China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa

Author: Chenchen Wu (the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University)

As global demand for energy increases, major players like the United States, the European Union, and Japan are facing competition from a new source as China struggles to meet its need for long-term energy supply. China-Africa cooperation has particularly been put in the spotlight. Some international observers accuse Chinese foreign policy towards African countries of undermining international efforts to increase transparency and good governance. Others describe a policy of ‘an aid for oil strategy’ or even a ‘neo-colonial policy’. On the African side, some blame on Chinese enterprises of underbidding local firms, especially in the textile industry, or of failing to hire Africans. In Beijing, the Chinese government insists on its ‘non-interference’ policy and refuses to link business with the human rights issue. The Beijing Summit in 2006 accelerated the interaction between China and Africa even further, as the two sides decided to accelerate cooperation, especially in joint resources exploration and exploitation.

This research paper, divided in two parts, aims to provide insights into the status of the Sino-Africa relationship and gives a relatively objective conclusion. Part one considers the policy level, examining the past relationship from the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ in the Bandung Conference in 1955, to ‘Four Principles of Chinese Cooperation with Africa’ in 1982, to ‘a New Strategic Partnership’ in 2006. This concludes that China’s policy towards African has moved away from unconditional assistance so that ‘mutual-benefits’ has become the priority. Part two examines the motivation level. Here I argue that China’s policy to Africa is not only driven by oil and other resource needs, but also the strategic importance of the African continent, which lies in three considerations, with commercial factors and diplomatic issues standing alongside the resource imperative. Some African countries like Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, have gradually become critical oil-exporters for China as extreme instability of the Mid-East supply has increased. In particular, since China and African countries are still developing areas, political cooperation in international affairs is necessary as well as important to secure their shared interests. Finally, I conclude that the cooperation between China and African countries is on the basis of complementary trade, mutual-respect, and a concern for increased influence for the developing world in international affairs, including the global political economy. Nevertheless, as a ‘responsible and rising power’, which is what China claims to be, China should take more actions in certain scenarios to stand with, and eventually contribute to the leadership of the international community.

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·  Part I the Policy level

This section debates the evolution of China’s African policy from the founding of New China to the contemporary era, by means of three turning points: in 1955, 1982, and 2006.

i) ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ in the Bandung Conference in 1955

China’s relation with Africa may be traced back to six centuries ago. In 1415, Chinese explorers visited the East African coast and brought shiploads of Chinese commodities. Kenya provided many local gifts as return. But the interaction in the modern time started from the Bandung Conference held in the year 1955, which was widely regarded as a seminal event in Sino-African history. The conference was expected to enhance economic and cultural cooperation of the two continents and promoted the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle. Of the 29 states that participated in the conference, six were African, such as Egypt, Libya and so on. The Former Premier, Zhou Enlai, attended the conference and presented the Five Principles of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’, which covered mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence (Looy, 2006:2). The achievement of great diplomatic success followed the conference increased Chinese interests in the continent.[1] In 1963, Premier Zhou embarked on his first ten-nation tour of Africa to promote the second Asia-African conference. Though few agreed on the necessity for the next meeting, Premier Zhou put forwards a particular ‘Eight-Principles’ that were designed to guide China’s engagement to African countries.[2]These principles clearly clarified the Chinese intention to assist African countries by the policy of economic and technical aid. Moving into 1970s, China significantly expanded aid projects in Africa, illustrated in the number of recipient countries. (See table 1). Furthermore, the principles showed that Chinese government provided the assistances to the African countries without asking for any return, at least from an economic perspective. Some loans did not require repayment if the recipients could not afford this. However, for China’s decision-makers, the aid diplomacy had both political and ideological objectives. On the ideological level, China seemed to support any revolutionary movement against imperialism, including African revolutions. On the political level, the primary motivation was to compete with Taiwan and then get African to support the PRC in international recognition, as well as to compete with the Soviet Union in the African sphere.

·  ii) Four Principles of Chinese Cooperation with Africa’ in 1982

After the most important political goal, the UN seat, was achieved in 1971, a mutual diplomatic recognition between China and America was established in 1979. The less intensive international environment was reflected in China’s foreign policy so that economic growth and domestic reforms instead of revolutionary goals dominated the policy agenda. The 12th Communist Party Committee National Assembly in 1982 sent two messages that had implications for China’s African policy: China would concentrate on domestic economic development; China would pursue its independent foreign policy characterised with ‘mutual benefits’ in real meaning (Li, 2007:72). On the 1982 trip to the African continent, in accordance with these changes, the Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang offered a wholly new ‘Four Principles on Sino-African Economic and Technical Cooperation’, which stressed equality and mutual benefits, practical result, diversity in forms and common development.[3] (Onderco, 2007: 5). If comparing the Four Principles of the 1980s to the Eight Principles in the 1960s, a remarkable difference was that China asked for mutual promotion of the two economies, as showed in principle 2 and 4. Indeed, economic assistance between the poor countries could not be sustained in the long term if it was only limited to a one-way flow. By that time, China was no longer interested in sustaining its position as an influential player on the continent, but was eager to develop own economic capability. In other words, Africa lost its importance in Chinese eyes and was marginalized as China’s focus shifted to its own modernisation. In a period when China itself depended on foreign funds, there was little that China could do for Africa.

iii) ‘A New Strategic Partnership’ in 2006

The lull in relations lasted until the Tiananmen turmoil in 1989. Though China intended to focus its diplomacy with the developed countries, it was confronted with harsh condemnation on human rights and punishment exemplified by political isolation and economic sanctions. These made China aware of the insurmountable value divergence between itself and the West. The only strategy seemed to be to look back, and to strengthen ties with the developing world as a defensive mechanism. This meant a reappraisal of the role of the third world countries, including the ASEAN countries and African countries, which expressed their understanding towards Beijing’s action in handling this internal problem. As part of an effort seeking political assistance, the Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen visited 14 African countries during 1989 and 1992. The tour highlighted Beijing’s intention in seeking potential political supports from the African side. During his 1996 national visit, President Jiang Zemin proposed building a long-term and stable Sino-African relationship of all-round cooperation and friendship geared towards the 21st century (China-Africa Friendship and Cooperation in Five Decades, 2000).

In 2006, Beijing government particularly released an important white paper, China’s African Policy, to clarify Africa’s strategic importance to China. It was ‘the first of its kind in China’s diplomatic history with Africa’, which embodied Chinese long-term plan of enhancing all-rounds cooperation with Africa (Li, 2007: 69). Through it, Beijing presents the world that the objective of China’s African policy is to ‘establish and develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa’ on the basis of advancing the fundamental interests of both sides. The white paper captures the Beijing government’s attempt to construct a strategic relationship with the continent. What Beijing addresses repeatedly is mutual-benefit under the framework of the strategic partnership. Apparently, the benefit here does not just purely refer to the political gains in 1955-1978, or the economic interests during 1978-1989. Instead, it established strategic goals through pragmatic pursuits, including political cooperation, economic interactions, and cultural exchange and so on, as showed in the white paper.

Part II Motivation level

In the context of China’s foreign policy, there are three dominating objectives: national unification, the promotion of world peace and an impartial world order, and the sustainability of economic development (Payne & Veney, 1998:2). Others note that China’s development strategy demands resource supplies and exports markets; that its diplomacy requires support in the international organizations and through persuasion it seeks allies to advance Chinese interests (Naidu & Davies, 2006: 70). In other words, the People’s Republic of China is not interested in exporting communist ideology; it is economic and political influences that occupy Chinese attention. China’s foreign policy towards Africa is not exception to this.

·  i) Resources concerns

When many criticise ‘China’s colonial behaviour in Africa’, African countries collectively have become an important trade partner, especially a reliable oil exporter for China. Since the Asian Pacific area fails to provide abundant energy resources to fuel Chinese economic growth, particularly after the accession of the World Trade Organization, and the Iraqi War has further shaken the already instable supply from the Middle-East region, China’s energy concern has switched to African continent. The African countries figures on the agenda of Chinese oil diplomacy due to several factors. Unlike the Middle East region, the external power influences are less evident in the continent and African oil industries are open to foreign investment. Furthermore, African oil has the characteristic of low-sulphur content, which is good for environmental protection; and its location in West Africa makes for easy processing by Chinese refineries (Naidu & Davies, 2006:73). Moreover, the historic links to liberation movements, the identity of the developing countries, the shared understanding of human rights question, along with the partnership based on non-interference policy have pushed the bilateral cooperation forwards smoothly.

With the political supports of their governments, the three largest national oil companies in China, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), China National Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Cooperation (CNOOC) have either operated new exploration deals with the oil exporting countries, or have taken over the stakes in already-established African oil companies. (See table 2). Other oil companies, like the Zhongyuan Oil Company, PetroChina also strive to invest in the African oil sector. During the process, China’s commercial banks sometimes act as credits-providers to ensure the commercial activity. For instance, in 2005, China’s Export and Import bank granted a 1 billion USD oil-backed loan to Angola, which was increased to 3 billion USD in 2006 for upgrading of local infrastructure. The increasing fund enabled Sinopec to secure concessions for the oil exploration in the coming years (Naidu & Davies, 2006:76). Nowadays, African countries have supplied approximately one third of China’s oil imports, increased from 11 percent in the year 1995, competing with the Middle East Region (See table 3). Angola, the second-largest oil-producing country in the continent, has exceeded the Saudi Arabia to become the top oil supplier, providing 17.46 percent of China’s oil imports. (Zhao, 2007: 26, cited from U.S. Energy Administration; Zhao Daojiong, 2006, China’s Oil Interests in Africa: International Political Problems).

It is apparent that China’s oil policy achieves a remarkable success in the continent. Consequently, some scholars begin to purely link China’s African policy with oil or energy, whereas others argue that China goes to Africa for grabbing raw materials to gear its impressive economic growth. Although the two theories could not portray the full picture of China’s African policy, the latter argument seems more pragmatic. Chinese manufacturing sector has created massive demand for cooper, aluminium, nickel, iron ore, oil and so on. Beside energy, China’s importing list in Africa is long. China not only imports oil from Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, but also buys iron ore and platinum from South Africa, timber from Cameroon, Congo and Gabon. China is in fact the world’s largest leading importer of crude oil, iron ore, manganese, plastic materials, metal ores, oil seeds, textile fibres, and pulp and paper; the second largest importer of cooper, which is needed by China’s electricity industry; the importer of 40 percent of world soy bean, and the consumer of 50 percent of world wood. Importantly, the demands for these commodities will continue in the foreseeable future, according to Deutsche Bank Research Report. (See table 4). As long as China continues to demand the resource inputs, the interest in African continent will not wane as many African countries have become major resource providers for China(Data from Deutsche Bank Research Report, 2006). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the African continent has become a major contributor to China’s resource imports basement.

ii) Commercial considerations

Certainly, of the immediate importance to China are Africa’s abundant resources. China needs every primary product, in many people’s eyes. However, it is insufficient to argue that China treats Africa purely as a resource base. It can be argued that China’s engagement with Africa in the new century is characterised not only by a need for economic resources, but more critically, by the commercial deals and political muscles. In the released white paper, economic interactions through preferential loans, financial cooperation, agricultural communication, and investment in African infrastructure are included and given high weight. In the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2007-2009), beyond cooperation in resources, bilateral ties will involve not only agriculture, trade, investment, but also infrastructure, science and technology. On the national visit of President Hu Jintao to Africa, commercial deals include automotive works in Namibia, opening fruit market to South Africa, expanding investments in infrastructure, telecommunication, tourism in Seychelles, and increasing the number of duty-free commodities in Mozambique (Africa-China: Hu’s Tour, 2007).