Socio-Cultural Profiles of Major Ethnic Groups in Greater Upper Nile

Socio-cultural profiles of Major Ethnic Groups in Greater Upper Nile

South Sudan is an extremely diverse country with dozens of ethnic groups and languages. Further complicating this is that many groups consist of different sub-groups with various dialects. Anthropological studies on groups South Sudan are some of the most well known in the field, particularly Evans-Pritchard’s seminal study on the Nuer from the 1930s. However, decades of war have meant that most research since the 1950s occurred in the period of peace between the first and second civil wars, or were done remotely. Most primary research therefore is either from the colonial period or from thirty to twenty years ago. The challenges of access and security have limited field studies since the mid-1980s, although many anthropologists from before that have continued to write remotely, or have conducted research in refugee camps. Importantly, there are a few excellent exceptions, including South Sudanese academics. In addition, much research carried out in the post-CPA period is still being written and has yet to be published.

It is highly recommended that primary sources by anthropologists are read to complement these short profiles. Some of the better known anthropologists are listed after each profile, with some of their principal works (or at least the most accessible for non-anthropologists), but the list is in no way comprehensive. Social structures are extremely complex and in constant flux. The high amount of ethnic groups in South Sudan means that many peoples have very little anthropological research written about them. The current conflict means that this will likely continue to be the case. A very short list of anthropologists for some of the smaller groups not profiled here is also given. An excellent source for some of the less visible ethnic groups is the Gurtong webpage, which has profiles on dozens of people groups within South Sudan (

A list of the counties where various Nuer and Dinka clans are located is more likely to confuse rather than clarify. Instead the UNOCHA ethnic map of South Sudan is a great visual guide ( Keep in mind many of the borders given between groups are not as well defined or are along exact lines as portrayed on the map- many of these areas are contested, shared or both.

Any mistakes or gaps are the author’s alone. Corrections, clarifications or updates are welcome.

Ethnic group: Dinka (Jieng or Muony-jang)

Language group: Nilotic

Sub-groups:

There are over twenty major Dinka clans. Some of these include- Rek, Ruweng, Bor, Twic, Nyarweng, Hol, Agar, Gok, Rek, Aliab, Ciec, Thoi, Luach, Ngok, Renk, Malual, Abiliang, Padeng, and Atwot. The Dinka are generally found in Greater Bahr al Ghazal, Greater Bor, and Upper Nile. See the UNOCHA ethnic map of South Sudan for locations.

Related groups: Nuer

Historic movement:

Oral traditions dictate that the Dinka migrated from Gezira between the 14th and 16th centuries due to drought and slave raids. They moved south following the Nile into the Bahr al Ghazal region and are believed to be one of the later groups to arrive in South Sudan.

Livelihoods: Agro-pastoralists

The Dinka peoples are very diverse. Similar to other pastoralists in rural South Sudan and in the wider region, cattle are a central part of Dinka livelihoods and society. The Dinka primarily rely upon livestock, but are also engaged in planting (cultivation) and fishing during the dry season. The importance of fishing and agriculture on food security, however, varies between communities. Like other agro-pastoralists, many Dinka communities are reliant on moving with their cattle in the dry season (usually January to May) to the toic (swamps in the rainy season which turn into pasture in the dry season), where they set up temporary cattle camps. Here the cattle are able to access water and grazing for part of the year. Fishing is usually best in the dry season as the rivers and pools get low and fish are easier to catch. At the beginning of the rainy season (June/July) the people return to their homesteads and fields are planted. This time is often the most significant hunger period for South Sudanese agro-pastoralists, as the cattle are not producing much milk and the fields are yet to be ready for harvesting. Once the harvest is ready people celebrate. At the end of the year drums are often heard from marriage celebrations or dances. Once the dry season returns in January the cattle are taken back to the cattle camps and the cycle starts again.

Historical Social Structure:

Before the colonial era the Dinka were an acephelous society- meaning they had no hierarchy or centralized system of coordination and control[1]. Instead the Dinka have been organized into a number of major inter-linked, but independent clans. The leaders that existed before the arrival of the British were either military, religious, kin group, or cattle camp elders who decided when to migrate. Loyalty and identity lied primarily with kin, not with the ethnic group as a whole. This is still the case, although political conflicts have manipulated the threat of the ‘other’to unify groups that in the past shared little loyalty. The Dinka are incredibly diverse and the language has a number of different dialects. For example, an important system of spiritual leaders found in Bahr al Ghazal never existed among the Dinka in Jonglei (Harrigan 2012). Kinship groups are the primary means of identity and loyalty among the Dinka. According to Harrigan, Dinka kinship is most clearly delineated by the sharing of bridewealth, both in paying and receiving.

The system of chiefs now found across South Sudan was created by the British colonial rule (1898-1956) as a means of civil administration (indirect rule)- primarily for the collection of taxes and solving disputes through customary courts. Chiefs were appointed to represent particular territories, and this system of local governance was reinforced by the GoSS after the CPA (through the Local Government Act in 2008). There are various levels of chiefs and although terminology varies depending on the region, the terms are usually translated to sub-chiefs/headmen, chiefs and paramount chiefs. In modern times one can recognize the hierarchy from the sashes the various chiefs wear when attending official events. Sub-chiefs, or headmen, are given black sashes, chiefs red sashes, while paramount chiefs have a number of lines on their red sashes-indicating the number of chiefs they represent. Harrigan explains that during the second civil war the chieftain system was used as a means of providing recruits as well as supplying food for the SPLA. Each sub-chief was expected to supply five recruits to the SPLA and supply one tin of maize for each family. This was later increased to three tins of maize for each family. The chiefs do not have any economic control over their community members and their primary responsibility is keeping the peace through the solving of disputes. The chiefs sit on customary courts and solve issues such as cattle theft, murder, elopement, and adultery. The courts have the same hierarchy as the chiefs, and if the judgment is appealed then cases move up the chain to higher level chiefs.

Kinship groups among Dinka share cattle and food, but territory is shared among a number of family groups. These kinship groups might coordinate for political representation, collective defense of grazing land or for ceremonies, but they do not share food. Only members of a common kinship group share food and are responsible for each other. The territorial groups are called wut, which literally translates from Dinka as cattle camp. The protection and defense of the cattle in the territory is shared between the youth belonging to the family groups.

Relationship with SPLA and other armed elements:

The common narrative is that the SPLM/A has been “Dinka dominated”from its inception in 1983. However, much like other ethnic groups the relationship between the SPLM/A and the Dinka civilian population has been complex and varied. In the beginning of the rebellion, many Dinka volunteered to join; however, the relationship between the SPLM/A and rural populations has not always been strong[2]. There were frustrations in Bahr al Ghazal in the 1980s due to their perceived exclusion from military strategy and relief support compared to other parts of the country. The recruitment of children for the Red Army was also not a popular policy, and created frustration with the leadership. While the fall of the Mengistu regime, the SPLA’s primary backer, and the subsequent 1991 split had a unifying effect, the attacks on Dinka villages by the SPLA Nasir faction at the same time led to discontent with the leadership for not being able to provide security. The consequent arming of the Dinka youth in Bahr al Ghazal, also known as Gelweng, led to the use of armed Dinka civilians as proxy militias for the SPLA. The clashes between the two factions, and the arming of civilian militias (i.e. gelweng, see White Army, Gelweng and Titweng section), were causing resentment among the civilians caught in the middle as targets. Furthermore after the 1999 Wunlit peace agreement the SPLA decided to disarm the gelweng to reduce the internal clashes that were occurring. The brutality of the disarmament process also resulted in violent clashes between the youth and SPLA, and created strong grievances against the movement.

Key individuals:

The late John GarangMabior

SalvaKiir

KuolManyang

Recommended readings:

Deng, Francis Mading. 1972. The Dinka of the Sudan. Waveland Press Inc. Illinois.

Deng, Luka Biong. 2010. “Social Capital and Civil War: The Dinka Communities in Sudan’s Civil War.”African Affairs, 109/435, 231-250. (

Harrigan, Simon. “Background paper for Bor, Twic, Ghol and NyarawengDinka”presented at AECOM conference, Nairobi March 2012 (

Jok, M.J. and S. Hutchinson. 1999. “Sudan’s Prolonged Second Civil War and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Ethnic Identities.”African Studies Review 42(2): 125-45. (

Leinhardt, Godfrey. 1961. Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka. Oxford Clarendon Press.

Ethnic group: Nuer (Neitinaadth)

Language group: Nilotic

Sub-groups (major clans):

Some of the major clans among the Nuer include the Lou, Jikany, Gawaar, Bul, Lek, Jegai, Adok, Nyong, Ador, Thiang and Lak. The Nuerare generally found in Greater Upper Nile (Unity, Jonglei and Upper Nile states). See the UNOCHA ethnic map of South Sudan for locations.

Related groups: Dinka

Historic movement:

According to oral traditions the Nuer migrated south from Kordofan to Bahr al Ghazal around 1700 due to drought. In response to slave raids by the Baggara Arabs in the 18th century the Nuer carried out a mass migration to the east across the Nile (Hutchinson 2012). The expansion in the 19th century by the Nuer was one of the largest expansions in Africa at the time. The Nuer moved into Dinka and Anuak lands and assimilated some people while pushing others to migrate. By the end of the century the Nuer had reached all the way to Ethiopia and their territory expanded between three and four times what it was previously. While the Nuer did use violence to expand their territory, marriage and adoption were often used as means of assimilating new groups. Hutchinson explains that many Nuer men would marry their daughters to Dinka and Anuak men as a means of assimilating them (ibid). Those paying bridewealth did not just owe cattle, but also owed cooperation and respect towards their in-laws for as much as eight generations afterwards. This expanded family groups and loyalties and eventually sons or grandsons would break away to form his own family group and village.

When the British definitively defeated the Lou Nuer in 1929-1930, the Nuer expansion diminished but did not stop entirely (Hutchinson 2012). According to Nuer oral sources and archives, Lou and JikanyNuer both continued to expand to the east and attempted to buy land from Anuak and Murle. The Murle took the land back in the 1950s, while the Anuak sold land to the Nuer south of Akobo. In 1982 this agreement came to a head and clashes broke out between Anuak and Nuer over the land rights (ibid). Hutchinson believes the disagreement might have sprung out of differing opinions on what the Nuer bought- either permanent land ownership or temporary access for grazing (ibid). The Nuer pushed the Anuak out of Akobo town and the Anuak are now primarily in Ethiopia, Pochalla and eastern Akobo county. The movement of thousands of South Sudanese to Ethiopia in the 1980s expanded Nuer territory in Gambella, again at the expense of the Anuak. Further clashes in Akobo in 2013 escalated tensions again after the death of an Anuak chief in Akobo who was calling for the Lou to give Akobo back to the Anuak.

Livelihood: Agro-pastoralists

The Nuer share a similar livelihood cycle with the Dinka (see the Dinka livelihood section for an explanation of the annual cycle). The Nuer dry season migratory patterns are too complex and vast to list here. However, like most dry season migratory patterns the cattle are taken to the toic (pastures), nearby the closest permanent or semi-permanent body of water, usually rivers. See map in index of migratory patterns.

Historical Social Structure:

Much like the Dinka, the Nuer ethnic group were historically acephelous and did not have a centralized system of political control before the arrival of the British. Instead the Nuerare divided into between eleven and thirteen sub-groups or clans. Within these clans there are family groupings interlinked through either marriage or descent. In reality this means that loyalty and identity lies with direct family primarily, and then with more extended family units dependent on outside threats. Hutchinson explains it as “brothers should unite against cousins, unless faced with a broader threat, whereupon cousins should all unite to face their common enemy”(2012:13). The consequence of this is very fluid alliances and loyalties outside the small familial units. The internal Nuer wars of the 1990s and early 2000 can be better understood through this lens. A perceived outside threat to all Nuer will unify them, but primary loyalties ultimately lie with small family units, not the ethnic group as a whole or even the major clans.

In pre-colonial time, Nuer society did have particular individuals responsible for spiritual and ritual aspects of society, such as earth priests and prophets, but they did not have a political role. Despite this prophets did have many followers and the songs (prophecies) of the most influential, such as Ngundeng Bong (1846-1906), still hold significant sway over much of the Nuer population (Johnson 1994). The spiritual leaders held influence due to their perceived powers to bless or curse and foresee the future. Current Nuer prophets are still believed to hold such powers and people go to them for blessings and direction. The British undermined the Nuer prophets as they were perceived as threats to colonial dominance and instead imposed a chieftain structure. Initially weak the government system of chiefs soon became adopted and assimilated into Nuer society.

The authority of government chiefs was directly affected by the two civil wars. As explained in the Dinka section, the SPLA, and the later breakaway factions, initially used the chief system as a means for recruiting as well as supporting their troops through food and other resources. However, high level chiefs (not seen as sympathetic to the political cause) were often targeted during the war years, either by Khartoum or by opposing factions of the SPLA. The current relationship between chiefs, the government, and the opposition varies from county to county. It is highly likely both sides in the current conflict are relying on the chieftain system in many of the same ways they did in the 1980s and 1990s –i.e. as sources of recruitment as well as economic support –albeit not always voluntarily. From quite early on the SPLA-IO has worked with Nuer prophets, such as DakKueth, in mobilizating and motivating the White Army.

Relationship with SPLM/A:

The Nuer relationship with the SPLM/A is extremely complex. The below discussion will focus on RiekMachar and his split from the mainstream SPLM/A to create his own movement in 1991 (SPLM Nasir), his rejoining of the SPLM/A in 2002, and then the most recent creation of his SPLM/A in Opposition (IO) after the violence broke in Juba in December 2013. The effects of the 1991 split are analyzed more closely in the militarization section. However, while Machar has received the most attention among the Nuer leaders, his political agenda has not necessarily been supported across the Nuer population or leadership. Machar’s involvement in arming and directing Nuer civilians who targeted civilians in Garang’s homeland in the notorious “Bor Massacre”still defines the political narrative surrounding him. While Machar publicly apologized for his involvement in the Bor Massacre in 2013, in the current conflict the government has also used this event as a means of discrediting him.