Chapter 7: Free Speech
A. Introduction
Purpose of 1st Amendment protection of free speech – keep the government from unreasonably interfering with the right to expression
1st Amendment doesn’t restrict private actors/entities
Main idea of 1st Amendment and BOR: individual rights trump the majority will
History – Bill of Rights established to protect rights England had deprived colonists of
Virtually everything in the BOR now applies to the states as well as the federal government
European free speech – free speech as long as it does not offend people
Theories of interpretations of the Constitution:
Original intent theorists
Textual theorists
Living document theorists
Historical ways to restrict speech:
Licensing and seditious libel
Sedition Act
War time and the right to free speech
Theories/justifications for the right to free speech:
Marketplace of ideas theory
Self-governance theory
Self-fulfillment theory
B. Content-Based Restrictions: Dangerous Ideas and Information
Speech that causes unlawful conduct
Shaffer v. U.S.
Bad Tendency Test
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten
Express Intent Test
Schenck v. U.S.
Clear and Present Danger Test: imminence of evil, seriousness of threat, deference to the legislature
Abrams v. U.S.
Holmes’s Dissent: marketplace of ideas theory
Gitlow v. New York
1st Amendment incorporated
Deference to the legislature issue
Whitney v. California
1st Amendment and right of association
Dennis v. U.S.
Government doesn’t have to wait until overthrow to act
Content-based discrimination v. content-neutral discrimination
Patriot Act
Alien and Sedition Acts
Espionage Act
Brandenburg v. Ohio
Overruled Whitney
Advocacy of violence for political reform is protected unless the speech is advocating imminent lawlessness and is likely to produce violence
Imminence, likelihood of lawless activity, express advocacy, degree of harm, intent
Express Imminent Danger Future Danger
Advocacy of Crime 1 3
Discussion of Ideas 2 4
Contempt of Court v. Contempt of Congress
Speech that threatens
Bridges v. California
Prior restraint – must have clear and present danger; high scrutiny
Watts v. U.S.
True threats are unprotected
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Live Activists
Posters of abortion doctors were unprotected death threats
Speech that provokes a hostile audience reaction
Terminiello v. Chicago
Offensive speech that doesn’t produce a CPD is protected
Cantwell v. Connecticut
CPD doesn’t have to materialize to be punished for it
Feiner v. NY
Heckler’s veto; subsequent cases distinguished
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
Fighting, lude, obscene, profane and libelous words are not protected (note: all are low-value speech)
Lude and profane words are now protected
Obscene are now protected to a degree
Libelous words are sometimes protected now
Fighting words are still unprotected
Test: words that are likely to cause an average lessee to fight (i.e., likely to incite an immediate breach of peace); must be directed at someone (Cohen v. California); cuss words aren’t fighting words (Rosenfeld v. New Jersey)
Fighting words v. hate speech
Logic behind hate speech legislation came from Chaplinsky
Skokie Controversy
Speech that discloses confidential information
Landmark Communications v. Virginia
Ban on newspapers prohibiting them from reporting facts
State supreme court can’t defer to state legislature
Questioned the CPD test
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart
Can’t prohibit newspaper from reporting facts about a trial, even if it deprives the D of a fair trial; can’t censor the press
Other safeguards: venue change, postponement of trial, barring press from courtroom
3 steps: examine nature and extent of pretrial news coverage, alternatives to alleviate problem, determine effectiveness of restraining order
Prior restraints are usually unconstitutional, but facts, such as if this were a university newspaper, might change things
Near v. Minnesota
3 times when prior restraints are allowed: publications that would jeopardize national security in wartime, obscene publications, and publications that threaten to incite violence and/or the violent overthrow of government
NY Times v. U.S. / U.S. v. Washington Post (i.e., Pentagon Papers case)
Government didn’t meet the burden of justifying the prior restraint even though the publication might undermine national security
Brennan ship at sea test
Must have overwhelming evidence of an impending catastrophe to justify a prior restraint of the press
Progressive Controversy
Prior restraint not allowing publication article on construction of the hydrogen bomb is constitutional b/c it is technical and the disparity of risk at issue
C. Overbreadth, Vagueness, and Prior Restraint
Overbreadth and Vagueness
Gooding v. Wilson
Statute was applied to more than just fighting words, so it was overbroad and unconstitutional
Statute itself wasn’t unconstitutional, just the way the state had construed the statute
Fighting words are limited to language that has a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed
Overbreadth doctrine tests the constitutionality of legislation in terms of its potential applications
A law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its application
Prior restraint
Requiring a permit to be obtained before marching, protesting or distributing can also be considered a prior restraint just like with prohibiting publication can
Lovell v. Griffin
If there is a permit process, you have to have clearly articulated standards, otherwise there is selective enforcement
This doesn’t necessarily apply to businesses being charged a fee to pass out advertisements b/c that is commercial speech
Near v. Minnesota
Statute authorizing injunction of publication was censorship
Collateral Bar Rule: injunction must be obeyed until it is set aside, and that person subject to the injunction who disobeys it may not defend against the ensuing charge of criminal contempt on the ground that the order was erroneous or even constitutional
You can’t argue that the injunction is unconstitutional, just that you didn’t violate the injunction
D. Content-based restrictions: low value speech
False statements of fact
NY Times v. Sullivan
1st Amendment protects statements, even false statements, made about a public official unless they were made with actual malice
Curtis Publishing v. Butts / AP v. Walker
NY Times standard applies to public figures too
More of a “reckless” standard than a “malice” standard
Gertz v. Robert Welch
States may define the appropriate standards of liability for a publisher of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual, as long as the standard is not strict liability (i.e., liability without fault)
Factors considered when determining whether someone is a public figure: issue, influence, thrusting into spotlight
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders
No reason to give special protection when the speech doesn’t involve matters of public concern
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
Public figures and officials may not recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with actual malice (i.e., knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true)
Interest in free speech overrides the interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress
Nonnewsworthy disclosures of private information
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
Once true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it, or it would invite self-censorship and suppression of public issues
Commercial speech/advertising
Commercial speech should be regulated so it’s more accurate and not false advertising; it’s geared towards making a profit, advertising, and competition; it proposes a commercial transaction; if the speech is false or misleading or proposes an illegal activity, the commercial speech is unprotected
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel
Commercial speech is protected but at a lower level b/c of the consumer’s interest and it can be regulated
If commercial speech is false, it can be sanctioned or punished
Value of commercial speech is the free flow of commercial information
If you have the right to ban selling something, you have the right to ban advertising that item
HOWEVER you can ban violence, but not speech about violence
Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission of NY
Test for whether commercial speech is protected: not misleading, not unlawful activity, regulation of speech must be on the basis of a substantial government interest, regulation must directly advances interest, regulation must not be more extensive than necessary (i.e., narrowly tailored)
Commercial speech gets less protection
Intermediate level of scrutiny applied to this regulation
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island
Ban did not advance state’s interest and was more extensive than necessary
“Adults can handle information” logic is not used today
Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly
AG failed to show that regulations governing advertising of cigarettes were not more extensive than necessary
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center
Ban on advertising the fact that you can compound drugs was unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech
Court used anti-paternalism approach even in the highly regulated drug industry
Obscenity
Roth v. U.S. / Alberts v. California
Obscene material (i.e., porn) is not protected and may be suppressed without proof that it will create a CPD
Test: applying contemporary community standards, whether the dominant theme of the material as a whole appeals to the prurient interest of an average person
Obscene material is unprotected (arguably) b/c it is utterly without redeeming social importance and doesn’t contribute to the marketplace of ideas
Distinguish obscene material from art
Miller v. California
Miller’s 3-part standard that is used today:
1. Average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest
2. Whether the work depicts or describes in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law
3. Whether the work taken as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value
Obscenity must now be sexual and offensive to be unprotected
Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. Slaton
Porn theatre not protected just because it was exhibited to consenting adults; state has power to make a morally neutral judgment that the public exhibition of obscene material has a tendency to injure the community as a whole, endanger the public safety or to jeopardize the states right to maintain a decent society
NY v. Ferber
Test for child porn is different than the test for obscenity; child porn is not protected whether it is obscene or not
States can regulate child porn b/c:
1. Physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child
2. Miller test not a satisfactory solution to problems of child porn
3. Advertising and selling of child porn provide an economic motive for an illegal activity
4. Value of child porn is de minimis
5. Categorical ban is compatible with precedent
Ashcroft v. The Free Speech Coalition
Porn appearing to depict minors (i.e., virtual child porn) is protected b/c it is not intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children
U.S. v. Williams
Statute prohibiting someone from selling virtual child porn, which is legal, under the pretext that it is actual child porn is constitutional
Issue of intent and commercial speech (you don’t have a right to make false advertisements)
Lewd, Profane, and Indecent
Cohen v. California
State may not make the simple public display of the word “Fuck” a criminal offense; no state interest found
“One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric”
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville
Ordinance making it a nuisance for a drive-in theatre to show nudity was both over and under-inclusive and thus invalid
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
Constitutional for Carlin’s 7 Filthy words to not be broadcast when children would be in the audience
Restriction was to form instead of substance
Sable Communications v. FCC
Statute prohibiting “dial-a-porn” services is unconstitutional b/c it limits the content and not just the form of the speech
Reno v. ACLU
Communications Decency Act was invalid b/c it was overly broad
Remember: indecent language is protected; obscene is not
Government may not ban large amounts of protected speech directed to adults in the name of protecting children, even if there is no less restrictive method available for protecting children
Ashcroft v. ACLU
Injunction against the Child Online Protection Act was upheld because there were plausible, less restrictive alternatives
Decision suggests that indecent speech gets full constitutional protection instead of lower constitutional protection
Young v. American Mini-Theatres
State has an interest in preserving quality of residential areas and thus could regulate where adult theatres were located based on the content of the films
Zoning is hard to challenge on a constitutional base b/c you can always find a state interest to justify the regulation
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres
B/c ordinance was not aimed at content of the films, but instead at the secondary effects of the theatres on the community, it is consistent with content-neutral regulations and is thus constitutional
You need a factual basis to make the secondary effects argument, but courts don’t require a high threshold of proof in cases like this
Secondary effects analysis only applies to sexual speech
Hard to challenge a time, place, and manner restriction on constitutional grounds
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books
City met the evidentiary requirement to prove that the ordinance was designed to serve a substantial government interest and that there were reasonable alternative avenues of communication still available; however, this didn’t really support the final rule that you can’t have more than 1 adult business in one building
City made a secondary effects argument and Court bought it
5-4 split of whether to defer to the legislature
Hate speech and porn
Beauharnais v. Illinois
Convicted of defaming the black race; court must uphold statute and convictions under the statute unless it can say that it is a willful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the state
Libel (false statement of fact) is not protected
True statements are protected
Opinions are protected
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
Hate speech statute was invalid b/c it prohibited speech solely on the basis of content
Even if the speech is unprotected, if the statute prohibiting it is content and view-point based, the statute might still be unconstitutional
Content-based restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional but can sometimes survive