International Conflict and Security Focus Questions: Part 2

International Conflict and Security
Focus Questions: Part 2

• What does McNamara mean when he talks of the “fog of war” and the need to take lessons away from wars in the past so that we can apply them to a less violent future? What are the major lessons that he took away from his reflections on the nature and causes of war in the 20th century? McNamara especially emphasizes his belief that the US needs to have more empathy when assessing our adversaries. What role did empathy play in the successful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and how was its absence a problem for the US in the conflict with North Vietnam? Are there any parallels between Vietnam and the conflicts we find America presently involved in (which is a point that the film’s director has tried to make in some of his editing decisions)?
• McNamara argues that “proportionality should be a guideline in war,” that “belief and seeing are not the same thing and both are sometimes wrong,” and that warriors—or at least those who lead them—need to “be prepared to examine their reasoning.” What specific historical events led McNamara to reach these conclusions? Why does he think that accepting these lessons is much more important at the start of the 21st century than was previously the case? Is there any evidence from your other readings in this part of the course to suggest that the international system as a whole is implementing these lessons?

• What is peace, and why does it matter how you “measure” it?Why is it useful to break up the idea of peacemaking into a series of distinct phases (e.g., ending a specific conflict, enforcing a settlement, preventing the outbreak of new conflict, building an institutional security framework, and—finally—the structural institutionalization of a peace accompanied by a hegemonic set of ideas that prioritizes peace” Thinking about the second half of the course, in which of these areas have we made the most progress? Where do we still need lots of work?
• Is all this talk about peace even a worthwhile undertaking in a world where international politics continues to reflect the core assumptions of anarchy? Why does Wendt think that the influence of anarchy on state behavior is wildly overstated? Under what circumstances would anarchy perhaps lead to more rather than less cooperation (think about Wendt’s ideas on the social construction and evolution of norms and institutions)?
• Why might international relations scholarship be the last place to go looking for cutting edge insights on peacemaking? What is it about the nature of this academic field and its raison d'être make its many of its researchers predictably resistant to the idea that war can be ended? Why might Americans in general be skeptical to the idea that the world would be better off without military force being a major option for security foreign policy aims? Is there any reason to believe that Americans would retain important comparative advantages in a world where ideas and economics, rather than military prowess, are the most powerful currency in international relations?
• Thinking about the big ideas in the second half of the course, what political, economic, and security arrangements appear to be most conducive to building long-term security? What is the relative breakdown of global financing directly related to peacemaking versus the amount committed to military force (albeit force that can be used in some instances to secure the peace)?
• How has role of nuclear weaponry in international politics changed since the start of the Cold War? (How much more powerful are these weapons now? How have their delivery systems changed? How has the global distribution and secure storage of these weapons changed? How have the rules about who gets to have them changed? Why will these rules likely change even more over time as we reach “the tipping point” (as described by Wofstahal)? Why have some nuclear defense systems—antiballistic missiles for example—sometimes been subject to limitations agreements?
• What are the core assumptions and main elements of nuclear deterrence theory? What basic credibility problems are inherent to nuclear deterrence as a security strategy? What problems are there with simply banning the weapons altogether?How was deterrence theory put into practice during the Cold War? How did “extended deterrence” work to dissuade aggression towards non-nuclear states during the Cold War? How, if at all, does the growing possibility of nuclear terrorism impact the logic of pursuing peace via deterrence?Why do some scholars—like Lieber and Press, for example—believe that post-Cold War political and technological developments make US ownership of nuclear weapons even more important than used to be the case?
• Why is the possession and use of some types of WMD’s banned completely under international laws, while the possession and use of nuclear weapons is not? How and why has disarmament been pursued and how effective has it been in reducing nuclear stockpiles? How successful has the world been in pursuing peace through limitations on the most dangerous kinds of weapons? Is there any reason to worry more about the vertical proliferation (a few countries own many weapons) as opposed to horizontal proliferation?
• How effective is the “great power concerts” approach to peacekeeping when compared to the “Wilsonian model” of collective security? What are some of the main examples of each type of collective security arrangement in the world today and what are their major strengths and limitations? What aremajor similarities and differences among the League of Nations, NATO, and the United Nations?
• Why and for what ends was the UN founded? How is it funded and to what extent does its funding mirror what we expect it to do? Why, in some ways, does it make sense to say that the UN is 20-some years old rather than 60 some? Who selects UN ambassadors, how much autonomy do they have (a good comparison might be how accountable a Senator is to her home state governor), and how do these factors shape the ability of the UN to protect global versus particular country interests?
• What are the main bodies within the UN? To what extent does the United Nation’s incorporate the core components of a successful great powers concert when we look at the actual behavior of the present-day great powers? What are the main features of each of the major strategies used by the UN to enhance and maintain international security? How do itsmechanisms for financing, resource allocation,and decision-makingenhance and/or detract from its effectiveness in peacekeeping and/or peacemaking?
• Is there any evidence to suggest that UN is getting better at maximizing its limited power to enhance security? What specific powers are outlined in the UN Charter to sanction belligerent states and leaders? What is the process by which these powers are implemented? Comparing your various articles’ assessment of the UN with organization’s portrayal in the documentary film we watched on the Congo, what do you think best accounts for the limited success the UN has had to date in dealing with smaller wars? What are some of the major reforms that have been untaken in recent years, and what more serious fixes have been proposed that might enhance the capacity and success of the UN as a peacemaker.What is the process for making serious reforms to the UN’s structure, and why is it so hard to improve the way it works?
• Under what kind of circumstances can a Wilsonian collective security framework work well? Why has NATO proved to be both more effective and reliable for its member states’ collective security needs than was the case with the League of Nations did? What are the main argumentscited inproposals to expand NATO into a much larger “league of democracies” that could rival the UN and act when the UN refuses to? What are the main arguments against this type of an organization?
• What is humanitarian intervention and R2P? What are some of the strategies and justifications most frequently invoked when imposing peace from the outside? What are some of the difficult ethical and practical questions involved with allowing one or more countries to violate the sovereignty of another country when that country is harming its own people? When is such intervention now permitted under international law?
• What is the recent track-record of humanitarian intervention? Is it getting better at protecting civilians and reducing inter-state belligerency? Should the current restrictions on its use be loosened (how far should R2P go)? What are some of the objections to R2P as it is being used today? What do the recent cases of Libya and Syria tell us about where we are with developing a coherent strategy of humanitarian intervention?
• What are the classical principles of “peacekeeping” (to use Morgan’s language) and what distinguishes this activity from humanitarian intervention (which also can involve troops under a UN flag these days)? What are the various roles that peacekeepers are asked play? How many peacekeepers are deployed in the world today—where are they from and where are serving? Why is it difficult to get nations to provide troops to peacekeeping nations even when the need for troops obvious? Why doesn’t the UN just use its own troops and resources?
• When are peacekeeping missions most effective; when are they not? What major events in the 1990s led a major reworking (i.e., the Brahami Report) in the resources and powers given to peacekeeping missions? How have these changes impacted the role and efficacy of peacekeeping?
• If present trends continue, will the globalization of communications and economics—factors that encourage complex multilateralism and economic integration—make the world safer or more dangerous over time? What can the experience of Europe tell us about the role that economic security and interdependence can play in decreasing conflict? Why do closer economic ties—especially those between capitalist systems—appear to foster less conflict among nations?
• Several different generations of Americans have been persuaded at one time or another that exporting democracy to underdeveloped countries will lead to more peaceful regional politics. What is the reasoning behind this assumption? and why might it be wrong? Why is the imposition of democracy by force especially problematic if democratic stability is the desired outcome in the target country? What lessons do your readings on this topic have for America’s objectives and strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq?
• In what key ways has American leadership played a critical role in reducing international conflict for the last half of a century? How our values, behavior, and especially our role in building international institutions been received by other countries?
• What will international politics and security look like if America’s fiscal policies continue to deteriorate to the point where we no longer can lead or play a major role in mediating conflicts around the world? Is there any other country or set of countries out there who can play the security role that the US has played? What evidence is there to suggest that the world already is looking beyond American hegemony? What actions should the US take to ensure security in the coming years should we no longer be in a position to lead as we once did?