The (Forgotten) European Political Community

The (Forgotten) European Political Community

1952-1954

by

Linda Risso

PembrokeCollege, Cambridge

In the early 1950s, European policy-makers recognised the need to go beyond the restricted scope of the treaties for the European Coal and Steel and Defence Communities and to provide them with a democratic and comprehensive political structure.The debate concerning this undertaking reached its highest peak in the discussion surrounding the European Political Community.

Although initially the EPC was praised by the ECSC members, in the following months the project underwent major changes and eventually collapsed in 1954. The reason for the EPC’s failure lay both in the widespread opposition to the rearmament of West Germanyand also in the criticism of its supranational nature, which its potential members considered a threat to national sovereignty and independence

Re-examinations of the project of the European Political Community (EPC) and of the opposition then faced by European policy-makers reveal remarkableprecursors to the current discussions regarding the European Constitution. Yet none of the people involved in the Convention or in the IGC have made any reference to it; indeed, one might conclude from their silence that many of them hardly remember it. Hence the need to investigate and comprehend nature and limits of the EPC: an insight into the history – and particularly the failure – of the Political Community would offer a better understanding of the obstacles that are on the way of the ‘Constitution for Europe’.

This paper opens with a brief account of the history of the European Defence Community, recalling how the signing of the Paris Treaty in 1952 paved the way to the first European Constituent Assembly. Through the analysis of the Assembly’s final report, this paper draws attention to the delicate issue of finding a balance between the need to achieve genuine common foreign and defence policies and the need to safeguard national sovereignty and independence.

First steps towards a united Europe

Federalist demands for a European Constituent Assembly resonated throughout all the early post-war plans for economic and political cooperation and the principle of a Political Union was enshrined in the ‘Manifesto of Ventontene’ (1941).

The foundation of the Council of Europe (May 1949) seemed to meet federalist demands, but it was soon revealed to be a disappointment. The decision-making powers rested in the Committee of Ministers (composed of the Foreign Ministers of member states), whereas the Consultative Assembly (consisting of appointees of national parliaments) had virtually no decision-making powers. Not only was the Assembly subordinated to the Committee of Ministers, but the Ministers were required to reach their decisions by unanimity only. This conflicted with the federalist demand for a democratically elected Assembly with wide-ranging powers, operating through majority voting.

Discussion regarding which route should be taken underwent a dramatic acceleration with Robert Schuman’s proposal for the creation of a Franco-German coal and steel pool. The project entailed the ultimate surrender of national sovereignty over the coal and steel sector to a supranational High Authority. Although this fell short of federalist demands, the prospects of a limited, but definitive, surrender of national sovereignty was seen as the first step towards the ultimate creation of a united Europe and consequently received their support.

In March 1952, after lengthy talks, the Treaty of Paris – which established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) – was signed and came into effect in July 1952. The ECSC was administered by the High Authority, a supranational organisation made up of nine independent members appointed by the member countries. The High Authority would work closely with the Council of Ministers, in which each country had a vote and would be responsible to the Common Assembly, whose 78 members were drawn from national parliaments. Although the High Authority was the main governing body, the Council could veto its decisions and the Assembly could ask for its resignation. Once more, in the federalists’ eye the ECSC was a disappointment: the Assembly was not elected nor did it have decision-making power, but instead possessed a merely consultative role.

The European Army project

As European policy-makers were taking the first steps towards European integration, the problem of the defence of Western Europe progressively became a crucial issue. Between 1949 and 1950, the foundation of NATO and the outbreak of the Korean War had put the rearmament on the front burner.

The NATO Council meetings of September 1950 had led to an American resolution to rearm West Germany and, in the following months, this materialised in the Spofford plan, which foresaw full German rearmament under the control of NATO. In order to prevent the re-establishment of German military and general staff, the French proposed the creation of a European Army, whose members would put their troops under the control of a supranational authority and a European Defence Minister (Pleven Plan).[1]

The plan for a common European army entailed the creation of a supranational authority and the curbing of national sovereignty: once the integrated army had come into being, it would have been impracticable for its members to have fully independent foreign policies. The Defence Community would represent its members in the international arena, with the right to enter defensive agreements and to join international organisations. Moreover, the creation of a common army required common training and – more importantly – a common budget to fund it. Finally, the EDC Treaty established an integrated procurement policy as well as a joint research project designed to lead to a more integrated armament industry. As a consequence of the power it would gather, the European Defence Community encountered the problem of maintaining adequate democratic control.

After initial hesitation, the Italian delegation at the EDC Conference acknowledgedthe need to establish a European Political Community as a democratic guarantee for the common army. Alcide De Gasperi, the Italian Prime Minister, proposed a political authority that would answer to an elected Parliament and that would coordinate the foreign policies of its members and administer the budget to finance the new army. To ensure that it would be capable of accomplishing these goals, the new authority would have large powers of taxation and full – and independent – decision-making power. Thus, the foundation of the new political authority would entail significant limits to national sovereignty. The Community members would permanently delegate to the supranational authority the right to levy taxes and to represent them in the international arena, including the right to conclude treaties or international agreements.

The audacity of the Italians was not matched by the other five delegations, which displayed less conviction. It became progressively clear that the EDC Conference had neither the power nor the sufficient cohesion to discuss the scope and the structure of the Political Community. As a compromise, they inserted Article 38 into the EDC Treaty, which ensured that,although temporarily postponed, the discussion on the political dimension of the integrated army would later be taken up by a Constituent Assembly.

The first part of Article 38 established that once it had come into being, the EDC (temporary) Assembly work towards the creation of a democratically elected Assembly, which would become the cornerstone of the Political Community. The EDC Assembly would also address problems arising from the coexistence of the different agencies for European cooperation that were already established, or that might be established in the meantime, with the purpose of ensuring the highest degree of coordination within the framework of the new Europe.

The second paragraph of Article 38 stipulated that the Assembly’s proposals would be submitted to the Council within six months and, once its approval had been secured, they would be passed on to the national governments. An intergovernmental conference would be called within three months to discuss the proposals and proceed to ratification by national parliaments.

Article 38 of the EDC Treaty

1. Dans le délai prévu au deuxième paragraphe du présent article, l’Assemblée étudie:

1. la constitution d’une Assemblée de la Communauté Européenne de Défense, élue sur une base démocratique;
2. les pouvoirs qui seraient dévolus à une telle Assemblée;
3. les modifications qui devraient éventuellement être apportées aux dispositions du présent Traité relatives aux autres institutions de la Communauté, notamment en vue de sauvegarder une représentation appropriée des États.

Dans ses études, l’Assemblée s’inspirera notamment des principes suivants:
-l’organisation de caractère définitif qui se substituera à la présent organisation provisoire devra être conçue de manière à pouvoir constituer une des éléments d’une structure fédérale ou confédérale ultérieure, fondée sur le principe de la séparation des pouvoirs et comportant, en particulier, un système représentatif bicaméral;
-l’Assemblée étudiera également les problèmes résultant de la co-existence des différents organismes de coopération européenne déjà créés ou qui viendraient à l’être, afin d’en assurer la coordination dans le cadre de la structure fédérale ou confédérale.
2. Les propositions de l’Assemblée seront soumises au Conseil dans un délai de six mois à dater de l’entrée en fonction de l’Assemblée. Avec l’avis du Conseil, ces propositions seront ensuite transmises par le Président de l’Assemblée aux Gouvernements des Etats membres, qui, dans un délai de trois mois à compter de la date à laquelle ils en auront été saisis, convoqueront une Conférence chargée d’examiner lesdites propositions.

Although a through analysis of the military provisions of the EDC Treaty is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth remembering that the EDC was much more advanced than any of the initiatives currently under discussion. With very few exceptions, all national troops would be placed under the Community’s control, with integrated training, procurement policies and armament production.[2] Moreover, within the framework of the Defence and Political Communities the European Army would be constantly under the democratic control of the supranational institutions, which would also be responsible for the implementation of a common defence and for the coordination of their foreign policies.

From the Luxembourg Resolution to the Ad Hoc Assembly

Article 38 provided for an Assembly with limitedbut realconstituent powers, but its materialisation was subordinated to the ratification of the EDC Treaty, a process that was likely to be lengthy. On the other hand, while EDC negotiations were still in progress, several motions in the Six parliaments had demanded that the creation of a political authority precede the formation of the European Army.This request was motivated in part by the fear that premature rearmament could jeopardise the democratic development of the newborn West German democracy.

At the first ECSC Council meeting (Luxembourg, September 1952), the Italian delegationsuggested that the ECSC Assemblyinitiated discussion regarding the feasibility of a political union. The Six agreed to appoint a special Assembly, made up of the ECSC Assembly and nine additional members to undertake the task of interpreting Article 38 and laying the foundation of the future European Political Community.[3] The ‘Luxembourg Resolution’, as this decision became known, allowed the Assembly six months to carry out its tasks.

The gathering met for the first time in October 1952 and chose the title of ‘Ad Hoc Assembly’, rather than ‘Constituent Assembly’ because the latter was criticised by many delegates as ‘too ambitious’. A Constitutional Committee, under the chairmanship of Heinrich von Brentano, was appointed to draw up a preliminary draft treaty for the Assembly’s consideration.

The Constitutional Committee’s discussion was directed by Article 38 of the EDC Treaty, which had already spelt out the institutional structure of the future Community with a democratically elected parliament, an executive representing the member states and a court of justice. On the other hand, the delegates needed to build on the provisionsof the ECSC and EDC treaties, through which the Six had already surrendered national sovereignty.

The work of the Constitutional Committee was hampered by internal divisions. On the one hand, the Italian delegation, supported by the Dutchdelegation, favoured a broad interpretation of Article 38 and pushed for the creation of a federal Europe with wide-ranging powers. Conversely, the French tolerated little more than the coordination of the ECSC and the EDC and opposed all attempts to create a real supranational authority.[4]The Constitutional Committee focused more on the need to provide the European institution with sufficient democratic control than it did on enlarging the capabilities of the Community.

Europe’s first Constitution

After six months of intense debate, the ‘Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community’ was ready and the Ad Hoc Assembly remitted it to the ECSC Council of Ministers.[5] It established a supranational community that, like the European Coal and steal and Defence Communities, would be ‘founded upon a union of people and states’, but, unlike them, it would be indissoluble.[6]

The EPC would have a bi-cameral Parliament consisting of a People’s Chamber and a Senate (Chapter II). The former would be directly elected for five years and its 268 seats would be distributed according to population but a carefully weighted systemwould prevent any two large states from dominating the Assembly. France would have 70 seats (on account of its overseas territories), West Germany and Italy would each have 63, Belgium and the Netherlandswould each have 30 and Luxembourg 12. The Senate would be elected by national parliaments for five years in accordance with the procedures determined by each member state. The 87 seats of the Senate would be distributed in the same proportions as in the Lower Chamber, butFrance would only have the same number of seats as Germany and Italy.

The Senate would elect the President of the European Executive Council, who would in turn appoint the Ministers. The Draft clearly stated that the Executive Council would not include more than two Members of the same nationality. After its appointment, the Executive Council would have to receive the Parliament’s vote of confidence and would have to resign if, at any stage, this confidence were lacking. According to Article 31 of the Draft Treaty, a three-fifths majority of the People’s Chamber would constitute a vote of no-confidence.

Although the decision-making power rested in the hands of the Executive Council, Parliament was also endowed with large powers. In addition to the right to withdraw its confidence to the Executive Council, Members of Parliament (along with those of the Executive Council) would have the right to initiate legislation and the right of amendment, interpellation and inquiries (Article 23).

Tab. 1 – Vote distribution according to the Draft Treaty

People’s Chamber / Senate
France / 70 / 21
FederalRepublic of Germany / 63 / 21
Italy / 63 / 21
Belgium / 30 / 10
The Netherlands / 30 / 10
Luxembourg / 12 / 4
Total / 268 / 87

Sources: Draft Treaty, Articles 15 and 17

Alongside the Executive Council, the Council of National Ministers represented the member governments. The chairmanship would be taken by each of the Council Members in turn for a period of three months, in accordance with the alphabetical order of the names of the Member States (Article 36). In the Draft Treaty the tasks of this body were only briefly described as harmonising the action of the Executive Council with that of the national government (Article 35).

Finally, the Draft Treaty established a Court of Justice and an Economic and Social Council. The Court would be identical to the Court of the ECSC and of the EDC, thus ensuring unity of jurisprudence (Articles 38 and 42). The Economic and Social Council would be an advisory body set up by the Council of Europe and would assist the Executive Council and Parliament (Chapter V).

Legislative proposals would need the approval of both chambers by simple majority. Once majority had been ensured, the bill would become law and be promulgated by the President of the Executive Council within eight days. For its part, the European Council could issue implementing regulations and, together with the member states, would be entrusted with the execution of such laws and regulations (Articles 52-54).

According to the Draft Treaty, the Community could make three types of decisions: it could propose a law, formulate a recommendation, and give advices. Legislative proposals would need the approval of both chambers by simple majority. Once majority had been ensured, the bill would become law and be promulgated by the President of the Executive Council within eight days. For its part, the European Council could issue implementing regulations and, together with the member states, would be entrusted with the execution of such laws and regulations. In order to ensure that a law was implemented, the Executive Council was empowered to issue regulations and decrees (Articles 52-54).Parliament could also issue recommendations. They would be binding in their aims, but would leave the choice of the means of implementation to the member states (Article 54). Finally, the Community could give an ‘advice’, which left the addressees – the member states or other Community organs – free to determine what action to take.

Recognising the need to provide a coherent and comprehensive institutional framework for the existing agencies of European integration, the Draft Treaty stated that the EPC would take over the powers and competencies of the ECSC and EDC within two years of the creation of the People’s Chamber (Articles 59-60). Thus, the Draft Treaty provided a consistent institutional system, avoiding unnecessary duplications. The Parliament and Council of National Ministers of the Community would replace the parallel institutions in the ECSC and EDC forthwith and judicial powers would be exercised by a single Court of Justice (Article 60). The ECSC High Authority and the EDC Commissariat would be under the responsibility of the European Executive Council during a two-year transitional period, when their presidents would be members of the Executive Council and have voting rights. Thereafter, the High Authority alone would continue its existence as an ‘administrative board’, whereas the Commissariat would be dissolved (Article 62).