Draft October 2012
Building states and developing resilience: A new Approach to International State Building
Søren V. Haldrup and Frederik Rosén.
In recent years we have experienced a change in the way international state building and peace building is approached. This change can be characterised as a turn towards the notions of capacity development and of state fragility and resilience. Considerable efforts and funds are currently being diverted towards promoting and implementing this new agenda. Yet, the approach remains a vaguely conceived and under-researched construct. This article therefore traces and discerns the resiliency approach to state building. To distinguish the approach and to illustrate a number of the practical challenges it implies, the emergence of ‘coaching and mentoring for capacity’ in state building is pointed as an example of how donors attempt to develop resilience in fragile states.
Introduction
In a 2012 speech, UNDP Administrator Helen Clark argued that resilience must be put ‘… at the heart of the development agenda’.[1] Her statement expresses perfectly how developing capacity for resilience in fragile states has grown to become a main focus of state and peace building actors. The concept of state resilience has not, however, been the subject of much systematic investigation.[1] This article seeks to remedy some of this gap by examining how the idea of resilience has appeared in the context of state and peace building. The article starts with outlining the appearance of the ‘resiliency approach’ and its key features. Current concepts of ‘resilience’ are closely related to the idea of ‘capacity’. The second section therefore explores the changes in the idea of and approach to capacity, in particular the conceptual move from ‘capacity building’ to ‘capacity development’. With the aim of distinguishing the resilience and capacity development approach, section three investigates the turn to ‘coaching and mentoring’ in the international state building, peace building and aid communities. In this context, south-south organised coaching and mentoring has appeared as a ‘logical’ response to the problems and challenges identified by recent ideas about capacity and resilience. It offers an instant capacity gain due to the influx of skilled people into the targeted branches and facilitates a long-term resilience building, while at the same time accommodating calls for local ownership and south-south cooperation.
A key point in this connection is that coaching and mentoring epitomizes a general approach to state and peace building, and its exploration can help us gain a greater theoretical understanding of some of the practical challenges of a state building agenda shaped by concepts of resilience, capacity, local ownership, south-south cooperation, including issues of planning, management and evaluation.[2]
The rise of state building and the move towards resilience
During the 1970s and 80s the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ viewed issues of development through the lens of economic liberalism. This period’s poverty reduction strategy of choice, the so-called Structural Adjustment Programmes or SAPs, had an economic focus and an anti-big-state flavour. Essentially these policies aimed at reducing countries’ fiscal imbalances and reorienting their economies towards the market. The SAPs did, however, manifest a number of flaws. Critiques have pointed, among other things, to problems of false assumptions,[3] suboptimal design and implementation,[4] potential to cause market failure and to worsen the economic situation for the poor,[5] undesirable impacts on the health sectors of recipient countries[6] and the possible creation of environments conducive to domestic conflict.[7] During the 1990s the policy-making environments did become increasingly observant of the fact that policies exist within a context of social, political and state institutions. Attention shifted towards building institutional capacity to address poverty and development.[8] Consequently the good governance agenda of the 1990s directed most of its efforts towards how various institutions, including state institutions, underpin society and the market. ‘Good governance’ and ‘best practice’ became key concepts in this discourse as development agencies focused on building technical and formal institutional capacity on the model of Western standards. Underpinning this approach was also the assumption that the presence of certain formal structures, skill sets and technical know-how would automatically lead politicians, the civil service and the justice sector employees to fit into the structure and act in a certain way.
The approach to state building has, since the latter part of the last decade, undergone considerable changes. Emphasis has shifted away from ambitious and comprehensive interventions with the purpose of building Western-like state institutions, towards helping fragile states and regions develop capacity to be ‘resilient’. Rather than assuming the universal applicability of best practice standards, focus is increasingly being turned towards context, local needs, local capacity, coordination and alignment. The international development establishment has thus moved away from the early focus on the non-state dynamics of the market, through the 1990s emphasis on the state as in need of good governance structures and towards today’s increasing concern with strengthening state resilience through contextualised capacity building. Three areas are particularly important if we want to understand the recent turn towards resilience and, accordingly, coaching and mentoring: the emergence of the focus on fragile states, lessons learned, and the growing unwillingness to intervene.
9/11: Fragile states become security issues
The end of the Cold War meant an end to the superpowers’ rivalrous assistance to many third world states and thus the beginning of an era of increased uncertainty and instability for such countries. During this period state instability or collapse was predominantly seen as a humanitarian issue until 11 September 2001 reframed issues of fragile and collapsed states as matters of global security.[9] Fragile or failed states came to be seen as potential safe havens for terrorist groups, drugs cartels and weapons dealers and thus a major source of global insecurity.[10] Building capable and functioning states became a priority within what appeared to be a new development–security nexus. The notion that development and security are entwined now underpins the approach of major international development actors such as the UN, the World Bank, OECD, DFID and USAID. As the 2011 World Development Report noted: ‘[I]nsecurity […] has become a primary development challenge of our time. One-and-a-half billion people live in areas affected by fragility, conflict, or large-scale, organized criminal violence’.[11] As a result of this change, state building has become a primary development and security priority and the issue of fragile or failed states has grown to be the primary area of focus. In 2009, for instance, one third of all aid to developing countries went to states labelled as ‘fragile’.[12]
Lack of success and lessons learned
Interventions during the ‘good governance’ era of the 1990s took the form of ambitious development projects, emphasising the equal importance of establishing the rule of law, respect for human rights, democracy, economic growth and effective, accountable, and transparent state institutions. Lack of success with the ambitious ‘one size fits all’ tools for building state capacity has, however, in recent years led to a rethinking of how to ‘do development’. As a result, major development actors have downscaled the level of ambition and/or begun to adhere to the notion that institutions need to be developed from the starting point of the local context. In a 2008 OECD publication it is, for instance, noted that ‘[t]here are important cases where international mediators have embedded concepts of political process or institutional arrangements that are incompatible with the specific context, or are too ambitious in scope or their timetable’.[13] Striking a similar chord, in its 2011 World Development Report the World Bank points to the considerable amount of time it has taken the fastest moving countries in the 20th century to approach adequate levels of development.[14] Against the backdrop of these experiences, the approach to state building shifted from good governance and best practice to one of ‘good enough’ governance and ‘best fit’.[15] China’s entry into the African arena as a major investment player is likely also a reason why Western donors have recently relaxed their requirements for good governance in recipient states.
Unwillingness to intervene
The ambitious and extensive approach practiced in the 1990s and 2000s demanded massive material and financial donor involvement. The willingness to intervene demonstrated in this period decreased progressively with the accumulation of experiences from the tough, post-conflict cases of Somalia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Lack of success combined with the financial burdens of ambitious involvement caused Western states to become reluctant towards extensive involvement in state building projects. This trend was amplified by the financial crisis of 2008 onwards. Ambitions and promises have been rolled back. The approach now stresses modesty, ‘good enough governance’, resilience and stability. Also emphasised is the need for donors to coordinate assistance through international organisations and the idea that institutions and capacities need to be locally grounded. It has also led to more involvement through regional and international organisations such as the African Union and the United Nations.[16] Additionally, aid is increasingly being channelled through and aligned with local government policies.[17]
The discourse of fragility and state resilience
Recent discussions on state building have dealt with issues such as the security–development nexus; the rise of a ‘post-liberal’ state building paradigm;[18] the appearance of a ‘fragile states’ discourse;[19] and a merging of peace building and state building.[20] A common feature in much of this recent literature is the increased focus in international development and security on the concepts of ‘fragility’ and ‘resilience’. Derived from the Latin resilire meaning ‘to rebound, to recoil’, the idea of the attribute ‘resilience’ has been developed in a number of different disciplines.[21] In the 1970s, for instance, resilience appeared as an increasingly popular concept in psychology[22], and it has also been a key concept in the field of ecology. Resilience thinking has also been popular in dealing with issues such as disaster planning and organisational management, health and community resilience.[23]
The concept of resilience emerged in the area of state building during the mid 2000s. In early 2005 the influential OECD–DAC publication ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’ was drafted at the Senior Level Forum on Development Effectiveness in Fragile States. The same year more than a hundred signatories endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness at the Paris High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (organised by the OECD). Ownership, alignment and harmonisation were amongst the principles endorsed in the Declaration. The principles found in the Paris Declaration, along with the problem of unrealistic expectations, also featured prominently in the early 2005 United Nations Development Group and World Bank publication on Transitional Results Matrices.[24] Between 2007 and 2008 the OECD–DAC published a number of documents on state resilience and how to enhance it.[25] In 2008 the Accra Agenda for Action was endorsed at the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The Agenda was designed to strengthen and deepen implementation of the Paris Declaration. Amongst the key features of the Accra Agenda were ownership, inclusive partnerships and capacity development.
The World Bank also embraced the notion of state resilience. Before 2009 the word resilience did practically not feature in any World Development Reports.[26] Resilience, however, became a key concept in the Bank’s 2010 and 2011 reports. In the 2011 report, the overall focus was on institutional resilience and its impact on violent conflict. A number of bilateral donors have also become fond of the concept of resilience in the context of state building. The OECD–DAC’s guidance on state building was endorsed in a 2011 publication produced by USAID. In this publication USAID also points to a general change in the way state building is being approached.[27] DFID likewise appears to endorse the new principles for engaging in state building.[28]
A general shift is thus taking place in terms of how state building is addressed. This change is marked by a turn towards the concepts of fragility and resilience as starting points from which to theorise and practice state building. There is, however, little agreement on what exactly constitutes a fragile state and how fragility is to be measured.[29] Still, some common features inform the debates. Most definitions, for instance, include elements such as low income,[30] inability of state institutions to provide basic services, and lack of human security. The definition of the OECD–DAC is increasingly being used to define fragile states.[31] State fragility is present, according to OECD–DAC, ‘when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations’.[32] Resilience is defined by the OECD–DAC as ‘a feature of states and more precisely social contracts [...] defined [...] as the ability to cope with changes in capacity, effectiveness or legitimacy’. Resilience and fragility are closely connected because fragility in essence has to do with lack of resilience. The relationship can be summed up as follows:
‘fragility arises primarily from weaknesses in the dynamic political process through which citizens’ expectations of the state and state expectations of citizens are reconciled and brought into equilibrium with the state’s capacity to deliver services. Reaching equilibrium in this negotiation over the social contract is the critical if not sole determinant of resilience, and disequilibrium the determinant of fragility’.[33]
Key in this new approach to state building is the notion of the social contract. A resilient state must, it is believed, ‘…be able to effectively deliver functions that match the expectations of societal groups’.[34] Because expectations of what state institutions ought to deliver can vary from one case to another, the argument goes, the state building process must take the local context as its point of departure. Building institutional capacity is, in this connection, not only perceived to depend on formal design, but also on the social context within which institutions function. Legitimacy, another key feature of state resilience, is similarly not assumed to depend on the extent to which institutions display Western standards of governance. Instead legitimacy is held to derive from the extent to which state institutions are locally owned, contextually grounded and responsive to the particular needs of a given population. This is explicitly recognised by the OECD–DAC when it states that ‘[w]hether and to what degree... [a population’s] expectations entail poverty reduction, development, security or human rights will depend on historical, cultural and other factors that shape state–society relations in specific contexts’.[35]