9.Sadrise Tadevedam Tasminneva Tena Sadrisam Yamalakavadityadi Prtyavijananabhasam

Commentary

Fallacies of each of the subdivisions of Pratyaksa viz. Smiriti, Pratyabhijana, Tarka, Anumana and Agama are described in Aphorisms 8, 9, 10, 11-50 and 51 of this Samuddesa.

Smriti or Smarana ( recollection ) has been defined in Aphorism 3 of Samuddesa III. We see Jinadatta. Later on when we see him again, we recognised him to be that Jina-datta. This is Smriti or recollection. But if we have remembrance of Devadatta when we see Jinadatta, this will be a fallacy of recollection ( Smaranabhasa ).

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9.Sadrise tadevedam tasminneva tena sadrisam yamalakavadityadi prtyavijananabhasam.

1.Fallaey of Pratyabhijnana is the knowledge of “this is that” in things bearing similarity or knowledge of similarity in the identical thing e. g. in the case of twins.

Commentary

In the case of twins, we may falsely take one of them as the other from the similarity or we may fail to recognise the real person wanted and say that he resembles the real man ( without understanding that he is the real man ). There are therefore two kinds of fallacy of Pratyabhijnana one referring to identity ( Ekatva pratyabhinanabhasa ) and the other to similarity ( Sadriyapratyabhijnanabhasa 1.

Pratyabhijnana has already been defined and explained in Aphorisms 5-10 Samuddesa III to which a reference may be made.

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10.Asambaddhe tajjnanam tarkabhasam.

2.Knowledge of concomitance in objects not related is fallacy of Tarka.

Commentary

Tarka or uha has been defined in Aphorism 11 of Samuddesa III. In tarka we have knowledge of universal concomitance viz. That of fire and smoke. Fallacy of Tarka occurs when we set up inseparable connection between objects which are independent of each other e. g. smoke and water.

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11.Idamanumanabhasam.

3.The following are fallacies of Anumana.

Commentary

Anumana has been defined in Aphorism 14 of Samuddesa III Anumana is employed by using Paksa, Hetu and Dristanta. Fallacies of these viz Paksabhasa, Hetvabhsa and Dristantabhasa with their subdivisions will be described in the following aphorisms.

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4.Tatranistadi paksabhasah.

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5.Anisto mimamsakasyanityah sabdah.

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6.Siddhah sravanah sabdah.

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7.Vadhitah pratyaksanumangamalokasvavachanaih.

1. Among them Paksabhasa ( fallacy of the minor term or thesis ) is Anista ( un-accepted ) etc.

1. Anista ( un-accepted ) is ( the view of ) Mimamsakas that sound is momentary.
2. It is established that sounds can be heard by the ear.
3. Opposition ( may exist ) from Pratyaksa, Anumana, Agama, popular acceptance and one’s own words.

Commentary

The followers of Mimamsa philosophy hold that sound is eternal. So in their case there will be Paksabhasa if we establish that sound is momentary. In the definition of Paksa we have laid. down that it must be Ista ( acceptable or that what we want ). Opposite of it will be anista and hence it will be a fallacy of Paksa.

Next, to establish by inference what is accepted ( Siddha ) is also Paksabhasa e. g. ‘sound can be heard by the ear’.

There is also Paksabhasa when it involves opposition to Pratyaksa, Anumana, Agama, Loka-vachana and Sva-vachana. These will be illustrated in the following five aphorisms. ( See Page 95 ).

Sdiddhasena Divakara has defined Paksabhasa in his Nyaya vatara as follow :–

“If that of which the major term or predicate ( Sadhya ) is affirmed is opposed by evidence ( Linga ), the public understanding, one’s own statement etc. wehave that which is known as the fallacy of the minor term or thesis ( Paksa-bhasa ) of which there are many varieites1”.

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16. Tatra pratyaksavadhito yathanusnognirdravyatvajjalavat.

1. In thee subdivisions, Pratyaksa0vadhita ( opposed to Pratyaksa ) may be exemplified by “Fire is not hot as it is a thing e. g. water”.

Commentary

Any proposition laying down anything opposed to actual perception is an instance of Pratyaksa-vadhita. We know by actual perception that fire is hot. If anyone terries to lay down in the shape of inference “Fire I not hot as it is a thing e. g. water”, it will be an example of Pratyaksa-vadhita.

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17.Aparinami sabdah kritakatvat ghatavat.

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1. Sound is without modification as is something caused e. g. a pitcher.

Commentary

This aphorism gives an example of the fallacy Anumanavadhita. The following is the correct inference or Anumana:

“Sound has modification.

Because it is caused.

Like a pitcher.”

But if we try to establish an inference opposed to this inference as follows :

Sound is without modification.

Because it is caused.

Like a pitcher.”

It will be an instance of Anumana-vadhita that is to say opposed by inference.

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18.Pretyasukhaprado dharmah purusasritatvadadharmavat.

1. Dharma will produce grief after death as it is subservient to beings like Adharma.

Commentary

This is an example of the fallacy Agama-vadhita. In all sastras, it is accepted that pursuit of Dharma will produce happiness after death and Adharma will cause misery. If we try to establish by inference that Dharma will produce misery after death, it will be an example of Agama-vadhita Anumana ( i. E. inference as opposed to the sastras ).

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1. Suchi narasirahkapalam pranyangatvachchankhasuktivat.

1. A human skull is pure as it is part of the body of an animal like a conch-shell or oyster.

Commentary

This is an example of Loka-vadhita Anumana or inference opposed to public understanding. According to popular acceptance parts of bodies of some animal’s e. g. conch-shells and oysters are accepted as pure, while parts of bodies of other animals e. g. human skull are considered as impure. So if we try to establish by inference as mentioned in the aphorism that human skull is pure, it will be a fallacy of Loka-vadhita Anumana.

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1. Mata me bandhya purusasamogepagarbhatvat prasiddhabandhavat.

20.My mother is barren because she does not conceive in spite of connection with a male like women famous as barren.

Commentary

This is an example of Sva-vachana-vadhita Anumana ( or inference opposed t one’s own words ). If a person says that his mother is barren and tires to establish this by an inference as shown in the aphorism, the inference will be opposed to his own words and will be a fallacy of Svavachana vadhita Anumana.

Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana in his notes on the translation of Nyayavatara has mentioned the following with reference to different kinds of Paksabhasa which will further elucidate the aphorisms in Pariksamukham regarding this subject.

“The semblance or fallacy of the minor term or thesis ( Paksabhasa ) arises when one predicates of the minor term ( Paksa ) that which is et to be proved to the opponent, or which is incapable of being proved, or when it is opposed to perception and inference, or inconsistent with the public understanding or incongruous with one’s statement thus :–

1. ‘The jar is corporeal ( Paudgalika )’ ––This is a conclusion which is et to be proved to the opponent.
2. ‘Everything is nothing’. This is a Saugata ( Buddhist ) doctrine which according to the Jainas, is incapable of being proved.
3. ‘The general ( Samana ) and particular ( Visesa ) things are without parts, are distinct from each other and are like themselves alone.’ this is opposed to perception.
4. ‘There is no omniscient being’. This is, according to the Jainas, opposed to inference.
5. ‘The sister is to be taken as wife’. This in inconsistent with the public understanding.
6. ‘All things are non-existent’. This is incongruous with one’s own statement.

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21.Hetvabhasa asiddhaviruddhanaikantikakinchitkaah.

21.Hetvabhasas are Asiddha, Viuddha, Anaikantika and Akinchitkara.

Commentary

Now the fallacies of Hetu are being described. Hetu has been defined in Aphorism 15 in Samuddesa III. The opposites of this are fallacies of Hetu1. These are of four kinds: Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikantika and Akinchitkara.

Siddhasena has laid down “The reason ( i. e. the middle term called Hetu has been defined as that which cannot exist except in connection with the major term ( Sadhya ); the fallacy of the rea-

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son ( Hetvabhasa ) arises from non-conception, doubt or misconception about it ( the middle term )”1.

Siddhasena lays down that there are only three ( and not four as mentioned in Pariksamukham ) varieties of Hetvabhasa : “That which has not et been established is called ‘the unproved (Asiddha); that which is possible only in the opposite was is called the inconsistent’ ( Viuddha ) ; that which can be explained in one way as well as in the opposite was is called ‘the certain’ ( Anaikantika )”2

Hemachandra also in his Framana-mimamsa lays down that there are only three kinds of Hetvabhasa viz. Asiddha, Viruddha and Anaikanitka.3 He rejects the view of those who maintain that there are two other forms of Hetvabhasa viz. Kalatita and Prakarana-sama. according to Hemachandra, Kalatita is included within the fallacy of Paksa and Prakarana-sama is an impossibility as none but a madman can use it. in arguments between sane men this is an impossibility4.

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Pramana-mimamsa II. 1. 16.

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22.Asatsattanischayo siddhah.

1. Asiddha is that whose existence is wanting in Paksa and which is not definitely established.

Commentary

Asiddha Hetvabhasa is of two kinds: Svarupasiddha and Sandigdhasiddha.

These will be described in the aphorisms whish follow.

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1. Avidamanasattakah parinami sabdaschaksusatvat.

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1. Svarupenasatvat.

23.“Sound is perishable because it can be seen by the eyes.” This is ( an example of ) non-existence of itself.

1. Because it does not exist at al in its self.

Commentary

Sound is heard b the ear and not seen by the eye. So in the Paksa ‘Sound,’ Hetu in its real nature does not exist. So this is an example of Svarupasiddha Hetvabhasa where the falsehood is a matter of certainty.

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1. Avidyamananischayo mugdhabuddhim prati agniratra dhumat.

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26.Tasya vaspadibhavena bhutasamghate sandehat.

25.When there is uncertainty, if one says to a man of inferior intellect ‘Here is fire because there is smoke.’

26.He has doubt owing to the existence of vapour etc. in the collection of man elements ( earth, water, etc. and he cannot definitely ascertain whether it it is smoke or vapour. )

Commentary

Sandigdhasiddha is described in these aphorisms. This fallacy arises where there is an uncertainty of the Hetu itself. For example, where there is no certainty whether what is seen is smoke or vapour, if one infers ‘there is fire because there is smoke’, the inference will not be sound as the very existence of the Hetu viz. smoke is involved in doubt.1 A person who is not thoroughly conversant with the major term ( Sadhya ) or the middle term ( Hetu or Sadhana ) will not be able to ascertain this is smoke’ and this is vapour2. So there is absence of certainty in these cases which is the criterion of the fallacy of Sandigdhasiddha.

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27.Sankhyam prati painami sabdah kritukatvat.

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28.Tenajnatatvat.

27.To ( the follower of ) the Sankhya ( philosophy) : Sound is perishable, because it is caused ( by some one).

1. because he does not know ( or accept ) it.

Commentary

In Sankhya philosophy, appearance and disappearance ( and not creation and destruction ) of things are accepted. So the inference ‘Sound is perishable because it is created’ y a follower of the Sankhya philosophy is an example of Sandigdhasiddha because he does not accept creating of a sound as creation is unknown ( Ajnata ) to him.

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1. ÃÖŸ¾ÖÃµÖ ÃÖÓ¤êÆês¯µÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Öê ÆꟾÖÖ³ÖÖÃÖ: ÃÖÓפݬÖ×ÃÖ¬¤ ‡ŸµÖ£ÖÔ: µÖ£ÖÖ ²ÖÖ¯ÖÖ ×¤³ÖÖ¾Öê®Ö ÃÖÓפʴÖÖ®ÖÖ ¬Öæ´Ö»ÖŸÖÖ×Ý®Ö×ÃÖ¬¤Ö¾Öã¯Öפ¿µÖ´ÖÖ®ÖÖ l Pramana-mimamsa. Bhasya on II. 1. 17.
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Hemachandra has mentioned that Asiddha Hetvabhasa may be Svarupasiddha or Sandigdhasiddha.1 The first should not be held to arise from not having the quality of a Paksa ( minor term ) because the definition of a Hetu has no connection with the quality of a Paksa. This fallacy arises from the fact that it wants the essence of Hetu viz. that it cannot arise otherwise. Hemachandra quotes the following verse from Kumarila Bhatta :–

“To infer the son of a Brahmin, to be a Brahmin is not universally accepted as it depends on the quality of Paksa”. ( For the mother might be unchaste ).2

Hemachandra has mentioned three subdivisions of Asiddha Hetvabhasa viz Asiddha regarding Vadi, that regarding Prativadi and that regarding both.3 The illustration of the first of these is the same as given in Aphorism 27 of this Samuddesa of pariksamukham.4

Some Jain logicians have laid down that there are other varieties of Asiddha Hetvabhasa viz. Visesyasiddha, Visesna-

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Pramana-mimamsa II. 1. 17.

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Pramana-mimamsa II. 1. 18.

1. ŸÖ¡Ö ¾Ö֤˵Ö×ÃÖ¬¤Öê µÖ£ÖÖ ¯Ö׸ÞÖÖ´Öß ¿Ö²¤ ˆŸ¯Ö×¢Ö´Ö¢¾ÖÖŸÖË †µÖÓ ÃÖÖÓ¸¾µÖÃµÖ Ã¾ÖµÖÓ¾ÖÖפ®ÖÖês×ÃÖ¬¤: l ŸÖ®Ö´ÖŸÖê ˆŸÖ˯Ö×¢Ö´Ö¢¾ÖõÖÖ®ÖßµÖã¯ÖêŸÖŸ¾ÖÖŸÖé ®ÖÖÃ֤㟯֤˵֟Öê ®ÖÖ×¯Ö ÃÖ¤Ë×¾Ö®Ö¿µÖŸµÖãŸÖé˯Ö֤׾֮ÖÖ¿ÖµÖÖê¸Ö×¾Ö³ÖÖÔ¾ÖןָÖê³ÖÖ¾Ö¹ý¯ÖŸ¾ÖÖ×¤×ŸÖ ŸÖŸÖË×ÃÖ¬¤Ö®ÖŸÖÖ““Ö l Pramana-mimamsa. II. 1. 18.

siddha, Bhagasiddha, Asrayasiddha, Asraiyakadesasiddha, Vyarthavisesasiddha, Vyarthaisesanasiddha, Sandigdhavisesyasiddha and Sandigdha-visesanasiddha1. Hemachandra says that all these are included within Vadyasiddha, Prativadasiddha and Ubhayasiddha as defined by him2.

In Prameakamala-martanda also it is mentioned “Others accept varieties of Asiddha viz. Visesyasiddha etc. these are mere varieties of Asiddha Hetvabhasa ( as defined in Pariksamukham ) because they bear the criterion of non-existence f itself. so these are not separate varieties, for there is no separate characteristics of these”3.

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1. Viparitanischitavinabhavo viruddhoparinami sabdah kritakatvat.

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1. ŸÖ¡Ö ×¾Ö¿ÖêµÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Ö¤µÖ ˆ¤Ö×ȵ֮ŸÖê l ×¾Ö¿ÖêµÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Öê µÖ£ÖÖs×®ÖŸµÖ: ¿Ö¾¤: ÃÖÖ´ÖÖ®µÖ¾Ö¢Ö¾Öê ÃÖ×ŸÖ “ÖÖÜÖãÂÖŸ¾ÖÖŸÖË l ×¾Ö¿ÖêÂÖÞÖÖ×ÃÖÞ¤ÖêµÖ£Ös×®ÖŸµÖ: ¿Ö¾¤¿“ÖÖÜÖãÂÖŸ¾Öê ÃÖ×ŸÖ ÃÖÖ´ÖÖ®µÖ×¾Ö¿ÖêÂÖ¾ÖŸ¾ÖÖŸÖË l ³ÖÖÝÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Öê µÖ£ÖÖ×®ÖŸµÖ: ¿Ö¾¤: ¯Öε֟ÖË®ÖÖ®ÖŸ®ÖŸÖ¸ßµÖÛúŸ¾ÖÖŸÖË l †ÖÁÖµÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Öê µÖ£ÖÖ×ÃŸÖ ¯ÖάÖÖ®ÖÓ ×¾ÖÀ¾Ö¯Ö׸ÞÖÖ×´ÖŸ¾ÖÖŸÖË l †ÖÁÖµÖîÛú¤ê¿ÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Öê µÖ£ÖÖ ×®ÖŸµÖÖ: ¯ÖάÖÖ®Ö ¯Öã¹ýÂÖêÀ¾Ö¸Ö: †ÛéúŸÖÛúŸ¾ÖÖŸÖË l ¾µÖ£ÖÔ×¾Ö¿ÖêµÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Öê µÖ£ÖÖ ×®ÖŸµÖ: ¿Ö¾¤: ÛéúŸÖÛúŸ¾Öê ÃÖ×ŸÖ ÃÖÖ´ÖÖ®µÖ¾ÖŸ¾ÖÖŸÖé l ÃÖÓפݬÖ×¾Ö¿ÖêµÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Öê µÖ£ÖÖ †¤ËµÖÖ×¯Ö ¸ÖÝÖÖפµÖ㌟Ö: ÛúׯֻÖ: ¯Öã¹ýÂÖŸ¾Öê ÃÖŸµÖªÖ¯µÖ®ÖãŸÖ˯֮®ÖŸÖŸ¾Ö–ÖÖ®ÖŸÖ¾ÖÖŸÖË l ÃÖÓפÝÖ¬Ö×¾Ö¿ÖêÂÖÞÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Öê µÖ£ÖÖ †¤ËµÖÖ×¯Ö ¸ÖÝÖÖפµÖ㌟Ö: ÛúׯÖ: ÃÖ¾ÖÔ¤Ö ŸÖŸ¾Ö–ÖÖ®Ö¸×ÆŸÖŸ¾Öê ÃÖ×ŸÖ ¯ÖããÂÖŸ¾ÖÖŸÖé l Pramana-mimamsa. Bhasya to II. 1. 19.
2. ‹ŸÖê †×ÃÖ¬¤³Öê¤Ö µÖ¤Ö®ÖµÖŸÖ¸¾Ö֤˵ÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Ÿ¾Öê®Ö ×¾Ö¾ÖõµÖ®ŸÖ ŸÖ¤Ö ¾Ö֤˵Ö×ÃÖ¬¤Ö: ¯ÖÎן־Ö֤˵Ö×ÃÖ¬¤Ö ¾ÖÖ ³Ö¾Ö×®ÖŸÖ, µÖ¤Öê³ÖµÖ¾Ö֤˵Ö×ÃÖ¬¤Ÿ¾Öê®Ö ×¾Ö¾ÖõµÖ®ÖŸÖê ŸÖ¤Öê³ÖµÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Ö ³Ö¾Ö×®ŸÖ ÕIbid.
3. µÖê “Ö ×¾Ö¿ÖêµÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Ö¤µÖÖês×ÃÖ¬¤¯ÖÎÛúÖ¸Ö: ¯Ö¸î׸™ÖßÖêsÃÖŸÖËÃÖ¢ÖÖÛúŸ¾Ö»ÖõÖÞÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤-¯ÖÎÛúÖ¸Ö®®ÖÖ£ÖÖÔŸÖ¸Ó, ŸÖ»ÖõÖÞÖ³Öê¤Ö³ÖÖ¾ÖÖŸÖË l Prameyakamala-martanda.

29.Viruddha ( Hetvabhasa ) is concomitance with the opposite of he major term e. g. sound is not perishable because it is caused.

Commentary

In this aphorism, Viruddha Hetvabhasa is defined and illustrated. Where the universal concomitance ( Avinabhava or Vyapti ) is ascertained with the opposite of the major term, we get the fallacy of ? Viruddha Hetvabhasa. in this case the inseparable connection ( Vapti ) of the middle term is not with the major term but with its antithesis. The example given is “Sound is eternal because it is an effect”. Now there is universal connection of an effect with perishability, but if we try to establish its opposite by the example given above, we get fallacy of Viruddha Hetvabhasa.

Dr. S. C. Vidyabhusana in his notes on Nyayavatara Gives another example : “The inconsistent ( Viruddha ) such as “This is flurry because it is a body of water’. here the reason alleged is opposed to what is to be established”.

Hemachandra defines Viruddha say that whose concomitance is the opposite or which is derived otherwise1.

Some hold the view that there are eight kinds of Viruddha, but in Prameya-kamala-martanda it is mentioned that all of these come under the definition here given2. Hemachandra also is of the same view3.

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1. ׾ָ֯ߟÖ×®ÖµÖ´ÖÖês®µÖ£Öî¾ÖÖê¯Ö¯Ö¤ËµÖ´ÖÖ®ÖÖê ×¾Ö¹ý¬¤:ll Pramana-mimamsa II. 1. 20.
2. µÖê “ÖÖ™Öî ×¾Ö¹ý¬¤³Öê¤Ö ¯ÖÝÖî׸™ÖßÖês¯µÖêŸÖ»»ÖõÖÞÖ»Ö×õÖŸÖŸ¾ÖÖ×¾Ö¿ÖêÂÖŸÖÖês¡Öî¾ÖÖ®ÖŸÖ³ÖξÖ×®ŸÖ l Prameakamala-martanda.
3. †®Öê®Ö µÖês®µÖֵÖê ×¾Ö¹ý¬¤Ö ˆ¤ÖÈŸÖÖßÖês×¯Ö ÃÖÓÝÖéÆߟÖÖ l Pramanamimamsa Bhasya on II. 1. 20. These eight varieties of Viruddha are described as follows by Hemchandra. thee are four varieties where Sapaksa exists and there are four varieties when Sapaksa.

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30.Vipaksepaviruddhavittiranaikantikah.

1. In Anaikantika ( Hetvabhasa ), ( Hetu ) resides also in Vipaksa ( in addition to being in Paksa and Sapaksa ).

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31.Nischitavrittiranitah sabdah prameyatvad ghatavat.

1. Where it is certain that ( Hetu ) is in ( Vipaksa ) ( we have the fallacy of Nischita vipaksa vritti Hetvabhasa ), e. g. “Sound is perishable because it is knowable like a pitcher.

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1. Akase nitepyasya nischayat.
2. Because it ( the quality of knowability ) is ascertained in things like Akasa which are imperishable.

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33.Sankitavrittistu nasti savajno vaktritvat.

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33.Where the matter is involved in doubt ( we have the fallacy of Sankita vipaksa vritti e. g. an omniscient being does not exist for he can speak.

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1. Sarvajnatvena vaktritvavirodhat.

1. Because there is no opposition of being able to speak with omniscience.

Commentary

When Hetu is found in Paksa, Sapaksa and Vipaksa we have the fallacy of Anaikantika Hetvabhasa. “The effect of the Presence of the Hetu in Vipaksa is to rob the conclusion of that logical validity which Anumana ( inference ) directly aims at”.

“Anaikantika Hetvabhasa is of two kinds (1) the Nischita Vipaksa vritti where it is certain that the Hetu resides in the Vipaksa and (2) the Sankita Vipaksa vritti where the matter is involved in doubt.”1

The following are illustrations:

(1)“Sound is perishable because it is knowledge”.

This is an instance of the Nisehita Vipaksa Vritti type, because it is certain that the quality of knowability resides not only in perishable things, but also in those that are imperishable e. g. space, souls and the like.

(2)Watches are fragile because they are manufactured with machinery.

This is an instance of the Sankita Vipaksa Vritti. The fallacy in this case lies in the fact that it is not chain whether the quality of being manufactured with machinery does or does not reside in things which are not fragile i. E. the Vpaksa.2

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1.The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain page 55.

2.The Science of Thought by C. R. Jain pages 55–56.

Dr. Vidyabhusana in his note on Verse 23 of Nyayavatara already quoted says :

“The uncertain ( Anaikantika ) such as ‘All things are momentary, because they are existent’. Here the reason alleged is uncertain, because ‘existence’ may or may not be a proof of momentarienss, for, an opponent may equally argue: ‘all things are eternal, because they are existent’.1 this example corresponds to the Sankita Vipaksa Vritti variety of Anaikantika Hetvabhasa mentioned above. The first variety is not described in Nyayavatara.

Hemachandra defines and illustrates both the varieties and uses the same examples as given in pariksamukham.2 he mentions that some logicians accept other varieties of Anaikantika Hetvabhasa but it is not necessary to accept these as all of these are included in the deification of the two varieties Nischita Vipaksa Vritti and Sankita Vipaksa Vritti varieties.3

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1. Nyayavatara by S. C. Vidyabhusana page 21.
2. ×®ÖµÖ´ÖõÖÖ×ÃÖ¬¤Öî ÃÖÓ¤êÆ ¾ÖÖs®ÖµÖ£ÖÖ¯ÖµÖã¯Ö¯Ö¤ËµÖ´ÖÖ®ÖÖês®ÖîÛúÖ×®ŸÖÛú: l

Pramanamimamsa II. 1. 21.

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1. Siddhe pratyaksatvadivadhite cha sadhye heturakinchitkarah.

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1. Siddhah sravanah sabdah sabdatvat.

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1. Kinchidakaranat.

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1. Yathanusno gnirdravyatvadityadan kinchit karttumasakyatvat.

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1. Laksana evasau doso vyutpannaprayogasya paksadosenaiva dustatvat.

1. Akinchitkara ( Hetvabhasa ) consists of ( use of ) Hetu ( middle term ) in connection with a Sadhya ( major term ) which has already been established and which is opposed by Pratyaksa etc.
2. Capability of being heard by the ear is established regarding sound, as it is sound.
3. Because ( Hetu ) does not do anything ( in such a case. )
4. As for example, fire is cold as this a thing. In such case ( Hetu ) cannot do anything.
5. This fault arises only in definition. For in use by those conversant with reasoning, the fault is proved by fault of Paksa ( minor term ).

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1. ¯ÖõÖ×¾Ö¯ÖõÖîÛú¤ê¿Ö¾Öé×¢Ö: ÃÖ¯ÖõÖ¾µÖÖ¯Öß, µÖ£Ö ®Ö ¦¾µÖÖ×ÞÖ ×¤ÛËÛúÖ»Ö´Ö®ÖÖÓõִÖæ¢ÖÔŸ¾ÖÖŸÖË l (8) ÃÖ¯ÖÜÖ¯ÖõÖîÛú¤ê¿Ö¾Öé×¢Ö×¾ÖÔ¯ÖõÖ¾µÖÖ¯Öß, µÖ£ÖÖ ¦¾µÖÖ×ÞÖ ×¤ÛËÛúÖ»Ö´Ö®ÖÖÓõִÖæ¢ÖÔŸ¾ÖÖŸÖË l (9) ¯ÖõÖ¡ÖµÖîÛú¤ê¿Öé×¢ÖµÖÔ£ÖÖ †×®ÖŸµÖÖ ¯Öé×£Ö¾Öß ¯ÖΟֵÖõÖŸ¾ÖÖŸÖË ll Ibid.

Commentary

Akinchitkara Hetvabhasa is here defined. Really speaking, this is not a separate variety as this is included in the fallacy of Paksabhasa as already defined being opposed to Pratyaksa, Anumana, Agama, Loka-vachana and Sva-vachana ( Aphorism 15 ). This fault I included in those varieties of fallacies. If you say, that it is redundant to lay down a separate definition of Akinchitkara Hetvabhasa, we reply ( by Aphorism 39 ) that this fallacy is described only for the understanding of students in a treatise dealing with definitions though this is not used at the time of discussion by logicians1.

As this is not really a different variety, it is not mentioned in works such as Nyayavatara, pramana-mimamsa etc.

Two examples of Akinchitkara Hetvabhasa are given in Pariksamukham. The first is: “Sound is capable being heard by the ear, because it I a sound”. Her the capability of being heard is established by itself. So it is useless to establish this by employing a Hetu. So this is an example of Akinchitkara Hetvabhasa where Sadhya ( Major term ) is Siddha ( already established). The second example is “Fire is cold as this is a thing”. Here coldness of fire is opposed to Pratyaksa. So employment of such a reasoning cannot produce any result in such case. This is an example of Akinchikara Hetvabhasa where Sadhya is opposed by Pratyaksa2.