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Insider Threats Negative 2.0 Michigan ‘15

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whistleblowers neg updates

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Whistleblowing bad

Whistleblowers are traitors, and the search for civil rights threatens the pre-eminence of the military-industrial complex

Vombatkere 13

(S.G. Vombatkere is a retired Major General, “Edward Snowden’s Wake-up Call : Cyber Security, Surveillance and Democracy”, Asian Tribune, http://www.asiantribune.com/node/62920, TMP)

Edward Snowden, in his courageous, principled expose, has brought out how USA's National Security Agency (NSA) has been spying on most nations in the world. This spying is clearly to establish or strengthen USA's political, economic and military global clout. India is the fifth-most spied-upon nation, even more than China and Russia. Considering that India is USA's strategic partner, spying on India is breach of faith. Iran tops the list (14 billion pieces of intelligence); then come Pakistan (13.5 billion), Jordan (12.7 billion), Egypt (7.6 billion), and India (6.3 billion). [Ref.1] It is piquant that India, USA's strategic partner, is in the “club” of Iran, Pakistan, Jordan and Egypt, where USA perceives “threat” to its global hegemony. USA has other strategic partners and doubtless they too are being spied upon, and many national leaders, notably of Turkey, Germany and Russia, have raised serious objections. But India is USA's junior and subservient strategic partner due to the long-term, built-in subservience of India's political and bureaucratic architects of the strategic alliance. There has been no official Indian protest and there is unlikely to be even a squeak on this sovereignty issue. However, people's voices have been raised, especially from within USA, against USA's presidentially-sanctioned, global electronic spying and surveillance. These voices are directed simultaneously at demanding recognition and protection of individual privacy rights, calling for accountability and transparency of U.S presidential and Congress decisions, and attempting to influence USA to pardon whistleblower Edward Snowden who is still in hiding. Snowden's expose on the heels of the commencement of the trial of that other courageous and righteous prisoner-of-conscience whistleblower Bradley Manning, is a grievous blow to the pride of NSA and the U.S establishment. Thus these whistleblowers are “traitors” who need to be punished severely because they have weakened USA against its “enemies”, self-created and self-imagined. Added to the list of “traitors” are the courageous people in The Guardian and Washington Post, like Laura Poitras and Glenn Greenwald, who actually brought Snowden's leaked information to public glare. It is now clearer than ever before that USA's official enemy is not this country or that, not Al Qaeda or Taliban, not this religion or that, but the spread of peace and real democracy, and the demands for human and civic rights, all of which threaten the pre-eminence of the military-industrial complex MNCs which run USA from behind a teflon curtain. Like all colonial powers of the past, this pre-eminence is based heavily on political, economic and military intelligence. In modern times it calls for surveillance and access to data and information from within and outside USA. Thus, U.S intelligence agencies would be particularly interested to access databases of various kinds, and real-time data as it is being created by land, ocean, aerial and space surveillance devices. ¶ With the kind of super-computing capability, global intelligence experience, and unparalleled military power and reach that USA possesses, this collated intelligence can be used for hegemonic aims.¶ ¶ These are stated in the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) created in 1997 by a group of conservative American politicians, academics and policy brokers. PNAC aims to “shape a new century favourable to American principles and interests” and “make the case and rally support for American global leadership” [Ref.2].¶ ¶ Thus it is the business of every country to protect its databases from hackers, sleuths, mercenary spies and intelligence agents, who try to obtain intelligence by one or more of several fair or foul means.¶ ¶ System and data security The damage that can be wreaked by deliberate corruption or destruction of programs or data, or lifting of data without the knowledge of the rightful owner of the data, by illegal access into the operating system is enormous. For example, if the computer system of Indian Railways is tampered with, goods and passenger trains across the country can be brought to a halt, causing huge economic loss, with heightened accident risk. Or if, like NSA's Stuxnet program destroyed Iran's nuclear enrichment centrifuges, our nuclear power plants' systems are broken into, it can result in a nuclear disaster. Government of India (GoI) has listed “the civil aviation sector (ATC), railway passenger reservation system and communication network, port management, companies and organizations in power, oil and natural gas sectors, banking and finance and telecom sectors” as critical, apart from certain “strategic government departments such as space (ISRO), External Affairs Ministry (passport database), the Home Ministry's police and intelligence networks,.... the Prime Minister's Office (PMO), the NSCS and the Cabinet Secretariat”. [Ref.3]. Security of government data and data concerning its citizens is vital for any government. Government and private intelligence agencies (the services of the latter purchasable by the highest bidder) are engaged in acquiring or “mining” information from their own country and from other countries which are competitors in the political, economic or military senses. It is standard security practice, for instance, that computers which are connected to the internet are not connected with the LAN, so that there is no access to the system through the internet. Other security measures are physical security to ensure that data is not tampered with or copied by individuals who work within the system or obtain physical access to the system. However, for systems which are necessarily connected to the internet for their functioning (e.g., internet banking), it is a mere combination of motivation – money, display of capability, ideology, etc – and time-on-the-job, for an experienced hacker to crack firewall codes and find passwords to gain access to programs and data.¶ This has been demonstrated by hackers, detected and punished or not, who have broken into systems as varied as banks, strategic, military, scientific, technical or industrial databases around the world. Another method is to plant viruses or clandestinely embed special-purpose hardware and software into commercially supplied hardware devices and software systems to transmit data that passes through the system. Routinely, firewalls to prevent unauthorized access into systems, regular change of passwords at all levels within the system, and restricting physical access to system terminals are time-tested methods for system and data security.

Leaks hurt U.S. credibility and economy – the tech sector loses billions of dollars

Griffiths 7/3 (James Griffiths, Reporter for the South China Morning Post where he rights about Hong Kong politics, China, the internet, and security, with a degree in Law from the University of Liverpool, “Two years after Snowden, NSA revelations still hurting US tech firms in China: report,” South China Morning Post, 3 July 2015, http://www.scmp.com/tech/enterprises/article/1831657/nsa-spy-revelations-damaging-us-tech-firms-competitiveness-china)

Revelations of digital surveillance by American spy agencies could end up costing US firms billions of dollars in lost business and lawmakers in Washington are falling short in their duty to address the issue, a US think tank has said. Tech firms, in particular, have underperformed in foreign markets following the leaks by former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden, according to a paper published by the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation. "Our original thought was once policy makers realised this was having an impact on business interests, they would take more aggressive action to address the concerns," Daniel Castro, ITIF vice president, told the South China Morning Post. He helped author the report. The ITIF predicted in 2013 that "even a modest drop" in the foreign market share for cloud computing could cost the US economy up to US $35 billion by 2016. That now looks like a conservative estimate as the revelations of cyber-snooping have negatively affected “the whole US tech industry,” the report said. Cloud computing firms and data centres have been some of the worst hit, with foreign companies choosing to avoid storing their data in the US following revelations about the NSA's digital surveillance programmes. A 2014 survey of British and Canadian businesses by Vancouver-based Peer 1 Hosting found that 25 per cent of respondents planned to pull data out of the US due to fears relating to data privacy. In February, Beijing dropped a number of major American tech firms from its official state procurement list, including network equipment maker Cisco Systems, Apple, and security firm McAfee. "The Snowden incident, it's become a real concern, especially for top leaders," Tu Xinquan, associate director of the China Institute of WTO Studies in Beijing, told Reuters in April. "In some sense, the American government has some responsibility for that. [China's] concerns have some legitimacy." The White House and US International Trade Administration declined to comment on the matter, when contacted by the Post. IBM, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard have all reported diminished sales in China as a result of the NSA revelations, which first emerged in the summer of 2013. The NSA was found to have tapped into the servers of major internet players like Facebook, Google and Yahoo to track online communication, among other forms of digital surveillance.

whistleblowers fail/backlash

Whistleblowing fails – governments and organizations can undermine their reputations to illegitimate leaks.

Sawyer et al 6 (Kim R. Sawyer, Professor at the University of Melbourne’s School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, Jackie Johnson, Professor at the University of Western Australia, and Mark Holub, Professor at the UWA Business School, “The Necessary Illegitimacy of the Whistleblower,” 17 July 2006, http://www.bmartin.cc/dissent/documents/Sawyeretal05.pdf)

For the whistleblower, the negative correlation with the organization underscores their pragmatic legitimacy. And it is their whistleblowing that underscores their moral legitimacy and identity. Rothschild and Miethe (1999, p. 121) describe this well: "It became clear to us that for many of these individuals the act of whistle-blowing had become what sociologists refer to as a 'master status'. One's master status is the critical bedrock of one's personal identity; it is how we first label ourselves and are recognized by others. For most of our whistle-blowers, the experience of whistle-blowing and its aftermath have been so traumatic that their 'master status' is now defined by their act of whistle-blowing. Their new identity - one based on the act of whistle-blowing - defines and engulfs nearly everything in their lives." Moral legitimacy takes over, and it is through moral legitimacy that the whistleblower expects their pragmatic legitimacy to be repaired. Whistleblowing then becomes a test of moral legitimacies, not just of the whistleblower and the organization, but of all their conferring entities. In the abstract, the moral legitimacy of whistleblowing is repeatedly reaffirmed. In increasing numbers, countries, states and organizations are adopting whistleblowing statutes to protect the unknown whistleblower. But in the particular, the story is different. It is easy to undermine the moral legitimacy of a particular whistleblower by questioning their moral legitimacy in other areas. While some have beatified whistleblowers,22 most would not view themselves in this way. They are just employees who reveal wrongdoing. Smearing the whistleblower is common. Smearing weakens the whistleblower's moral legitimacy and, by implication, the legitimacy of their whistleblowing. As Sawyer (2004, p.7) observes: "There are now good whistleblowers and bad whistleblowers. The good whistleblower is the whistleblower who lives in another country, or who works for another organization (preferably a competitor), or who blew the whistle 50 years ago. The bad whistleblower is the whistleblower in your own organization who blows the whistle now."

Company backlash means that whistleblowing fails – organizations fire or demote workers to destroy legitimacy and prevent further leaks.

The retaliation experienced by whistleblowers is well documented. There are many case studies of prominent whistleblowers where the retaliation against whistleblowers is evidenced in its entirety.4 Case study information can also be extracted from the transcripts of formal inquiries, for example the Australian Senate Inquiry into Unresolved Whistleblowing Cases (1995).5 Systematic studies of whistleblowing show the scale and the scope of the retaliation. A 1990 study of 233 US whistleblowers cited in Grace and Cohen (1998) found that 90 percent had lost their jobs or were demoted, 27 percent faced lawsuits and 26 percent had psychiatric or medical referrals subsequent to blowing the whistle. A comprehensive survey of US whistleblowers by Rothschild and Miethe (1999) of 761 individuals finds that: • 69 percent of the whistleblowers lost their job or were forced to retire; • 64 percent received negative performance evaluations; • 68 percent had work closely monitored by supervisors; • 69 percent were criticized or avoided by co-workers; and • 64 percent were blacklisted from getting another job in their field. Whistleblowing and retaliation appear to co-exist. Indeed, Rothschild and Miethe (1999) find that whistleblowers experience reprisals regardless of their age, gender, educational attainment or years of employment in their current job. Only retaliations against African Americans appear to be at a higher rate than for other employees. Rothschild and Miethe (1999) identify three factors which influence retaliation: the supervisory status of the whistleblower; the degree of wrongdoing; and whether the whistleblower discloses to an external body. Reprisals are more likely if the whistleblower is a non-supervisor, if the wrongdoing is severe, and if the whistleblower blows the whistle to parties external to the organization. The incidence of retaliation against external whistleblowers is on average 10-15 percent higher than for internal whistleblowers. The Rothschild and Miethe (1999) study provides an insight into why organizations retaliate against a whistleblower. By blowing the whistle, the whistleblower assumes a role different from other employees. Their identity is now defined by their whistleblowing, not by their prior performance. Their legitimacy is now the legitimacy of a whistleblower, not that of an employee. As a stakeholder, their legitimacy becomes important to the organization because it is negatively correlated with the legitimacy of the organization. And it is this negative correlation that determines the whistleblower's future. For an organization, its pragmatic legitimacy determines its operational viability. Organizations maintain their legitimacy with other entities through exchanges which increase the expected value of the other entity, through the joint influence of the organization and the other entity, and through shared values. For an individual, their pragmatic legitimacy can be similarly defined by their ability to exchange, influence and share values with other individuals and entities. When an organization retaliates against a whistleblower, they destroy the whistleblower's pragmatic legitimacy by destroying their ability to exchange, influence and share values with others. Dismissal, demotion, negative performance evaluations, and loss of authority all minimize the pragmatic legitimacy of the whistleblower. A notable US example is the case of James Alderson, the Chief Financial Officer of North Valley Hospital, who blew the whistle on the secret accounting practices of the Quorum Health Group. He could not have anticipated the consequences of his action. Within five days he was sacked, within three years he had filed a whistleblower lawsuit under the False Claims Act6 , and in the next ten years his family lived in five different towns.7 Thirteen years after blowing the whistle, his case was settled. In the interim, the Hospital Corporation of America, the parent company of Quorum, had reimbursed the US government US$840 million as a result of the whistleblower law suit. Alderson reflected "Yes, I would do it again. I can't believe it's over. But then again, it will never be over."8