SDI 2010 South Korea Aff Wave 1

SDI 2010 South Korea Aff – Wave 1

Kallmyer - Peterson

South Korea Aff – Wave 1

**1AC** 3

1AC Hegemony Advantage - 1 3

1AC Hegemony Advantage - 2 4

1AC Hegemony Advantage - 3 5

1AC Hegemony Advantage - 4 6

1AC Hegemony Advantage - 5 7

1AC North Korea Advantage - 1 8

1AC North Korea Advantage - 2 9

1AC North Korea Advantage - 3 10

1AC North Korea Advantage - 4 11

1AC North Korea Advantage - 5 12

1AC Asian Balancing Advantage - 1 13

1AC Asian Balancing Advantage - 2 14

1AC Asian Balancing Advantage - 3 15

1AC Asian Balancing Advantage - 4 16

1AC Asian Balancing Advantage - 5 17

**Inherency** 18

Troops in South Korea Now 18

**Solvency** 19

Troops Fail – Anti-Americanism 19

AT: Anti-Americanism 20

Other Solvency Mechanism – OPCON 21

A/T: “Presence Key to Deter China” 23

A/T: “Nuclear Umbrella is Good” 24

**Hegemony Advantage** 25

Withdrawal Solves Overstretch 25

Troops Invite Aggression 26

Other US Forces Solve Deterrence 27

A/T: Deterrence Disad 28

Offshore Balancing Solves Targeting 29

A/T: “Troops key to US/SK Alliance” 30

A/T: There are still troops in Japan 31

A/T: “South Korea is a launching pad to other conflicts” 32

Nuclear Posture Not Credible 33

Winning Korea key to Nuclear Posture 34

Regional Alliances solve Nuclear Credibility 35

Regional Security key to Nuclear Credibility 37

Nuclear Credibility Impact – Asian Arms Race 38

Regional Alliances Solve North Korea 39

**Asian Balancing Advantage** 40

No Modernization Now 40

Withdrawal Solves Modernization 41

Withdrawal Solves Modernization 42

Withdrawal Solves Modernization 43

Withdrawal Solves Stability 44

Troops Hurt South Korea Modernization 45

Troops Hurt South Korea Modernization 46

Troops Hurt South Korea Modernization 47

Modernization Key to Regional Security 48

Troops Prevent South Korean Leadership 49

Withdrawal Key to China Cooperation 50

Chinese Economic Cooperation Impact 51

A/T: “South Korea Can’t Afford Modernization” 52

North Korea Aggression Increasing 53

U.S. Engaging China Now 54

**North Korean Advantage** 55

War is Coming 55

War is Coming 56

War is Coming 57

War is Coming 58

War is Coming 59

North Korea Proliferating Now 60

Probability is High 61

Troops = Targets 62

Troops = Targets 63

Presence Incites North Korea 64

Withdrawal Solves North Korea 65

Withdrawal Solves North Korea 66

South Korea Can Deter North Korea 67

Presence Prevents Chinese Action 68

Withdrawal Solves Chinese Action 69

Sanctions Fail 71

Major Power Draw-In 72

Proliferation Impact 73

A/T: “North Korea Can Still Hit U.S. Post-withdrawal” 74

**1AC**

1AC Hegemony Advantage - 1

Uncontrolled domestic spending makes collapse of U.S. deployments inevitable. The most critical question for hegemony is not where we base, but how effectively we manage this transition.

BANDOW, 10 [Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, the Bastiat Scholar in Free Enterprise at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Cobden Fellow in International Economics at the Institute for Policy Innovation, the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, the Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution at the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, former special assistant to President Reagan, former editor of Inquiry magazine, widely published in such periodicals as Foreign Policy, Harper's, National Interest, National Review, The New Republic, and Orbis, as well as leading newspapers, including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post; “Bankrupt Empire,” Apr 19, d/a: 7/15/10, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=23256]

The United States government is effectively bankrupt. Washington no longer can afford to micromanage the world. International social engineering is a dubious venture under the best of circumstances. It is folly to attempt while drowning in red ink. Traditional military threats against America have largely disappeared. There’s no more Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, Maoist China is distant history and Washington is allied with virtually every industrialized state. As Colin Powell famously put it while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: “I’m running out of enemies. . . . I’m down to Kim Il-Sung and Castro.” However, the United States continues to act as the globe’s 911 number. Unfortunately, a hyperactive foreign policy requires a big military. America accounts for roughly half of global military outlays. In real terms Washington spends more on “defense” today than it during the Cold War, Korean War and Vietnam War. U.S. military expenditures are extraordinary by any measure. My Cato Institute colleagues Chris Preble and Charles Zakaib recently compared American and European military outlays. U.S. expenditures have been trending upward and now approach five percent of GDP. In contrast, European outlays have consistently fallen as a percentage of GDP, to an average of less than two percent. The difference is even starker when comparing per capita GDP military expenditures. The U.S. is around $2,200. Most European states fall well below $1,000. Adding in non-Pentagon defense spending—Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and Department of Energy (nuclear weapons)—yields American military outlays of $835.1 billion in 2008, which represented 5.9 percent of GDP and $2,700 per capita. Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations worries that the increased financial obligations (forget unrealistic estimates about cutting the deficit) resulting from health-care legislation will preclude maintaining such oversize expenditures in the future, thereby threatening America’s “global standing.” He asks: Who will “police the sea lanes, stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combat terrorism, respond to genocide and other unconscionable human rights violations, and deter rogue states from aggression?” Of course, nobody is threatening to close the sea lanes these days. Washington has found it hard to stop nuclear proliferation without initiating war, yet promiscuous U.S. military intervention creates a powerful incentive for nations to seek nuclear weapons. Armored divisions and carrier groups aren’t useful in confronting terrorists. Iraq demonstrates how the brutality of war often is more inhumane than the depredations of dictators. And there are lots of other nations capable of deterring rogue states. The United States should not attempt to do everything even if it could afford to do so. But it can’t. When it comes to the federal Treasury, there’s nothing there. If Uncle Sam was a real person, he would declare bankruptcy.

1AC Hegemony Advantage - 2

Army presence in South Korea is not flexible enough. Removing troops allows mission refocus toward Air and Naval superiority.

O’HANLON, 4 [Michael, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Sydney Stein, Jr., Chair, The Brookings Institution, “THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM KOREA,” Testimony before Committee on Armed Services, US House of Representatives, [H.A.S.C. No. 108–31], 6/15, d/a: 7/15/10, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/security/has167000.000/has167000_0f.htm]

Now some people would argue—leaving aside the issue of the peninsula, leaving aside the military balance on the peninsula, whether or not the ROK could maintain a robust defensive perimeter on its own—we don't want to send a message to the region more broadly of any kind of weakness or any kind of reduction in our strength. We don't want to take away capability, that Secretary Rumsfeld was discussing in Singapore a short time ago, to increase our ability to deal with possible hotspots in Southeast Asia, in the Taiwan Strait, et cetera. I would agree with that concern, but I would also say that the brigades in Korea have not been very usable for other regional contingencies. They are essentially anchored to Korea. That has always been the logic of their presence. They are among our least flexible military units in the entire U.S. forward deployment. And therefore, taking one of those out of Korea, putting it in Iraq temporarily and then bringing it back to the United States, I believe, actually increases our long-term regional flexibility. And therefore, I would not oppose this change on those grounds, either. It is true the Asia-Pacific remains very important. The Asia-Pacific has a number of possible contingencies we need to think more about, and this committee has been showing the way. I think most of those contingencies are largely naval, Air Force or Marine in nature. But even the ones that may involve the Army would be better served by an Army that is not starting from bases in Korea, because Army forces in Korea are largely, if not exclusively, focused on the Korea contingency. We have been very reluctant ever to redeploy them for any other purpose. Therefore, by keeping them there, you would not be sending a message to the rest of the region of greater capability. You would essentially be tying down some of your long-term capability.

Moving toward regional threat balancing solves fiscal hegemony crisis and maintains U.S. leadership.

The United States faces a fiscal crisis. If America’s survival was at stake, extraordinary military expenditures would still be justified. But not to protect other nations, especially prosperous and populous states well able to defend themselves. Boot warns: “it will be increasingly hard to be globocop and nanny state at the same time.” America should be neither. The issue is not just money. The Constitution envisions a limited government focused on defending Americans, not transforming the rest of the world. Moreover, if Washington continues to act as globocop, America’s friends and allies will never have an incentive to do more. The United States will be a world power for decades. But it can no afford to act as if it is the only power. America must begin the process of becoming a normal nation with a normal foreign policy.

1AC Hegemony Advantage - 3

Detaching American interests from deployed Korean troops causes regional powers to focus on conventional defenses. This secures the overall U.S. position.

BANDOW, 8 [Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, Vice President of Policy for Citizen Outreach, the Bastiat Scholar in Free Enterprise at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Cobden Fellow in International Economics at the Institute for Policy Innovation, the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance, the Senior Fellow in International Religious Persecution at the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, former special assistant to President Reagan, former editor of Inquiry magazine, widely published in such periodicals as Foreign Policy, Harper's, National Interest, National Review, The New Republic, and Orbis, as well as leading newspapers, including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post; “Ending the U.S.-Korea Alliance” June 9, d/a: 7/15/10, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17812]

The pro-alliance mantra includes promoting regional stability, but the contention that East Asia would dissolve into chaos and war without Uncle Sam’s restraining hand is both arrogant and presumptuous. Everyone in the region has an interest in preserving peace and promoting prosperity. North Korea remains a problem state but the threat of war on the Korean peninsula has diminished dramatically; the result of the recent Taiwanese election has moderated fears about potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Beyond these two cases, there are no obvious bilateral controversies with much likelihood of flaring into violence. Still, does an American presence dampen geopolitical rivalries and arms races? Washington’s role as de facto security guarantor might discourage allied states from doing more for their own defense, but that is a dubious benefit since the belief that the United States will intervene encourages countries to be more belligerent in any disputes with other nations. Moreover, America’s presence virtually forces Beijing to upgrade its military, lest it remain permanently vulnerable to foreign coercion. That is the worst dynamic possible—weakening friendly nations and keeping them permanently dependent on Washington, while convincing China that only a sustained military buildup will enable it to deter U.S. intervention. America’s interests would be best served by the development of a regional balance of power, in which friendly nations act to protect their own interests and constrain the PRC. In 1950 the ROK would have been swallowed had the United States not intervened. In the early succeeding years South Korea could not have defended itself. But those days are long over.

Troop overstretch is the most important factor in overall military readiness.

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORY GROUP, 6 [Chaired by William Perry, former United States Secretary of Defense, “The U.S. Military: Under Strain and at Risk,” January, d/a: 7/18/10, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2006/us-military_nsag-report_01252006.htm]

Since the end of World War II, a core element of U.S. strategy has been maintaining a military capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression in more than one theater at a time. As a global power with global interests, the United States must be able to deal with challenges to its interests in multiple regions of the world simultaneously. Today, however, the United States has only limited ground force capability ready to respond outside the Afghan and Iraqi theaters of operations. If the Army were ordered to send significant forces to another crisis today, its only option would be to deploy units at readiness levels far below what operational plans would require – increasing the risk to the men and women being sent into harm’s way and to the success of the mission. As stated rather blandly in one DoD presentation, the Army “continues to accept risk” in its ability to respond to crises on the Korean Peninsula and elsewhere. Although the United States can still deploy air, naval, and other more specialized assets to deter or respond to aggression, the visible overextension of our ground forces has the potential to significantly weaken our ability to deter and respond to some contingencies.