Social Media Negative File

Keryk Kuiper (Iowa City High) – – feel free to email me or find me at any point if you are confused or have questions

Zahir Shaikh (Blake)

Clare McGraw (Juan Diego)

Alan Hughes (Harker)

Quick notes

For every off that is original I have included both the 1nc and the 2nc but for everything that we have a preexisting file for I have only put the 1nc.
I think the counterplan is probably the best way to go - that or the narcissism kritik - and T you can maybe win because it's not direct curtailment but it would be hard.

Biometrics

Frontlines

1nc

( ) If surveillance protects society it is de facto justified.

Posner 6 — Richard A. Posner, Senior Lecturer in Law at the University of Chicago, Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago, was named the most cited legal scholar of the 20th century by The Journal of Legal Studies, holds an LL.B. from Harvard University, 2006 (“Wire Trap,” New Republic, February 6th, Available Online at http://www.newrepublic.com/article/104859/wire-trap, Accessed 04-16-2015)

The revelation by The New York Times that the National Security Agency (NSA) is conducting a secret program of electronic surveillance outside the framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has sparked a hot debate in the press and in the blogosphere. But there is something odd about the debate: It is aridly legal. Civil libertarians contend that the program is illegal, even unconstitutional; some want President Bush impeached for breaking the law. The administration and its defenders have responded that the program is perfectly legal; if it does violate FISA (the administration denies that it does), then, to that extent, the law is unconstitutional. This legal debate is complex, even esoteric. But, apart from a handful of not very impressive anecdotes (did the NSA program really prevent the Brooklyn Bridge from being destroyed by blowtorches?), there[s] has been little discussion of the program’s concrete value as a counter-terrorism measure or of the inroads it has or has not made on liberty or privacy. Not only are these questions more important to most people than the legal questions; they are fundamental to those questions. Lawyers who are busily debating legality without first trying to assess the consequences of the program have put the cart before the horse. Law in the United States is not a Platonic abstraction but a flexible tool of social policy. In analyzing all but the simplest legal questions, one is well advised to begin by asking what social policies are at stake. Suppose the NSA program is vital to the nation’s defense, and its impingements on civil liberties are slight. That would not prove the program’s legality, because not every good thing is legal; law and policy are not perfectly aligned. But a conviction that the program had great merit would shape and hone the legal inquiry. We would search harder for grounds to affirm its legality, and, if our search were to fail, at least we would know how to change the law--or how to change the program to make it comply with the law--without destroying its effectiveness. Similarly, if the program’s contribution to national security were negligible--as we learn, also from the Times, that some FBI personnel are indiscreetly whispering--and it is undermining our civil liberties, this would push the legal analysis in the opposite direction. Ronald Dworkin, the distinguished legal philosopher and constitutional theorist, wrote in The New York Review of Books in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks that “we cannot allow our Constitution and our shared sense of decency to become a suicide pact.” He would doubtless have said the same thing about FISA. If you approach legal issues in that spirit rather than in the spirit of ruat caelum fiat iusticia (let the heavens fall so long as justice is done), you will want to know how close to suicide a particular legal interpretation will bring you before you decide whether to embrace it. The legal critics of the surveillance program have not done this, and the defenders have for the most part been content to play on the critics’ turf.

( ) Rights can’t be absolute and even if they were, privacy wouldn’t be one of them.

Himma ‘7

Kenneth - Associate Professor of Philosophy, Seattle Pacific University. The author holds JD and PhD and was formerly a Lecturer at the University of Washington in Department of Philosophy, the Information School, and the Law School. “Privacy vs. Security: Why Privacy is Not an Absolute Value or Right”. San Diego Law Review, Vol. 44, p. 859, 2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=994458

It is perhaps worth noting that absolutist conceptions are not limited to privacy rights. Some people take the position that the moral right to life is absolute; on an absolutist conception of the right to life, it is never justified to take the life of a person—and this rules out not only the death penalty, but the use of deadly force in defense of the lives of innocent others from a culpable attack. Many people take an absolutist view with respect to something they call a “right to information,” holding that there should be no restrictions of any kind, including legal protection of intellectual property rights, on the free flow of information. As this view has most famously, and idiosyncratically, been put by John Perry Barlow, “information wants to be free.”5 When it comes to rights, absolutist talk among theorists, lawyers, and ordinary folk is not at all uncommon these days. Indeed, some people seem to think that rights are, by nature, absolute and hence that it is a conceptual truth that all rights are absolute. Consider the following quote from Patrick Murphy, a Democrat who ran for Congress in 2006: I am also very concerned about the erosion of constitutional rights and civil liberties over the past few years. I taught Constitutional Law at West Point, and it makes me so angry to see our elected leaders in Washington—specifically the White House and the Republican leadership in Congress—pushing policies that erode the foundation of this country. The equal protection clause of the constitution is absolute. The right to privacy is absolute. The right to assemble is absolute. Yet time and time again, the administration has supported, and the Congressional leadership has supported nominees and policies that do not follow the constitution. With my background, I can add to this debate. And I’m not afraid to take a stand for what’s right.6 As Murphy explains it, every right in the Constitution is absolute and hence utterly without exception. As there is nothing in the Constitution or any legal instrument or norm that suggests or entails that constitutional rights are absolute, it is reasonable to think that Murphy believes, as many people do, that it is part of the very meaning of having a right that it can never justifiably be infringed. This is why debates about political issues are frequently framed in terms of whether there is some right that protects the relevant interests; rights provide the strongest level of moral or legal protection of the relevant interests. It is certainly true that rights provide a higher level of protection than any other considerations that are morally relevant, but it is not because rights are, by nature, absolute. Rights provide robust protection of the relevant interests because it is a conceptual truth that the infringement of any right cannot be justified by an appeal of the desirable consequences of doing so. No matter how many people it might make happy, it would be wrong to intentionally kill an innocent person because her right to life takes precedence over the interests of other people in their own happiness. As Ronald Dworkin famously puts this conceptual point, rights trump consequences.7 But this conceptual truth about rights does not imply rights are, by nature, absolute. The claim that rights trump consequences implies only that some stronger consideration than the desirable consequences of infringing a right can justify doing so. This latter claim leaves open the possibility that there is some such consideration that would justify infringing some rights. One such candidate, of course, is the existence of other more important rights. It is commonly thought that at least some rights are commensurable and can be ranked in a hierarchy that expresses the relative weight each right in the hierarchy has with respect to other rights. For example, one might think that the right to life is at the top of the hierarchy of commensurable rights, and that property rights are in this hierarchy also. This would explain[s] the common intuition that one may use deadly force when necessary to defend innocent lives from culpable attack, but not when necessary only to defend property rights from violation. If, as seems clear from this example, it is possible for two rights to conflict and for one to outweigh the other, it follows that rights are not, by nature, absolute. What may explain the mistaken view that rights are necessarily absolute is confusion about the relationship of various terms that flesh out the status, origin, and contours of moral rights and obligations. For example, rights are frequently described as “inviolable,” meaning that a right can never be justifiably violated. This, of course, is a conceptual truth; to say that a right is violated is to say that its infringement is without justification. But this does not imply that rights can never be justifiably infringed; a person’s right to life can be justifiably infringed if he (they) culpably shoots at an innocent person and there is no other way to save that person’s life except through use of lethal force in defense of his life. Rights are also thought, by nature, to be supreme, relative to some system of norms—moral, social, or legal—in the sense that they cannot be defeated by other kinds of protections; moral rights are thought to be supreme over all other kinds of considerations, including social and legal rights. But this does not imply that rights are absolute because it says nothing about the relative importance of one right to another; it simply asserts that, by nature, rights outweigh all other relevant considerations. Supremacy and inviolability are part of the very nature of a right, but these properties do not entail that rights are, by nature, absolute. Of course, the negation of the claim that all rights are absolute does not imply that no rights are absolute. The possibility of conflicts between any two rights does not preclude there being one right that wins every conflict because it is absolute, and hence, without exception. A moral pacifist, for example, takes this view of the moral right to life and holds that intentional killing of a human being is always wrong. Moreover, if there are two rights that do not come into conflict with each other and win in conflicts with all other rights, those two rights might be absolute. One might think, for example, that the rights to privacy and life can never conflict and that both are absolute. I am somewhat skeptical that any right is absolute in this strong sense, but if there are any, it will not be privacy. As we will see in more detail, privacy is commensurable with other rights, like the right to life, which figures into the right to security. It seems clear that privacy rights and the right to life can come into conflict. For example, a psychologist might be justified in protecting a patient’s privacy interests even though doing so includes information that might prevent that person from committing a minor property crime of some kind, but she would not be justified in protecting that information if the psychologist knows its disclosure is necessary to prevent a murder. In any event, I will discuss these kinds of examples in more detail below.

( ) No Privacy violation- FISC check abuse

Branda ‘14

(et al; JOYCE R. BRANDA, Acting Assistant Attorney General, BRIEF FOR THE APPELLEES - Amicus Brief for Smith v. Obama – before the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. “Amici” means “friend of the court” and – in this context - is legal reference to the Reporters Committee – October 2nd - https://www.eff.org/document/governments-smith-answering-brief)

Plaintiff provides no plausible explanation for how the program could cause that distress. She does not contend that there is any reasonable likelihood that government personnel would actually review metadata about her calls that the government may have acquired under the Section 215 program. That likelihood is particularly remote if “[n]one of her communications relate to international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” Pl Br. 4. Again, information in the Section 215 database is subject to substantial protections and limits on access imposed by orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Those orders do not permit indiscriminate access to or review of the metadata; instead, there must be an advance judicial finding (or, in cases of emergency, an advance finding by government officials and judicial approval after the fact) that a given selector is suspected of association with terrorism, and only the small fraction of metadata responsive to queries using such suspected-terrorist selectors—that is, within two steps of the judicially approved selector—may be reviewed.

( ) Biosurveillance is key to global effectiveness

McNickle 12

(Michelle McNickle, Associate Editor of InformationWeek Healthcare, “Feds To Use Social Media For Biosurveillance”, http://www.informationweek.com/regulations/feds-to-use-social-media-for-biosurveillance/d/d-id/1107452?, ZS)

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently awarded Accenture Federal Services a two-year contract to help the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) enhance its biosurveillance capabilities. With the help of Accenture, OHA will begin using information gathered from social media sites -- Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, and Flickr -- to better inform and protect the public against national health emergencies, such as disease outbreaks or biological attacks. Accenture defines biosurveillance as the "monitoring of public health trends and unusual occurrences, relying on pre-existing, real-time health data -- data that s publicly available and easily obtained," according to a statement. "Because of the vast amount of data and information available and readily shared through social media … and the rapid pace information is shared, collecting and understanding information from these channels is critical." The initiative is a pilot program that John Matchette, partner at Accenture and leader of its Public Safety agency work, said the company is hoping to have operational in approximately eight months. In an interview with InformationWeek Healthcare, Matchette described the program as using people as "sensors" to detect health issues such as pathogens or symptoms. "The best way to do this is to treat humans as sensors and let them self-report," Matchette said. Gathering more data points and reacting faster to potential threats are the two main goals for Matchette and his team, he said, and social media will make this possible. Matchette made clear the initiative isn't aimed at mining data that's secret or private. The agency is looking at public data to see where patterns exist in different geographic areas. The program is based on a key-word approach to scanning social media sites. Accenture will begin by developing a lexicon of health conversations that spans these sites to use as a baseline. "Step one is to get that identified, and then we have standard interfaces that go out and look at these websites, like Facebook and Twitter, and they watch for these trends," Matchette said. "There's a lot of health discussion at the same time, so mission one is to understand what normalcy looks like, and once you've done that, you can look for deviations from normal, and that’s how you detect patterns." After developing this baseline, Matchette said the company will be in a position where it can "react and modify…. [A] lot of this is tweaking the underlying analytics to begin to run and get results." The underlying technology the company is using, he said, isn't custom code. Instead, Accenture has a collaboration platform, which integrates data sources and other off-the-shelf products. "So the effort isn't in the coding of the solution because the analytics have been developed," Matchette said. "It's deciding what the lexicon is, and then refining the results."