Summary
On Monday, December 13, Fatah and Hamas agreed to resume reconciliation talks before the end of December, preceding a Hamas visit to Cairo in order to sign an Egyptian-brokered Palestinian reconciliation proposal which Hamas had previously rejected in 2009. This also followed an inaugural announcement by Hamas on December 1 that expressed its willingness to accept a Palestinian referendum regarding a peace treaty with Israel. As Hamas continues to abide by a de-facto cease-fire with Israel in place since January 2009 and embrace its more diplomatic side in order to sustain the international sympathy it has attracted in the aftermath of May’s flotilla incident.[link = the rifts are exacerbated between Hamas and Gaza’s swamp of militant groups, who are now working not only against Israel, but also in opposition to Hamas.
Analysis
In the past, Hamas has had little trouble maintaining control over its militant rivals, either by addressing their similar goals, cooperating on offences against Israel or by demonstrating its superior force to keep these groups at bay, organizing deadly raids on their neighborhoods, arresting and torturing their members, and confiscating their weapons. However, the more international support Hamas garners from more moderate counties like Turkey, also looking to reassert its significance in the region like Turkey and the more concessions Hamas gains, like the easing of Israeli and Egyptian blockades on Gaza, the higher the stakes are for Hamas to continue its apparent hiatus from violence in order to preserve these gains. As Hamas’ rivals continue daily to launch rockets into Israel from Gaza, Hamas is compelled to adopt a more forceful approach against these previously marginal groups. This is a classic example of the “State-Extremist” paradigm, wherein these extremists groups were permitted to operate freely when their militancy served the political interests of the state, but now that Hamas’ tides have turned, these groups, unwilling to rescind their violence, are becoming increasingly powerful to challenge Hamas and re-expose Gaza to the wrath of Israeli retaliation.
Gaza’s militant enclave can be broken down into four categories explained below, the first drawn from the ranks of Hamas itself and the latter three vying to fill the void of armed resistance left as Hamas continues to show restraint with Israel and mulls over reconciliations with the Palestinian National Authority.Question: how long can hamas sustain this though because its not actually acting within their interests to reach peace with PNA right? Just to fake it and take what they can from doing so?
While these groups are all smaller in size than Hamas, they show a willingness to work together, potential to tap into Hamas’ own more radical elements, loose alignment with foreign Islamist elements, and resilience as new groups, specifically in the Salafist category continue to form.All these groups seek to rule the Palestinian state they hope toestablish using various degrees of violence. They are separated by two main factors: religious conservancy and the issue of involvement in the political process, though geographical and tribal divisions also come into play less significantly.
1) Hamas security forces - In 2006, Hamas created the Executive Force, a security body of about 9,000 people established to counter that of the rival Fatah police forces. Although Hamas attempted to portray the new policeforce as separate of Hamas’ armed wing the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, previously responsible for Hamas’ operations against Israel and recognized as a terrorist group by the United States and European Union, in reality, there was enormous overlap between the two bodies. When Hamas took control over Gaza in 2007, the Executive Force became the basis for the two new policing branches established under Hamas’ Internal Ministry. The first branch, the street police, are more publically accountable, wearing uniforms, recruiting publically, and responding mainly to local grievances like neighborhood disputes. The second branch is known as “Internal Security,” a plainclothes division known for its brutality in dealing with suspected collaborators with Israel, Fatah supporters, and Salafi-Jihadist extremists who challenge Hamas’ directives. Both branches, though especially the more elite Internal Security,are known to draw from members of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades; Hamas Interior Ministry spokesman Ehab al-Ghossain told TIME magazine, “Many of the Qassam operate within both the Qassam brigades and the Internal Security.”
Hamas internal fissures leave the movement divided between the Syrian-based leaderKhaledMeshaal vying for larger militancy vs. Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh in Gaza who favors more restraint as it fears harsh Israeli backlash. The Qassam Brigades, led by Ahmed Jabari are known to sit in the former more radically militant camp and some even consider that those within the armed wing are increasingly adhering the more austere form of Sunni Islam that Salafis practice, making the crucial branch of the Hamas movement susceptible to manipulation from the Salafi-Jihadi movement in Gaza.
2) Groups similar to Hamas – These groups often garner support from the same ideological pools as Hamas, and thus swing back and forth between working with and against their larger rival. The main opposition group to Hamas is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), which only has close to 1000 members and like Hamas was formed by former members of the Muslim Brotherhood who adopted a more radical approach than the Brotherhood offered. PIJ, also a United States and European Union designated terrorist organization, differs from Hamas in that it rejects participation in the Palestinian political process as a means to liberating Palestine. PIJ also diverges in the heavy amount of Iranian support it garners, compared to Hamas who has been delicately playing a balancing act between support from countries like Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. PIJ’s armed wing, the Al Quds Brigades, claim there has been an increase in arrests of its members by Hamas in 2010 though their attacks on Israeli targets persist.
3) Secular Fatah-affiliated groups - This category comprises the armed wings of the Fatah political movement and their splinter groups, as well as other secular political movements who have worked alongside Fatah in the past under the umbrella of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The armed wings of Fatah include the prominent Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and the smaller Abu al-Rish Brigades (Fatah Hawks) and Sami al-Ghul Brigades, as well as more radical splinter groups like Tanzim and Knights of the Temptest. These groups, though often religiously conservative are not Islamist in nature like Hamas or PIJ.
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and its offshoot The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) are Marxists movements prominent on the resistance front since the late 1960s. PFLP was the second largest faction of the PLO after Fatah. These groups ally more with Hamas than the rival PIJ, largely due to Hamas’ involvement in the political process from which PIJ abstains, though continue to fall under the Fatah sphere of influence.
4) Salafi-Jihadist groups – There are a large number that continues to increase of Salafi-Jihadist groups in Gaza that operate like small transnational gangs, cooperating closely without banding into one unanimous movement for tactical reasons. Maan News Agency estimates there are more than 11,000 Salafists in Gaza today, about 70% of whom are former Hamas supporters. As Hamas’ continues to opt for diplomacy over militancy, these Salafist groups steadily draw support from the resulting discontent with Hamas. Groups like Jaljalat, created by a former commander of the Hamas’ QassamBriades, formed directly following Hamas’ decision to participate in Palestinian politics in 2006, while other groups are still developing, according to a self-designated Salafi-Jihadi leader in Gaza Abu al-Bara al-Masri, reported by Al-Arabiya.
Unlike Hamas’ roots in the Muslim Brotherhood, these groups adhere to the ideology of Al Qaeda prime (AQ), though there is no overwhelming evidence of direct operational ties to AQ. The illusive term Al Qaeda in the Levant, which doesn’t actually represent one cohesive body, encompasses the myriad of these militant groups, which range in size from dozens to hundreds, divided mostly by neighborhood or clans.
These groups oppose the usual Israeli targets, but also resist against Western institutions, such as internet cafes and Christian centers in Gaza. Establishing an Islamic state in Palestine is just the start to further expanding their caliphate. They reject both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas for their secular governing, failing to institute Islamic law in Gaza and the West Bank.
While many of these groups were divided on their support for Hamas, the August 2009 raid by Hamas security forces on a Rafah mosque belonging to the JundAnsar Allah group served as a turning point in which many of these groups unified to publically oppose Hamas’ rule. The raid occurred after JundAnsar Allah’s leader, Abd-al-Latif Musa (aka Abu Noor al Maqdisi), declared Gaza an Islamic emirate during his sermon, symbolically usurping Hamas’ officially-secular command, and resulted in more than two dozen deaths, including that of the movement’s leader [link=
These groups share common goals, have similarly limited operational capabilities, and operate in close proximity to one another in the tiny coastal territory of the Gaza Strip. They do coordinate offenses and maintain direct contact with each other, though are hesitant to unify so as to make it difficult for Hamas to destroy them in one strike, as was largely done to JundAnsar Allah after the 2009 mosque raid.
Question – is their overlap in membership between groups?would imagine so, could be worth mentioning
One of the more prominent groups in this category isJaish al-Islam (Army of Islamaka Tahwid and Jihad Brigades) which represents the Dughmush clan of Gaza and has several hundred members. They have been involved in several high profile kidnappings including that of BBC reporter Alan Johnston in 2007 [link= and that of Israeli soldier GiladShalit who they abducted and handed over to Hamas in 2006. Jaish al-Islam appeared in recent headlines after the Israeli Air Force’s assassination in November of one of its senior operatives Mohamed al-Namnam, who was implicated in plotting an impending attack on Israeli targets in Sinai, Egypt.
Other smaller groups include Fatah al-Islam, Jaish al-Ummah, Jaish Allah, Al Tafkir, the Lion’s Den of Jihad Fighters, Soldiers of the Monotheism Brigades, andAnsar al-Sunna.
One leg up Hamas has had against each of these militant rivals for popular support is the conglomerate of social services it provides to Gazans. An interesting trend is the emergence of a parallel Salafi movement of charities that have adopted similar causes, feeding the poor and offering free Quran lessons, with a more religiously conservative twist. If the Salafi humanitarian movement continues to gain legitimacy, there is potential for some of the more conservative Gazans who pledged their support for Hamas in exchange for such services to switch loyalties. While Hamas can use state-funding for such needs, the Salafis rely on foreign funding coming mostly from Saudi Arabia. (One example is the Abdullah Aziz Bin Baz charity.)
Standing alone, each of these competing militant groups are smaller in number and have clear constraints on the extent they can grow without tapping into the more conservative elements within Hamas. Wedged between Israel and Egypt who have strategic imperatives to prevent weapons, funding, and training from flowing into Gaza, the only way for these militant groups to augment their resistance is to link up with foreign Islamic jihadist groups, like those from Sunni areas of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Evidence of such links was revealed in a recent Wikileaks cable, which exposed Egyptian intelligence cautioning the U.S. of weapons smuggling into Gaza using Bedouin recruits from Sinai, Egypt, facilitated by Iran. With Hamas’ shifting alliances, Iran has an interest in exploiting both the rifts within Hamas and between Hamas and its rivals to maintain its foothold in the strip.
Question – isnt there more about recent Jihadi arrests in Sinai connected to Gaza? Anyone know off hand?
Question – would hamas-fatah reconciliation ultimately weaken these groups by making them increasingly marginal or really cause them to strengthen themselves?
There will always be groups to fill the void of resistance to Israel as Hamas becomes more mainstream, similar how IRA-splinter groups broke off from the central IRA every few decades as it entered into political armistices. [link= While Hamas still has the stronger command to quell the resistance of these smaller groups and, at least outwardly, disassociate itself from their continuing hostility, it will be important to watch for internal tensions within Hamas and potential breaking points between its political and armed spheres.