Singer on Famine Relief

Singer on Famine Relief.

Singer argues that (nearly) all of us are failing in a serious moral duty, namely the duty to contribute to famine relief. He offers two arguments, differing slightly in the crucial moral premise. He subsequently considers a number of objections.

The argument, in its two versions, is this:

Argument 1.

1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad.

2. If it is in one’s power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral worth (i.e. without causing something comparably bad, or doing anything wrong in itself, or failing to promote some comparable good), then one ought to do it.

3. People are now dying of starvation, and we could prevent some of these deaths by contributing to charities devoted to famine relief.

Therefore

4. We should contribute to famine relief most or all of our income which we now devote to unnecessary purchases (new clothes, new cars, etc. that replace serviceable but older items of the kind, single malt and fishing equipment, nights at the movies, and so on).

Argument 2 differs only in the second premise, which is replaced by a weaker formulation:

1. Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad.

2’. If it is in one’s power to prevent something very bad from happening without compromising anything that is morally significant, one ought to do so.

3. People are now dying of starvation, and we could prevent some of these deaths by contributing to charities devoted to famine relief.

Therefore

The conclusions of the two arguments actually differ in the amount one is obliged to contribute. On the first argument, most or all of our income amounts to this—we ought contribute until our quality of life is just above that of those who our contributions help. In the second argument, the amount one is obliged to contribute is simply those resources whose absence does not seriously impair the well-being of you or your dependents.

Singer thinks that premises 2 and 2’ are controversial, and require some defense. In particular, they imply that what one ought to do to prevent the bad thing from happening does not depend on whether others are similarly able to prevent the bad thing from happening.

Beneficence and Supererogation.

It is generally presumed that we have duties of beneficence to others. When you can do someone a great good by a small sacrifice, it is wrong not to do this. So, e.g., if you can save the life of another at the cost to you of merely five minutes time and wet clothes, it is wrong of you not to save the life.

It is generally presumed that duties of beneficence do not require enormous sacrifices. So, for example, many of us could save the life of another who is in need of a kidney. But we are not morally required to undergo a risky operation, and impair our long term health, but donating one of our kidneys.

An action is supererogatory if it is good because beneficent, but not morally required. So, for example, saving a child from drowning when this poses no risk to your life—the water is not that deep and you are an able swimmer—is morally required. Not to do this is to fail in a duty of beneficence. On the other hand, risking your life to save a child stuck in a burning house is not required by one’s duty of beneficence. Such enduring such a risk, as in this case and that of organ donation, is supererogatory. As such it is an action worthy of special moral praise.

The idea of supererogation and duties of beneficence raises a problem. Where do duties of beneficence leave off; just how do we draw the line between acts that merely fulfill one’s moral duty and acts that are supererogatory?

Suppose there are X number of people positioned to prevent a grievous harm, of whom you are one. If all acted in concert, each would need to sacrifice G (say, 10 bucks or 10 minutes, or whatever) in order to prevent the harm. But if only one acts to prevent the harm, much more will be required—N times G, where N is the number of people similarly positioned.

One idea for limiting duties of beneficence is this. Under the above conditions, beneficence requires that you sacrifice G. Sacrificing more than this is doing more than your share, and so is supererogatory. Call this claim the thesis of limited beneficence.

The idea is pretty intuitive. It is also contradicted by Singer’s premises 2 and 2’.

Singer defends 2 and 2’ as follows.

First, he offers an implicit reflective equilibrium argument.

1. If one endorses limited beneficence, one must claim that the strength of one’s obligation to prevent an evil decreases when others are similarly positioned to prevent the evil.

2. If this is true, then one is less obliged to save a drowning child (at no risk of your own life) when others standing by see the child, but do not act.

3. Were this true, one would be less culpable for failing to act if others failed also to act to save the child.

4. One is not less culpable.

Therefore

5. It is not true that obligations of beneficence lessen in strength when others are well positioned to prevent the evil in question.

Therefore

6. The thesis of limited beneficence is not true.

In this argument, only 2 is explicit.

Singer considers two objections to premise 2/2’, and two objections to premise 3.

The first objection to premise 2/2’ is this. People are in fact incapable of living up to the moral obligations expressed in 2/2’. If one insists on principles which cannot generally be met, then people will not take seriously even the moral principles they can live up to. So it is better to endorse a mistaken conception of limited duties of beneficence, than not—for if we don’t limit duties of beneficence, people will ignore not only those duties (because they are incapable of living up to them) but also the moral duties which make civilized societies possible, e.g. the duties not to kill or steal, and so on.

Singer’s response is that:

1) What people will find themselves able to do is generally a function of what they take others to expect of them, and if it is expected of them that they will live up to 2/2’, they will.

2) Even if they will generally not do so, there is little chance that asking people to do this will lead to a general breakdown in morals. And it is worth running this risk in order to prevent worldwide famine.

3) Finally, the argument at best establishes that we ought not expect others to live up to 2/2’. It does not change the fact that each of us individually ought to live up to it.

The second objection to premise 2/2’ is this. The duties of beneficence defined by 2 and 2’ require behavior that will turn out to be ineffective. To fulfill our duty we must work to the point of exhaustion, and live at the point of poverty, in which circumstances we are in fact less able to prevent famine relief than we would otherwise be.

Singer responds that if this in fact 2 and 2’ don’t require any such thing. They require only that one work to relieve famine only to the extent that nothing of comparable moral worth, or nothing of significant moral worth, respectively, is lost. So one has not dispensed with the idea of supererogation. Further, within the scope of those duties of beneficence, one should work as best as possible to remove famine—so if more work, or more sacrifice, would actually decrease the aid one can render, one ought not work any harder.

Singer also considers three objections to premise three. These objections concede that one ought to do what one can to prevent famine, but deny that the best way to do this is by contributing (or by contributing as much as Singer argues we ought) to charities devoted to famine relief.

The first objection is this. Effective famine relief is really a job for governments. By contributing to private charities, one makes it possible for governments to ignore this obligation. So contributions to private charities are a bad idea, and actually harm the cause of famine relief in the long run.

Singer responds that we all ought to work to encourage our governments to undertake famine relief, but says that by failing to contribute to private charities we make it likely that our government will think its citizens don’t care about famine relief, and therefore make it likely that the government won’t undertake famine relief.

A second objection claims that famine is produced by overpopulation. So saving lives now contributes to greater starvation in the future. Hence one should not contribute to famine relief.

Singer agrees that that the factual claim might be right, but argues that it merely changes the nature of what we are obliged to do. Rather than contribute to famine relief, i.e. to projects which aim to save the lives of those now starving, one ought to work for effective population control, i.e. to prevent the births of people who, if born, will starve in the future. The extent of these obligations are no less exacting than of the obligations to prevent the deaths of those now starving, it is just that our efforts ought to be differently aimed.

The third objection is this. Premises 2/2’ seem to require that we collectively give to the point at which the productivity of our own economy is lessened. If we are giving excess income to famine relief rather than buying clothes, cars and movie tickets, lots of people will be out of work. This bad, and so on premise 2’, at least, not required. Hence while we might be obliged to contribute to famine relief, we cannot be obliged to contribute to the extent Singer implies.

Singer responds that:

a) Actually, it is premise 2 not 2’ that is right.

b) Even if it is 2’ that is right, we are obliged to do a great deal more than we are now doing.

c) There are economic reasons, as well as philosophical, for thinking that economic continued economic growth is a bad thing. In which case, it is not true that contributions which decrease growth are bad (they will be good because they prevent a bad thing, namely economic growth), so even on 2’, we ought to contribute as much as Singer implies.

A Possible Flaw in the Defense of 2/2’:

The case of the drowning child is relevantly different from the case of famine relief. No one can by herself relieve famine. But each person viewing the drowning child can by her own efforts save the child. Moreover, in the case of the drowning child, there is a particular person who suffers the evil which would have been prevented had any individual acted. This is not so in the case of famine relief. If you contribute $100 to famine relief, fewer people will starve to death this year. But there is no particular person who will live if you contribute but who will die if you don’t. There is simply no fact of the matter about which of those saved by, say, Feed the Children, got your $100 worth of food. Consequently, there is particular person who is harmed by your failure to contribute. This is not to say that failure doesn’t make the world a worse place; it is to say that the way in which the world is worse is morally different from the way in which it is worse if you fail to save the drowning child.

The difference can be put in a principled fashion:

When one can prevent a great evil from befalling a particular person or persons without sacrificing something of morally comparable value (or morally significant value), you are obliged to prevent the evil, whether or not others are positioned to help you do so, and whether or not they act to help you to do so.

You are so obliged because if you fail to act, the person who suffers the evil has a moral complaint against you (as against the other bystanders)—you could have, but did not, prevent her suffering without enduring comparable suffering yourself.

When one can prevent a great evil without sacrificing something of morally comparable value (or morally significant value), but no one in particular is helped by your sacrifice, things are different. If you fail to act, or fail to act in an effective manner, no one has a moral complaint against you, because no one is in a position to say that you could have, but did not, prevent her suffering without enduring comparable suffering yourself.

In these circumstances, one is obliged only

to contribute your fair share to prevent the suffering. To do less is to impose an undue burden on your fellows. But no more is required, because if your fellows fail in their obligation, while you do not, avoidable evil is suffered, but not by anyone who has a cogent moral complaint against you.

A Possible Objection to 3.

It is false that famine is generally caused by overpopulation. Famine is generally caused by governments (or the lack of them) which make it structurally impossible for local populations to be self sufficient. Famine is a consequence of war and of bad government. It is also false that famine relief fails for lack of funds. More typically, there is plenty of food available, it is merely that conditions make its distribution impossible (war, weather conditions, such as flood, and government policy).

Effective famine relief requires effective distribution, this is generally lacking, and there is nothing an individual citizen of one country can do to make effective distribution possible in other countries.

CAUTIONARY NOTE:

This objection is cogent in some, highly publicized, cases of famine. It is not cogent with respect to all sorts of cases of low-level but endemic poverty. E.g. it might arguably apply to recent ‘emergency situation’ famines in several countries in Africa, but clearly does not apply to the endemic plight of children in most Central and South American countries.