SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Appeal No. 02-2793
FRANK AMENDOLA AND MELESSA AMENDOLA, ON BEHALF OF THEIR MINOR CHILD, DANNY
PLAINTIFF - RESPONDENT,
v.
SAINT TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL CORPORATION, ST. TAMMANY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS
DEFENDANT – APPELLANT,
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION TO ADOPT A LIMITED DUTY BASEBALL RULE IN TULANIA AND TO UPHOLD PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENTS’ DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS, ENTERED IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH CIRCUIT.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
TEAM 14
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents……………………………………………………………..…………….……1
Table of Authorities ……………………………………………………………………..………2
Questions Presented…………….…………………………………………………….…...……..6
Argument………………………………………………………………………………………....7
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD THAT THE HAIR-LENGTH POLICY VIOLATES THE APPELANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS…………………………….7
A. Substantive due process affords the Amendolas the fundamental right to choose the length and style of their son’s hair……………………...…………………….8
B. St. Paul’s hair-length policy does meet the burden of having a substantial justification……………………………………………………………………...... 9
C. Enrollment in sports at a public school does not preclude the Amendolas from their constitutional rights……………………………………………………………....11
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD THAT THE HAIR-LENGTH POLICY VIOLATES THE APPELANT’S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS…………………...13
B. St. Paul’s hair-length policy constitutes gender discrimination……………..…..13
C. St. Paul’s hair-length policy constitutes a Title IX violation …………………....14
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY REFUSED TO ADOPT THE LIMITED DUTY BASEBALL RULE …………………………………………………………...... 16
A. The Baseball Rule cannot coincide with the majority of states’ current shift towards comparative negligence standards…………………………………………..17
B. The Baseball Rule cannot replace traditional common law duty rules………..….20
C. The legislature holds the responsibility of creating a Baseball Rule…………………………………………………………………………...... ….23
D. The most modern version of the Baseball Rule does not apply to the facts of this case……………………………………………………………………..………….……....27
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………28
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
United States Supreme Court
Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970)………….………….……….……………….....…14
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)….………….…….…..14
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)……………………………………………………...... 14
Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940)…...... 9
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) …...... 13
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)…...... 9
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980)...…………………………….……………………..……13
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) …...... 11
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) ……………………………………………………...... 8
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)………………………………………....14
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)…...... 13
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)………………………………………………...8
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)……………………………………………..14
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)…………………………………………………...8,9,11
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)…...... 12
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)……………………………………………………...9
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)…...... 10, 12
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)……………………………………………………...... 8, 9
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)...….…………………………..……………….…9
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) ………………………………………………....14
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) ….……………………………………...13
Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)……………………………………………………….8
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)...…………….……………………….……..….14
United States District Court and Court of Appeals
Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 773 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985)……………………………...13
Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972)…………………………………………….....8
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.1977)……………………………….....14
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969)…...... 8, 9, 10
Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir.1979)……...... 14
Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970)……………..………….…………………8, 9, 10
Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970)………………………………………….….8
Gobla v. Crestwood School District, 609 F. Supp. 972 (M.D. Pa. 1985)…….………………….13
Hayden v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2014) ……………………...... 15
Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1974)……………………………………………..8, 10
Huebschen v. Department of Health, 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983)…………………………...14
Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970)……………………………………………..8
Robbins by Robbins v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 941 F.Supp. 786 (S.D. Ind. 1996)………………………………………………………………………..……………………12
Wells v. One2One Learning Found., 39 Cal. 4th 1164 (2006). …...……………………….....…7
State Cases
Akins v. Glens Falls City School Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325 (1981)…...... 16
Anderson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 231 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1950)…………….……………21
Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677 (2012)………………………………………..21, 22
Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233……………………………………………………….…………21
Bellezzo v. State, 851 P.2d 847, 852 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) ………………………………....16, 21
Benejam v. Detroit Tigers, Inc., 635 N.W.2d 219 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)………………16, 17, 25
Baxter v. Noce, 107 N.M. 48 (1988)……………………………………………………………..18
Coronel v. Chi. White Sox, Ltd., 595 N.E.2d 45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) superseded by Statute as stated in Jasper v. Chicago Nat. League Ball Club, Inc., 722 N.E.2d 731 (1999)…………..…..20
Groncki v. Detroit Edison Co., 557 N.W.2d 289 (1996)…………………………...……………16
Jones v. Three Rivers Management Corp., 483 Pa. 75 (1978)……………...……………….21, 27
Rountree v. Boise Baseball, LLC, 296 P.3d 373 (Idaho 2013)………………..…17, 18, 23, 24, 26
Maisonave v. Newark Bears Prof'l Baseball Club, Inc., 881 A.2d 700 (N.J. 2005)…………….27
Maytnier v. Rush, 225 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967)……………………………………..…… 27
Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682 (1981), superseded by statute as stated in Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 628 (1992)……………………………………………………………………..…………18, 19, 20
Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297 (1990)…………………………..…………………. 24
Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249 (1984)……………………………………...………………25
S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903 (Ind. 2014)……………………..…………20
Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244 (1999)…………………………………...………………….21
Winn v. Frasher, 116 Idaho at 503………………………………………………..……………..24
Federal Statutes
42 U.S.C. § 1983………………………………………………….….…….……………………...7
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)……………………………………………………………………………...14
State Statutes
Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 12–554……………………………………………………………………23
Colo Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–21–120 (1994)……………………………………………………....23
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:53A–43 to 2A:53A–48…………………………………………………….23
745 Ill. Comp. Stat. ………………………………………………………………………...……23
Constitutional Provisions
Fourteenth Amendment….…….………………………….……………………7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15
The Equal Protection Clause...... …...13, 14, 15
The Due Process Clause….…………………….….………………….………………………7, 8, 9,
Secondary Sources
Jacob A. Stein, Stein on Personal Injury Damages Treatise § 14:6 (3d ed. 2012)………………17
Restatement (Second) of Torts: Negligence §496A (1965)………………………….…………..17
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD THAT THE HAIR-LENGTH POLICY VIOLATES THE APPEALANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD THAT THE HAIR LENGTH POLICY VIOLATES THE APPEALANTS EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS.
III. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY REFUSED TO ADOPT THE LIMITED DUTY BASEBALL RULE FOR TULANIA.
ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court will review the case at hand de novo. St. Paul’s High School’s (“School Corporation” or “St. Paul”) hair-length policy forces the Amendolas to forgo their fundamental liberty in raising their son Danny (D.A.) in the manner they deem appropriate. The policy also constitutes a violation of DA’s equal protection rights. The Amendolas seek relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), which provides a private cause of action for individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated. There is no dispute that St. Paul was acting under color of law, which is the first requirement to satisfy a claim under Section 1983. The Amendola’s will show that their constitutional rights were violated in the following two ways. First, the hair-length policy arbitrarily infringes on their fundamental liberty to choose the manner in which they raise and groom their son, thus constituting a violation of their substantive due process. Second, the hair-length policy subjects D.A. to discrimination based on his sex and violates his equal protection rights.
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY HELD THAT THE HAIR-LENGTH POLICY VIOLATES THE APPELLANT’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
The Amendola’s have the constitutional liberty to choose the manner in which they raise their son D.A., including but not limited to his grooming. Because St. Paul is a public school, their policies are subject to the same burden of justification of other state entities. Wells v. One2One Learning Found., 39 Cal. 4th 1164, 1190 (2006). St. Paul’s hair-length policy does not meet the necessary requirements to justify infringement upon the Amendola’s fundamental rights. As a result, the school’s hair-length policy is a violation of their substantive due process.
A. Substantive due process affords the Amendolas the fundamental right to choose the length and style of their son’s hair.
St. Paul’s hair-length policy violates the Amendolas’ Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. See, e.g., Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). ("The [Due Process] Clause ... provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."). A "substantive due process" analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted right. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). Mr. and Mrs. Amendola have the constitutional right to exercise care, custody and control over the manner in which they raise their son D.A. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65(2000); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). This includes decisions over his personal grooming and hair-length, which is a well-established fundamental right. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1970); Arnold v. Carpenter, 459 F.2d 939, 941-42 (7th Cir. 1972); and Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49, 51-52 (7th Cir. 1974). “Ones choice of hairstyle is an element of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Holsapple at 51-52.
A student's right to wear their hair as they please is also protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1970). The basis of this fundamental right derives from the individuality and personality that ones’ hairstyle reflects. Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Vt. 1970). There is no right more sacred than for each individual to be in control of his own person, and to be “free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Crews at 1263. The right to wear one's hair in a length and style of their choosing has long been upheld as a fundamental liberty. This freedom of choice in hairstyle also extends to students in schools, and is a protected under substantive due process, absent substantial justifications.
B. St. Paul’s hair-length policy does meet the burden of having a substantial justification.
The Amendolas have the right to raise their son in the manner in which they deem fit, absent compelling circumstances. Troxel at 510. This right extends to choices regarding his grooming and hair length. If the state wishes to curtail this right, it must meet a “substantial burden of justification.” Reno at 302; Crews at 1266; Breen at 1036.
The Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of "due process of law" includes a substantive component, forbidding the government’s infringement on "fundamental" liberty interests, regardless of the manner of due process. Reno at 302. The only time the government is permitted to infringe on a fundamental liberty is if the infringement is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Id. When officials wish to curtail a fundamental right, there is a substantial burden of justification required. Id. The Constitution protects children in schools from “arbitrary and unjustified governmental rules.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 505 (1965). A governmental interference is only justified if it is “unrelated to the suppression of free expression” and the restriction on the freedom is “no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Even if the governmental purpose is legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). The power to regulate must be exercised in a way that does not unduly infringe on the protected freedom. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.” Shelton at 487. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). Students both in and out of the classroom are considered "persons" under The United States Constitution. Id. They possess fundamental rights which the State must respect.” In order to justify a state or school official curtailing a mode of expression, it must show that its policy was caused by something more than a mere discomfort or unpleasantness. Id. at 509. Since the impact of hair regulations extends beyond the schoolhouse gate, the degree of state infringement on personal rights is significantly greater than in many other areas of school discipline. Crews at 1264. This Court has previously rejection similar justifications for hair-length polices as those put forth by St. Paul. Theories such as: disruption to fellow students and risks to health and safety, (Crews) and an attempt at establishing the need for a hair-length policy arguing a correlation between hair-length and academic performance (Breen and Holsapple), were all rejected finding a lack of a “substantial justification.” Where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school," the prohibition cannot be sustained. Tinker at 509.
St. Paul’s specifically seeks to justify its hair-length policy arguing that it promotes discipline, maintains order, and ensures safety for students. (R. at 33.) The schools policy creates provisions that extend to the Athletic Code, allowing coaches to choose “acceptable hair length” for each individual sports team. (R. at 34.) It also forbids hairstyles that create problems of health and sanitation, obstruct vision, or call undue attention to the athlete. Id. Head Coach Belichick, of the boys Baseball team, requires that his male players have their hair cut above their ears, eyebrows, and collar. Id. Mr. Belichick maintains that his standards promote an image of “clean cut” boys, and establishes “uniformity for the sake of team unity.” Id. These reasons do not meet the burden of a substantial justification as they do not serve a compelling state interest. Reno at 302. The only notable instance where justifications such as these have been supported, is in the context of on duty police officers. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976). The court in Kelley based its decision on the facts that police officers are public officials acting in an official capacity. Id. The facts of our case are distinguishable in that we are dealing with civilians and more specifically students, operating in the setting of a public sports team.