Ahmadinejad and the Guards: Battle Between Former Allies
As the next presidential election day in Iran approaches the tension in the battle between the head of the government in Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) is also heating up. Contrary to the last two presidential races when the political circles of the IRGC assisted Ahmadinejad in his aspirations, this time the force is facing the plans of the president’s aides and allies. This view of course is based on the assumption that there is no conspiracy involved in all of this and that the gap between these two is not a mirage. And while the conflict between these two has limits and constraints, both depend on the survival of the larger political body.
The recent remarks by the representative of ayatollah Khamenei in the IRGC Ali Saeedi in which he talked about the “engineering” role of the Guards in the elections gave Ahmadinejad the cause to jump in and implicitly warn the force not to interfere in the race and not meddle with the public’s votes. He even asserted that any person who tries to manage or control the public, will in turn be controlled by the public.
This remark indicates that Ahmadinejad’s weapon of choice in containing the IRGC is public opinion, something that reformers and Hashemi Rafsanjani had tried in the past.
IRGC cultural deputy’s response indicates that the confrontation between the two institutions is probably much larger behind the public eyes. While calling Saeedi’s remarks out of line, Moghadamfar criticized Ahmadinejad for falling into the trap of foreign enemies who desired a confrontation between the two. In reality however, the confrontation between Ahmadinejad and the IRGC is rooted in the larger power struggle that is raging among the different factions within the regime and has nothing to do with the plans or desires of foreign countries.
The surfacing of the battle between these two is the outcome of Ahmadinejad’s 11 day boycott of cabinet meetings in 2011. Following that event, Basij militia forces and those of the IRGC launched harsh verbal attacks on Ahmadinejad for his disregard for the supreme leader’s directives. Since then, both sides have been publicly criticizing each other, directly or implicitly. The height of these verbal barrages is the term Ahmadinejad used for what he calls illegal port jetties that the IRGC owns and operates to import illegal goods into the country.
IRGC commander Aziz Jaafari recently categorically asserted that the IRGC did now own any illegal ports. Another target that Ahmadinejad publicly attacked is Fars news agency, an agency is known to be closely tied to the Guards. In one of his most recent charges, Ahmadinejad also accused the IRGC of being responsible for the disruptions in the foreign exchange market which have tremendously eroded the market value of the country’s currency, the Rial. The IRGC in turn has warned of the dangers of what it calls the “deviant current,” a group of Ahmadinejad allies some of whom have known presidential aspirations. Ali Saeedi has also recently announced that the IRGC had made a mistake about supporting Ahmadinejad and that he is no longer enjoys the support of the IRGC or the principlists, a political group of ideologues that hold key elements of power in the political institutions of Iran.
These public back and forth accusations reached such intensity that former IRGC commander who happens to be a Majlis member claimed that Ahmadinejad had an improper attitude towards the force right from the beginning and had responded negatively to the Guards’ supportive actions.
With this history, the future between these two groups seems gloomy. Should Ahmadinejad and his circle of allies continue their ambitions to run in the June presidential election, one should expect the battle between the two to climax in the March-June period. Ahmadinejad has been a paradoxical president in the sense that he has benefitted the most from the IRGC while at the same time he has engaged in the harshest attacks against it, since former president Bani-Sadr.
But what is the nature of the relationship and the differences between the IRGC and Ahmadinejad? I believe IRGC’s support of Ahmadinejad has not been dependant on the latter’s persona but on the views of the supreme leader. In reality, that section of the force which participates in political affairs does so within the context of supporting the supreme leader and following his wishes and is not based on any alliance with or independent conviction in a political faction or person. The political decisions and actions of the IRGC are not based on the outcome of the wishes of the base of the body of the force as they filter up the ranks. The decisions are the responses to the wishes and expectations of the supreme leader. This desire of the supreme leader has of course created circles and quarters in the IRGC and the Basij that have strong interests in intervening in the political realm. Still, these circles do not have a base in the force or in the political groups independent from the supreme leader. Movements in the IRGC have undoubtedly arisen with different political views. Jamiate Isargaran Engelab Islami (the Society of Devotees of the Islamic Revolution), Jamiate Rahpooyan (the Society for the Adherents of the Path) , and Jebhe Istadeghi Jebhe Paydari (the Perseverance Front for the Resistance Front) are among them. Not all the cadres of these groups have a record of activity in the Guards though their main leaders have been in the force. Still, the presence of IRGC cadres is not limited to those in these groups. Other groups such as the Sazemane Mojahedin Engelabe Islami (the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution), Jebhe Mosharekat, Kargozarane Sazandeghi, groups following ayatollah Montazeri all have leaders who at one time were among prominent IRGC commanders or personalities.
Following the views and priorities of the supreme leader I 2005 and 2009 in supporting Ahmadinejad, the IRGC mobilized its resources for that purpose. Significantly, he did not enjoy his own base in the force at the time. Tehran mayor and a former IRGC commander Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf and former IRGC commander Mohsen Rezai both enjoy greater support in the force than Ahmadinejad. Even former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi enjoyed wider support among the Guards.
The number of former IRGC commanders in Ahmadinejad’s first and second cabinets have been 7 and 8 respectively, while in Rafsanjani’s they stood at 3 and 4 and for Khatami they were 6 and 4. But even former IRGC commander presence in cabinets did not translate into a bond between the two institutions. Some of these cabinet members had in fact ended their relationship with the force and some did not even cooperate with it.
IRGC’s involvement in the country’s economic affairs began during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, but it was a gradual entry into the field. During Khatami’s presidency, this expansion came to a stop but during Ahmadinejad’s terms large economic projects in the country were handed to the Guards. It should be noted that the principal supporter for the IRGC’s entry into the economic sphere is none other than seyed Ali Khamenei himself, and the security considerations of the country, including the crisis in its international relations.
The expansion of the IRGC’s activities has in reality created an institution parallel to the government which has created its own problems as far as economic management is concerned. So the force has successfully emerged to become the most serious institution confronting Ahmadinejad’s aspirations and even policies.
Future events shall demonstrate whether the IRGC will succeed in curtailing and negating the political aspirations of Ahmadinejad’s circle or whether the latter’s unconventional steps and acrobatics will prevail and dampen the political activities of the Guards.
It should be noted that one of Khamenei’s key tools to extract his desired votes from the ballot boxes and contain Ahmadinejad’s group continues to be the IRGC and the Basij.
Source:
http://www.roozonline.com/english/news3/newsitem/archive/2013/january/15/article/ahmadinejad-and-the-guards-battle-between-former-allies.html
Accessed: 16/01/13