To Use the Bomb or Not to Use It: Primary Source Documents
Document A: Unanimous resolution of the League of Nations Assembly, Protection of Civilian Populations Against Bombing From the Air in Case of War, League of Nations, September 30, 1938
“Considering that on numerous occasions public opinion has expressed through the most authoritative channels its horror of the bombing of civilian populations…
- Recognizes the following principles as a necessary basis for any subsequent regulations:
- The intentional bombing of civilian populations is illegal;
- Objectives aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives and must be identifiable;
- Any attack on legitimate military objectives must be carried out in such a way that civilian populations in the neighborhood are not bombed through negligence”
Document B: Appeal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt on Aerial Bombardment of Civilian Populations, September 1, 1939
“....If resort is had to this form of inhuman barbarism [the ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centers of population] during the period of the tragic conflagration with which the world is now confronted, hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings who have no responsibility for, and who are not even remotely participating in, the hostilities which have now broken out, will lose their lives. I am therefore addressing this urgent appeal to every government which may be engaged in hostilities publicly to affirm its determination that its armed forces shall in no event, and under no circumstances, undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian populations or of unfortified cities...”
Document C: June 6, 1945Secretary of War Henry Stimson Diary Entry
“I told him [the President] that I was busy considering our conduct of the war against Japan and I told him how I was trying to hold the Air Force down to precision bombing [of military/industrial targets, rather than civilians] but that with the Japanese method of scattering its manufacture it was rather difficult to prevent area bombing. I told him I was anxious about this feature of the war for two reasons: first, because I did not want to have the United States get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities; and second, I was a little fearful that before we could get ready the Air Force might have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon [the atomic bomb] would not have a fair background to show its strength.”
Document D: July 2, 1945 MEMORANDUM ON THE USE OF S-1 BOMB [Atomic Bomb], Secretary of War Stimson to Pres. Truman
"I personally think that if in [our declaration of surrender terms to the Japanese] we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty [the Emperor], it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance."
Document E: Walter Brown [Assistant to Secretary of State James Byrnes], Diary entry July 24, 1945
“Byrnes [is] still hoping for time, believing after atomic bomb Japan will surrender and Russia will not get in so much on the kill, thereby [leaving us] in a position to press for claims against China. . . [he] said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over before the Russians got in, with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur. Once [they are] in there, he felt, it would not be easy to get them out.”
Document F: Minutes of Meeting held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945 at 1530 [meeting included Pres. Truman, General George Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson and others]
“We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.
With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop out their own country.
Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worthwhile position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu [2nd largest Japanese island] operation. As to any discussion of specific operations, the following data are pertinent:
Campaign / U.S. CasualtiesKilled, wounded, missing / Jap Casualties
Killed and Prisoners
(not including wounded) / Ratio U.S. to Jap
Leyte [Philippines] / 17,000 / 78,000 / 1:4.6
Luzon [Philippines] / 31,000 / 156,000 / 1:5.0
Iwo Jima / 20,000 / 25,000 / 1:1.25
Okinawa / 34,000 (Ground)
7,700 (Navy) / 81,000
(not a complete count) / 1:2
Normandy
(1st 30 days) / 42,000 / ------/ -----
There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds to resolution of their subordinates.
…GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had asked General [Douglas] MacArthur’s opinion on the proposed operation and had received from him the following telegram, which General Marshall then read:
“I believe the operation presents less hazards of excessive loss than any other that has been suggested and that its decisive effect will eventually save lives by eliminating wasteful operations of non-decisive character. I regard the operation as the most economical one in effort and lives that is possible. In this respect it must be remembered that the several preceding months will involve practically no losses in ground troops and that sooner or later a decisive ground attack must be made. The hazard and loss will be greatly lessened if an attack is launched from Siberia sufficiently ahead of our target date to commit the enemy to major combat. I most earnestly recommend no change in OLYMPIC [the Kyushu invasion plan]. Additional subsidiary attacks will simply build up our final total casualties.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that it was his personal view that the operation against Kyushu was the only course to pursue. He felt that air power alone was not sufficient to put the Japanese out of the war. It was unable alone to put the Germans out. General Baker and General Eisenhower both agreed to this. Against the Japanese, scattered through mountainous country, the problem would be much more difficult than it had been in Germany. He felt that this plan offered the only way the Japanese could be forced into a feeling of utter helplessness. The operation would be difficult but not more so than the assault in Normandy. He was convinced that every individual moving to the Pacific should be indoctrinated with a firm determination to see it through.”
Document G: Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Memorandum of Conversation with General George Marshall May 28, 1945
[Opprobrium (def.): the disgrace or the reproach incurred by conduct considered outrageously shameful]
“General Marshall said he thought these weapons might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave – telling the Japanese that we intend to destroy such centers. There would be no individual designations so that the Japs would not know exactly where we were to hit – a number should be named and the hit should follow shortly after. Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear. We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force.”
Document H: Memorandum from J.R. Oppenheimer to Brigadier General Farrell, May 11, 1945
- “The bomb under consideration differs from normal explosive bombs in that its detonation involves the production of radiation and of radioactive substances.
- The active material of the bomb itself is toxic. There is about 10 to the ninth times as much toxic material initially in the bomb itself as is needed for a single lethal dose.
- During the detonation, radiations are emitted which (unless personnel is shielded) are expected to be injurious within a radius of a mile and lethal within a radius of about six-tenths of a mile.
- After detonation, highly radioactive materials are produced. The activity decreases inversely with the time. One second after detonation there will be the equivalent of about 10 to the 12 curies of radium. After a day this will fall to about 10 million curies.
- … The actual physical distribution of the radioactive products is not known to us, since it depends in detail on meteorological conditions as well as on the specific air mass motions induced by the explosion; these latter have not been experimentally studied . It is, however, likely that most of the activity will rise to a considerable height above the target and will remain as a fairly compact cloud for a period of hours after the detonation. The subsequent history depends essentially on temperature and wind conditions. If the bomb is delivered during rain, it may be expected that most of the active material will be brought down by the rain in the vicinity of the target area.”
Document I: Memorandum by J.R. Oppenheimer to Pres. Truman, "Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons," June 16, 1945
“You have asked us to comment on the initial use of the new weapon. This use, in our opinion, should be such as to promote a satisfactory adjustment of our international relations. At the same time, we recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war.
(1) To accomplish these ends we recommend that before the weapons are used not only Britain; but also Russia, France, and China be advised that we have made considerable progress in our work on atomic weapons, that these may be ready to use during the present war, and that we would welcome suggestions as to how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations.
(2) The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.”
Document J: MEMORANDUM ON THE USE OF S-1 [Atomic] BOMB from Ralph A. Bard, Assistant Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the Navy, June 27, 1945
“Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.
During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.
I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program. The stakes are so tremendous that it is my opinion very real consideration should be given to some plan of this kind. I do not believe under present circumstances existing that there is anyone in this country whose evaluation of the chances of the success of such a program is worth a great deal. The only way to find out is to try it out.”
Document K: COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION (as of 6 July 1945)
“. . . 2. Over-all situation.Recent advances in the western Pacific, culminating in the capture of Okinawa, provide the Allies with bases from which effective air attack can be directed against all important areas under Japanese control. Furthermore, the Allies are now in possession of potential forward bases for an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands, Korea, or the central China coast. In addition, increasing Soviet forces in the Maritime Provinces and along the Amur River threaten Manchuria and the areas bordering the Japan Sea. On the continent the Japanese are now forced to depend upon inadequate and vulnerable land communications. . .
Sea and air operations have virtually destroyed the capability of the Japanese naval and air forces for other than suicide operations against our forces. Blockade, and air attacks on productive capacity and concentrated reserves of material, are seriously impairing remaining Japanese defensive capabilities. The incendiary [fire] bombing attack of Japanese cities has had a profound psychological and economic effect on the Japanese. The complete destruction of major areas in all of the important war production centers is placing a tremendous strain upon residual economy and producing a chaotic condition in administration and control, which will greatly accelerate the effects of subsequent all-out attacks upon transportation. . .
3. Economic Situation. The Japanese economic position has deteriorated greatly. . . Increasingly heavy air attacks, supplementing continued and intensified blockade, are seriously reducing Japan’s residual production. Recent aircraft production is estimated at 1,200-1,500 combat planes monthly, as compared with a peak production of 2,300 reached late in 1944. The Japanese are so short of aviation fuel that orthodox air operations of a sustained nature in any significant force are improbable, although sufficient gasoline will be available to meet their capabilities for all-out suicide attacks. The electronics industry is not able to provide the armed forces with adequate supplies of radar or of radio and sound equipment. . . .
4. Armed Forces.
a. Ground. The ground component of the Japanese armed forces remains Japan’s greatest military asset. There are at present some 110 infantry and 4 armored divisions in the Japanese Army with a total strength of about 4,600,000 men. . . About 1,000,000 men, however, are now for all practical purposes isolated from the Japanese Inner Zone.
b. Naval. The Japanese navy has been reduced in size to about the equivalent of one small and unbalanced task force. With the exception of two damaged cruisers, one destroyer, and some submarines in Singapore area, remaining battle ships, carriers, and cruisers appear to be immobilized in home waters. Their main capability and probable employment hereafter will be in suicide attacks by a small task force, and harassing and suicide operations by small surface craft and submarine attacks. Extensive minefields probably exist in the vicinity of important harbors and other strategic areas around the homeland.
5. Defense of Japan. The defense of the main islands of Japan is receiving and will continue to receive the primary attention of the Japanese.
We estimate that by late 1945 there will be available in the Japanese Home Islands and their outposts in the Rukyus, Izu-Bonins, and Kurilos more than 35 active divisions and 14 depot divisions, which, plus army troops, will total over 2,000,000 men. The Japanese also will continue development of the “National Volunteer Army” and may form combat home defense units to supplement their regular armed forces. Fanatical resistance will be offered in the defense of any of the Home Islands. . . .The remainder, some 95 divisions, will be disposed in the main islands, Korea, Manchuria, and in China north of the Yangtze. . .
b. Air. Until September 1944, the Japanese Air Forces steadily increased in size. Since that time they have suffered a substantial reduction in strength. . . .