“History Program, Japanese Air Force”
World War II in the Pacific, An Encyclopedia, (2001), pp. 228-229.
History Program, Japanese Air Force
In 1955, the Japanese government established the Office of Military History (OMH) within the Japanese Ministry of Defense, and systematically collected all official documents relating to the Asia-Pacific war. It now possesses more than 83,000 documents relating to the army and 33,000 documents relating the navy. By the early 1970s, the OMH had published 102 volumes of Senshi sosho (The Official Military History), of which fourteen volumes were devoted to air force strategies and operations: volume 7, Military Air Force Operations in Eastern New Guinea; volume 19, Japanese Mainland Antiaircraft Operations; volume 22, Military Air Force Operations in Western New Guinea; volume 34, Military Air Force Operations in Southern Strategy, volume 36, Military Air Force Operations in Okinawa, Taiwan, and Iwo Jima; volume 48, Military Air Force Operations in the Philippines; volume 52, Armament and Management in the Military Air Force (part 1); volume 53, Military Air Force Operations in Manchuria; volume 61, The Third Air Force Fleet Operations in Burma and Dutch Indonesia; volume 78, Armament and Management in the Military Air Force (part 2); volume 87, Development, Production, & Supply of Military Air Force Weaponry; volume 94, Armament and Management in the Military Air Force (part 4); volume 95, General History of Navy Air Force; and volume 97, Construction & Basic Resource Management of the Military Air Force.
The volumes of Senshi sosho demonstrate that the weakness of Japan’s air force was one of the decisive factors in the nation’s defeat. According to Senshi sosho, the Japanese air force had several critical defects. First, the military established its air force on the assumption that it would be used to fight against the Soviet Union in Manchuria. Because the Russian air force would always be larger than the Japanese air force, the latter primarily prepared itself for air-to-air battles. In October 1941, however, general headquarters decided to use the military air force in Southeast Asia. The military air force did not have enough time to adjust itself to the rapid strategic changes. The primary aim of the new southern strategy was to assault the Philippines and Malaya (now Malaysia) simultaneously; to destroy the main bases of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands; and to occupy strategically important areas. Under such an ambitious plan, the air force had to cover a large area, which necessitated an extremely long supply line.
Second, Japan’s relatively lower productivity, outdated technology, shortage of natural resources, and lack of manpower were responsible for the weakness of the Japanese air force. The Allied powers, using more efficient construction machinery, for example, were able to build an air base in a week or so, whereas Japan, depending primarily on manpower, needed several months to do the same job. Japanese air force radar, communication systems, and weaponry were quite inferior to those of the Allies. The use of kamikaze suicide squads was a result of Japan’s desperate need to conserve fuel and weapons. Neither the military nor the navy provided air force personnel with appropriate training based on any kind of long-term, systematic program.
Third, even though both the military and the navy recognized the importance of the air force, they paid only secondary attention to the need to strengthen it. The military considered its ground force strategy to be the main thrust of its operations, and the navy believed that a frontal assault using battleships was its primary focus. Since the 1920s, there had been some in the military who had called for Japan to have an independent air force. In December 1938, the military established the Military Air Force Bureau and appointed Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, War Department vice minister, as its head. Top members of the military, such as Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki and General Kawabe Shozo, later became heads of the Military Air Force Bureau, but the idea of establishing an independent air force and giving it top priority made no headway at general headquarters, where the prevailing thought was still firmly rooted in traditional strategy.
Fourth, general headquarters could not coordinate the operations of the military and the navy air forces. Since one of the key factors in securing victory in the Asia-Pacific war was a successful military-navy-air force joint operation to acquire air bases in the Pacific region, this lack of coordination eventually proved fatal for Japan.
The volumes of Senshi sosho repeatedly insist that general headquarters failed to understand the critical importance of the air force in the Asia-Pacific war. They suggest that successful air force operations would have required greater productive power; better coordination among the military, the navy, and the air force; a smoother flow of natural resources; more advanced technology; and a more appropriate level of manpower. As it was, the great success of the Japanese air force in the opening weeks of the Pacific war blinded that service to the imperative need for modernization and doomed it to defeat. Individual weapons, such as the Zero fighter, were fully the equal, and more, of anything in the Allied air arsenal, but by 1943 even this splendid warplane was outclassed by U.S. fighters. The interservice rivalries that afflicted the Japanese army and navy also crippled the Japanese air force.
Yone Sugita