Bartlett School of Planning

BENVGPL4: Pillars of Planning

Urban Politics Essay

Session 2012-2013

Student Number: 12085186

Question 2: Demonstrate How Power Relationships Influence Consensus-Making: A Case Study of the Ørestad/Metro Development Project in Copenhagen, Denmark.

Word Count: 2,189.

Introduction

In the 1970’s, Danish planning became a more political-administrative matter and the planning process was extended by participation from and interest groups and the attempts to integrate physical, economic and social objectives in the process (Worm et al. 1984 c.f. Andersen et al. 2000). This means that in this decade, the rational scientific perspective was extended by an integrative participatory welfare oriented planning (Andersen et al. 2000). This essays tries to explain the nature of the power-relations that existed between the stakeholders and the trifling attention paid to consensus building, public participation and negotiation. It shows that the project is a typical example of decision makers employing forceful means to carry out their plans. Lack of openess and involvement of the affected residents in the decision making and implementation processes are striking features of the project (Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University, 2004). The paper concludes by suggesting solutions planners could have employed and can also make use of in future development projects.

Theoretical Background: Elitism and State Led Enterpreuralism

The Ørestad UDP is a clear cut example of the neo-corporate trend in the Danish planning system. It came about from the combination of a particular political climate and the interaction between interests at different scales, labelled ‘new state led enterpreneuralism’. Conventional wisdom shows that the establishment of the Ørestad was born out of an elite desire to transform the southern Swedish region and Copenhagen area into a transnational metropolitan region whose economic, educational and research potentials would allow it to compete closely with its German counterparts of Berlin and Hamburg to the south (Bucken-knapp 2001).

The foundation for this in Copenhagen was introduced by the Conservative-Liberal government that came into office in 1982 that had to deal remnants of the socio-economic decline of the city that occured in the 1970’s. An expert commission was created by the home secretary and they found two negative self-perpetuating mechanisms of the crisis namely: 1) industrial decline, lack of new growth and employment sectors and 2) increasing concentration of socially excluded and low income groups (Andersen et al. 2000). This led to the abolishment of the Great Copenhagen Council in 1987.

The Ørestad development project and the metro development are seen as elitist because the city government, private sector and the Ørestad Development Company set up by the public-private partnership exercised their power over the Amager and Øresund regions where the projects were scheduled to take place. The relationship between these stakeholders allows us an insight into the political culture of the said regions. They did not take into consideration the attitudes and behaviours of the everyday residents of the Øresund, which was an example of de facto decision-making. The result was therefore dominance of the elits over the everyday inhabitants.

Power Relationships between the Stakeholders

Economic growth and commercial competitveness were the driving forces behind the establishment of the Ørestad. The project involved a public-private partnership, which was aesthetic and corporatein nature, rather than the traditional forms of decision-making:multilevel governance as opposed to top-down government (Department of Development and Planning Aalborg University, 2004). Schumpetarian action was the important political rationale behind this movement which included a consensus like climate(Andersen et al. 2000). The result was the formation of the ‘growth coalition made up of representatives of the three leading parties Social Democrats, Conservatives and Liberals. Thelaw establishing the Ørestad was passed in 1992. It combined the Ørestad Development Project with the Metro to reduce operational costs and gain parliamentary approval because the Conservate-Liberals were not interested in further allocation of resources to the city.

The government set up the Ørestad Development Company in March of 1993 which was jointly owned by the Copenhagen City Government (55%) and the Danish State (45%), its role was to construct and develop the Ørestad and also build and run the proposed metro that would link the central city to the development area. The ØDC therefore had parliamentary backing and was given authority to sell the land at exorbitant prices to bring in revenue that would be used to construct the metro’s infrastructure, a sort of self-financing initiative. All these decisions were made in advance and behind closed doors without public hearings, debate or alternative proposals, lacking in transparency and openess, thus disregarding and ignoring the established planning act. The exclusion of the public from the decision-making process can be justified because“power relationships sustain conflicts and tension, while motivation to co-operate encourages participants to sacrifice their own interests” (Shin, 2010 p 4). This is an important reason for not including the public in the decision-making processes of the project.

Criticism

Fig. 1 Power Relationship among stakeholders

The table shows that the ØDC was the go-between the society and the city government although the society was excluded from the decision-making process entirely, they however voiced their concerns when the project kicked-off. It also shows the strong focus paid to economic and commercial activities of the market to enhance growth.

Negotiation, Consensus Building and Conflict

After the decision was made and announced to establish the project, public opposition arose from the residents of the region whose argument against implementation of the project were that it would increase the level of traffic in the Amager area. So also, construction of the Fields shopping center was argued to be unsustainable as it would attract more car drivers and therefore cause pollution. Another bone of contention was a piece of land known as the Amager Commons, conservationist group DN (Danmarks Naturfredningsforening) argued that according to the regional plan of 1989, the land was earmarked for park and recreation purposes and not a large scale urban development project. The choice of the more expensive metro and rejection of the tram and light rail was also another dividing issue further down the line, the rationale behind this choice was not made known to the public. As stated above, the opportunity for public debate and consensus building was not allowed, neither was there any alternative to the project as a whole, which violated the existing planning laws. The stakeholders came up with a face value solution to pacify these detractors by offering the DN an advisory role on the Ørestad Committee.

In 1995, two public meetings were held lasting approxiamtely five and half hours with thirty-five questions asked. In these meetings, the ØDC’s Director mentioned that the decision on the project could be discussed but not changed, meaning that concerned citizens could not influence the project’s planning. The most occuring question was why the metro was situated in the periphery of Amager?. Most of the residents resolved that ‘things had been going on over our heads’ and they therefore gave up as it was too late to oppose the plans (Department of Development and Planning Aalborg University, 2004). This was a clear detraction from consensus building, eight conditions need to hold for a process to be labelled consensus building (Innes, 2004, p7), from this theory, only one was met and this was inclusion of a full range of stakeholders. However, it must be said that this was only satisfied after all the major decisions had been made. The city’s governement clearly exhibited outright coercion and eliminated any form of negotiation. As (Shin, 2010, p5) put it, “outright coercion goes beyond the negotiation environment because negotiation is not possible in such a hierarchy”. This demonstrates that the Copenhagen city government arrived at the decision without putting the public in the know.

The Decision Making Process (Power, Authority, Influence and Force)

From the literature, it is obvious that the government and the ØDC to a lesser extent were the major players in the decision-making process. Financing the project was one of the most central and controversial issues surrounding the decision making process (Andersen, 1998, Gaardmand , 1991, c.f. Andersen et al. 2000). This led to the combination of the two individual projects as stated above. In 1994, a choice of rail system that best suited the city was to be made from the options of trams, light rail and metro. The ØDC chose the metro, justifying its selection by arguing that it would be the most environmentally friendly, most economic, carry the highest number of passengers and limit the likelihood of accidents (Department of Development and Planning Aalborg University 2004). Here , they exerted power and force as there were strong arguments for trams and light rail based on examples in the Netherlands, Sweden and France.

Consultants Carl Bro were forced to recommend the Metro by the government as a result of its superior technology because it was driverless and fully automatic which meant elimination of human errors, and allowed for 98% punctuality and efficiency. In retrospect it can be argued that the decision makers chose this line of action to eliminate delays and expedite the progress of the project. For example, public participation could have forced them to consider alternatives which could have increased the project’s delivery time. Figueroa explains this in (Hilding-RydevikTheodorsdottir, 2003, p 247), “in transport decision-making a situation of asymmetrical power exists from the outset (economic interest-rational for growth), and this is compounded by technocratic decision-making”. This translates as, in any public process; some essential requirements are not open for discussion or debate (brute force).

Both projects were estimated to cost around 1 billion Euros but through financial underwriting they would only require 150 million to begin, this strategy was borrowed from the Insurance sector. An issue that created conflict between the stakeholders arose when the contract for the construction of the metro needed to be allocated; the ØDC had to choose between Siemens and Ansaldo. The ØDC used its influence to select Ansaldo simply because their bid was cheaper and would encounter fewer delays even though they acknowledged it was of inferior quality and constituted a higher risk.

In corporate exercise of power as demonstrated by the Ørestad project, extra influence was paid to politicians, businesses, commercial and professional groups in secret where public participation and debate became nonexistent. As a result of the political and apparent economic significance of the project, it was impossible for the public and residents to assemble what is dubbed an accountability capacity. This is because there were no suitable contexts for allowed debates or critiques, no forums where concerned voices could air their opinions and most importantly no public participation or consultation (Hansen and Jamison, 2004).

Suggestions for Planners as Mediators

The choice of the government to exclude the public and residents of the Amager region from the decision-making process as regards the Ørestad/metro development was unconscionable; it was never their intention to carry the public along. The modus operandi left no room for criticism, provision of alternatives or the inclusion of new possibilities. The suggestion here is that public participation could have brought about wide spread consensus whilst allowing for transparency and openness in the administrative process. Public participation plays an active role in decision making, favouring an open process of negotiation between different stakeholders and strengthening the quality of the process whilst circumventing controversies in the final decision (Figueroa 2003 c.f. Hilding-RydevikTheodorsdottir, 2003). Planners need to ensure that public participation is incorporated at all stages of the planning process i.e. at the onset, during and towards its completion.

(Forester, 2006) suggests planners should mediate participation rather than moderate debate which he argues encourages practical proposals to negotiate. He goes on to argue that mediation leads to crafting of workable agreements that bring about mutual gain. This mediation can be achieved through joint education of the stakeholders, through acknowledging of mutual vulnerabilities & definition of common challenges and identification of underlying interests which would have satisfied all the actors in the development of the project. These strategies can of course create conflicts, so therefore planners must develop skills and the repertoireto address conflicts and generate resolution. If all these are satisfied, consensus building could then be achieved. It is important to note that conflict is ever present throughout consensus building and the process requires a huge investment in time (Innes, 2004). Finally, “planners should have encouraged an adaptation that would have brought a consensus as efficiently as possible, with the knowledge that general agreement would have been advantageous for everyone, even the powerless” (Shin, 2010 pp4).

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to shed more light on the power relationships existing among the various stakeholders in theØrestad/metro project planning process. It also showed that the project was characterized by behind the scenes decision-making, shunning public participation in the stages of formulation and implementation. Lack of openness and transparency, and disregard for the residents of the area were also found to have taken place throughout the development of the project up till date.

From the findings, it is obvious that public involvement and participation in the decision-making processes where potential alternative developments and their consequences are open for hearing and discussion should be have been allowed to blossom, as these would have made all the participants happy. Planning practice and planning theory can use insights from the literature on conflict resolution to assist diverse and distrusting stakeholders to learn about issues and their differing interests and to propose mutually beneficial, mutually agreeable options for joint action (Forester, 2006).

References

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  3. Bucken-Knapp G. (2001) Just a train ride away, but still worlds apart: Prospects of the Øresund Region as a Bi-national City. GeoJournal 54(1) pp: 51-60.
  4. Department of Development and Planning Aalborg University (2004). Research Report on Science and Technology Policy Paper by Hansen K.B. and Jamison A. available from on May 5 2013].
  5. Department of Environmental Management and Sustainability Sciences (2012), Public Participation in Renewable Energy Infrastructure Projects: A Comparison between Copenhagen and Malmo Regions, Group Report Presented by Group EMSS2-4 available from [Accessed 5 May 2013].
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  8. Innes, J. (2004). Consensus Building: Clarifications for the Critics. Planning Theory, Vol. 3(1): pp: 5-20.
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  11. Shin, HaeRan, (2010), ‘Can One Actually Say What One Wants? – Adaptive Preferences in the Negotiation Process,’ Planning Theory and Practice. 11(3): 339-357.