After the “Cherry Trees”
The primary outcomes of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 which concern us are the requirement for a follow-on conference in 1930 to deal with any issues created by technological progress or the geopolitical situation, the “building” holiday (which actually applied only to the US and Japan, as the British Empire, France and Italy were authorized to build capital ships within certain limitations before 1930) and the restriction on replacing those ships retained under the Treaty prior to their reaching a service life of twenty years.
If the “building holiday” had not been included in the Treaty, there still would have been a significant delay before the laying down and completion of Treaty capital ships. The US, Japan, France and Italy all had ships on the building slips, many of which would have to be cleared away before new ships which met Treaty restrictions could be laid down. Into this delay must be added the need to provide new or revised designs, based on new requirements from the various Naval staffs and approved by their various governments, at a time when such design staffs and warship building capacity were being cut back as peacetime economy measures.The numbers of ships completed before 1931 would have been small in any case, under the rule that a replacement ship for an ship approaching twenty years service was to be laid down no earlier than the seventeenth of service of the ships being replaced. For the USN, as an example, this would have been 1928, and limited to two ships, which would have completed in 1931.
The next assumption is that the London Conference in 1930 would not have led to a treaty extending the “holiday” and/or extending the service period for capital ships from twenty to twenty-six years. The London Treaty of 1936 was signed only by the French, US and the British Empire. This Treaty reduced capital ship main armament limits to 14” guns, but essentially eliminated the cruiser and destroyer quantitative limitations imposed in the 1930 Treaty. The year before, 1935, the British had negotiated a unilateral treaty with Germany, in which Germany was brought into the Treaty structure, with a quantitative limit at 35% of the British Treaty allowance of tonnage for capital ships. The British also reached an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1937 in which the Soviets agreed to abide by the Treaties.
Eventually a succession of events would free the various navies from the Treaty structure. Japan gave notice in 1934 and left at the end of 1936. Germany left the treaty structure in 1939, when it withdrew from its agreement with the British, which had been negotiated in 1935 to replace the “Versailles” Treaty limitations which Germany had denounced in 1933,. The British Empire suspended its participation in late 1939, along with France, at the start of World War Two. France, along with Italy, had never signed the 1930 Treaty. Italy suspended its participation in 1940, having also never signed the 1930 Treaty. The USN, however, remained legally bound to the Treaty structure through the middle of 1940, through acts of Congress which authorized the strength of the Navy. The London Treaty of 1936, held because of Japan’s notice of withdrawal, also never came into effect, though only the US, France and the British Empire signed on to that Treaty.
Any construction, of course, would have had to adhere to the provisions of the Washington Treaty of 1922, both in quantity built and technical characteristics. As it is, the most information available for such designs as were considered for building is for the USN between 1923 and 1939. Surprising enough, the navies with the next most amount of information on their programs are the French, Italian and German. The least amount is known about the Japanese and British programs. The Japanese programs were subject to secrecy on the part of the Japanese, but also because such programs were overcome by the design requirements for their extensive rebuilding program of their existing ships. The problem with the British is that they spent most of their design effort coming up with ‘small” battleship (less than 35,000 ton standard displacement) proposals for each naval arms limitation conference, hoping to persuade the other navies to reduce the limits of the Washington Treaty further, despite the adamant resistance of the US and Japan.
All the navies who were participants in the 1922 Washington Treaty executed modernization and reconstruction programs for their capital ships. In the case of the US, the funds authorized and appropriated certainly exceeded $900 million over a nine year period. A modernization generally left the hull and machinery unchanged, adding bulges, while updating secondary and AA armament, fire control systems, adapting superstructures and some deck protection improvements. Reconstruction added bulges and rebuilt torpedo protection systems and altered the hull size and shape, replaced the existing machinery, updated main, secondary and AA armament and fire control systems, added horizontal armor and revised the superstructure. The Washington Treaty allowed such modernization, to a total of a 3,000 ton displacement increase. Changes to the main armament and turrets or the vertical armor scheme (thicknesses and arrangement) were not allowed, except for the French and Italians, who could up gun their capital ships within the 3,000 ton modernization and 35,000 ton overall limit.Two factors are not clear from the historical record. The first is did the additional displacement from the modernization or reconstruction count against the Treaty quantitative limits or only the initially declared displacement. Second, would the disposal of ships replaced by new construction under these scenarios have provided additional funds beyond the historically budgets that offset the costs (and impact on aircraft carrier, cruiser and destroyer building programs and modernization) of new construction.
United States
With the confirmation of the Treaty by the Senate in 1922, US capital ship design took a hiatus until 1928, when the first studies were undertaken to provide for the authorization and appropriation for capital ship construction to begin in 1931. The US was a signatory of the 1922, 1930 and 1936 Treaties. Under the Constitution, the provisions of these treaties became US law and Congress insisted that the USN fully abide by the treaties’ provisions until 1939. When Japan refused to provide information on her future capital ship programs in 1937, the US, along with France and the British Empire invoked the “escalator” clause of the 1936 Treaty, returning the limitation on main armament to 16” guns (from 14”) and increasing the standard displacement limitation from 35,000 tons to 45,000 tons. Only in 1939, with the authorization to retain over-age ships and in 1940 when the Treaty quantitative limits, and then qualitative limits were discarded, did the USN finally escape the Treaty system which its primary opponent, the Japanese, had abandoned in 1936.
The battleships, battle cruisers, armored cruisers and monitors of the USN in service on 31 December 1923 under the limitations of the Washington Treatyof 525,000 tons (ships in service/commissioned with declared or estimated standard displacement)
Seattle / 23 September 1903 / 7 August 1906 / 14,500Charlotte / 21 March 1905 / 7 May 1908 / 14,500
Missoula / 29 April 1905 / 21 July 1908 / 14,500
Florida / 9 March 1909 / 15 September 1911 / 21,825
Utah / 15 March 1909 / 31 August 1911 / 21,825
Arkansas / 25 January 1910 / 17 September 1912 / 26,000
Wyoming / 9 February 1910 / 25 September 1912 / 26,000
New York / 11 September 1911 / 15 April 1914 / 27,000
Texas / 17 April 1911 / 12 March 1914 / 27,000
Nevada / 4 November 1912 / 11 March 1916 / 27,500
Oklahoma / 26 October 1912 / 2 May 1916 / 27,500
Pennsylvania / 27 October 1913 / 12 June 1916 / 31,400
Arizona / 16 March 1914 / 17 October 1916 / 31,400
New Mexico / 14 October 1915 / 20 May 1918 / 32,000
Mississippi / 5 April 1915 / 18 December 1917 / 32,000
Idaho / 20 January 1915 / 24 March 1919 / 32,000
Tennessee / 14 May 1917 / 3 June 1920 / 32,300
California / 25 October 1916 / 10 August 1921 / 32,300
Colorado / 29 May 1919 / 30 August 1923 / 32,600
Maryland / 24 April 1917 / 21 July 1921 / 32,600
West Virginia / 12 April 1920 / 1 December 1923 / 32,600
Total capital ship tonnage: 569,350 tons
Tonnage of armored cruisers: 43,500 tons
Tonnage of “dreadnought” capital ships: 95,650 tons
Tonnage of “superdreadnought” capital ships: 332,400 tons
Tonnage of 16” gun armed capital ships: 97,800 tons
One of the anomalies of the Treaty was the status of the three “Tennessee” class armored cruisers. The USS Seattle remained in service, armed, as an armored cruiser, into 1931. These ships exceeded 10,000 tons in standard displacement and carried guns larger than 8”. Under the Treaty, they were “capital ships” and should have counted against the aggregate tonnage allowance for the US. There was continuing interest throughout the 1920s of modernizing these ships along the lines of reconstruction of the US battle line, but with an upgraded machinery plant. These ships would serve as peacetime flagships on secondary stations and in wartime, escort convoys and support the battle line, releasing the new heavy cruisers to scout, with the aircraft carriers, for the fleet.
Between 1926 and 1934, the US rebuilt their battle line, starting with the “Florida” and ending with the “Idaho”. The modernizations were allowed under theTreaty; up to 3,000 tons could be added to the ship’s standard displacement, to counter improvements against submarine and air attack. All the ships involved received bulges and additional horizontal armor on decks and turret roofs. The coal powered ships had their boilers replaced by oil fired boilers left over from the 1916 program. Main gun turret elevation was increased in the “Nevada”, “Pennsylvania” and “New Mexico” classes. It was planned to do this with the earlier ships (“Florida”, “Wyoming” and “New York” classes), but at the time (1926-27), the British protested and the US acceded to those protests, though they could have argued for an increase to twenty degrees, the standard elevation of British “big gun” turrets at that time. None of the ships experienced a 3,000 ton increase in displacement, as the new boilers were lighter and offset the increases of the additional armor and the bulges. In some cases, net horsepower increased, in all case, length to beam ratio decreased, and all ships showed a slight decrease in maximum sustained sea speed. The earliest plans were to replace the machinery of the battleships of the “New York” and later classes with that of the cancelled “South Dakota” battleships, but this was considered too costly, despite the great improvement in ship speed, internal compartmentalization and reliability, especially during periods of maintained maximum sea speed the use of these electro-turbine power plants would have provided. At least, the reciprocating engine machinery of the “New York” class and the “Oklahoma” could have been replaced;instead these ships remained the “lame ducks” of the Battle Force (at emergency load displacement, “Oklahoma” could barely touch 18 knots, while sustained steaming at 20 knots shook their machinery to pieces).When the “New Mexico” class was rebuilt, their machinery was replaced by modern (1931) geared turbines which slightly improved maximum speeds, but provided significant improvement in cruising range. Buying three common sets of machinery also reduced initial and life cycle costs for these ships. It was intended to do the same for the “Big Five”, but reconstruction funding disappeared until 1939. Another mistake was in spending scarce funds to modernize the “Florida” and “Wyoming” class battleships, especially after the London Treaty forced their disposal or conversion only four to five years after being rebuilt. These ships, especially the “Florida” class, added very little to the strength of the US battle line when facing a Japanese battle line with 14” and 16” guns. As it was the US spent over $900 million (1939 dollars) over a nine year period (1926-1934) on the reconstruction effort.
The USN’s original plan for modernizing its battle line started with replacing the coal burning machinery of the older battleships, using the surviving oil fired boilers from the “South Dakota” class. The oldest available plans, however, are a modernization of the “Nevada” class, which makes sense given the strategic, operational and tactical disadvantages of USS Oklahoma’s reciprocating engines. This involved packaging the entire power plant from the “South Dakota” class into the “Nevada” class hull, increasing elevation of main gun turrets, replacing the cage masts and the 5” gun secondary with 6” guns also left over from the 1916 program. The use of the turbo-electric machinery would probably have increased displacement by 1,000 tons, not just because the machinery weighed more, but because of the internal bulkheads that would be added, first in compartmentalizing the turbo-electric plant, and then in building the “five bulkhead” torpedo protection system of the “Big Five” into the existing hull. This would probably have precluded use of the 6” guns in order to get the level of horizontal protection improvement sought in the modernization. The ships would still be bulged, even with the construction of a “modern” TPS within the hull, in order to counter the increase in displacement and bring the belt back up to the desired height above the waterline at battle displacement. Had this modernization been applied to the “New York” and “Nevada” classes, the USN would have eliminated three of its “problem children” of the late 1930s, the reciprocating engines vibrating badly when held to the “new” fleet cruising speed of fifteen knots and the lack of power leaving the USS Oklahoma at 17-18 knots at emergency deep displacement. Instead, despite the bulges, the two classes would have been good for at 23 knots sustained sea speed at battle displacement and easily cruised at ten or fifteen knots.
“New York” Mod 1922 DesignStandard Displacement / 28,912 tons
Normal Displacement / 32,117 tons
Battle Displacement / 33,028 tons
Full (Emergency) Displacement / 35,259 tons
Dimensions / 573’ (OA), 565’ WL x 102.5’ x 33.25’ max D
Guns / 10 x 14”/45, 12 x 5”/51, 8 x 3”/50 AA
Machinery / 4 s, 60,000 shp = 23 kts @ battle disp
Armor / 12” belt, 4” deck, 14” turret, 12” barbettes
Notes: Had the scenario outlined above been followed, the “New York” class would have been reconstructed in 1925-1926, instead of 1926-1927. The reconstruction would have replaced the coal-fired boilers and reciprocating engines with a “South Dakota” turbo-electric plant. The superstructure would have featured ‘heavy” cage masts along the lines of the “Colorado” class, probably also salvaged from the “South Dakota” class. It was intended to replace the 5” secondary with 6” guns, but displacement limitations imposed by the increased deck protection and bulges would have required retention of the 5” guns, though with movement to the superstructure, the twin mount might have been introduced. The “New York” class was declared at a Treaty displacement of 27,000 tons. Calculations in 1923 determined the actual displacement at 23,958 tons at standard displacement. Given the declared displacement, the USN had an additional 3,042 tons to work with in modernizing the “New York” class. The turbo-electric plant from the “South Dakota” class weighed in at 2,698 ton (dry), compared to the 2,311 tons for the “New York” class. Historically, the bulges, the heavy tripods and fire control tops and the new deck armor cost 3,567 tons. The addition of the turbo-electric plant and rebuilding the interior protection into a five bulkhead torpedo protection system as in the “Big Five” would have cost an additional 1,387 tons. This would bring the calculated standard displacement to 28,912 tons. The torpedo protection system of the “Big Five” was designed to resist a 400lb TNT warhead. Adding bulges would have increased this to 700lbs. The bulges would have been designed more to offset the increased displacement and raise the belt back to the required height above the water line than improve underwater resistance. The turbo-electric plant would resolve the issue of passing steam lines from the boilers to the turbines past the No.3 turret’s magazines, which suffered from increased temperatures that adversely impacted the powder. The turbo-electric plant was rated at 60,000hp, the USN intending to operate the ship at 2/3ds power in peacetime. At trials in 1914, the USS Texas made 21.13 knots at 28,850hp at a displacement of 26,132 tons. The USS Texas would probably run trials after reconstruction at 32,117 tons. The increased displacement and the bulges should cost 2 knots, based on the historical reconstruction. The 200% increase in power on the other hand, should have added about 4.25 knots, which leaves a trials result of near 23.5 knots. The “New York” class should have been good for around 22.5 knots at battle displacement right out of dry dock. The turbo-electric plant and the additional fuel of the TPS basically doubled the range. The remaining issue would have been increased elevation of the guns. When the USN tried to increase the elevation of the guns of its first reconstructed battleships, the British objected. The USN felt it was within the Treaty allowance to increase the elevation, but the US gave in to the British objections. Range at fifteen degrees for the 14” Gun Mark 8, was 23,000 yards and at thirty degrees, 34,300 yards. Without increased turret elevation, aerial spotting could not be exploited, as the visual horizon was around 24,000 yards. The maximum ballistic range for the 15” Mark I at twenty degrees elevation, the common maximum turret elevation among British capital ships, was 23,387 yards, which explains the British concern with this proposed modification. On the other hand, the Japanese turrets were already completed at 25 degrees maximum elevation, allowing the 36cm (14”) Gun 41st Year Type to range to at least 30,000 yards. Modifications during the late 1920s, increased this to 33 degrees and range to almost 35,000 yards. Since the British had built the first ship of the “Kongo” class and continued to assist in building Japanese capital ships up to IJNS Fuso, they would have known this, and given their designation of Japan as the primary threat after WWI, their objections to the US program can only be understood as Britain’s commitment to legalism in international affairs. The “Nevada” class would be reconstructed to a similar design. Both classes would have received eight 5”/25 Mark 10 AA guns and the Mark 19 director and 15’ “height/range finder” sometime after 1928 in place of the 3” guns.