6/9/03

EDGE

Jeremy Marcus

Julia Kung

The Arab League

Formation:

The Arab League, commonly known as the League of Arab States, was formed in 1945 for the purpose of giving political expression to the Arab nations. The original drive behind the league was given by the British in 1942 who hoped to rally the Arab nations against the Axis powers, however the league did not form until the final months of World War II. The original charter members were Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan (now Jordan), Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Although not an original signatory of the charter because he represented no official government, a representative of Palestinian Arabs was given full status and a vote in the Arab League.

Countries Joining in Subsequent Years:

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was granted full membership in 1976. Other current members include Algeria (1962), Bahrain (1971), Comoros (1993), Djibouti (1977), Kuwait (1961), Libya (1953), Mauritania (1973), Morocco (1958), Oman (1971), Qatar (1971), Somalia (1974), Southern Yemen (1967), Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1958), and the United Arab Emirates (1971) (Full descriptions of member countries to follow).

Organization:

The league is organized into a council, special committees, and a permanent secretariat; the secretariat currently has its headquarters in Cairo. The league votes with each member country having a single vote of equal weight, irrespective of its size. The constitution of the league provides for coordination among the signatory nations in the areas of education, finance, law, trade, and foreign policy, and it forbids the use of force to settle disputes among members. A joint defense treaty was signed in 1950.

Leadership

Secretary-General Amr Moussa

The secretary-general is nominated by at least two member states of the Arab League and appointed by the council by a two-thirds majority for a five-year renewable term.

The present Secretary-General, Amr Moussa, was born in 1936 and studied law in Cairo. He began a career in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry in 1958, where he held positions as ambassador to India and to the United Nations. From 1991 until his appointment as secretary-general in May 2001, he served as Egyptian foreign minister.

Economic Efforts

Historically, among the most important activities of the Arab League have been the coordination of Arab economic life; these efforts have included the Arab Telecommunications Union (1953), the Arab Postal Union (1954), and the Arab Development Bank (1959, later known as the Arab Financial Organization). The Arab Common Market was established in 1965 and is open to all Arab League members. The common market agreement provides for the eventual abolition of customs duties on natural resources and agricultural products, free movement of capital and labor among member countries, and coordination of economic development.

Historically Significant Positions:

During the inception year of the Arab league, it took a position supporting Syria and Lebanon in their disputes with France and also demanded an independent Libya. Later, in 1961, it supported Tunisia in a conflict with France. From the beggining years the league made public its oppostion to Israel and offered its support towards the formation of a Palestinian States with a majority Arab population. Shortly after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 the league countries jointly attacked it, but Israel resisted the multifaced attack successfully. The league continued to maintain a boycott of Israel and of companies trading with Israel. The summit conferences of 1964–65 established a joint Arab military command, which has failed to provide a unified strategy towards the formation of a State of Palestine.

Egypt's membership in the League was suspended from 1979 to 1989 because of its treaty with Israel, and the league's headquarters were temporarily moved to Tunis. In 1988, the league endorsed the PLO's plan for a negotiated settlement with Israel, and therefore returned its headquarters to Cairo in 1991.

After much debate, the league ultimately supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). However the league remained divided over the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the ensuing Persian Gulf War.

Arab League Response to American Threats

In assessing the future of the Arab League before the recent war, Arab analysts have freely acknowledged that the future of the Arab League “largely depends on the way it deals with the Iraqi crisis.” (Yunfei) As Sayed Eliwa, political science professor of the elite Egyptian Helwan University, explains, “Undoubtedly, the Arab League is now standing at a crossing. It has to work on two fronts: healing rifts between member states internally while safeguarding the interests of the Arab nations externally.”

However, in considering the response of the Arab League to the Iraqi crises, the need for major reforms becomes apparent. The recent Iraqi crises demonstrated, on a world stage, the weaknesses and disunity of the Arab League. As Qatar’s foreign minister Sheikh Hammad bin Jassem remarked, “our meetings [the Arab League’s] are ceremonial and we don’t have a defined target.”

The Arab League originally reacted to the crisis in Iraq by attempting to persuade the Iraqis to comply with the UN resolutions. Arab League chief Amr Moussa explained that an Iraqi acceptance of the UN resolutions “will bring us away from a war and near to a political solution that would represent a full compliance by Iraq with the UN Security Council resolution.” (Yunfei) The Arab League held emergency meetings and had leading member states visit Iraq all in efforts to coordinate a common stance against the US led war in Iraq and promote a strategy to avoid such a war. The Arab leaders felt that any war in the area would further destabilize an already worsening situation in the Middle East. In the weeks prior to the war the leaders of the Arab League “came out strongly against war in Iraq, asking Arab nations not to participate in such a war but also calling on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to comply fully and completely with all U.N. resolutions.” (CNN, 3/2/03) While the leaders of the Arab League came out with this position, there was little unity in reaching this decision, and support for the position was not complete.

In the months leading up to the eventual war there was a distinct lack of unity among the nations of the Arab League. One notable confrontation evolved between Iraq and Kuwait. On December 7th, 2002, Iraq issued an apology to Kuwait for the events of a decade earlier, the invasion of Kuwait that precipitated the Gulf War. Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, sent the following message to Kuwait: “We apologize for what happened to you in the past,” while further proposing that the “devoted and holy warriors in Kuwait” join with the Iraqi forces and their “common creator” against the “infidel armies of London, Washington and the Zionist entity.”

However Kuwait, instead of welcoming this apology and joining forces with Iraq as Saddam had hoped, instead labeled the apology as “efforts to create disorder amongst the leadership and people of Kuwait.” Arab League chief Moussa declined any involvement in the Iraq Kuwait issue, responding to questions about the confrontation by stating: “It is not obliged for the Arab League to make any statement on what Saddam is talking about. My stance is clear that it is imperative for Iraq to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions.” This example illustrates the hesitation that the Arab League had shown in attempting to resolve any conflict within its member nations. By completely avoiding the issue, the Arab League let the hostility between the nations grow which led to further complications as the war approached.

In the weeks prior to the war, Kuwaiti and Iraqi delegates were openly insulting one another at Arab League meetings. The Iraqi delegate at one point even went as far as publicly stating, “Shut up, you monkey. A curse upon your mustache [honor], you traitor.” Certainly when one is invoking primates and speaking of another delegate’s mustache, things have gotten far out of hand.

An additional factor creating tensions and mistrust within the Arab League in the months leading up to the war was the situation in the Middle East between the Israelis and the Palestinians. According to columnist Liu Yunfei, “The negative factors to the Mideast peace process [dealt] a heavy blow to confidence on the side of the Arabs, and consequently channels criticism to the Arab League.” Sayed Eliwa, political science professor of the Egyptian Helwan University, further explains that “Many Arabs are getting much more disappointed that a host of resolutions and statements could not be translated into actions.” This mounting disappointment could clearly be seen in the actions of the member countries in the months leading up to the war.

For example, on October 24th, 2003, Libya informed the Arab League of its intentions to quit the league because of the displayed inefficiency in dealing with Arab issues, especially the Palesinian-Israeli conflict and the Iraqi Crisis. Libyan leader Omar Muammar Ghaddafi states, “Why should we remain as a member of an ineffective organization?” Reports later surfaced that Qatar intended to follow Libya’s example and leave the league as well. However, in November Libya reversed its position and decided to remain a member of the league. The Libyans concluded that in the time of crisis leading up to the Iraqi war, that “despite some limits, the Arab League is required to play an even more effective role at a time when the Arab nation is facing dangers.”

However Libya was not done creating rifts within the Arab League. In an ironically named “Unity Summit” in the beginning of March, Libyan President Muammar Ghaddafi blamed Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others for involving the US in the area twelve years prior in the Gulf War, which he claimed was the source of the current Iraqi conflict. Gadhafi had previously accused Saudi Arabia of entering into "a pact with the devil" by inviting US troops to defend its territory in 1990. Gadhafi’s comments at the summit prompted the Saudi, Iraqi, and Syrian leaders to immediately leave the room and respond harshly to the comments, accusing the Libyan leader of ignorance. The Saudi representative further called Libya an “agent for colonizers.” This series of insults prevented anything constructive from happening for the day at the conference, as the major issues were forgotten in a series of insults. Furthermore, the conference was broadcast live on Arab satellite television, making the disunity and arguments within the Arab League public for the whole Arab world to witness. In Saudi Arabia, Khaled al-Maeena, editor of the Arab News, said he was “shocked, appalled and saddened by the news.” "I felt embarrassed," he said. "In front of the world we've become a laughing stock. The Arab people are disappointed and confused…The spat took the steam off the main thrust, which was the Iraq issue."

Furthermore, The United Arab Emirates caused an additional stir at the same summit when it called for Saddam Hussein to surrender power and leave Iraq. The proposal requested that “The Arab League, in cooperation with the U.N. secretary-general, should supervise the situation in Iraq for an interim period during which all necessary measures are taken in order to return the situation to its normal situation according to the will of the brotherly Iraqi people.” While many in the Arab world were calling for a unified front against the incursion by the Western powers, others were advocating surrender to the demands of the West. Moussa responded to this proposal by stating that it was not considered an official request and it “was excluded from the consideration of the council.” The proposal was generally publicly ignored at the conference, in spite of the fact that it was well known such ideas had been floated around several of the countries individually for several weeks. In response to this, the Emirati information minister grumbled that the Arab League "didn't have the courage" to respond to the proposal. However the Iraqis responded to this proposal angrily. In New York, Mohammed Aldouri, Iraq’s Ambassador to the United nations, said Saddam’s relinquishing power was “not at all” likely. He further called the proposal by the UAE “silly”. At the summit, an angry Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabrisaid that the proposal was not discussed because the “summit does not discuss silly, dirty, trivial ideas.” Without further elaboration, Sabri claimed that the United States and Israel were the real authors of the proposal.

While the above mentioned Unity Summit was intended to consolidate the Arab voice in a position regarding the potential for a war in Iraq, due to the diversity of opinions, no strong statement was reached. Different countries came to the summit with very different positions. Some countries - particularly in the Persian Gulf – argued at the summit that war was inevitable and said that the region should be planning for the aftermath. A second camp, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, insisted that war could be avoided if Iraq cooperated fully with U.N. weapons inspectors. A third camp - led by Syria - wanted the summit to make an unequivocal anti-war declaration. The end result was simply a weak declaration against military action, a compromise not satisfying to any of the camps. Different camps also branded each other, with the Egyptians commenting on the UAE plan, “It is just like one of these Gulf states to criticize the rest of us and come up with this kind of a plan," referring to the plan encouraging Saddam to step down from power and go into exile.

These arguments and diversities of opinions prevented the Arab League from reaching a consensus in the months leading up to the eventual invasion by allied forces. Altercations such as the problems with Libya, Kuwait, the UAE, and others marred the attempts for the Arab League to act as a unified body in their response to the threat of the war.

This weakness and disunity currently exhibited by the Arab League is not a new phenomenon. Prior to the Gulf War in 1990 there was a meeting of the Arab League in Cairo also intended to achieve a peaceful resolution to a conflict involving Iraq, that time because of their invasion of Kuwait. However, this summit nearly ended in a fistfight between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti foreign ministers, and did nothing to stave off the war.

One of the major dividing points for the Arab nation leading up to the recent war was the various levels and types of involvements different countries had with the United States. Many of the Arab nations were in one of two conditions: dependant on US aid, like Egypt, or dependant on American protection, like Saudi Arabia. Therefore these countries did not have the freedom to come out with a hard stance against the American action even if this is what they believed. While certain states such as Syria tried to push a hard line against America, they could not get the support behind this from the rest of the members of the Arab League. For example, Syria called for a hard line before the invasion, calling for a resolution for all member nations not to open their territory for U.S. military use. However the resolution adopted by the League called only for no direct participation in a military attack. Clearly the various degrees of involvement with the United States inhibited the unity and functioning of the Arab League.

A final demonstration of the ineffectiveness of the Arab League was seen in the weeks leading up to the war. In a last attempt to prevent another war in the region, the Arab League organized a high level peace delegation to visit Baghdad. The delegations were to consist of foreign ministers from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and Baharain, in addition to the Arab League secretary General, Amr Moussa. However Iraq first informed the delegation that it wished to delay its arrival, and finally cancelled the trip all together.

In Iraq’s memorandum to the Arab League on the reasons for the cancellation of the trip, Iraq cited developments pertaining to the growing threat of a United States led war on the country as the reason for Baghdad’s sudden decision not to host the Arab League delegation. The Arab League expressed “deep regret” over Iraq’s decision. Iraq’s logic in canceling the trip serves as a signifier as to the weakness of the Arab League. In a time of crisis when the league was attempting to reach out and help one of its member delegations, it was refused on the basis of the crisis. It is clear that the Arab League is not the body that Arab nations turn to in times of crisis for support, but rather an entity not to be trusted.

Furthermore, this problem spreads beyond Iraq’s attitude. Two other member countries, Lebanon and Syria, had raised serious questions about the purpose of the delegation’s visit, and had threatened to pull out of the committee. Additionally, Syria is alleged to have advised Iraq to refuse the visit. The conflict over the delegation’s visit stemmed from the controversy over the message the Arab League members wished the delegation to convey to Iraq. Several Gulf countries allegedly wished Saddam to abdicate power and go into exile to spare the region another war, while others disagreed with this request and refused to be associated with a delegation containing this message. The delegation representing the views of the Arab League insisted that persuading the Iraqi leader to abdicate was never part of the delegation’s mission, and said that the purpose of the trip to Baghdad was to relay to Iraqi leaders the Arab summit’s message. The main thrust of this message was the call for full Iraqi compliance with the United Nations Resolution 1441. The confusion over this visit and its eventual refusal exhibit the disorganization of the Arab League, the vast disagreement between its members, and the lack of power the league holds, as one of its members would refuse a peace delegation representing several of the other nations.