Ethics and the Space Shuttle Challenger Launch
Case Background
In January of 1986, seven NASA astronauts lost their lives when the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded just seconds after takeoff. The Rogers Commission, a committee responsible for the investigation of the incident, attributed the disaster to the mechanical malfunction of the solid rocket booster O-rings along with failure from various levels of contracted management. Although problems with the O-rings had been apparent as early as two years before the launch; various managerial and political circumstances led management to ignore these concerns. This report analyzes the ethical issues surrounding the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger.
O-rings are engineered to prevent scorching combustion gasses from leaking from the laterals of the solid rocket boosters. The design is simple in nature, and consists of a polymer-elastomer cross section. Compressed during fabrication, O-rings create a seal at the interface by forming to a preset groove. The compression factor is determined by a miniscule gap between the clevis and tang of the booster. Compression presents a very significant consideration for proper booster operation; O-rings compression must be flexible enough to withstand the shuttle’s vibrations but rigid enough to prevent any combustion gas from escaping. Further strengthening agents include heat-resistant putty which seals the joint assembly in the inner section. The Space Shuttle Challenger utilized a primary O-ring and secondary O-ring that worked in parallel to seal the solid rocket booster joints.
Faulty O-rings allowed searing combustion gases to leak from the laterals of the rocket booster and burn a hole through the external fuel tank. The Rogers Commission attributed the malfunction of the O-ring to various factors including flawed design of the solid rocket boosters, inadequate low-temperature test benching of the O-ring composites and improperly sealed joints.
A government contracted company by the name of Morton Thiokol was appointed by NASA to design and fabricate the solid rocket boosters. Morton Thiokol had previous success in the developments of highly sophisticated rubbers and chemicals, and then again later with the design of nuclear-tipped Titan missiles. NASA reviewed and accepted their design for solid rocket boosters in late 1976.
Issues and problems surrounding the operation of the O-rings were evident from the analysis of prior launches. An examination of the fourth shuttle mission which launched in November of 1981 revealed significant erosion of the O-ring material. Later investigation revealed the source of the erosion originated from exposure to ultra-high temperature gasses escaping past the putty.
During the launch of flight 51-C in January of 1985, similar effects had been documented. Engineers for Morton Thiokol had discovered a thick-cake of black soot and deposition of synthetic polymer grease along the interface of the solid rocket boosters. This finding was startling in the fact that it pointed out that hot gas had actually escaped from the booster during launch. It appeared as though the O-rings were further weakened during the low temperature launch in Florida that day. This prompted Morton Thiokol to undertake research and testing of O-ring behavior in low temperature environments. Design modifications were proposed for the O-rings, but would fail to be available for many more months because of corporate restructuring and re-tooling operations. Morton Thiokol continued to employ the faulty O-rings in numerous launches preceding the design modifications.
With problems evident and the increasing probability of catastrophic failure, Morton Thiokol engineers voiced their concerns. Roger Boisjoly, a senior-level staff engineer, was seen as the most vocal opponent to launches utilizing compromised O-rings. Boisjoly recognized the failure of both the primary and secondary seals within the joints of the solid rocket boosters from prior launches. Boisjoly also recognized the possibility for catastrophic failure if the situation was not immediately remedied. Data and statistics illustrated how low temperature launches rendered the operation of the O-rings inefficient and hazardous. Although Morton Thiokol recognized the O-rings as acceptable, Boisjoly and others felt this interpretation to be inaccurate. Boisjoly tried desperately to convince management of the severity of the problem. Several memos and phone calls were placed to Robert Lund, an engineering vice president at Morton Thiokol, regarding the issue. The reception of the news was greeted with mere annoyance and inactivity.
Continued pressure from Thiokol engineers resulted in the development of a taskforce with the purpose of solving the O-ring problem in both the short and long term. The taskforce, assembled in late July of 1985, had little effect on the policies and procedures of the parent company. The taskforce lacked the appropriate managerial approval, resources, and power to make any difference. Bureaucratic red tape hindered every attempt to arrive at a working solution. Team members recognized this and made attempts to alert managers in other areas but failed due to the corporate hierarchal structure.
The days prior to the Challenger launch brought an unprecedented sense of urgency due to the forecasted low temperatures. Low-temperature launches increased the likelihood of failure within the O-ring joints. Although the previous launches documented temperatures as low as 53 degrees Fahrenheit, temperatures during the Challenger launch would be almost 30 cooler. Engineers were understandably concerned regarding the lack of data and statistics for such a low-temperature launch. A teleconference was scheduled the night before the launch to discuss the low temperature performance of the solid rocket boosters.
Engineers presented their findings and offered their recommendations regarding the launch. Robert Lund argued in favor of delaying the mission due to the advice from company engineers and the lack of low-temperature data present on O-ring operation. He argued that the launch should only commence at ambient temperatures of 53 degrees or greater. This recommendation was greeted with inqugility and skepticism from Project Manager Larry Mulloy. He regarded the data as questionable and challenged the engineer’s findings. Jerald Mason, a senior executive for Morton Thiokol, called for a revised recommendation which favored the launch. By doing this, management was circumventing the original proposals called for by middle managers and engineers for the project. The revised recommendation surprised NASA management, and despite reservations, the decision was made to go ahead with the launch the next morning. The decision to launch can undoubtedly be traced back to various situational pressures which comprised human safety in the interests of other parties.
The actual launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger had been delayed a record number of times. Numerous postponements had occurred due to inclement weather, defective equipment, political influences, and managerial decisions. Although the mounting number of delays added considerable pressure on NASA officials to launch, various other factors contributed to the urgency. The Space Shuttle Challenger was carrying NASA’s first civilian astronaut; a New Hampshire school teacher. Ronald Reagan’s State of the Union Address was expected to focus on sweeping national reforms in education. With the Space Shuttle Challenger expected to be in orbit during this timeframe, Reagan would have undoubtedly illustrated this example to support his agenda. With unforeseen competition from the ESA (European Space Agency), NASA set out to prove the reliability and dependability of the space shuttle with an incredibly ambitious schedule. This would also serve to model the agency’s economic efficiency and investment potential. In addition to these pressures, the mission proceeding Challenger was of great importance and couldn’t be delayed. If successful, the following mission would sample and collect data on Halley’s Comet several days before the Russians. NASA also had to consider the interests of their number one client. Without efficient, quickly refurbish able launches, NASA might have been in jeopardy of losing satellite contracts from the United States military. Although these factors had no contribution in the actual mechanical failure of the shuttle, they served as a catalyst for poor decision making prior to the launch.
The question now becomes whether or not the launch was justified in the face of severe opposition and conflicting statistics. Both sides of the story will be presented along with facts and statistics that support both stances. Should Morton Thiokol and NASA have approved the launch with the information available at the time?
The Launch should have been postponed
Research and analysis indicates that the necessary data was available to stop this horrible tragedy. Engineers at Morton Thiokol recognized the potential for disaster several years before the actual incident occurred. Furthermore, various attempts were made to postpone the shuttle launch or ground the fleet altogether. Engineers such as Roger Boisjoly raised concerns time and time again only to find an attitude of indifference towards the problem at hand. Internal memos quote Roger Boisjoly as saying:
"It is my honest and very real fear that if we do not take immediate action to dedicate a team to solve the problem, with the field joint having the number one priority, then we stand in jeopardy of losing a flight along with all the launch pad facilities."
This quote is taken from a memo addressed to a senior company executive nearly six months before the actual disaster occurred. The urgency of the situation is quite clear lacking any vague terminology or definitions. After several more memos, a taskforce coalesced with the clear mission of solving the O-ring problem. The taskforce was given little resources, authority, and support to achieve their primary objective. Frustration and dissatisfaction grew within the taskforce as members began to realize what little power they had. The dissatisfaction is evident through this quote obtained from a senior engineer on the taskforce:
“Our team has been given no resources, power, or management support. Every attempt to arrive at a workable solution is met with red tape and bureaucratic nonsense. I have the distinct feeling that we only reason we have a team is to shut us up.”
Data and statistics were marginalized in favor of supporting a company agenda. Low-temperature launches indicated increased failure in O-rings operation. Memos sent from Morton Thiokol to NASA constantly downplayed the situation and lacked vital information. Vague terminology was constantly used so that the company would remain contracted to its very large client. Only a handful of memos were sent to NASA regarding the problems with the O-rings regarding the joint seal. Of the ten previous shuttle missions, eight had exhibited severe O-ring damage. The O-rings should have been regarded as a high priority with all parties notified of their importance.
Data and statistics in the Morton Thiokol’s database also contained erroneous data. Reports show that a number of temperature dependent tests were highly suspect and considered doctored in some ways. Although company executives maintain that recorded data supported the credible facts and figures, many internal engineers had their doubts. The Rogers Commission also had their doubts and recognized this as a contributing factor to the accident. Whether data and statistics were purposely skewed to support company objectives or absent due to human error remains a mystery.
Research also reveals that during this time Morton Thiokol was in discussions with NASA over a new contract. Given the scope contract, it’s quite possible that it would have been the biggest in Morton Thiokol’s history with an estimated worth of over one billion dollars. This raises several issues in regards to how this circumstance affected Morton Thiokol’s decision to launch. One might argue that this company was placing finance before functionality to suit its own best interest. This raises significant issues in regards to ethicality and morality when one places profits above human life.
Another factor to consider in this ethics case is the failure of communication that occurred within both agencies (NASA, Morton Thiokol). Both institutions were organized in a standard hierarchal structure similar to those in the public sector. Engineers would report to a group manager who would then later report to a project manager. This strict chain-of-command structure made it extremely difficult for engineers to voice their concerns to the upper echelons of the company. Communication failure also occurred between the two agencies on various levels. There was no distinction placed on the type of data distributed versus the importance. Minor problems received just as much attention as chief concerns.
With pressure continually raining down from third party interests, efficiency took precedence over safety. There were a significant number of pressures to launch, even under suboptimal conditions. With a total of 6 launch cancellations that year and Challenger launch delays numbering 5, NASA found itself in a precarious position. Launch delays are pricey due to refurbishing costs along with the costs associated with contracted labor. NASA recognizes the urgency in launching shuttles on a timely schedule due to the limited amount of funding received each year. Other political and economical interests obviously influenced the decision to launch. The State of the Union Address was expected to mention the shuttle in orbit resulting in additional publicity to the launch. With the first civilian astronaut participating in the launch, the eyes of the nation would undoubtedly be fixed upon NASA. Lucrative military contracts should also be considered. Morton Thiokol also received pressure from NASA to approve the launch. When concerns were raised regarding the temperature on the launch date Lawrence Mulloy, NASA III manager, was quoted as saying:
"My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?"
This example illustrates how Thiokol also had pressures and influences to deal with. Through these examples, one can firmly believe that outside interests contributed to the launch decision.
One must also consider the communication dynamics that took place on the night prior to the launch. The original decision not to launch came from experienced engineers and management such as Roger Boisjoly and Bob Lund. The solid rocket booster program manager Larry Mulloy expressed his doubts and concerns regarding the original decision and subsequent data that supported it. Mulloy then actively tried to circumvent the original decision through consultation with an engineer manager by the name of Joseph Kilminster, but all attempts were futile as Kilminster sided with the original decision. An essence, every attempt to circumvent the no-launch decision was being called into play. With firm stances on both sides of the fence, Jerold Mason asked others to exit the room so that a 5 minute management meeting could take place. This approach was obviously flawed from initiation as only selected personnel could participate and express their opinions accordingly. During this meeting Jerold Mason tried to persuade Bob Lund to re-evaluate his decision and was quoted as saying: