Does U. S. Support for NATO Serve a Strategic Purpose?

Does U. S. Support for NATO Serve a Strategic Purpose?

Dave Schuler·Tuesday, December 28, 2010·21 Comments

The Huffington Post quotes Massachusetts Representative (and, presumably, ranking Democratic member of the House Financial Services Committee in the next Congress) Barney Frank as denying that U. S. support for NATO has a strategic purpose:

“These kind of restrictions on domestic spending with unlimited spending for the war — and you always have to talk about both — is a great mistake,” Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) told The Huffington Post last week. “And the liberal community’s got to focus more on Afghanistan, Iraq, NATO. NATO is a great drain on our treasury and serves no strategic purpose.”

Lawrence Korb, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, seconds him:

“Barney Frank has a good point,” said Korb. “We ought to rethink the whole idea of NATO.”

The first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, famously quipped that the purpose of NATO was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. Clearly, those goals are obsolete.

NATO’s budget has two primary components: the civil budget and the military budget. In fiscal 2009 and 2010 the U. S. paid $66.1 million and $84.1 million, respectively, for the NATO civil budget and $408 million and $430 million, respectively, for the military budget. That’s less than one half of one percent of our military spending, an appreciable amount to be sure but a drop in the ocean of U. S. military spending. For our half billion dollars per year we’re getting support from our NATO allies in Afghanistan, military coordination with those NATO allies, and reduced transaction costs for our interactions with them. That’s probably worth the half billion per year we’re spending for NATO membership.

Still, the question is worth asking. Does U. S. support for NATO continue to serve a strategic purpose? Are we getting value for our money?

There’s one more aspect of the question that I think deserves consideration. A linchpin of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy has been a renewed cooperation with international institutions. Will this mean the actual existing international institutions, of which NATO is a significant example, or hypothetical international institutions?

Excerpted Comments:

HalDsays:

Wednesday, December 29, 2010 at 11:24

I believe it was Kissinger who said that one indicator of the success/usefulness of an alliance is the belief that it is no longer necessary. (I’m paraphrasing of course). The alliance has expanded such since then that it does call into question whether we would go to war over,say, Ukraine (not a member yet but seriously proposed) or any of the other former Soviet republics. The definition of collective security of which NATO is an example is an attack on one is an attack on all. That serious stuff.

Alan Kelloggsays:

Thursday, December 30, 2010 at 05:21

Until Russia is a stable democracy (it is neither) we’re going to need NATO. You take a good hard look at Russia you’ll see a failing state tearing itself to pieces with a declining population. Where once the Soviet Union was a first world army supported by a third world society, now Russia is a second world army supported by a third world society.

Mark my words, when Russia is a stable democracy—no cult of the leader, no political shenanigans—then you can dissolve NATO as it will be unnecessary. Until then NATO remains vital to our security, and the security of Europe as a whole.

Ha T. Nguyensays:

Wednesday, December 29, 2010 at 14:33

Well, you know when the new Republican Congress is looking to cut domestic spending totally by gutting Department of Education, National Science Foundation, etc, 500 million dollars is nothing to sneeze at and may help save some domestic cuts.

Brettsays:

Wednesday, December 29, 2010 at 01:47

I think NATO played an important role in the early 1990s of assuring other countries in Europe that German re-unification wouldn’t lead back to the Bad Old Days.

Certainly its expansion into Eastern Europe, and continued existence after the 1990s, is not particularly vital and necessary. It’s basically a tool for the US to keep a foot in Europe, keep up links with European militaries, and rope NATO into providing support for US-led missions elsewhere. We probably should have begun phasing it out in the late 1990s/early 2000s.

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