William C. Wohlforth, ed., Cold War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates.University Park, PA: PennsylvaniaStateUniversity Press, 2003. 346 pp. $60 hardcover, $25 paperback.

Cold War Endgame is an extremely valuable resource for anyone interested in the events that led to the end of the Cold War. The volume not only presents important new evidence concerning the final years of the Cold War, but uses the evidence to test central theoretical debates in the study of international relations.

The book is divided into three primary sections. The first is a transcript of a 1996 conference at Princeton's WoodrowWilsonSchool that examined key events connected with the end of the Cold War, such as the unification of Germany, superpower cooperation during the 1991 Gulf War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Among the participants were former policymakers who played key roles in shaping the superpowers' foreign policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including James Baker (secretary of state under George H. W. Bush); Brent Scowcroft (Bush's national security adviser), Jack Matlock (U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union under Ronald Reagan and Bush), Aleksandr Bessmertnykh (Soviet first deputy foreign minister and then foreign minister), and Anatoly Chernyaev (chief foreign policy adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev). The second and third sections of the book consist of six essays by well-known scholars of international relations and history, who present divergent views about U.S. and Soviet actions during this period.

One of the themes in the book that elicits near unanimity among the conference participants is the importance of the development of trusting relationships between U.S. and Soviet leaders (pp.21, 35, 84, 144, 158, 161, 175-204). By the late 1980s, key officials on both sides came to believe that their interlocutors were trustworthy people who were genuinely committed to the establishment of a cooperative U.S.- Soviet relationship.

Soviet leaders' increased willingness to trust their American counterparts was [End Page 189] especially important because it facilitated the Soviet Union's international retrenchment. In line with the "new thinking" on Soviet foreign policy, Gorbachev and his chief aides tended to believe that the Americans would not exploit the USSR's geopolitical retreat. Former Soviet officials at the conference claimed that substantial cuts in defense spending and the abandonment of the Soviet Union's empire in Eastern Europe did not engender significant fears about Soviet security (pp.20-21, 46, 74, 234, 238). Thus, contrary to the views of offensive-realist scholars like John Mearsheimer, Gorbachev and his closest advisers did not make worst-case assumptions about U.S. intentions. Instead, they expected that U.S. leaders would be sensitive to, and even supportive of, Soviet interests.

The importance of trust in the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations during the final years of the Cold War begs the question: What caused American and Soviet leaders to trust one another after four decades of bitter enmity? A number of participants in the 1996 conference as well as contributors to Cold War Endgame point to one possible answer: personal, repeated interaction among key U.S. and Soviet officials during Gorbachev's tenure as leader of the USSR (pp.21, 144, 158-166, 170).

Although it is clear that many former U.S. and Soviet officials believe that personal contacts were critical to the development of cooperative relations between them, this hypothesis suffers from important limitations. If personal interactions were sufficient to develop trusting relations, why did summit diplomacy and other negotiations between the superpowers during the first four decades of the Cold War not lead to outcomes similar to what we saw in the late 1980s? Why did most Soviet conservatives in the 1980s, such as Marshal Sergei Akhromeev (who participated in numerous talks with American officials), not develop a trust of U.S. leaders in the same way that Gorbachev and other "new thinkers" did? The shortcomings of the "personal contacts" hypothesis lead us to a third theme of Cold War Endgame: the importance of ideas in bringing about the end of the Cold War.

Most of the participants in the 1996 conference, as well as many of the contributing scholars to Cold War Endgame, agree that Gorbachev's rejection of orthodox Marxist-Leninist principles in favor of ideological beliefs much closer to those of the Western powers played a critical role in the development of greater trust in U.S.- Soviet relations. Former Soviet officials at the conference repeatedly mentioned Gorbachev's desire to make the Soviet Union a "normal state" that could join the community of liberal democratic powers. This preference induced the Soviet reformers to take steps to end the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, even if that goal necessitated cutting loose the Soviet Union's empire in Eastern Europe and allowing a unified Germany in NATO (pp.20-21, 41, 47-48, 133, 192, 220, 229, 244, 256-260, 266). As Chernyaev explained at the conference: "The most important thing for Gorbachev [on the subject of German unification] was that he regarded the process of unification as a democratic national movement. From his standpoint it was quite legitimate, quite consistent with New Thinking, and therefore opposing [it meant] ... opposing his own philosophy for which he began perestroika" (p.70).

In contrast, Soviet officials who remained committed to orthodox Marxist- Leninist beliefs were much more fearful for Soviet security as a result of the Soviet [End Page 190]Union's geopolitical retreat. Hence the widespread agreement among Soviet participants in the 1996 conference that Gorbachev was virtually isolated with regard to his most revolutionary foreign policies, particularly his decisions to acquiesce in Germany's reunification within NATO and to support the United States during the 1991 Gulf War (pp.66, 82, 103, 239).

The ideological revolution in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev's leadership played a similarly critical role in the formulation of American policies. A clear relationship existed between domestic changes in the Soviet Union and U.S. leaders' perceptions of Soviet intent. As U.S. officials became convinced that Gorbachev wanted to carry out democratic reforms, they grew more optimistic about the future of U.S.-Soviet relations (pp.18, 161-165, 170).

The role of the Soviet Union's failing economy in bringing about the Cold War's end is a fourth dominant theme in the scholars' essays. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth supplement some of their other works by providing another defense of the view that Soviet economic decline was the key cause of the revolution in Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s. Most of the other essays spend at least some time attempting to refute Brooks's and Wohlforth's evidence and conclusions.

In light of the prominence of economic considerations in the scholarly portions of Cold War Endgame, it is somewhat surprising that the conference participants spent relatively little time addressing this issue. Whether this was because the participants believed that economic considerations were not as important as other variables in the Cold War's end, or because economic variables were so obviously important that they need not be discussed in great detail, is impossible to tell from the transcripts.

Problems such as this point to the greatest weakness of Cold War Endgame: The conference participants do not systematically weigh causal variables to help the reader understand why events transpired as they did. Instead, the participants at various points claim that personality, interaction, ideas, and economic variables all contributed to the end of the Cold War. Although this claim is hard to dispute, it would have been useful for purposes of theory-testing if the former officials had systematically considered how much each variable mattered and in what ways these variables shaped outcomes. Although formality of this sort would no doubt have curtailed much of the spontaneous dialogue at the conference, the analytical gains would likely have outweighed the costs. This weakness, however, does little to tarnish the overall value of the book.

Mark L. Haas