Active Soviet military support for Indonesia during the 1962 West New Guinea Crisis
This article shows that during the 1962 West New Guinea Crisis the Soviet Unionplayed a much more active military role than previously assumed. Khrushchev secretly supplied Indonesia with Soviet manned submarines and bombers and was prepared for these units to participate in an Indonesian attack againstthe Dutch. The Soviets also helped the Indonesians draw up operational plans.This deployment fits into a pattern of covert Soviet military interventions in the developing world between 1960 and 1962 and suggests that in some cases Khrushchev was prepared to use Soviet military units to support wars of national liberation in the developing world.
Key words: West New Guinea, West Irian, Sukarno, Khrushchev, wars of national liberation, Cuban Missile Crisis.
Since the end of the Cold War researchers haveuncoveredseveral Soviet military operations in the developing world which were hithertounknown to the Western public. It has been revealed that in the Korean War Soviet pilots secretly flew North Korean MiG-15 jet fighters in combat missions against American aircraft.[1]Similarly, Soviet personnel flewEgyptianTupolev Tu-16 medium bombers during Egypt’s military intervention in Yemenandhelped man North Vietnamese anti-aircraft missile batteries in the Vietnam War.[2] Even the Soviet deployment of nuclear missilesin Cuba in 1962 had an unknown dimension, with the discovery that the Moscowalso sent tactical nuclear weapons to the island for use onshort range rockets, cruise missiles and bombers.[3] Clearly, in the first half of Cold War the Soviet leadershipwas more willing than previously thought to sendits combat forces intothe developing world,although it sought toconceal their presence and activities.
Evidence hasalso emerged of another covert Soviet military deployment, this time tohelpIndonesia in its confrontation with the Netherlandsover the Dutch colony of West New Guinea. Former Soviet naval officershave revealedin the Russian and Dutch media that they took partin an operation to aid the Indonesians.[4]They claimed that in 1962 the USSRsecretly provided Indonesia withsubmarines and Tu-16 bombersmanned by Soviet crews and assignedthem to take part in a large scale Indonesian attack on West New Guinea. Other Russian sources, including a revised edition of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs, support these claims.[5] Furthermore, a Dutch researcher, Matthijs Ooms, has shown that the Dutch naval intelligence service, MARID (Marine Inlichtingendienst), received information in the summer of 1962that Soviet crews were manning Indonesian submarines.[6]
Thisdegree of Soviet involvement has not been appreciated in the existing English language literature on the West New Guinea crisis.[7]Previous authors haverecognised that the Soviet Union sold arms to the Indonesians but Moscow was not thought to have committed its own forcesto the Indonesian cause. Drawing on published Russian, Dutch and Indonesian sources and contemporaneous American, Australian and British intelligence reports, this article will show that the Soviets played a much more active military role in the West New Guinea Crisis. It confirms that Khrushchev secretly supplied the Indonesians with Soviet manned submarines and bombers and was seemingly prepared for them take in part in a major attack on the Dutch forces in West New Guinea.The Soviets also helped the Indonesians prepare operational plans and encouraged them to take the territory by force. This aggressive behaviour by the Soviets turned West New Guinea into a potential Cold War crisis. The Netherlands was a NATO ally of the United States and through its intelligence services Washington knew of the secret Soviet deployment.Soviet involvement in an Indonesian attack could therefore have caused a superpower confrontation.More broadly, the Soviet operation in West New Guinea sheds new light on Khrushchev’s foreign policy in the early 1960s. Together with other examples it suggests that the Soviet leader was ready to covertly use Soviet military units to support wars of national liberation in the developing world.
The West New Guinea crisisarose fromtheprocess of Dutch decolonisationin South East Asia. The Netherlands gave independence to most of theDutch East Indies in 1949, thereby creating Indonesia, but it chose to retain theWest New Guinea portion of the colony. The Indonesian President, Sukarno, opposed this colonial holdover and hepushed the Dutch to withdraw from the territory, which the Indonesians called West Irian, and transfer sovereignty to Indonesia. The Netherlands refused. West New Guinea did not share a land border with Indonesia and the Dutch argued that the Papuan peoples in the colony were ethnically distinct from Indonesians and should in time exercise the right to national self-determination on their own. Negotiations over the issue became deadlocked so Sukarno applied escalating economic and diplomatic pressures on the Dutch .In 1957 he seized Dutch commercial assets in Indonesia and in 1960 he broke off diplomatic relations. The Dutch remained obdurate,however, and took steps to advance West New Guinea to self-government.
Indonesiatherefore turned tomilitary action. Amidst much belligerent rhetoric from Sukarno, Indonesian guerrillas were infiltrated by sea into the colony and inJanuary 1962 the Mandala military command was set up to plan, prepare and execute operations to recover West New Guinea.[8]The Mandala commanders envisaged a three phase campaign; in phase one, lasting until the end of 1962, more Indonesian guerrillas would be infiltrated into West New Guinea and ‘free areas’ set up.[9]At the same time naval, air and land bases inIndonesia would be developed in preparation for full scale war. Phase two would start at the beginning of1963 with an operation to capture and occupy the small island of Biak, just north of West New Guinea, which was central to the Dutch defences.In phase three the Indonesians would take control over the rest of the territory.
Sukarno could contemplate such action against the Dutch because he had received strong backing from Khrushchev and the Soviet Union. Soviet propaganda and diplomacy supported the Indonesian claim to West New Guinea and Khrushchev supplied Sukarno with considerable amounts of modern weaponry, so much so that by 1962 Indonesia was the biggest non-communist recipient of Soviet Bloc military aid.[10]Initially it obtained its equipment via Moscow’s East European satellites, buying arms worth $182 million from Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1958.These purchases equipped the Indonesian air force, AURI (Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia), and navy, ALRI (Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia), withSoviet built jet fighters and bombers, destroyers and two Project 613 diesel-electric submarines. In January and February 1961 Sukarno expanded ALRI and AURIstill further, with two huge arms deals signed directly with the Soviet Union. The USSR agreed to supply Indonesia with $521 million worth of arms between 1961 and 1964, including four more Project 613 submarines, destroyers and a light cruiser. AURI would receive the latest Soviet military aircraft, such as 20 MiG-21fighters and 20 Tu-16 medium bombers, six of which were the Tu-16KS variant armed with the Kometa air to surface anti-shipping missile. The Kometa was a formidable weapon,with a range of 70-90 kilometres and a one tonne warhead.[11] The arms were sold on credit and the terms were generous, giving a one-third discount on nominal cost price and allowing repayments to be deferred until 1964. It would take time for Soviet Bloc instructors to properly train Indonesian personnel in how to use this advanced weaponry, limiting its immediate effectiveness, but it enabled Sukarno to pose a growing military threat to West New Guinea.
Thesedevelopments caused unease in Washington.Khrushchev appeared to be exploiting the West New Guinea issue and lavishing Sukarno with arms in order to woo Indonesia into the Soviet camp. Indonesia was officiallynon-aligned in the Cold War butSukarno was a vocal critic of Western imperialism. There was also a large domestic communist party, the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), which urged using all means to ‘liberate’ West New Guinea.[12]By backing Sukarno’s irredentist campaignKhrushchev could build upon these elements andlureIndonesia away from non-alignment. If an Indonesian-Dutch war did break out it could drive Sukarno even closer to the Soviets and bolsterthe PKI. Indonesia might be lost to the West and that would be a major blowbecause Indonesiahada population of 92 million, the sixth largest in the world, valuable raw resources such as rubber, tin and oil, and an important strategic location, dominatingsea lanes and not far from countries like Laos and South Vietnam which were already struggling with communist insurgencies.[13]Mindful of these strategicconcerns, the United Statesmoved towardsa policy of pushingthe Dutch into serious negotiations with Indonesia and ultimately withdrawing from the colony.[14]By 1962 then the West New Guinea dispute had taken on a Cold War dimension, with the Soviet Union supplying Indonesia with arms while the United States promoted a negotiated settlement.
American anxieties were intensified by anIndonesian-Dutch naval clash in January 1962 but this incident also exposed Indonesian military weaknesses. MARIDhad discovered from signals intercepts thatIndonesian motor torpedo boats were going to land 150 marines on the south coast of West New Guinea near Vlakke Hoek.[15]The Dutch decided to intercept the infiltration operation and on the evening of 15 JanuaryDutch destroyers attacked the Indonesian boats, sinking one and killing around 50 Indonesians.[16]The Indonesian leadership was furious at this humiliating defeat. The next dayit held an emergency meeting at the presidential palace to discuss how to retaliate but the discussion revealed that even with the ample supply of Soviet arms Indonesia was notyet prepared for open war.[17]Sukarno and other civilian leaders wanted AURI aircraft to immediately sink a Dutch warship.However, the air force commander, Suryadi Suryadarma, who had previously boasted that at every minute AURI was ready to attack, had to admit that his new Tu-16 bombers were not fully operational. AURI did not have enough trained pilots to fly them.[18]The AURI airbases on the Maluku Islands, which were nearest to West New Guinea, were not ready either ruling out attacks even by Indonesia’s elderly B-25 Mitchell piston engine bombers.[19]Suryadarma was duly dismissed from his post.
Unable to immediately retaliate Sukarno took a dual-track approach. On the one hand, he consented to American proposals for talks with the Dutch. The United States was making strenuous efforts to get negotiations underway and avoid further military clashes. In February American Attorney General Robert Kennedy visited Indonesia and the Netherlands and pressed both sides to be more flexible. It was finally agreed in March that secret Indonesian-Dutch talks would be held in the United States with an American mediator. At the same time thoughSukarno continued the infiltrations of guerrillas into West New Guinea and the preparation of Indonesian military forces and bases for large-scale warfare.An American intelligence report indicated that in the first three months of 1962an additional 7,000 AURI and ALRI personnel were deployed in the ‘New Guinea operations area’.[20]
The negotiation track of Sukarno’s policy seems to have caused some friction between theSoviet Union and Indonesia. As part of its build-up of Indonesian forces, Jakarta sought to obtain furthermilitary equipment from the USSR. In early February the new head of AURI, Omar Dani, flew to Moscow and met with Khrushchev.[21]He reportedly asked for more MiG-21 fighters and Tu-16 bombers. Unfortunately Dani’strip coincided with Robert Kennedy’s visit to Jakarta and he found the Soviets suspicious and critical of Indonesia’s behaviour. According to an American intelligence report, the Soviets complained to Dani that the Indonesians had failed to produce detailed plans for a large scale attack on West New Guinea with Sukarno appearing to now favour negotiations with the Dutch.[22] The Soviets refused to provide the aircraft Dani requested, though they did supply 200 military advisers and promised to speed up work on a surface to air missile site near Jakarta.[23]
Soviet displeasure increased when the Indonesians agreedto attend thesecret talks with the Dutch in the United States. Moscow appeared to fear that in spite of its substantial military and diplomatic investment in the Indonesian cause, it was losing influence to the Americans. On 16 March the Soviet ambassador in Jakarta had a testy meeting with the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subandrio.[24]The ambassadorurged Subandrio to reconsider, arguing that negotiations should take place under United Nations’ rather than American auspices and accused the Indonesians of submitting to American pressure. Khrushchev was later reported to have written a reproachful letter to Sukarno expressing regret that after all the support the Soviet Union had given the Indonesians they had turned to United States for help over West New Guinea.[25]Subandrio tried to reassure the Soviets bychoosing Adam Malik, the Indonesian ambassador to the Soviet Union, as Indonesia’s representative at the talks.[26]As a furtherconciliatory gestureSukarno made a public speech on 21 March praisingSoviet aid to Indonesia.[27]
The Indonesian-Dutch talks began on 20 March at Middleburg near Washington, with the veteran American diplomat Ellsworth Bunker acting as mediator. The negotiations were friendly but they quickly reached an impasse and Malik departed for Indonesia. In an effort to kick start the diplomatic process Bunker put forward a formula for a settlement.[28] Under this three stage ‘Bunker Plan’ the Dutchwould first transfer West New Guinea to a United Nations body which would administer the territory for one or two years. The United Nations would then hand overWest New Guinea to Indonesia. FinallyJakarta, in cooperation with the United Nations, would give the people of West New Guinea an opportunity to exercise their right of national self-determination.The Americans recommended the Bunker Plan to the Indonesians and Dutch as a basis for further negotiations. Sukarno was receptive, although he wanted Indonesia to have control over West New Guinea by the end of 1962 which would meanshortening Bunker’s timetable.[29]By contrast, the Dutch and especially the pugnacious Dutch Foreign Minister, Joseph Luns, were dismayed and indignant.[30] They saw the Bunker Plan as merely a face-saving device to cover an Indonesian take-over of West New Guinea. Furthermore, they did not believe that the Indonesians would ever allow the Papuansa truly free vote on self-determination. Given the importance of American support the Dutch cabinet was not able to reject the Bunker Plan outright but for weeks Luns sought to water down its provisions and delay negotiations. At the same time,to counter the Indonesian military build-up and guerrilla infiltrations the Dutch sent outnaval and troop reinforcements to West New Guinea.
It was at this point, with negotiations stalled and the Dutch reinforcing their position in West New Guinea, that Sukarno appears to have decided to ask Khrushchev forsubmarines and aircraftmanned by Soviet crews. On 2 May the Indonesian Foreign Ministry announced that Sukarno had sent Subandrio to Moscow to buy more arms.[31] Before he left,Subandrio explained to the American ambassador, Howard Jones, why he was going. He saidthat Luns and the Dutch cabinet were delaying negotiations because they knew the balance of military power was in their favour. The purpose of his trip to Moscow was to make arrangements to correct this imbalance as soon as possible.[32]General Abdul Nasution, the Indonesian Minister of Defence, gave a rather different explanation to the Indian ambassador.[33] He told him that the Indonesian cabinet had decided to build up military forces and ultimately attack West New Guinea, although Nasution did not believe he could mount an effective offensive until December. Nasution said Subandrio’s mission to the USSR was to implement the cabinet’s decision. Whatever the motivation Subandriosigned a new arms deal in Moscowon 8 May.[34] No details were publicly disclosed but the New York Times reported a ‘high Indonesian source’ as saying that the new Soviet military aid was ‘enough to take care of the West Irian problem.’[35]
A fuller picture of what was agreed in Moscow can be gathered from various later statements by Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoyan, the Soviet First Deputy Chairman. It seems to have been the Indonesians who requested the weapons and crewmen. In discussions with Rumanian communist leaders in October Khrushchev said that Sukarno had taken the initiative and sent Subandrio to Moscow to ask for ‘submarines, aircraft and commanders for these things.’[36]Despite, or perhaps because of the recent friction between Moscow and Jakarta, Khrushchev gave Sukarno what he wanted. Mikoyan told Soviet military officersin November that: