International Relations from Thucydides to Kofi Annan

Lecture 2:

International Relations from Thucydides to Kofi Annan

Topics: -

1. Realism and Power: A Dominant Tradition from Thucydides to Morgenthau

2. Beyond Balance of Power: Pettman's 'Three Balances'

3. An Emerging International Society?: The Arts of Cooperation

4. Envisaging Global Processes: World-System Theory

5. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading

1. Realism and Power: A Dominant Tradition from Thucydides to Morgenthau

Today, we are going to briefly overview some of the main theories in international relations, and how these theories seek to explain the current world situation, the main historical trends, and how they propose guidelines for the action of states and the formation of policies. It will not be possible to outline all the different theories in detail: any standard textbook on International Relations discusses the main theories (see Carlsnaes 2002; Henderson 1998; Holsti 1995; Wittkopf & Kegley 1995).

Instead today, I will outline one dominant theory in its classical form, i.e. political realism, which has had a strong influence on most U.S. and British administrations in terms of their foreign policy (see Morgenthau 1985; Klarevas 2004; Kung 1997). We will explore some of the limitations of this theory, and then move onto a brief discussion of how far this theory can be applied in the modern period of a highly interdependent world. Here we can see the contemporary diplomacy now requires a much more sophisticated face for the use of raw power, thereby allocating a wider role to diplomacy and international cooperation. At the same time power, in all its dimensions, remains a fundamental aspect of international and global politics. It is thus possible to suggest that a balance is needed between political realism and idealism (Klarevas 2004) as well as a recognition that other ideas capture some of the complexity of global affairs in the 21st century.

From there the lecture will outline some alternatives to this traditional realist theory. Ralph Pettman has suggested that we need to add extra perspectives to the realist viewpoint. Alongside balance of power we need to add 'balance of productivity' and 'balance of ideology' (Pettman 1991). Next we will briefly look at Conway Henderson's idea that brute power analyses are no longer adequate by themselves as we move towards the 21st century. He argues that international activity is moving towardsan at least partly cooperative 'international society', even though no genuine community with fully shared interests has yet been established (see Henderson 1998). Lastly, we can briefly turn to some of those thinkers who have tried to consider the world as a global system, a system driven by the expansion of liberal capitalism, but now deeply interpenetrating all areas of politics and culture (e.g. Axford 1995; Wallerstein 1984). Immanuel Wallerstein's 'world-system' theory, first outlined in 1974 and then researched for three decades (Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989, 2002), and now part of an active ongoing school of thought (see Goldfrank 2000). It helped widen the debate on the emerging global system, its development, medium and long-term trends, and associated problems for states and governance. As we shall see, how this process of an emerging global system is envisaged will directly affect the way nations, organisations, cultures and individuals try to position themselves in the contemporary world.

A simple version of the 'realist' tradition has been with us at least in an implicit form since states first engaged in expansion, warfare, and contests of power. From this perspective, there is no over-arching set of rules, no higher standards to which the state can appeal in deciding action. In this view, values and laws are human constructs. Instead, the state must concern itself with survival, power, and a pragmatic foreign policy designed to advantage itself in the international system. The treatment of other states externally, and the treatment of persons internally (as subjects or citizens), depends on these practical necessities. At times cooperation will be the best policy, at other times warfare, depending on the interests and needs of the state.

This tradition was well established in ancient thinkers, both East and West. In ancient Greece, the historian Thucydides wrote one of the first realist accounts of the dire necessities of state leadership amid the problems of complex alliance systems and endemic warfare, concerned with the 5th century Peloponnesian War (see Monten 2006; Klarevas 2004, p18 for the strong impact of this writer). Parallel problems emerged in early China (8th-3rd centuries B.C.), and realist thought would strongly colour (though not dominate) Chinese thinkers such as Sun Tzu and Sun Ping, and to a lesser extent Mo Tzu. Likewise, a realist tradition would emerge early in Indian thought in the type of statecraft recommended by Kautilya (for a discussion of such early systems of international relations, see Watson 1992; Buzan & Little 2000).

Some of the key components of the realist position in international relations include: -

We must look at actual 'real' situation in the world, including negative aspects
Emphasis on power, its retention and augmentation in international relations
Emphasis on the state as the key actor in international relations
Emphasis on national interest as the basis for the motivation of leadership groups

Emphasis on behaviour and outcomes, not ideas
Tends to have a negative view of human nature as being essentially self-interested
Detailed studies follow from this of decision-making, balance-of-power, and theories of hegemony (political dominance)

In the West, this type of tradition was founded on thinkers such as Hobbes and Machiavelli, and heavily criticised by more idealist views in thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Voltaire, J.S. Mill and Hugo Grotius. This realist tradition was only partly undermined by the evolution of cooperative democratic forms of government in France, the U.S. and then other parts of Europe. Likewise, ideal visions of a community of nations within Europe, and a cooperative peace among democratic states would not remain dominant as major states competed for empire, relative power, and engaged in arms-races and intensified warfare through the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

A challenge to the realist tradition was found in the post-World War I effort to create a more representative form of government, a peaceful international order (President Woodrow Wilson's efforts at self-determination by national groups in Europe) and the attempt to create a genuinely cooperative international organisation, the League of Nations. It was in this period of the 1920s, perhaps, that idealism held out the strongest hope for a new international order based on law, humanism and cooperation (see Küng 1998). Idealism has re-emerged in the late 20th century within the context of liberalism (see below), humanism, human rights movements, and the desire to see an international system whose violence is moderated by international law and norms of behaviour. It also offers a much wider scope for participation in creating the international order, and is ready to engage with a wide range of civil movements and actors rather than focus on the dominance of states.

However, these idealist aspirations had received a number of set-backs by several historical trends: -

The collapse of the effectiveness of the League of Nations, in part due to German and Japanese resistance, but also due to the non-involvement of the U.S.
The collapse of democratic processes in Germany, Italy and Japan, replaced by fascist, NAZI or militarist governments
The inability to create a truly just and representative national system in Central Europe
Crises in the world economic system, culminating in the Great Depression (peaking in 1929-1930)
World War II, with its total war, attacks against civil populations, and use of genocide (and other humanitarian abuses)
The creation of nuclear weapons, then nuclear deterrence, based on destructive power and the threat to use such power
The recognition that the European nation-state system had not found any permanent solution to warfare, nor a way to establish a permanent and stable international order.
The emergence of ideologically driven warfare and conflict, i.e. conflict driven by democratic, authoritarian, communist, neo-colonialist and anti-colonial ideas.

However, through the late 20th century (with the collapse of the Soviet Union) and the early 21st century (with the strong role of regional groupings such as the EU and international institutions), new forms of idealism, political liberalism, and cosmopolitanism (discussed further in week 11). Some of these trends have been outlined as follows: -

Liberalism, often inappropriately portrayed as realism's polar opposite, loosens the strict views of realism. Its fundamental propositions are: first, international politics involves a variety of agents, including states (big and small), organizations (intergovernmental and nongovernmental), groups (transnational and domestic), and even individuals (public and private); second, these agents pursue interests (both selfish and collective) through an international agenda that includes economic, environmental, developmental, and cultural matters, in addition to security matters; third, the exercise of power involves a variety of hard (material) and soft (ideational) resources; and fourth, laws and institutions (both domestic and international, as liberalism does not distinguish clearly between the two) based on principles, norms, morals, and rules, play the vital function of providing order in the international system. . . . As a result, poverty in Africa might receive as much attention as arms control in Central Europe. Hope tends to trump despair in a paradigm that maintains that some moral standards are universal. The international community can improve the world and promote justice through cooperation - especially through international institutions, as multilateralism is a preferred approach to global problems. If, as Thomas Hobbes once suggested, force and fraud are the two principal virtues of realism, law and legitimacy can be seen as the principal virtues of liberalism. (Klarevas 2004, p19)

War, conflict and the development of power emerged as the main considerations of states in the post-World War II period. We can see this clearly in one classic text, Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, by Hans Morgenthau. This was a classic text which was republished many times, and became a standard text in many Western universities teaching International Relations, International Politics or Foreign Affairs during the 1960s-1980s. It also came to have a strong influence on practitioners such Henry Kissinger, and indirectly on U.S. Presidents such as Nixon (see Küng 1998). Some of the basic ideas of Morgenthau are listed in Box 1.

These simple, and 'self-evident' ideas turn out to be much more problematic when put into practice. Limitations to political realism soon emerged in the new political order that was build after World War II. Critical weaknesses in Morgenthau's account

Morgenthau was a sophisticated thinker who tried to build a detailed view of power, including how its use was justified.

However, limitations in the realist position soon emerged and include: -

The 'objective laws of society' that Morgenthau speaks of have been very hard to define or objectify. Likewise, accounts of international relations, economics and politics have also failed to reach any consensus that accurately predicts or fully explains complex international behaviour. Hence international relations and global processes are subject to periods of instability and low predicability. On this basis, it is not certain that we should speak of international relations as a science, or even claims that social science paradigms work in all areas of international politics (Molloy 2003).

Self-interest and power turn out to be insufficient to explain the behaviour of nations and government. Ideas and ideologies also have a crucial role (see Pettman 1991). Thus the foreign policy of the Soviet Union had been conditioned not only by real politik, but also by ideas of class struggle found in Marxist-Leninism. Likewise, the policies of modern China were largely opaque without a good understanding of Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism, and equally importantly, of traditional Chinese culture (Nathan 1993a; Nathan 1993b, Nathan 1993c; Pye 1985). Ironically, the U.S. post-World War II policy of the world-wide containment of Communist was largely based on ideals found in the liberal and capitalist world views, with an emphasis on patterns of democratic governance and establishing humanitarian norms through international organisations and support for political reform in foreign nations (see Kapuchan 1998). This idealist approach was tempered by both pragmatism and realist concerns of power, but both trends were elements of U.S. foreign policy. The European Union too, has followed this approach to some degree, with a strong concern for civil and social dimensions of 'power', as well as an emphasis on cooperation and 'transnational negotiation' (Kagan 2002). Middle and small level powers, e.g. Australia, Canada and Norway, have often seen the idea of being a 'good international citizen' as an effective way of enhancing their international influence. Today a large number of ideas and concerns drive both resistance to the global system (anti-globalism), and condition the way globalism operates (diverse cultures and religious systems, feminism, environmentalism, humanism etc.). This means that ideology and culture remain central to the way power is viewed, legitimated and used in the international system.

Morgenthau himself admits that ideas act as means for interests: means of communication, expression and aid formulation of interests, especially in the public arena (Morgenthau 1985, p11). Thus 'power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls another'. (Morgenthau 1985, p11) This means, therefore, that political institutions, cultures and ideas can have a central role in organising and mobilising power.

Assessments of power can be inaccurate, and do not always account for the problem of 'political will'. The U.S. assessment of national power led to a dangerous engagement in the Vietnam War - by all quantitative measures, North Vietnam, even with massive Soviet and Chinese aid, was a much weaker nation than the alliance supporting the South (Rothgeb 1993). In part, ideological factors, including the theories of class, guerilla and people's war, were the basis for successful resistance against an enemy with much greater material power. The United States and her allies, in turn, were limited at first by conceptions of the conflict as a police action, by reluctance to overtly take a land war into North Vietnam, by alarming television exposure of the war, and by a strong internal critique of the war which became overwhelming. Likewise, the intention of an enemy whose capability is well known can be misinterpreted, e.g. Chinese involvement in the Korean War was not expected by most U.S. commanders and military advisers (Hoyt 1990). At present, the outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan also involve the issue of political will and long-term staying capacity, rather than just crude assessments of power.

This means that smaller nations or groups whose intention and specific targets are uncertain can pose serious problems for even power alliances, e.g. uncertainty over North Korean intention has posed a major dilemma for Northeast Asia and the U.S. through 2003-2006. Today, the power of the 'weak', and of small, organised groups to inflict damage on great nations remains one of the dilemmas of terrorism and well as forming part of the threat posed by organised criminal activity. This asymmetric conflict poses a major challenge even to great powers and coalitions of states in the 21st century (see further Arreguin-Toft 2001).

Political realism can itself be a persuasive political tool that is used to force recognition by weaker or middle powers of the dominance of greater powers or a hegemonic (leading) superpower. Images of superpower dominance, of high technology military solutions, and electronic intelligence form part of this conception of power preponderance, used at different times by imperial nations or superpowers (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, the U.S.). Likewise, realism poses both as a science and a pragmatic approach to world affairs (Molloy 2003).

In spite of the relative dominance of political realism and foreign policy and strategic affairs, a large number of cooperative international groupings have emerged since World War II, e.g. the UNSC (though limited), the European Union, NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN, the Organization of American States (OAS), the WTO, and the G8 as well as a sizeable international cooperation in areas of aid, transport and telecommunications. These are now functional/structural elements in the international system (Buzan & Little 2000, pp241-346). Cooperation, in particular, can have a multiplier effect on the power of small and even medium powers, and create a more stable environment for great powers. This has led to a range of theories about how institutions shape international affairs, sometimes called the 'new institutionalism': -

Contemporary work in this area often highlights the ability of international institutions to help ameliorate international market failures . . . International institutions create incentives for states to cooperate by reducing collective action problems; by lengthening the "shadow of the future," thereby enhancing the prospects for states to engage in strategies of reciprocity; and by increasing the ability to link various issues, thereby increasing the costs for states of failing to comply with established rules and norms. (Mansfield & Milner 1997, p6)

Since Morgenthau, there has been a re-working of the realist theory to account for these criticisms, called neo-realism, (see Henderson 1998; Keohane 1986). Neo-realism seeks to explain the importance of super-powers and great powers in the international system. Neorealism (sometimes called Structural Realism) abandoned reliance on the nature of human beings to account for discord and cooperation in world politics, but focused instead on the competitive, anarchic nature of world politics as a whole. A proponent of this theory is Kenneth E. Waltz, who wrote the Theory of International Politics (1979). Waltz initiated a new line of theoretical inquiry in his attempt to systematise political realism into a rigorous, deductive systemic theory of international politics. Neorealists' criticisms of interdependence theorists is that they exaggerate the extent to which great powers, including the U.S., are dependent on others. Although the U.S. places great emphasis on allies such as found in NATO, or intelligences linkages with Britain, Canada, and Australia, it is also able to act in a unilateral fashion in imposing economic sanctions, or use considerable pressure and a preponderance of power to bring allies together to form ad hoc coalitions. Neo-realists argue that international organisations often serve the interests of, or are constrained, by these powerful states. Likewise, strategic realists have also tried to built a rational case for military pre-emption on the basis of 'anticipatory self defence', (Slocombe 2003), or on notions of un-authorized humanitarian intervention, whereby even without UNSC sanction a state may need to intervene to avoid massive human suffering (for the complexity of this notion, see Stein 2004). This ideas also parallel the concept of 'globalisation from above' whereby strong states shape the international system and channel many of its flows (see lecture 1).