AN OLDEN TIMES BEDTIME STORY THAT’LL PUT YOU TO SLEEP
“THE PIPER CUB AND THE LST AIRCRAFT CARRIER”
(A WWII POOR MAN’S CARRIER)
By John C. Kriegsman
Liaison Pilot Air Officer, 77th Infantry Division Artillery
My empty Piper Cub weighed 650 lbs. It cost $3500.00 to build; our main purpose was to spot artillery fire. We also did dozens of flunky jobs. Both the Germans and the Japs told their people not to fire on the little planes with the big wings, because the muzzle blast would give away their position, and artillery shells would come in like rain. That was the only protection we had.
Reminiscing during the last days of WWII, General A. D. Bruce, Commander, and 77thth Infantry Division made the statement, “The secret weapons of the South Pacific War were the Piper Cub, and the bulldozer.”
The bulldozer could clear the area for an airfield in a matter of days. They could make a roadway in a matter of hours. Using their slave labor it took the Japs weeks, and months for the Japs to do the same thing. The Piper Cub Aairplane was effective, efficient and a cheap way to see into the jungles, trees, and the hills before the roads were built.
When the 77th loaded the ships for an invasion of an island, the Cubs had to be disassembled, and loaded on the deck of a transport ship. At the invasion beach it had to be carefully loaded into a surging landing craft for the trip to the crowded beach, replace the wings, and test flight, all before observing could begin. Very little could be done until a beachhead was secured, and the better part of a day could be used. Finding an uncluttered beach to use temporarily as an airstrip was a problem.
This was the case on July 21, 1944, when the 77th hit the beach on Guam. Actually, by noon the Cubs were in the air observing, and directing artillery fire. By evening they were able to direct the perimeter fires for protection during the night.
On This shows the Brodie landing and takeoff device as it was mounted on LST 776. This allowed Piper Cubs L-4 observation planes to take off even before the convoy was over the horizon, and before the ground forces were able to “hit the beach”. These islands were all rock, and had no beaches on which a landing strip could be built.
When the Cubs needed refueling they could return to the LST, and refuel so that they could keep on observing.
There was another arm extending 50’over the side forward on the LST.
October 20, 1944, General MacArthur made his famous return to the Philippines’ on the Island of Leyte. The 77th was in floating reserve, and was brought on shore on November 21st. All equipment was made ready. On the late afternoon of December 6th, about 8,000 men loaded into small landing craft. Under cover of darkness we were headed to Ormoc Bay.
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Two days before this, there was a tremendous Nnaval Bbattle between Ddestroyers;, about a dozen destroyers on each side plus a sub, and small craft from the Japs. Both sides lost several destroyers before limping back to their respective ports. On the Nnext day, General Bruce sent me to Ormoc Bay to observe if any activity was going on. I could see nothing happening, and he gave the order to proceed with the Ormoc Bay invasion. I stationed my Cubs on the 7th Division Landing strip about 30 miles south of our beachhead to keep them out of the action. I boarded a landing ship so I could pick out a landing strip immediately.
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Our convoy with the 77th landed at daybreak at a small village called Deposito about 10 miles south of Ormoc City, debarking at 7:00 A.M. on the infamous day of December 7th, by the 77th. My Cubs were already in the air covering the landing. General Bruce sent a message to Corps Commander General Hodges, Commander of the 24th Corps, “The 77th has landed 7 come 11.” I delivered the message in minutes. The 7th Div. was coming up the coast from the south. The 11th Airborne Div. was coming down the valley from the north of Ormoc City.
About 40,000 Japs were in the area. Fortunately, they were in disarray from their trek over the mountains from the Eastern shore; they were making an orderly retreat hoping for seven ships to arrive with reinforcements from Manila in time to help them.
One transport did arrive at the Port of Ormoc City on Sunday night, December 12th; they did not know the 307th Combat Team Ooccupied the Ormoc City. In stone silence they waited for the Jap version of an LST loaded with replacement soldiers to disembark. When the unloading ramp was lowered, and men began to pour out, all hell broke loose. In less than one hour only one soldier out of approximately 750 soldiers remained alive. He was found a week later curled up in the “Crow’s Nest.”. The other six transports were sunk the next day by the U.S. Air Force.
For the next week, the fighting became a slaughter of the enemy. It took six days for two bulldozers to bury the dead. On Christmas Eve, another Combat Team loaded on landing craft for an all night “cruise” to Palompon on the west coast for a surprise landing on Christmas day, to prevent the escape of the remainder of the Japanese Army on Leyte. The main street became a landing strip of the Cubs. They were the only link over land to Ormoc City. The road was still under control of the Japs who were in the hills looking down on the road.
During the week, the 77th going north was met by the 11th coming south. The southern flank of the 77th was met by the 7the 7th working up the coast from the southern flank. The island was secured. The area was turned eover to the Americal Div., who still found plenty of the enemy to deal with.
During this operation, Cub surveillance was constant. As the infantry occupied an area, flat fields and roadways were established as airstrips. Cubs were constantly in the air directing artillery fire, dropping rifle grenades, flushing the Japs out of buildings, hauling white stove gas to the infantry units mired in mud, hauling out the dead and wounded, and dead, delivered the mail, and blood plasma and flying officers to observe their units from the air.
Immediately on January 1st, 1945, the 77th moved, back to the Eeastern shores on the Gulf of Leyte to prepare for the next operation. OKINAWA!! We couldn’t even pronounce the name. During the weeks that followed, we were continually upgrading our equipment, getting new recruits, and supplies.
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Through rumors and the grapevine, we found we were to secure a group of islands. It developed that they were near Okinawa, wherever that was. About two weeks before we were to leave, we found out we were going to leave a week before the main task force to establish an anchorage. About that same time we were issued two of the craziest looking hooks we had ever seen on any aircraft. Along with the hooks were instructions how and where they were to be mounted on our Cubs. Mystery was the order of the day. wWe figured we were to hook something, but we did not know what!!
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Somehow, word came that we were to operate off an LST ship, of all things. A Navyal Commander would arrive on a transport ship to explain how the hooks were to be used. Several days passed, and the transport did arrive. Contact was made with the Commander. He was extremely vague. He was unable to supply a picture, or even sketch how the LST was fitted to hook a Cub, or why it was necessary in the first place. He did say the LST was used at Iwo Jima by the Marines, who had L-5 Stinson aircraft. They were much heavier than our Cubs. They waited on board until an airstrip was secured on shore, which took about two precious days. Then they took off, and never returned.
LST 776, with a Brodie device mounted on its deck, did arrive late on the day before the convoy was to leave. Several of the 77th air section, including Lt. Montgomery, and myself and me, went on board. The crew told us how the device worked, and what we were expected to do to get our two Cubs on board without damaging them. Next day the convoy assembled early to move out for the Kerama Retto Islands. They were a small group of rocky mountainous (high hills) islands with no beaches.
The convoy got underway. Our LST was in the convoy. We had no chance to practice landings or takeoffs. Lt. Montgomery and I were expected to get on that ship. The LST could accommodate only two Cubs. Initial Oobservation of those islands was extremely critical. With the convoy under way, we were the show of the day. All eyes and field glasses from nearby ships were on us as we gingerly flew around the LST valiantly trying to hook the 3’ by 4’ loop. From the curve of the hook to the top of the propeller we had about 20” to “play” with. Lt. Montgomery was the first to hook the loop. I managed in five passes. Thanks be to God that we did not damage our precious planes.
LST 776 was a strange looking craft, but very simple. Forward was a steel pole about 30 ft. high. An arm protruded over the port side about 50’ at about the 10:00 o’clock position. There was the same thing aft of the ship with the arm pointing at about the 8:00 o’clock position. The ends of the arms had a cable going from one to the other like a trolley cable. Both ends of the arms on top were sort of a receiving platform for the crew to stand on to manipulate the trolley.
This shows the crew switching the Cub from the landing cable to the decking cable. It was no easy job. It required care so as not to hit the wings on the poles. Landing the engine was stopped, and the propeller was stopped. However taking off the propeller was live, and immense care had to be taken.
This was in the Kerama Retto anchorage. One of the is1ands can be see in the distance. It was March 29, 1945.
When a plane was to land, a trolley device would roll aft on the cable. A nylon rectangle about 3’ wide and 4’ long would be dropped from it. The LST would be turned into the wind, and at full speed. The LST had little or no keel. As a result, the ship would roll gently. This meant thoseat those 50’ arms over the side would make an arck maybe 30’ high. The pilot would approach this loop in sort of a porpoise fashion. It was necessary for the pilot to get the rhythm of the ship as he made his approach, so that when he hooked -, or worse yet, missed - the loop, the arm would not come crashing down on him.
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Cubs were tail-draggers. When a pilotone made a three- point landing, he pulled the “joy-stick” into his belly. It was as natural as pulling on your trousers. Not so when you hooked the loop. You had to remember to jam the stick ahead at the slightest tug indicating that you were hooked to the loop. That kept the nose down so the prop would not go up into the cable, and get all chewed to pieces.
This cave was one of many aroundProbablye the Kera Retto Islands. About 350 skiffs with depth charges mounted on themworst thing that could happen was to think that you were in these caves whichhooked when you were about 30 miles offnot, and you jammed the southern tip of Okinawa. Most had railroad tracks to roll the skiffs from the water into the caves. Under cover of darkness these skiffs were be driven by kalmias into the rudders and propellers of the stick forward. Diving 30 ft. straight down could make for a big problem. We started doing this without any practice or instructions, and the problem was that things wereere so close that extreme concentration was required.
capitol ships firing on Okinawa rendering them helpless so the Jap air force could easily bomb them. However the destroyers protecting our advanced convoy moved in, and fired their 5” shells into the caves, and destroyed them before they could do any damage to our ships.
Securely hooked, the trolley would roll down the cable. The ship’s crew would stop the roll. At the fore ward end of the cable, the crew would transfer the Cub to the cable going on to the ship, and then lower the Cub to the deck for refueling.
To take off, a small nylon loop about 12 inches in diameter was installed in the small “eye” at the top of the hook. The pilot and, passenger, and in the Cub with its propeller active, would be lifted up, hooked on the trolley, and transferred to the larger cable. The crew would then pull the trolley aft as far as it could go. It would be held there while the LST headed full -power into the wind. The pilot would apply full RPM for take-off. When he had checked his mags, and was ready for take-off he signaled the crew, and they would release him.
The cable was about 300’ long. When the pilot arrived at about the 250’ mark he would pull the release chain, much like flushing an old-fashioned toilet. He still might not have enough airspeed. By using that 30’ height he could, nose down, and pick up enough airspeed to fly just before he hit the water. From there on it was normal flying until it was time to land and refuel.
We did not feel it was a risky operation at all, as some did. However, we were concerned about a chances to practice, since we were the only two Cubs which could observe the initial landings. We were led to believe we were most important essential for the success of the whole operation.
The Kerama Retto Islands were a group of about six small islands about 20 miles west of the southern tip of Okinawa. The islands formed sort of a circle about 2two miles in diameter. An anchorage was to be established for supplying the invasion forces for Okinawa. The islands in our hands would make it almost impossible for the enemy to penetrate into the anchorage, and do damage to our ships.
March 26, 1945. As the 77th Division convoy approached the Kerama Rettos at about 30 miles as and we were still over the horizon safe from discovery by the Japs, we took off, even long before the invasion forces got to the islands. We were sure the Japs would wonder where those little planes with the big wings came from. The islands were nothing but rock several hundred feet high, with no beaches.with no
beaches.
Over our radio we were asked if we noticed anything unusual. We reported a funny thing. All the islands had dozens of caves with some sort of railroad tracks going from the water to the caves. There was nothing else around. It turned out this information was probably the greatest observation we ever made.
Those caves contained small fast skiffs (boats) with at least one depth charge mounted on them. The Japs figured an American force might attack Okinawa. They did not believe anyone would even bother to look at the Kerama Rettos; otherwise they would have done a better job camouflaging the tracks, which would have been a vvery simple matter.
The Japanese plan for the use of these boats was this. There were about 350 skiffs in thoese caves. WhenAs the American convoys assembled to attack Okinawa on Easter Sunday, during the night these small, rather fast boats would come like a swarm of bees during the night. They would drive the boats into the rudders and propellers of these battleships and cruisers at anchor. It was another example of a kamikaze mission. The pilot of the boat had no chance of escaping death before the explosion, which would have been considerable. It was hoped that they would cause enough havoc to at least cripple the American’s capitaol ships to make them easy prey for their shore batteries, and air force.
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The Ddestroyers protecting our little convoy moved into position, and fired their 5” shells into the caves, and destroyed those lethal weapons before they had a chance to go into action.
I doubt that in their wildest dreams did the Japs believed that 1,400 ships would arrive during the night of March 31st to assault the beaches on April 1st. It was the greatest maneuvering of ships under cover of darkness that had ever happened up to that time. (V-E Day was greater.) If there were collisions, they were only minor. It was an amazing feat, because the Ccaptains of those ships were drawn from all walks of life. Not necessarily experienced seamen. They trained for this duty only a few short months before. The Ccaptain of our LST 776 was a tobacco farmer from North Carolina by the name of Copeland, who- passed away about 1960.