Moodie & Co Principal

Moodie & Co Principal

Robert A Moodie LL.B. (Hons.) Ph.D

Barristers & Solicitors

Dispute Resolution & Litigation Lawyers 11 Halcombe Rd

Feilding

Phone (06) 323 4636

Facsimile (06) 323 4623

11th March 2005 Mobile (0274) 466 697

Statement by Dr Rob Moodie regarding the Berryman

Bridge Collapse in 1994

Background Information

Kenneth Richards was killed when the laden light truck he was driving plunged 30 metres into the Retaruke River on the 22nd March 1994 after two transoms (the supporting beams suspended from wire ropes running from side to side beneath the bridge) snapped causing the Te Rata Station bridge to collapse.

Construction of the Te Rata Station bridge was completed on 22nd March 1986, and it collapsed on the 22nd March 1994. It was therefore only 8 years old to the day, when the structure failed.

The bridge provided access to Te Rata Station, a property owned by Mrs Margaret Berryman and farmed by her husband Keith. The bridge was constructed on Crown land at the entrance to the property by the New Zealand Army. The construction was undertaken as a community support training exercise. The Bridge was designed and engineered by 2nd Lieutenant J R Armstrong of the New Zealand Army Engineering Corps, and constructed by Army Staff under Lt Armstrong's supervision.

Keith and Margaret Berryman paid for all the materials used in the construction of the Te Rata Bridge. The original design called for treated pine timber to be used in the construction of the transoms and stringers that comprised the support structure of the bridge. However, when the bridge was built treated pine of suitable size was not available. Oregan timber from a demolition site was purchased and used, but only after Lt Armstrong viewed the Oregan timber at the demolition site from which it was obtained on Friday 24th January 1986, and approved it as being suitable for the stringers and transoms, that is, for the structural timbers of the bridge.

The Coroner's Inquest into the Death of Kenneth Richards

A Coroner's Inquest (a judicial inquiry) into the death of Kenneth Rickards was held at Taumaranui in February 1997. At that inquest the New Zealand Army gave evidence that the Te Rata Bridge was properly constructed in accordance with UK and Australian Army manuals.

However, the Coroner formed a view that Lt Armstrong was inexperienced and appeared to lack formal technical qualifications for bridge building. He also noted that a senior warrant officer employed on the project also lacked design experience or qualification. On the 2nd May 1997 the New Zealand Army received advice from the Coroner that he intended to make adverse comment in his findings about these matters.

In response to advice from the Coroner that he intended to make adverse comment directed at the Army, the Army made submissions through senior counsel insisting that the bridge had been properly and adequately designed, engineered and well built, and represented that the sole reason for the collapse of the Te Rata Bridge was the failure of the Mr and Mrs Berryman to properly maintain the structure.

As a result of the submissions made on behalf of the New Zealand Army by their legal Counsel Mr McGuire, the Coroner changed his initial view and concluded that the design and construction of the bridge by the New Zealand Army was entirely sound. He concluded -

I had initially considered that perhaps the 2nd Lieutenant's designs were not checked by his superiors but I accept Mr McGuire's submission that they in fact were.

My concerns with the New Zealand Army is simply that the Court would perhaps have thought that this project was better left under the supervision of an officer of more experience than a 2nd Lieutenant …but… in particular I refer to Mr McGuire's submissions…The bridge was well built. There is no problem.

I emphasis that there is no suggestion here that the standard of construction of the bridge was in any way lacking.

After finding that the bridge had been soundly engineered and constructed, and after making oblique reference to the speed of Mr Richard's truck possibly being a contributing cause of the bridge failure, the Coroner then emphatically concluded that the bridge collapse was due to disrepair resulting from the lack of a planned programme of inspection and maintenance on the part of Mr Keith Berryman.

Army Court of Inquiry

In September 1994 the Army convened a Court of Inquiry into the collapse of the Te Rata Bridge and that Court of inquiry concluded, in summary, that

Lt Armstrong's design of the bridge deck was unsatisfactory and resulted in variable load

factors and stringers that were undersized; and

The use of Oregan timber for the main structural members of the bridge deck when it was obviously intended to be semi-permanent or permanent in nature was unwise; and

The bridge was not inspected or approved for use and no post construction inspections were carried out.

After the collapse of the Te Rata Station Bridge Keith and Margaret Berryman were charged with offences under the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 by the Occupational Safety and Health division (OSH) of the Department of Labour. These charges were dismissed by Judge Abbott in the New Plymouth District Court. OSH maintained it's interest in the matter however, and, unusually, were represented at the Coroner's Inquest by New Plymouth Crown Prosecutor Mr Tim Brewer. Mr Brewer is a Brigadier in the New New Zealand Territorial Army, and is the present Judge Advocate General of the New Zealand Defence Force.

At the time of the Coroner's inquest both Mr McGuire and Mr Brewer knew full well that the Army had conducted a Court of Inquiry into the collapse of the Bridge. Yet neither Counsel for the Army or OSH advised the Coroner of that fact. Brigadier Brewer had not only been informed in writing of the Army Court of Inquiry, he had also been informed of the identities of witnesses before the Court of Inquiry. He knew that the recently retired Colonel Commandant of the Army Engineering Corps had carried out an examination into the cause of the bridge failure and had given evidence on the matter to the Court of Inquiry.

Coroner not Informed of Court of Inquiry

Neither Mr McGuire nor Mr Brewer informed the Coroner that the Army had convened a Court of Inquiry and had reached conclusions about the cause of the failure of the bridge structure. Instead the Army presented evidence and made submissions to the Coroner that were quite contrary to the knowledge of the New Zealand Army High Command about the real reason for the collapse of the bridge. In short, the evidence and submissions of the Army and OSH were not true. In the result that evidence, and those submissions completely perverted the course of justice at the Coroner's formal inquest into the death of Kenneth Richards. By this evidence and submissions, the coronial inquiry was completely usurped and corrupted.

The Butcher Report

Mr Butcher is a qualified and experienced civil engineer. When in retirement Mr Butcher examined the cause of the collapse of the Te Rata Bridge at the request of the New Zealand Army. Mr Butcher's entire report and evidence before the Court of Inquiry follows this explanatory note. In his report on the cause of the bridge collapse Mr Butcher found -

There was nothing in the design calculations document supplied to him that would suggest that the calculations have been subjected to a checking protocol, or QA procedures, or a peer review; and

There was no reference (in the design procedures and material properties listed) to applicable New Zealand standards such as NZS 3603:1981, Code of Practice for Timber Design, nor to documents such as the Bridge Manual 1956 and the Highway Bridge Design Brief CDP 701 1978 of the MWD. The latter documents set out the recommended practice for the design of bridges in New Zealand at that time; and

The allowable stresses used in the design of the timber members were far too high for the grade and timber species used; and

The designer used the FRI Bulletin No 41 without adjustment to determine allowable stresses in bending and sheer … this was an error of judgment…the information contained in Bulletin 41 has been misinterpreted; and

The design procedure for the timber deck structure was unsatisfactory and resulted in variable load factors and stringers that were undersized. It was fortuitous that the owner elected to install substantial running planks over the stringers during construction of the deck and kept them well nailed throughout the life of the bridge. Full or partial composite action with the stringers was thus possible and together with the greater transverse load distribution provided additional stringer load capacity not taken into account in the design; and

The design of the deck structure could not be considered as adequate for the bridges intended use but (due to the changes fortuitously made by Mr Berryman) the inadequacies of the design procedure did not contribute to the failure of the transom nor to the resulting collapse of the section of the bridge; and

The decision to use untreated timber in the original bridge cannot be supported…Oregan is durable when continually immersed in water, but has a very short life when exposed to the weather or when subject to alternate wetting and drying; and

The collapse of three bays of the timber deck structure on 22nd March 1994, was due to the failure in bending of a timber transom when subjected to the rear axel load of 23 kN - (about 2350kgs which was within the design parameters) of a vehicle crossing the bridge; and

Inspection of the transom…shows considerable and serious decay of surfaces which had been in contact including the internal faces of the laminated member (the transom); and

The transom failed …due to…an almost 50% reduction in the nominal strength of the member in bending. The reduction in strength of the member was in my opinion entirely due to decay of the untreated timber; and

Oregan timber should not have been used for the main structural members of the deck structure of the bridge when it was obviously intended to be semi permanent or permanent in nature; and

Several additional factors contributed to the collapse…the decision to use two 300 x 75 beams bolted together for the transoms in place of a solid 300 x 150 member. The interface was not flashed and permitted the entry of water to the centre of the laminate which, with the oxygen available in the gap, encouraged fungal growth and accelerated the rate of decay. The effective life of the member would have been significantly reduced as a result.

In short the evidence of Mr Butcher was, as the Coroner had at first intuited, that, due to a lack of technical qualification and experience, Lt Armstrong's design and calculations were completely botched, and he had not received adequate guidance and supervision by more experience superiors.

The Single Cause of the Failure of the Te Rata Bridge

There can be no doubt whatsoever that whilst there was a litany of serious failures in the design and construction of the Te Rata Bridge, the cause of the early failure of the structure (after a life of only 8 years) was due entirely to the lamination of the transom timbers without providing a flashing (a raincoat) to keep water from penetrating the gap in the laminate. This was a basic design and construction failure. The full responsibility for this failure rested entirely with the New Zealand Army.

The failure to flash the laminate was further seriously aggravated by the fact that, on the advice of a builder friend, Mr Keith Berryman had actually purchased, and provided to the Army Engineers, sufficient three ply malthoid to provide all of the transoms (and stringers) with a malthoid raincoat. This raincoat was for the very purpose of preventing water penetrating the join in the laminate. Yet this flashing material was not used by the engineers as requested by Mr Berryman.

The extent of the decay in the laminated transoms was not visible to Mr and Mrs Berryman because the decay that Mr Butcher found significantly reduced the life of the timber was in fact causing rot from inside to out.

The stringers were made of the same timber as the transoms and, although undersized, they had not failed due to any surface decay. This finding of Mr Butcher is important because it confirmed that the Oregan timber (apart from the timber decaying due to the un-flashed lamination) had not in fact reached the end of its useful life.

Butcher Principal Findings not Carried Into Court of Inquiry Findings

It was never doubted that the failure of two transoms caused the bridge structure to fail. And in paragraphs 19 and 20 Mr Butcher is quite specific on why the transoms failed. Yet these findings of Mr Butcher are nowhere to be found in the Court of Inquiry Report. So even at the stage of the compilation of it's own Court of Inquiry conclusions, Army brass deliberately omitted reference in the Court of Inquiry findings to the evidence that conclusively established that design and construction flaws by Army staff caused the bridge to collapse and the consequential death of Kenneth Richards.

Corrupted Process

The Defence Forces Rules of Disciplinary Procedure prevent any Court of Inquiry evidence or finds being used in any other proceedings, and also prohibit any evidence or report of a Court of Inquiry being shown to any person without the express consent of the Commanding Officer of the service involved. In other words the proceedings and findings of a military court of inquiry, are by statutory regulation, absolutely privileged unless a Commanding Officer approves their release.