top of the list. When reading Slain, pay particular attention to criticism of the U.S. and European view that territorial sovereignty must come before the pursuit of legitimacy. Unaware at the time of these meetings, I was listening to the rationale for putting territorial sovereignty ahead of legitimacy.

There is another important history of nation building that we are not covering; apparently it was lost history, lessons unlearned by many. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the United States Marine Corps was heavily engaged in nation building in Central American and the Caribbean. Last unit’s readings on Haiti and the Dominican Republic alluded to this era. The Corps captured its lessons in the Small Wars Manual of 1940. The lessons in this manual account for why the Marines fought in Vietnam quite differently than did the Army. The manual makes the distinction between major wars (wars between major powers) and small wars (major power interventions into the affairs of small powers). The manual says that because the political objective is to bolster a weakened government, or a newly installed government, every action taken should be in the name of that government to build public support. Keep this principle in mind as you do the assigned reading with an eye to where and how it is followed or violated and with what consequences for nation building

I moved the Goodson article to optional reading. It’s not that it’s bad but it seems not to add anything to the other two articles in Fukuyama. I added the relevant material from one of the Dobbins books from Rand. There’s a lot of meat in that not found in the other articles.

Required Reading

Fukuyama, Slain, pp. 107-124.
Fukuyama, Weinbaum, pp.125-144.
Dobbins, After the War, pp.85-103.

Optional Reading

Fukuyama, Goodson, pp. 145-169

Discussion Questions

DQ 1. Acting in the name of the host nation government: One principle of this type of conflict is that the intervening force should consistently act in the name of the government to increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Is this Small Wars Manual principle, commonly repeated in counterinsurgency literature, rigorously followed? Who does and who doesn’t? What are the consequences for nation building?

DQ 2. Sovereignty versus Legitimacy: Discuss the importance of the decision to put territorial sovereignty ahead of legitimacy. What does this suggest about the composition of the initial intervention force? Does this generalize to other cases?

DQ 3. Footprint: Associated with the war in Vietnam, the Powell Doctrine argued that if the U.S. is going to intervene, then it should go in big. The Gulf War (1990-1991) is seen as a demonstration of the wisdom of that doctrine. Secretary Rumsfeld preferred a smaller intervention force. What are the pros and cons of the large versus small footprint approach in the context of Afghanistan? We’ll talk about Iraq later.

DQ 4. Interagency coordination: Consider the idea of coordinating the capacities of the various departments and agencies of the U.S. government. (a) Their planning processes must be coordinated in Washington. (b) Their day-to-day operations must be coordinated in country. And conflicts must be adjudicated at all levels. How important is interagency coordination in explaining the failures in the U.S.-led intervention into Afghanistan?

Lessons Learned

Submit a 350-word summary of what you have learned from this unit's assignments, readings, and discussions and how they relate to your learning experience and work environment. Include all assigned reading, not just the reading associated with the DQs.