The Manhattan Project

1

The Manhattan Project:

Motives Shrouded in Secrecy

A research paper composed by:
Lou Maiuri

Professor Al-Tikriti History 299

The Manhattan project encapsulates the pinnacle of controversy in the History of the United States, and perhaps on the world stage. The decision of President Harry S. Truman to usher in the Atomic age in August of 1945 resonated profoundly across the globe. The instant eradication of hundreds of thousands of lives was procured by the most brilliant minds over a half decade in a slow, arduous process known as the Manhattan Project. This codename held significance only to those selected by the U.S. government to partake in the endeavor of Atomic engineering; President Truman was even unaware of the progress until the bomb was fully functional. Simultaneous with the production of the bomb was the growing skepticism towards the Soviet Union and her intentions of invading China, a major trade partner of the United States.

Truman’s Secretary of State, James Byrnes, was a chief proponent of atomic diplomacy, and saw Japan as justifiable way to manage the Soviet Union. However, President Truman’s primary agenda aired on the side of ending the war as opposed to intimidating Russia. Under heavy pressure from both his cabinet and the American public, Truman signed off on the use of the bomb, a decision that continues to be questioned today. The American motivation for the deployment of the Atomic bomb was not solely to end the war, but to deter the Soviet Union from issuing a declaration of war on the Japanese as well as occupying Manchuria in China. The Soviet Union’s declaration of war would have ultimately led to Japanese surrender; however, the United States was focused on bringing an end to the war rather than prolonging it.

The examination of the Manhattan Project’s ideology must begin with those involved in the endeavor. President Harry Truman, the man responsible for making the decision to use the bomb, was placed in an extraordinary position through unordinary circumstances. Truman was sworn into office after serving only three months as the Vice President. On April 12, 1945, Truman was notified that President Roosevelt had passed away as a result of a cerebral hemorrhage. Truman assumed the role of President and was sworn into office on April 13, 1945. Less than three months after Truman’s swearing in, the news of the first successful atomic test reached Washington. In, A History of our Time: Readings on Postwar America, a Truman diary excerpt depicts the personal fears associated with such power. Truman states, “I hope for some sort of peace- but I fear that machines are ahead of morals by some centuries and when morals catch up perhaps there’ll be no reason for any of it. I hope not. But we are only termites on a planet and maybe when we bore too deeply into the planet there’ll be a reckoning who knows?”[1] Even as a confident leader of the free world, Truman’s words constitute a sense of hesitation towards atomic power.

The personal reflections of Truman contrast deeply with his eventual facilitation of the use of the atomic bomb. This contradiction was heavily influenced not only by the American public’s outcry for peace, but also by his cabinet members, mainly Secretary of State James Byrnes.Byrnes had served in the Senate with Truman in prior years, serving as a mentor and a good friend. Byrnes isolated Truman from other key advisors regarding the Manhattan Project following his appointment as lead advisor in connection with the bomb. Byrne’s direct involvement in diplomacy with the Soviet Union shows a striking correlation with his avid approval for the use of the bomb. Secretary of War Henry Stimson corroborates Byrne’s desire to flaunt the power of the atomic bomb in his diary entries. Stimson states, “I found that Byrnes was very much against any attempt to cooperate with Russia. His mind is full of his problems with the coming meeting of foreign ministries and he looks to having the presence of the bomb in his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon to get through the thing.”[2] Byrnes influence is clearly seen in the actions of President Harry Truman at the Potsdam conference. Truman postponed the commencement of the meeting until the bomb had been successfully tested, stating that he wanted to have his “master card” in hand before negotiations with Europe took place.

Aside from the political realm of the Manhattan Project, there consisted the military aspect of the assignment. Lieutenant General Leslie Groves was appointed with the task of managing the Manhattan Project. Originally confined to engineering and plant production, Groves watched his duties gradually start to encompass a larger field. In his account of the Manhattan Project, Now it can be Told, Groves defends the use of the bomb with minimal remorse or regret. In the epilogue, Groves states, “While it is tragic that the forces for destruction that we unleashed are stronger than man’s present ability to control them, it is fortunate indeed for humanity that the initiative in this field was gained and kept by the United States. That we were successful was due entirely to the hard work and dedication of more than 600,000 Americans who comprised and directly supported the Manhattan Project.”[3]

The psyche and behavior of General Leslie Groves proved to be a topic of discussion among his peers and the scientists who he interacted with. His moral code seemed to possess a naivety that frustrated those around him. Author Stephane Groueff examines the candid personality of General Groves in his book, Manhattan Project. He asserts, “Others found it difficult to believe that in the world of the 1940’s any intelligent and well-informed man could remain so candid and undoubting. They concluded the general, too disciplined and proud … hiding his feelings.”[4] Above all other figures involved in the Manhattan Project, Groves seemed to have an almost human attachment to the bomb. His unwavering loyalty to the project represents the primary viewpoint of postwar America, a viewpoint that would begin to shift as more information surfaced regarding the involvement of the Soviet Union and the notion that Japan was on the verge of surrender.

In fact, by the summer of 1945 Japan was a broken country in economic turmoil. The German army had surrendered in early spring of that same year, on May 8, 1945, without successfully engineering an atomic weapon. The only major obstacle that was blocking complete allied victory was Stalin and the Red Army. Author Ferenc Morton Szasz examines the revisionist viewpoint as a plausible theory on why America dropped the bomb. In his literature, The Day the Sun Rose Twice, Szasz asserts, “There existed little immediate need to drop the bombs. Instead, argue the proponents of this position, America dropped the atomic weapons primarily to intimidate the Soviet Union, both in Asia and in Eastern Europe. [5] Szasz goes on further to uncover important military leaders who opposed the use of the bomb. He states, General Dwight Eisenhower did not want the United States to use the bomb, and Admiral Chester Nimitz always maintained there was no need for it. Admiral William D. Leahy argued that ‘the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan’.”[6] The revisionist movement concerning the atomic bomb took root in the 1960’s and was heavily influenced and fueled by the statements of high ranking military officials denouncing the importance of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The revisionist viewpoint gained substantial ground during the 1970’s when America underwent an anti-government phase following the Vietnam war and the resignation of President Richard Nixon.[7]Perhaps the most striking evidence against the use of the atomic bomb was the intelligence that had been procured by the United States Military. In the waning months of the war, Japan was in complete disarray having exhausted most of its fuel and food supplies. In fact, intelligence suggests that further conventional bombings of major Japanese cities would effectively bring the war to a halt. In, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, Robert Jungk cites the viewpoint of Military Intelligence Director Alfred MacCormack on the state of Japan. Jungk states, “We had begun a secret process of mining all their (Japan’s) harbors, which was steadily isolating them from the rest of the world. Ife we had brought this operation to its logical conclusion the destruction of Japan’s cities with incendiary and other bombs would have been quite unnecessary.”[8] It is quite evident that the United States had a stronghold on Japan and was moving in to deliver the crippling blow that would render the allies victorious in the Pacific.

However, the United States government deemed that the isolation of Japan was considered to be a strategy based on cowardice, and with the new atom bomb added to the arsenal many officials were eager to demonstrate its power. The anticipation of marveling at the achievement at Los Alamos became too much to bear for the United States, and the pride of becoming the first country to unlock and harness atomic energy resulted in a blind decision. The use of the atomic bomb can be paralleled with an allusion of a child’s excitement on Christmas morning; overwhelming and clouded due to sheer anticipation.

Now although the revisionist viewpoint is easy to adopt many years after the destruction caused by fat man and little boy, it is unfair to assume the sole purpose of the detonation consisted of the intimidation of the Soviet Union. The atomic bomb became available during a period of extreme duress. The world had suffered the loss of many soldiers while brutal dictators such as Stalin and Hitler vied for global supremacy with a ruthless demeanor. Truman was faced with a monumental decision where time was fleeting and hesitation was not an option. This pressure coupled with the thousands of hours and billions of dollars spent on the Manhattan Project had backed Truman into a corner with seemingly no other option but to authorize the atomic campaign.

General Groves, fearful of not being able to utilize the bombs, turned a blind eye to the already crippled Japanese army in the effort to hasten the dropping of the second bomb. Author and academic Barton J. Bernstein explore the determined nature of Groves to deploy the second bomb before the Japanese had a chance to surrender. In his article he asserts, “Groves alleged self-aggrandizement, his careerism, and his need to justify the project usually motivated and dominated his actions.”[9]Truman’s vital mistake in authorizing the use of the atomic bomb was placing an incredible amount of trust and power into the hands of his cabinet officials and military leaders. Groves had become disillusioned by his tireless project management in Los Alamos and could not accept that his toils were in vain.

Perhaps the most convincing argument against the use of the bomb stemmed from Economics professor Gar Alperovitz. A scholarly article composed by Alonzo Hamby illustrates different courses of action that would have sufficiently ended the war without the use of the atomic bomb. Hamby relies heavily on the insight provided by Alperovitz in earlier works. In regard to Japanese surrender Hamby states, “Any remaining Japanese reluctance to quit the war would have been quickly overcome by the second step, entry of the Soviet Union in August 1945. American failure to accept and implement this "two-step logic" for an expeditious end to World War II was largely a result of the emerging Cold War and especially American concern over Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe and northeast Asia.”[10] Once again the issue of the Soviet Union is introduced as a primary factor in the decision to drop the atomic bomb.

Scholar Jill Kauffman compiled many primary sources in her article Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Kauffman, like many other scholars investigating the topic of atomic weaponry, called on credible primary sources including General Eisenhower and scholar Gar Alperovitz to illustrate her viewpoint. She asserts, “In April we knew they were beginning to try to surrender. They were already defeated in every sense. We were bombing their cities without any opposition. The Japanese were making airplane gasoline out of acorns. So we knew that they were on their last legs," says historian Gar Alperovitz. General Dwight Eisenhower, who succeeded Truman as president, held a similar view. "The Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”[11] These assertions by high ranking military officials offer ample evidence to suggest the secondary motivation behind the use of the bomb.

The completion of the atomic bomb gave the United States supreme power in the late summer months of 1945. Tired with losing American lives and mounting tensions with the Soviet Union provided a tedious environment for the decision surrounding the bomb. The urging of cabinet officials and the incredible amount of time and devotion spent on the Manhattan project made all signs point to the use of the atomic bomb. The United States could not risk going to war for another decade with the Soviet Union, and instead of bringing about the end of the war, the atomic bombs proved to be the first move by the United States in the Cold War.

Bibliography

Barton J. Bernstein The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 2003)

Groueff, Stephane. Manhattan Project The Untold Story of the Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Backinprint.Com, 2000. Print.

Groves, Leslie R. Now it can be told the story of the Manhattan Project. New York, N.Y: Da

Capo, 1983. Print.

Hales, Peter B. Atomic spaces living on the Manhattan Project. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1997. Print.

Hamby, L. Alonzo, "The Decision to Drop the Bomb," Journal of American History, Vol. 84, no. 2 (September 1997)

History of our time readings on postwar America. New York: Oxford UP, 2003. Print

.

Jungk, Robert. Brighter than a Thousand Suns A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists. New

York: Harvest Books, 1970. Print.

Kauffman, Jill. "Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Issues & Controversies in American History.

Facts On File News Services, 1 Oct. 2005. Web. 9 Nov. 2009.

Lamont, Lansing. Day of Trinity. New York: Atheneum, 1985. Print.

Szasz, Ferenc M. The Day the Sun Rose Twice. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1984.

Print.

[Type text]

[1]History of our time readings on postwar America. (New York: Oxford UP, 2003.), 19.

[2]History of our time readings on postwar America. (New York), 20.

[3] Groves, Leslie R. Now it can be told the story of the Manhattan Project. New York, N.Y: Da Capo, 1983. 414

[4] Groueff, Stephane. Manhattan project: The Untold Story of the Making of the Atomic Bomb. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1967. 107

[5] Szasz, Ferenc M. The Day the Sun Rose Twice. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1984), 151

[6] Szasz, Ferenc M. The Day the Sun Rose Twice. 151

[7] Szasz, Ferenc M. The Day the Sun Rose Twice. 155

[8]Jungk, Robert. Brighter than a Thousand Suns A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists. (New York: Harvest Books) 1970, 206.

[9] Barton J. Bernstein The Journal of Military History, Vol. 67, No. 3 (Jul., 2003), pp. 883-920

[10]Hamby, L. Alonzo, "The Decision to Drop the Bomb," Journal of American History, Vol. 84, no. 2 (September 1997)

[11]Kauffman, Jill. "Atomic Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki." Issues & Controversies in American History. Facts On File News Services, 1 Oct. 2005. Web. 9 Nov. 2009. <