Reform of the Forest Crime Monitoring and Reporting Project

CMB/99/A05

March 2002

The Forest Crimes Monitoring and Reporting Project (FCMRP) is currently non-functional. The question for the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) and the international donor community to address is whether the FCMRP can be made to work with the continued involvement of the Department of Forestry and Wildlife (DFW), or whether the many conflicts of interest that currently exist within the department are so entrenched that DFW will never be a viable project partner and a replacement needs to be found. What is certain is that without immediate and fundamental change the FCMRP will fail and the government, the international community and Global Witness will lose all credibility if they continue to support it.

Recommendations

If the FCMRP is to succeed, with the continued involvement of the DFW, the RGC should:

  • Instruct DFW to cooperate fully, and in a timely manner, with both the Department of Inspection (DI) and the Independent Monitor, with immediate effect. This should be confirmed in a letter to be copied to: the Minister of the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), the Director of the Forest Crime Monitoring Office (FCMO), the Director of the Legislation and Litigation Office (LLO), the Director of the Forest Management Office (FMO), the Director of KAMFOREXIM and the Directors of all 24 Provincial Forestry Offices, and representatives of the international donor community.
  • Regularly review the performance of the DFW departmental directors involved and hold them accountable for the successes and failures of the FCMRP.
  • Ensure that DFW fulfils its obligations under the initial project agreement and provides the Independent Monitor and DI, with all relevant information as detailed below with immediate effect. Ultimately this information should be made public.
  • Stipulate in all concession agreements that the concessionaire is required to give DFW, DI and the Independent Monitor, or any other authorised agency, immediate and unrestricted access to all concession land and processing facilities. This should include a penalty clause for failure to comply with this requirement.
  • Instruct the concessionaires, with immediate effect, to provide DFW, DI and the Independent Monitor with official written authorisation to allow these entities instant and unimpeded access to all concession land and processing facilities.
  • Instruct the concessionaires, with immediate effect, to make all their staff aware of the above authorisation requiring them to cooperate with any investigation or inspection being conducted by DFW, DI or the Independent Monitor or any other authorised agency.

In order to ensure that the information generated by the FCMRP and other sources is being used to its fullest extent in the successful pursuit and prosecution of the perpetrators of forest crimes, the RGC should:

  • Increase the involvement of other government law enforcement agencies, for example the Ministry of Interior Economic Police, in the detection and suppression of forest crimes, in particular those involving the alleged illegal activities of concessionaires and of DFW staff.
  • Ensure that the FCMRP employs a team of skilled litigation lawyers.
  • Work closely with the judiciary and provide training on the issue of forest and wildlife crime and/or establish a Special Court to deal exclusively with forest crimes.

If the RGC determines that FCMRP cannot succeed with the continued involvement of DFW, the RGC should:

  • Move the Forest Crime Monitoring Unit (FCMU) from DFW premises.
  • Remove all management responsibilities for anyone involved in the FCMRP from DFW/MAFF, including the Director of the FCMU who should report directly either to the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers or a Joint Select Committee of Parliament.
  • Ensure that the FCMU has GIS capabilities independent of DFW and a duplicate set of all documentation held by the FMO.

If the government determines that the information generated by the FCMRP is not being used to its fullest extent, by DFW, in the pursuit of the perpetrators of forest crimes, the RGC should:

  • Remove both the Illegal Forest Activity Suppression Section and the Litigation Section from the control of LLO and put it under the direct control of the Director of the FCMU; who should report directly either to the Cabinet of the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers or a Joint Select Committee of Parliament.
  • Increase the involvement of external government agencies, for example the Ministry of Interior Economic Police, in suppression and litigation activities.

Introduction

When the Royal Government of Cambodia established the Forest Crimes Monitoring Unit in December 1999 it was heralded by the government, the international donor community and Global Witness as a huge step forward in the battle against illegal logging in Cambodia; finally the government's rhetoric would be put to the test in a clear, transparent and measurable way.

The Forest Crimes Monitoring and Reporting Project was a world first in that the performance of the two government agencies charged with monitoring forest crimes would be audited by an Independent Monitor, in this instance Global Witness. The original concept of the project remains good and, quite rightly, has been widely promoted at numerous international fora as a potentially effective means of combating forest crime.

However, the reality is that the RGC's flagship forest reform project is currently non-functional and has not been allowed to work as it was originally envisaged ever since its inception in December 1999. At an operational level the problem is clear: the Department of Forestry and Wildlife, under the guidance of the MAFF is not fulfilling its obligations under the project document or fulfilling its broader mandate to suppress forest crimes. In many instances, it is actively undermining the work of its project partners: the Department of Inspection and Global Witness. What is less clear is why this should be the case.

It could be that the obstruction by DFW staff is a result of personal decisions of the individuals concerned, or, that they are being put under pressure by some higher authority; from within the Department, the MAFF or from some other outside influence such as the concession companies, the armed forces or politicians. There is little doubt that some or all of these factors apply, varying on a case-by-case basis. Whatever the ultimate reason, the result has been a breakdown in trust between individuals working on the project, and a failure to meet not only the project aims and objectives but also to crack down on serious forest crimes, particularly those perpetrated by concessionaires.

The failure of the project is symptomatic of the raison d'etre of the whole forest industry in Cambodia: to make as much money as possible as quickly as possible, fuelled by illegal logging. This has resulted in the almost complete destruction of the commercial forest resource, and the project has been allowed to flounder in a sea of vested interests whilst illegal loggers have operated with impunity.

This document outlines in brief the fundamental problems with the FCMRP and potential ways forward. This includes a series of recommendations that could make the project function from the perspective of continued involvement of DFW or, if that is not workable, what can be done in the absence of future DFW participation.

It should be noted, however, that even if the project was meeting all of its objectives in full this would not mean that forest crimes in Cambodia were being effectively dealt with; they would merely be effectively recorded. This is because the FCMRP does not deal directly with either the prevention or suppression of forest crimes. Investigation and prosecution of forest crimes, for example, are responsibilities of the Litigation and Legislation Office (LLO). This document looks at the FCMRP in a wider context and suggests other reforms that, if put in place, would make the success of the project more likely and its impact on forest crimes greater. For instance, the non-functioning of the LLO, the main recipient of information generated by the project and the 'teeth' of the government’s fight against illegal logging, is potentially even more serious than the failings of the project itself.

In the light of these experiences the project must be altered immediately and in a fundamental way to ensure its success and to justify continued support. More importantly, the FCMRP needs political backing at the very highest levels. All stakeholders should participate in this effort.

NB: This report highlights the responsibilities of various institutions in the failings of the FCMRP. However, Global Witness does recognise that these institutions are made up of individuals many of whom have worked hard to make this project work and to develop other initiatives in forestry reform.

The Project

On the 25th January 1999 the Prime Minister, Samdech Hun Sen, issued a 17 Point Declaration outlining actions to be taken in order to crack down on illegal logging in Cambodia. MAFF and the Ministry of Environment (MoE) were given the task of implementing the Declaration and reporting back to government on the success of the crackdown. The FCMRP was devised after the February 1999 Consultative Group Meeting, following pressure from the international donor community, to facilitate the implementation of the Declaration. The IMF encouraged the RGC in the pursuit of effective forest law enforcement by specifying the establishment of a permanent forest monitoring system as a requirement for resumption of its macroeconomic support programme. In essence the FCMRP was meant to institute a systematic programme for detecting, reporting and recording forest crimes. The information generated by the project was to be used in the design and execution of suppression activities.

The Forest Crime Monitoring Unit started operations in December 1999 and consists of three components:

1. An office in DFW known as the Forest Crime Monitoring Office responsible for monitoring forest crimes in production forests.

2. An office in the Ministry of Environment, known as the Department of Inspection (DI) responsible for monitoring forest crimes in protected areas.

3. An Independent Monitor, Global Witness, responsible for monitoring the performance of the above agencies. Global Witness gives independent oversight to both the Prime Minister, via the Focal Point at the Council of Ministers, and the international donor community.

Personnel

In the region of 60 DFW and MoE staff are paid for by the Project. However the vast majority of these people do not work exclusively on detecting, reporting and recording forest crimes. This situation is untenable particularly in respect of the 24 provincial foresters employed by the project. On the one hand these foresters are employed in a forest management capacity by DFW, working closely with the concession companies, and on the other hand they are expected to report cases of the same companies logging illegally, possibly with the knowledge of their DFW colleagues. This represents a clear conflict of interests and, in at least one case, the project is paying someone who is known to be involved in illegal logging. Perhaps the clearest example of a conflict of interests is that of the current Director of the FCMU is also the Deputy Director of the Forest Management Office, responsible for administration of the concessions and dealing with the concessionaires on a daily basis. In any event, at a purely logistical level, the fact that so many people employed by the FCMRP have other jobs means they have little time for detecting illegal activities.

One of the main responsibilities of the Independent Monitor is to conduct field inspections of concession operations to gauge the level of illegal logging. This information is used as the benchmark with which to assess the veracity of the reporting of forest crimes by DFW. The information is also passed on to the relevant authorities for further investigation, suppression and ultimately prosecution. However, the recipient of Global Witness' crime reports, the Director General of DFW, is ultimately responsible for DFW relations with the concession companies. Once again this represents a clear conflict of interests.

Global Witness does not seek to suggest that merely because there is a potential conflict of interest that there is in fact any wrong-doing. However, such situations should be avoided so that there is no suspicion of impropriety or opportunity to interfere with the Project. It is therefore essential that all staff employed by the Project work exclusively for the Project and have no role to play in general forest management or other dealings with the concessionaires.

The Department of Forestry and Wildlife should:

  • Ensure maximum independence of FCMRP staff from management functions and offices.
  • Ensure that all staff employed by the FCMRP work exclusively for the Project.
  • Ensure that there is a clear line of command from all Project staff to the Director of the FCMO.
  • Ensure that the Director of the FCMO has sole power to hire and fire Project staff.
  • Ensure that anyone fired from the Project is not eligible for any other position within DFW.
  • Ensure that the performance of Project staff is regularly reviewed.
  • Ensure that the FCMO is out of bounds to non-Project staff.

Information requirements

In order to determine what is illegal it is first necessary to know what is legal. If DFW was serious about combating illegal logging it would be making every effort to make as much information as possible available to as many people as possible, as quickly as possible. Such provision of information should include the general public who could play an invaluable role in reporting forest crimes. However, this has never been the case. Ever since the concessions were awarded in secret in the mid 1990s the operations of these companies and of DFW itself have been shrouded in secrecy. Not only have the public been kept in the dark but DFW has also withheld information from other government Ministries, notably the Ministry of Environment.

Global Witness' efficacy as Independent Monitor has been severely compromised by the lack of information provided by DFW. Instances of non-compliance with the Reporting Protocols by DFW are too numerous to list here but include refusing to provide Global Witness with photocopies of transport permits, providing incomplete log lists and providing a concession map without coordinates. In the first instance Global Witness’ staff were forced to spend days copying out the transport permits by hand. In the latter two cases the incompleteness of the information rendered it useless.

The Reporting Protocols were drafted in early 2001 to facilitate information sharing. The fact that these protocols took four months to negotiate is indicative of the reluctance of DFW to be open and transparent. Global Witness was denied access to all information whilst the Protocols were negotiated, a time when logging was at its height in the dry season. Having finally agreed the Protocols DFW has used them more as a barrier to the free flow of information than as a tool to aid its dissemination. Much of Global Witness’ staff time is currently spent tracking down, or simply waiting for, information held by DFW and MAFF.

The minimum information requirements of the Independent Monitor and the DI for the proper functioning of the FCMRP include:

  • All laws, decrees, rules, regulations, procedures, codes of conduct and Ministerial or Departmental decisions pertaining to the forest industry in Cambodia.
  • A list of all concessionaires, including full contact details, concession contracts, investment agreements official track records, sustainable forest management plans and environmental and social impact assessments.
  • A list of all subcontractors that cut, transport or process on behalf of the concession companies, including full contact details.
  • A complete set of up-to-date concession maps, including UTM coordinates, clearly showing the year of operation for each successive coupe.
  • A map showing the location of all legal sawmills.
  • Copies of all official sawmill licences.
  • All cutting permits.
  • All transportation permits.

This information should be provided to the Independent Monitor and the Department of Inspection on a regular basis, as a matter of course, without the need for a specific request. It should be noted, that free access to all these documents was agreed in the original project document, which was signed by high-level government representatives. However, this has been consistently ignored.

To further facilitate the sharing of information the Department of Forestry and Wildlife should:

  • Give the Independent Monitor and the DI free access to the Case Tracking System (CTS).
  • Give the Independent Monitor and the DI free access to GIS information.
  • Comply in full with further requests for information as set out in the Reporting Protocols.
  • Allocate one member of staff at DFW with responsibility for addressing these requests for information and ensuring that the Protocols are adhered to.

It should be stressed that this information is not only a minimum requirement for the future functioning of the Project but should also be made freely available to the public at large. At the very least provincial forestry offices should be able to provide this information upon request to the community. DFW could also make good use of its innovative new website to make this information more widely available. Alternatively the Project's own website, not updated since January 2001, could be used.