Conflict and Cohesion: Constructions of 'Community' Around the 2001 'Riots'

25/11/18

Conflict and Cohesion: constructions of 'community' around the 2001 'riots'.

Paul Bagguley and Yasmin Hussain

Department of Sociology and Social Policy

University of Leeds

Leeds

LS2 9JT

Email:

Paper presented to the Communities Conference on 18-20 September 2003.

Introduction

In 2001 there were riots in Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham in May, June and July. In Oldham on 26-29 May around 500 people were involved injuring 2 police officers and 3 members of the public with damage estimated at £1.4 million. In Burnley about 400 were involved on 24-26 June, with 83 police officers and 28 members of the public injured, and damage estimated at over £0.5 million. Finally, in Bradford up to 500 people were involved in 'riots' over the weekend of 7-9 July. The injured included 326 police officers and 14 members of the public with estimates of damage to property ranging up to £10 million. There were other less serious disturbances at Easter in Bradford, in Leeds on 5 June and Stoke-on-Trent on 14-15 July. Around 400 people have been arrested in relation to the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham (Denham, 2002: 7).

The official response to the riots is bifurcated between a national level focus on community cohesion, social capital and related blurring of the state/civil society distinction, and a local criminal justice response that has been highly repressive. Consequently the former has had the potential to garner greater media and political attention, than the latter. The local responses have been managed through central government steering and financial incentives. The criminal justice system’s response has been extremely repressive, especially in the case of those arrested for the Bradford riots (Bagguley and Hussain, 2003). In the first part of this paper we focus on the discourse of these official reports.

Despite the recent emphasis given to it, the term 'institutional racism' is strikingly absent from the official reports. These reports like other instances of contemporary governance (Schofield, 2002) have mobilised the discourses of community in support of government goals. Whilst the principal policy responses to the riots of the 1980s were dominated by a 'law and order' discourse (Solomos and Rackett, 1991) we find that the response to the riots of 2001 has explicitly rejected this: 'While there is no doubt that both drug abuse, and drug dealing, are serious problems, the claim that drug related activity played a significant part in the disturbances was not supported by either the police, or by the local Drug Action Teams.' (Denham, 2002: 9). Central to the reports have been themes of 'community cohesion' and ‘segregation’, so in the first section of this paper we consider some theoretical issues surrounding how 'community' functions within contemporary governmentality.

'Race', Ethnicity and the Discourse of 'Social Cohesion': theoretical issues.

There is now a substantial body of work on governmentality, and analyses of New Labour's ideologies of social cohesion, community, etc. (e.g. Finlayson, 2003; Scholfield, 2002; Walters, 2002). However, where we wish to advance these debates is to emphasise how 'New Labour' discourses of community are racialised in particular ways. The reports can be read as an 'index' of changing racialised discourses. Within the governmentality literature that deals with New Labour etc. there is a striking silence on questions of ethnic identity, and racialised assumptions encoded within.

Whilst the Foucauldians (e.g. Rose, 1999) have analysed in a rather general way the discourses, practices and effects of neo-liberal governmentality in general, they have neglected the play of ethnic difference through these discourses, thus reproducing the essentialism of neo-liberalism itself. What runs through the discourse of the official reports is an essentialising and reifying account, that is expressed through the deployment of concepts like ‘community cohesion’, ‘social capital’, etc. Put more directly they have produced a racialised narrative of the riots that connects to a series of policies where they can be ‘seen to be doing something’ about the events of the summer of 2001.

A further problem with the Foucauldian analyses is that despite their claims as to the open, provisional, performative, etc. character of the discourses and practices of neo-liberal governance (e.g. Schofield, 2002), there is surprisingly little analysis of precisely this aspect. If such governmentality is so provisional, where are the competing definitions of reality within it? It is presented as too homogenous, as too dominating. Such criticisms have previously been made of Foucault’s work. However the purpose of raising them again here is to highlight the fact that several official reports were produced on the riots, and they are not reducible to a single discourse.

Although we are drawing upon Foucauldian conceptual resources, perhaps we should emphasise that we are not asserting the generic superiority of a Foucauldian paradigm. Rather we treat these debates as providing us with a series of 'middle range' concepts that are suited to the subject matter. We are analysing the reports as particular forms of discourse. Their particularities as official reports mean that their arguments and claims cannot be reduced to or wholly explained by something external to them. Nevertheless they do assume particular meanings within their social context.

The Official Reports: An Overview

Immediately after the Bradford 'riot' a report on 'race relations' in Bradford by Ouseley (2001) was published. Although the work and writing on this report was completed before the 'riots', certain themes within it contributed to the agenda of the 'riot' reports. In particular the report identified residential segregation as a particular issue facing Bradford. In this sense the report helped to set the agenda and focus for the subsequent reports that we are principally concerned with here are those by Denham (2002) Building Cohesive Communities, which arose from a Ministerial Group on Public Order, coordinated by the Home Office. Closely associated with this was the report by Cantle (2002) Community Cohesion, which was produced by an 'independent' Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT). A tension runs through this report between assertions of ‘common values’ and ‘valuing difference’, between a static traditionalist conception of ‘common values’ and the dynamic nature of cultural identities, especially between first and second generation South Asians. Cantle avoids analysing why the riots occurred; it avoids ‘political’ questions and focuses on the ‘management’ of cohesion – achieving cohesion through managerial techniques.

The Denham and Cantle reports are thus part of the same administrative process, and were concerned with defining the policy agenda in response to the riots from within the specific remit of the Home Office. Significantly, although the Commission for Racial Equality comes under the responsibility of the Home Office, it did not play a central role in the construction of the reports.

The Ritchie (2001) report on the situation in Oldham, although funded by the Home Office, differs from Cantle in a number of respects. There is less emphasis on the discourses of social cohesion, social capital, etc. and more emphasis on evidence about economic and social conditions, and the impact of local policies in relation to housing, education, etc. In addition rather more emphasis is given to White racism. However, like the other reports it does not to analyse the 'riots' in any detail, but rather focuses upon the wider social and economic context. Whilst this might be seen as a laudable aim it has the practical effect that what happened in the 'riots' is not really examined at all. No evidence is presented and the causal connections between the wider economic and social context and the ‘riots’ are assumed rather than demonstrated.[1] This is a common feature of the reports. They construct issues that can be 'managed'. The 'riots' themselves are depoliticised, and reduced to criminal justice questions.

In contrast to these, the Report of the Burnley Task Force (Clarke, 2002) was commissioned locally, and on several key points it differs markedly from the reports commissioned by the Home Office. However, it shares many characteristics of those closer to the Home Office. The aim was to seek explanations for the 'riots', and seek broader policy changes in Burnley's local government (Clarke, 2002: 5). However, the analysis of what happened over the weekend of 23 June is limited to just over two pages of an eighty seven-page report. Most critically the report 'de-politicises' and tries to 'criminalise' the riots:

'As a result of what I have heard, I am convinced that what was described as a 'race riot' was in fact a series of criminal acts, perpetrated by a relatively small number of people. Certainly racial intolerance played a significant role in those disturbances; the confrontations that took place were clearly identified as aggression and violence by both white people and those from the Asian Heritage communities. However, in my view, the label of 'race riots' does the people of Burnley a grave disservice.' (Chair's introduction, Clarke, 2002: 8)

This is somewhat contrary to the Denham report, which claimed that drug dealers were irrelevant. Furthermore, the CRE was specifically criticised for withdrawing funding from the Burnley and Pendle Racial Equality Council (Clarke, 2002: 48). What is most distinctive about the Burnley report is its emphasis on economic factors and on the limited resources of Burnley Borough council, and other public agencies in the area.

The Denham report identified a range of factors behind the riots including: deprivation '… all of the disturbances took place in or near wards that are in the 1% most deprived in the country.' (John Denham, Home Office Minister, speech given to the Industrial society and the Runnymede Trust, 18 March 2002, London); young men; racial, generational and cultural conflict; racial attacks; far-right activity (Denham, 8). However the discussion of these remains little more than a list and the motivations of those who participated remain unclear. Despite this list of factors and the stress on 'underlying factors' and 'complexity', the central themes of the Denham report are community cohesion and segregation. Although the report stresses that it drew upon the analyses of the Cantle, Clarke, Ouseley and Ritchie reports (Denham, 2002: 11), it clearly attempts to incorporate all of the reports into the dominant Home Office discourse of 'social cohesion', versus 'segregation'.

In the following sections we analyse the reports thematically, considering how they construct the political response to the riots through varying discourses of 'community'.

Segregation.

The issue of residential segregation has become central to the reports, media representations and popular understandings of the causes of the riots. The binary opposition between 'social cohesion' and 'segregation' has become the dominant frame through which the riots are now 'read':

'Cantle, Clarke, Ritchie and Ouseley have all identified segregation, along racial lines, as a growing problem, and a significant contributory factor to the disturbances.' (Denham, 2002: introduction)

The theme of segregation organises several other 'racialised' themes of the Home Office reports, e.g. language. Much of what is claimed about segregation contradicts recent academic debates (ODPM, 2003). The Denham report cites Ouseley on the role of residential segregation, and highlights lack of fluency in English as a reason why ethnic minority people may choose particular places to live, suggesting that: '… geographical segregation is likely to contribute to a lack of opportunity for different communities to meet, to have a dialogue and work together.' (Denham, 2002: 13)

Underlying the idea of segregation and its causal role is a romantic view of the village community where people, live, work and interact in the same small location. One of the central features of contemporary post-industrial cities is precisely that residence, employment and leisure are not spatially coterminous. Whilst highlighting segregation based on ethnicity, they ignore segregation based upon class. No evidence or measures of segregation are presented.

Central to Ricthie's analysis is the way in which the report constructs the 'problem' in terms of 'segregation' as opposed to 'social cohesion'. The report argues that this is to be explained by: '… the preferences both within the indigenous and Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities of people "to live with their own kind"'. (Ritchie, 2001: 9)

Segregation is seen as being reinforced by marriages between South Asians in Oldham and those born in Pakistan or Bangladesh (Ritchie, 2001: 10). Consequently it is argued that:

'Many youngsters reach school with limited if any command of English and the school environment which, for the children of early immigrants provided plenty of exposure to English spoken by fellow, white pupils, no longer has this effect in what are substantially segregated schools.' (Ritchie, 2001: 11)

Despite the claim that Oldham is the 'most segregated town in England' (Ritchie, 2001: 16) there was no attempt to measure segregation[2]. This construction of segregation as 'pathological' persists throughout the Ritchie report despite the fact that CRE found that the local authority's housing allocations and local estate agents were discriminating against South Asian families (Ritchie, 2001: 17), and that: 'The fear of racial attack and harassment for some BME communities remains a strong and pervasive incentive for clustering.' (Ritchie, 2001: 20)

Similarly Cantle suggests that whilst there are degrees and levels of integration and segregation, the report argues that there is no contact between communities in some instances. No evidence is provided for this claim. There is some discussion of segregation by choice as opposed to economic constraint, and some choices, related to worship for instance, are seen as legitimate. Overall extreme segregation is seen as a 'fact', despite no evidence being presented, and there is a fear of more 'mono-cultural' schools developing (p28-29). This could only mean more schools consisting solely of South Asian pupils. Since there would also be fewer 100 per cent white schools. White only schools are generally not seen as problematic in cultural terms (despite a passing critical reference to C of E schools). In short 'mono-cultural' is a code for 'South Asian'. The report suggests that segregation is no longer a 'necessity' for ethnic minorities on the grounds that they clustered together to develop specialist services and shops, because '… major supermarkets now supply wide ranges of ingredients and ready meals from around the world and Bollywood films can be seen in mainstream cinemas, which indicates the mainstreaming of a number of specialist services.' (Cantle, 2002: 59)

Whilst the other reports stress residential segregation, the Report on Burnley emphasises employment segregation. In this case the concern with housing is not one of segregation, but with its material and economic condition. However, labour market segmentation is criticised on the basis of hearsay evidence: 'It has been argued that statutory and voluntary organisations have contributed to racial segregation through their employment policies'. (Clarke, 2002: 47). However, the report does note the lack of any '… truly multicultural structure that allows people from all sections of the community to interact with each other.) (Clarke, 2002: 51

In relation to Bradford recent research simply concludes: 'Increasing residential segregation of South Asian communities is a myth.' (Simpson, 2003: 12). Whilst more neighbourhoods (Census enumeration districts of between 100 and 200 households) have South Asian majorities, others have become more mixed, and fewer are overwhelmingly White. Overall he found that there were fewer 'mono-racial' areas in 2001 than in 1991, whilst the favoured index of segregation was 0.74 in 1991 and 0.75 in 2001. In national terms then Bradford has a relatively high but stable level of overall segregation, but it is not a polarising city with 'ghettoes'.

In summary the official reports have constructed segregation as pathological in contrast to the 'integrated community'. They present no evidence regarding segregation other than hearsay, and do not examine its causes and consequences in any detail.

Social Cohesion and Social Capital: constructing 'good communities'

Social cohesion is counterposed to segregation, and segregation is assumed as a 'social fact', and defined pathologically in opposition to social cohesion: 'The high levels of residential segregation found in many English towns would make it difficult to achieve community cohesion' (Cantle, 2002: 70). This implicitly defines community in a manner coterminous with council boundaries. Here again the boundaries of community are not explicitly defined. Social capital is a central theme that also runs through the report's account of social cohesion. Volunteering is seen as central to high quality social capital, but the social capital of ethnic minority groups is defined as a social problem:

'There is evidence to suggest that a considerable amount of volunteering takes place within minority ethnic communities, usually through schools and religious activities. The problem, however, is that these activities tend to be for the benefit of others from the same ethnic group/community.' (Cantle, 2002: 72)

Social capital is seen as something to be 'measured', and the report identifies '… eight verifiable and quantitative domains of social capital…' at the local neighbourhood level(Cantle, 2002: 73); these are empowerment; participation; associational activity; networks and reciprocity; collective norms and values; trust; safety and belonging. In terms of examples and policies these are reduced to 'measurable outcomes' where empowerment becomes 'giving people a voice'; participation becomes 'supporting local activities'; associational activity becomes supporting networks between organisations; supporting networks between individuals will be achieved through 'Good neighbour award schemes.' Collective norms and values will be an 'ethos which residents recognise and accept'; trust is to be achieved by 'bringing conflicting groups together'; safety will involve people in 'local crime prevention'; and belonging will be achieved by 'Boosting the identity of a place via design, street furnishing and naming.' (Cantle, 2002: 73-74) In this way social capital has become a discourse and technique central to contemporary governmentality.

Overall social cohesion is seen as the causal factor behind the problems facing these localities. In fact it is presented as leading to the economic decline that these places suffer from: 'It is accepted that in societies where there is a high degree of community cohesion, there is greater economic growth and strong development. Areas lacking in cohesion are usually identified as economically deprived.' (Cantle, 2002: 75) The idea of a common 'civic identity' is central for the Denham report, and from this flows a series of proposals about the need to unite '… people around a common sense of belonging regardless of race, culture or faith.' (Denham, 2002: introduction). This would then become a means of ensuring that government polices are achieved: