Nuts and Bolts: Family Law 101
September 16, 2015
Summary of Some Important Family Law Cases

Alimony

Boemio v. Boemio, 414 Md. 118 (2010)

Bradley v. Bradley, 214 Md. App. 229 (2013)

Walter v. Walter, 181 Md. App. 273 (2008)

Whittington v. Whittington, 172 Md.App. 317 (2007)

Award of custody while parents living together

Ricketts v. Ricketts, 393 Md. 479 (2006)

Child Interview by Judge

Marshall v.Stefanides, 17 Md. App. 364 (1973)

Shapiro v. Shapiro, 54 Md. App. 477 (1983)

Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md. App. 1 (1996)

Child’s Surname

Lawrence v. Lawrence, 74 Md.App. 472 (1988)

Malin v. Mininberg, 153 Md. App. 358 (2003)

Schroeder v. Broadfoot, 142 Md. App. 569 (2002)

Child Support

Arrington v. Dep’t of Human Res., 402 Md. 79 (2007)

Bradford v. State, 199 Md. App. 175 (2011)

Cutts v. Trippe, 208 Md. App. 696 (2012)

Dep’t of Human Res. v. Mitchell, 197 Md. App. 48 (2011)

Flanagan v. Dep’t of Human Res. ex rel. Balt. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 412 Md. 616 (2010)

Guidash v. Tome, 211 Md. App. 725 (2013)

Kamp v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 410 Md. 645 (2009)

Petitto v. Petitto, 147 Md. App. 280 (2002)

Richardson v. Boozer, 209 Md. App. 1 (2012)

Rosemann v. Salsbury, Clements,Bekman,Marder & Adkins, LLC, 412 Md. 308 (2010)

Conditional Custody Awards

Cohen v. Cohen, 162 Md. App. 599 (2005)

Frase v.Barnhardt, 379 Md. 100 (2003)

Schaefer v. Cusack, 124 Md.App. 288 (1998)

Court’s Authority to Rule Limited by Pleadings

Gatuso v. Gatuso, 16 Md. App. 632 (1973)

Ledvinka v. Ledvinka, 154 Md. App. 420 (2003)

Custody Evaluations: Parents’ Access

Sumpter v. Sumpter,436 Md. 74 (2013)

Custody Factors

In re Adoption No. 12612, 353 Md. 209 (1999)

Bienenfeld v. Bennett-White, 91 Md.App. 488 (1992)

Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119 (1977)

Giffin v. Crane, 351 Md. 133 (1998)

John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md. App. 406 (1992)

Montgomery County Dep’t of Social Services v. Sanders, 38 Md.App. 406 (1978)

Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507 (1992)

Swain v. Swain, 43 Md.App. 622 (1979)

Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986)

Custody – Court Can’t “Predict the Future” to Change Custody

Schaefer v. Cusack, 124 Md.App. 288 (1998)

Discovery Sanctions

Flynn v. May, 157 Md. App. 389 (2004)

Heineman v. Bright, 124 Md. App. 1 (1998)

Fees for Child’s Counsel

Lapides v.Lapides,50 Md. App. 248 (1981)

Meyr v.Meyr, 195 Md. App. 524 (2010)

VanShaik v. VanShaik, 200 Md. App. 126 (2011)

Improper delegation of Court’s decision-making authority

Tarachanskaya v. Volodarsky 168 Md. App. 587 (2006)

Joint legal custody

McCarty v. McCarty, 147 Md.App. 268 (2002)

Shenk v. Shenk, 159 Md. App. 548 (2004)

Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290 (1986)

Jurisdiction and Venue

Britton v. Meier, 148 Md. App. 419 (2002)

Krebs v. Krebs, 183 Md. App. 102 (2008)

Nodeen v. Sigurdsson, 408 Md. 167 (2009)

Marital Property

Aleem v. Aleem,175 Md. App. 663, (2007)

Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md. App. 350 (1984)

Crawford v. Crawford, 293 Md. 307 (1982)

Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115 (1981)

Falise v. Falise, 63 Md. App. 574 (1985)

Flanagan v. Flanagan, 181 Md. App. 492 (2008)

Grant v. Zich, 300 Md. 256 (1984)

Harper v. Harper, 294 Md. 54 (1982)

Heger v. Heger, 184 Md. App. 83 (2009)

Kennedy v. Kennedy, 55 Md.App. 299 (1983)

Kline v. Kline, 85 Md. App. 28 (1990)

Randolph v. Randolph, 67 Md. App. 577 (1986)

Pope v. Pope, 322 Md. 277 (1991)

Schweizer v. Schweizer, 301 Md. 626 (1984)

Smith v. Smith, 193 Md. App. 29 (2010)

Williams v. Williams, 71 Md.App. 22 (1987)

Masters (now Magistrates)

Miller v.Bosley, 113 Md. App. 381 (1997)

Wise-Jones v. Jones, 117 Md.App. 489 (1997)

Modification of Custody

Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486(1991)

Kaufman v. Motley, 119 Md.App. 623 (1998)

Koffley v.Koffley,160 Md. App. 633 (2005)

Levitt v. Levitt, 79 Md. App. 394 (1989)

McCready v.McCready, 323 Md. 476 (1991)

Shunk v. Walker, 87 Md. App. 389 (1991)

Money Damages for withholding visits

Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt, 170 Md. App.572 (2006)

Khalifaet.al. v. Shannon, 404 Md. 107 (2008)

Parenting Coordinators

Brandau v. Webster, 39 Md.App. 99 (1978)

McCarty v. McCarty, 147 Md.App. 268 (2002)

Parent must have notice before court can decide custody

Burdick v. Brooks, 160 Md. App. 519 (2004)

Parentage testing

In re Roberto D. B., 399 Md. 267 (2007)

Relocation

Domingues v. Johnson323 Md. 486(1991)

Goldmeier v. Lepselter, 89 Md.App. 301 (1991)

Shunk v. Walker, 87 Md.App. 389 (1991)

Split Custody

Jordan v. Jordan 50 Md.App. 437 (1982)

Third-Party Custody/Visitation

Aumiller v. Aumiller, 183 Md. App. 71 (2008)

Barrett v. Ayres, 186 Md. App. 1 (2009)

B.G. v. M.R., 165 Md. App. 532 (2005)

Conover v. Conover, No. 2099, Sept. Term, 2013

Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661 (2008)

Karen P. v. Christopher J. B., 163 Md. App. 250 (2005)

Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404 (2007)

McDermott v. Dougherty, 385 Md. 320 (2005)

Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172 (1977)

When to Appoint Child’s Counsel

Meyr v.Meyr,195 Md. App. 524 (2010)

Nagle v. Hooks,296 Md. 123 (1983)

VanSchaik v. VanSchaik, 200 Md. App. 126 (2011)

* An alphabetical index of cases and page numbers are at the end.

In re Adoption No. 12612, 353 Md. 209 (1999)

Facts: Mother was convicted of murdering her 5 week old baby, imprisoned and then released. This is a third party custody case regarding Mother’s remaining child. The trial court did not consider Family Law § 9-101.Rather the court found that Mother “posed no threat of death or fatal abuse” to theremaining child.

Holding: The Court of Appeals held that §§9-101 and 9-101.1 apply when abuse is directed against a sibling of the child at issue.Since the sibling of the child in this case was murdered, the trial court was required to determine whether abuse or neglect was likely to occur if custody or visitation rights were granted to Mother,and unless it specifically found that there was no likelihood of further child abuse or neglect by her, to deny custody and unsupervised visitation. The plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history indicate that the focus of these statutes is on the party guilty of the previous abuse, not the particular child that had previously been abused or neglected, and that the goal of these statutes is to ensure that no child whose custody or visitation is subject to the court’s control will be placed with such a person unless the court is convinced that there is no likelihood of further abuse or neglect on the part of that person. The Court further held that the trial court had erred in failing to apply these statutes and that its finding that Mother posed no threat of death or fatal abuse was not sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.

Aleem v. Aleem, 175 Md. App. 663 (2007)

No comity for Talaq (Pakistani) law regarding divorce and marital property: The Circuit Court declined to afford comity to the property division resulting from a Pakistani talaq divorce. The parties, Pakistani citizens, had resided in Maryland for over 20 years and the wife was a permanent resident of the United States. The parties were married in Pakistan, but they never lived together there.

While the wife’s divorce action was pending in Maryland, the husband divorced the wife under Pakistani law by talaq, simply saying,“I divorce you, I divorce you, I divorce you.” The “divorce” took place in the United States and was registered in Pakistan. The alleged Pakistani marriage contract, and Pakistani law addressing division of property upon divorce (that rights in property follow title unless the marriage contract departs from its usual form to expressly provide the wife with some right in her husband’s property), is contrary to Maryland public policy concerning equitable distribution of marital property.

The appellate court noted that the “default” position under Pakistani law is that a wife has no rights to property titled in her husband’s name, while the “default” position under Maryland law is that the wife has marital property rights in property titled in her husband’s name. This conflict is so substantial that applying Pakistani law would be contrary to Maryland public policy. The appellate court held that the trial court did not err in declining to apply, under principles of comity, the law of Pakistan in determining Wife’s rights in marital property titled in Husband’s name.

Arrington v. Dep’t of Human Res., 402 Md. 79 (2007)

Arrington v. Dept. of Human Res., et al., No. 10, September Term, 2007, and McLong v. Oliver, No. 26 , September Term, 2007 (Cases were not consolidated but were argued on the same date.)

Holding: In a case of constructive civil contempt for failure to pay child support, the court may not incarcerate a defendant for failure to meet a purge that the defendant is not able to make in time to avoid the incarceration.

The Court in Arrington: The disposition in Arrington’s case was patently unlawful. Arringtonwas sentenced, determinatively, to eighteen months which is a criminal sentence not permitted in a civil contempt case even if a purge provision is addedand especially when the purge is one that the court must have known Arrington could not immediately meet. The purge provision in this case was that Arrington enter Dismas House—a correctional facility—”and secure full-time employment with earnings withholdings ...”At the time of sentencing, there was no indication that Arrington would be accepted into Dismas House or that if he was accepted, that he could secure full-time employment in time to avoid incarceration. The evidence only showed that he would be an acceptable candidate for work release.The finding of contempt can stand, but the sanction imposed, even though no longer in effect, must be vacated.

The Court in McLong: The sanction in McLong’s case is equally unlawful. McLong was given a determinate sentence, of two years, which is itself unauthorized, with or without a purge. The initial purge of $2,000 was obviously one that McLong could not meet; nor was the amended purge of $200 and presentation of a GED certificate one that the court had any reason to believe could be instantly met. It appears that the amended order was entered without a hearing, and therefore without any evidence on McLong’s ability to meet that purge.The court determined that one may not obtain a GED certificate unless and until the person passes a battery of tests, and there is nothing in the record to show that McLong, still incarcerated, had any ability even to take the tests. As with Arrington, the finding of contempt may stand, but the sanction must be vacated.

Aumiller v. Aumiller, 183 Md. App. 71 (2008)

In a grandparent visitation case, there must be a showing of unfitness or exceptional circumstances. The court may consider future harm, as well as current detriment, as long as there is sufficient evidence and not mere speculation. Prior to the death of the Father, the Mother refused to facilitate a relationship between the minor children and the paternal Grandparents. Following their son’s death, the paternal Grandparents sought reasonable grandparent visitation through the court. The trial court granted their request, but while the case was on appeal, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404 (2007) causing the case to be remanded. On remand, the lower court denied the paternal grandparents visitation; theyappealed. The appellants asserted that since the appellee prevented them from having a relationship with the minor children and are refusing to inform the children about their father, the appellee would cause the children future harm. And further, that these factors are tantamount to exceptional circumstances. The Court held that the evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to show future harm and if the Court adopted the appellants’ argument, it would render the holding in Koshko irrelevant.

Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md.App. 350 (1984)

Distribution of retirement benefits – the Bangs Formula: The spouse’s share is 50% multiplied by the “marital share.” The marital share is a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of months of employment during the marriage, and the denominator of which is the total number of months and years of employment at the time of retirement.

Source of funds: During the marriage, the Husband’s mother conveyed property to herself and the Husband as joint tenants. The Husband and the Wife lived in the home. The Husband and his mother took out a mortgage on the home to build a second house on the property which became the mother’s home. The Husband and the Wife made payments on the mortgage from marital funds, and made substantial improvements to the property. A fire then destroyed the parties’ house, and it was rebuilt from insurances proceeds and marital funds. Under the “source of funds” theory, whenever property owned by one spouse is mortgaged as security for a loan, the proceeds of which are used to acquire or improve the property, the property is not fully “acquired” until the mortgage is paid.

Barrett v. Ayres,186 Md. App. 1 (2009)

The paternal Grandparents filed a complaint for, and were granted, visitation under FL § 9-102 (the Grandparent Visitation Statute, or GVS). The relationship between the Grandparents and the Mother deteriorated to the extent that the Mother filed for modification of visitation, asking the court to terminate the Grandparents’ visitation. The trial court denied the Mother’s request for modification, and the Mother appealed. The Court of Special Appeals found in favor of the Mother, holding that: (1) whenever a parent seeks to modify an order granting visitation to a third party, due process requires that the third party make a threshold showing of unfitness or exceptional circumstances; and (2) the Mother’s desired modification was a material change in circumstances warranting modification.

B.G. v. M.R., 165 Md. App. 532 (2005)

Mother had sole legal and physical custody. Mother was murdered. The maternal Grandmother filed a complaint for custody, asking for custody of children. The trial court granted custody to Grandmother and Father appealed. The McDermott vs. Dougherty decision was issued by the Court of Appeals between the trial court decision and the appellate court decision. The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case, instructing the trial court to reconsider, in light of McDermott, its finding that exceptional circumstances existed that would overcome presumption that father should be awarded custody of children.

Bienenfeld v. Bennett-White, 91 Md.App. 488 (1992)

The Court of Special Appeals held that evidence of the parties’ religious views and practices may be considered, along with other factors impacting upon the child’s welfare, if such views or practices are demonstrated to bear upon the physical or emotional welfare of the child. The Court emphasized that absent such a demonstration, courts have no business treading on the constitutionally sensitive ground of religion.

The Court also held that the trial court’s decision did not infringe on the mother’s right to free exercise of religion because the mother retained unlimited prerogative to direct the children’s religious upbringing during visitation periods, and the trial court specifically tailored the mother’s visitation rights to coincide with particular religious holidays so that the children would be able to fulfill the religious obligations imposed by her faith.

Boemio v. Boemio,414 Md. 118 (2010)

Issue: Is the use of independent guidelines in addition to the required statutory consideration when awarding alimony acceptable?

Facts: During a trial to determine the amount of alimony and child support the husband would pay, the Circuit Court conducted the statutory analysis required under Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §11-106 of the Family Law Article. In an effort to transform those statutory factors into a final monetary award, the court also consulted an alimony formula promulgated by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. The court acknowledged that this formula was subject to the twelve statutory considerations in § 11-106, and applied it accordingly. The trial court ordered alimony. The husband appealed, contending that the trial court erred in consulting guidelines that were not expressly included in the Code.

Holding: Maryland’s alimony statute permits courts to consider “all the factors necessary for a fair and equitable award, including [the twelve listed in the statute.]” Thus, courts are not limited to the twelve enumerated in Section 11-106 of the Family Law Article. Given the difficulty of translating predominantly qualitative factors into a numerical award,courts may consult guidelines developed by a reliable and neutral source that do not conflict with or undermine any of the considerations expressed in the statute when determining the amount and duration of alimony.

Bradford v. State, 199 Md.App. 175 (2011)

Thiscase deals with a “delayed sentencing agreement” in a child support contempt case. “[U]nder the terms of the DSA, Ms. Bradford admitted that she was in contempt of court and agreed to serve a sixty day jail sentence to commence at a future date. The agreement provided for a monetary purge which, if timely paid before the sentence commenced, would have discharged the contempt. Ms. Bradford was not represented by counsel at the time she signed the agreement. The Department then submitted the DSA to the circuit court, which, without holding a hearing, entered an order holding her in contempt and imposing the sentence.

Contempt/Present Ability to Purge: “If the sanction for civil contempt is incarceration and the purge is the payment of money, the question will be whether the defendant is then, on that day, able to make that payment; the court may not order an incarceration to commence in the future, because the finding of ability to purge must be contemporaneous with when the incarceration is to commence and must remain in existence throughout the period of incarceration.”

Valid Waiver of Right to Counsel: In the DSA, Ms. Bradford admitted that she was in contempt of court, agreed that she had the present ability to pay her child support obligation and address her arrearage, and consented to a sixty day jail sentence if she failed to do so. While the DSA recited that Ms. Bradford waived her right to an attorney at the conciliation conference, there was nothing in the DSA that suggests that her waiver was knowing or voluntary. On July 27, 2009, based solely upon the DSA, the court held Ms. Bradford in contempt and imposed a sentence, without first providing the advisement required under Rule 15–206(e). Indeed, because the court did not hold a hearing, it made no inquiry whatsoever into whether appellant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. If, instead of signing the DSA, Ms. Bradford had appeared in court and consented to the July 27, 2009 order, Rule 15–206(e)(2) would have required the court to assure itself that she received a notice pursuant to Rule 15–206(c)(2)(C),8 and, if she had not, to advise her of the notice’s contents. If, in this hypothetical court proceeding, Ms. Bradford had indicated a desire to waive counsel, the circuit court would have been required to “determine, after an examination of the alleged contemnor on the record, that the waiver is knowing and voluntary.” Rule 15–206(e)(2)(B). The circuit court’s failure to do so would have mandated vacating the order. Redmond, 123 Md. App. at 417,718 A.2d 668.

Bradley vs. Bradley,214 Md. App. 229 (2013)

Facts: After parties were divorced and had entered into a separation agreement which provided that ex-husband pay ex-wife indefinite alimony, ex-husband filed motion to terminate the alimony obligation.

Holding: Termination of indefinite alimony provision imposed pursuant to separation agreement was not permitted. “The trial court is not permitted, even in order to purportedly avoid a “harsh and inequitable result,” to terminate an indefinite alimony obligation that was imposed pursuant to a separation agreement, where the agreement expressly stated that alimony was only terminable upon the remarriage of ex-wife or the death of either party, the agreement stated that the parties waived the right to have any court change or make a different provision for the support and maintenance of the ex-wife, and there was no strong policy prohibiting a couple from agreeing to an indefinite alimony provision that was not terminable.